The problem
INDIA’S grand experiment with local governance began
with the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in 1992. Since then, a lot of
changes have taken place, including the opening of the economy, increase in
social mobility, changes in the party system, rapid advancement in technology,
among others. This issue of Seminar is an attempt to take a stock of
this experiment 30 years later – what we have achieved and where we failed?
It is true that there have been efforts to give legal
status to local self-governments across rural and urban India since
independence, and the third-tier structure with radical promises is a product
of the long conversation on the relationship between democracy and
decentralization.
One of the important consequences of seven decades of
competitive electoral politics and economic development in India has been the
transformation of authority in rural areas and the decline of the old social
order. Not only did these constitutional amendments serve the purpose of
decentralization in the Indian political system, but extensive quotas for
historically marginalized groups and women ensured better descriptive
representation of these communities than ever before. The Act mandated
one-third of the total seats in all local bodies to be reserved for women as
well as reserved seats for the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs)
and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) based on the percentage of their populations.
These groups gained a share of political power, and this development was marked
by the emergence of a new pattern of leadership – naya
netas (new leaders) – who are independent of
traditional power structures.
While this indeed is a sign of greater democratization
at the local level in India, there is another side to this story. Despite the decline
in caste hierarchies, there remains abundant evidence of the reproduction of
traditional local power structures, even though they may no longer be based on
land and ritual distinction exclusively, as they once were. We have yet not
seen signs of a political pipeline from panchayats to
parliament. It is still a rare phenomenon for schedule caste candidates to win
from non-reserved seats. Similarly, while the participation of women at the
polling booth has increased manifold in the past three decades, they continue
to remain at the margins as far as nomination as candidates for assembly or
general elections are concerned, or for that matter important
positions in organizational structure of the party.
The decentralization of governance structures has often
been described as a means of both improving service delivery and curbing
corruption. One of the most common arguments in favour of decentralization is
that it increases the accountability of government by ‘bringing it closer to
the people.’ It has been argued that decentralization changes the nature of
local political agency, increases the participation of local communities in
decision-making processes, and improves political enforcement. The notion that
decentralization will increase participatory governance and lead to
improvements in people’s well-being is not entirely consistent with documented
evidence. There is some truth to the skepticism as to
whether the introduction of democratic principles alone can help achieve
objectives, without addressing the social and political structures at the local
level, especially in areas where a large number of people are dependent upon a
small number of powerful local elites.
Local governments in India are a state subject and
thus there is a considerable variation across states in the architecture of
this model as well as number of items on which local governments can act
independently. States have followed different trajectories to devolve powers,
functions, and responsibilities to the elected representatives. These local
bodies continue to have very limited financial and administrative powers. It is
well known in policy circles that local governments are under-resourced and
over-burdened. State governments through its bureaucratic machinery continue to
exercise considerable discretionary authority and influence over local
governments. The powers of local elected officials in India remain seriously
circumscribed by the state government and bureaucrats in multiple ways, thereby
diluting the spirit of the constitutional amendments. The institutional design
of local government demands for more trust – the state governments and
bureaucrats must shed their inhibitions and reluctance to share power.
Similarly, many of the deficiencies of Indian politics
visible in national and state elections have now become part and parcel of
third-tier elections as well. The sheer money and muscle power deployed during
these elections is phenomenal. If one calculates the average money spent by a panchayat election candidate, then expenditure incurred per
voter is likely to be higher than what Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha candidates usually spend. The situation is not very different in
municipal elections too.
And despite the fact that the law bans candidates from
using party symbols in panchayat elections in
many states, partisanship plays a key role due to astronomically high cost of
contesting those elections. Candidates are often helped financially by
district-level politicians to contest elections in exchange for their support
as an agent in the locality.
In many states, the elections at different tiers of
local governments are direct, and in other cases indirect (council members
elect the president). Researchers have documented that indirect elections at
various levels have created a system in which large numbers of candidates get
elected unopposed, mostly supported by the ruling party in the state.It is not surprising then the presidential candidate
at different tiers of both urban and rural local governments are mostly
relatives of sitting Members of Parliament (MP), Members of Legislative
Assembly (MLA), and ministers, and figures from the ruling party in the state.
In fact, as soon as a change in the ruling regime in the state capital takes
place, successful no-confidence motions are brought against many incumbent
district and block council presidents.
Local-level politicians remain the primary contact
points for most citizens in both urban and rural India. A lot of our
understanding about the successes and failures of India’s decentralized model,
especially in academic circles, largely comes from rural, and the complexity of
urban politics has not received due attention. While there are indeed areas of
overlap between rural and urban local bodies, we need to develop new frameworks
to understand the differences in challenges the local governance structures
face in these two contexts.
The essays in this issue of ‘Seminar’ are an attempt
to access the impact of transformative promises as envisioned in 73rd and 74th
constitutional amendments. Were we being over-ambitious then or have we become
too impatient with the slow pace of change now?
In the 75th year of Independence, it is time that we reimagine the
relationship between decentralization and democracy in a rapidly changing India
to make the promises of these constitutional amendments a reality.
RAHUL VERMA