SINCE early childhood, we have seen and experienced the Bodo nationalistic movement demanding a separate homeland – Bodoland. People in large numbers, both men and women, joined the movement, inspired by the notion of freedom, justice, equality and the right to self-determination. We have witnessed how families in our villages have lost members in the prolonged freedom struggle. We lost several near and dear ones ourselves. Over five thousand Bodo people have died between 1987 and 2020.

The brutal suppression of the agitation by the state machinery, as well as by some non-state actors, has contributed to the massive violation of human rights in the region. Villages were burnt, people taken to jails, tortured and thousands were left to be haunted for life. Many died in extrajudicial killings. This has been a familiar story for the majority of people in Bodoland since the late 1980s. In the absence of any pragmatic and sustainable solution to the demand for autonomy, the situation is far from being over. In such a volatile political climate, the forces opposing the Bodo demand make the peace process even more fragile and unachievable.

The two peace accords which were signed with Bodo revolutionary groups in 1993 and 2003, failed to address the core political demands of the Bodo community, the single largest tribal group in the Northeast. The third Bodo accord which was inked on 27 January 2020, however, offers more hope for socio-economic and cultural development in the Bodo heartland than the ones signed earlier. It has ended the armed struggle among factions of the National Democratic Front of Boroland, an insurgent outfit which has been waging an armed insurgency since its formation in 1986. Moreover, the influential All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and United Bodo People’s Organization (UBPO) are signatories to the new accord. For the first time, the stakeholders of the Bodo movement have come together to sign an accord. This is a big victory for the government. More significantly, the stakeholders have agreed to settle for an expanded autonomous council within the state of Assam – a solution far from what was being demanded by the Bodo groups.

 

The Bodos are the autochthones of the Brahmaputra valley. Within the modern nation-state mechanism, there have been several attempts in the past to address the socio-political and economic aspirations of the Bodos. Prior to India’s independence, the Bodo leaders pitted their lot with the struggle for India’s freedom, while also putting forth, in concrete terms, their political aspirations for autonomy as evidenced from the Memorandum submitted to the Simon Commission by Bodo social reformer Gurudev Kalicharan Brahma. In view of their unique social and cultural reality, the Bodos have treaded a different path even before the emergence of the present Assam state.

India’s freedom from the British brought large Bodo areas within the purview of Assam. However, this came about through a series of political negotiations, measures and agreements. The Bodo leaders, along with other tribal leaders, were able to bring Gopinath Bordoloi, the first Chief Minister of Assam, to the negotiation table and concede to them the provisions for protection of their lands: the inclusion of Chapter X of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation Act 1947. These provisions did not come as freebies. The tribal leaders had, at that time, actually called for the inclusion of Plains Tribal Areas within the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. As this did not happen, they had to settle with the Tribal Belt and Block arrangement within the state legislature.

While such a provision for the protection of land and socio-cultural institutions quietened the Bodo aspirations for some time, they soon realized that the Assam state treated the Tribal Belt and Block areas with utter neglect and isolation, resulting in wholescale deprivation from the benefits of development accruing to other parts of Assam. Added to this all-round neglect and isolation, in terms of social and economic development, there were overt and covert moves by the Assam state to coerce Bodos into assimilating within the Assamese fold – an unending project of the ruling elites, who continue to see the Bodos and the indigenous communities with fear and distrust.

 

For instance, Bishnu Prasad Chaliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam, conceded to the chauvinistic agents of Assamese nationalism and brought about the Assam Act No. XXXIII of 1960: The Assam Official Language Act. This single act caused much consternation and unease among the different tribal communities residing in undivided Assam and provided fuel for kick-starting a series of movements for separation from Assam. The act sought to promote Assamese language and provided no space for the use of other languages such as Khasi, Bengali or Bodo in the official spaces of the state. It may be noted here that, fearing this onslaught, the Bodo Thunlai Afad (Bodo Sahitya Sabha – BSS) was already formed in 1952 with the chief aim to sustain and promote the Bodo language, literature and culture.

Thus, the dichotomy of inclusion-exclusion of the Bodos in the state of Assam was played out within this two-pronged axis of neglect and isolation from development schemes and structures, on the one hand, and the coercive assimilationist move towards Assamization on the other hand. Land alienation became a basic issue in the tribal areas. Vast tracts of tribal belt and block areas were lost to non-tribals through usury, fraud and deceit. The Assam government also usurped the tribal belt and block areas through delimitations, placement of large number of immigrants/refugees from Bangladesh, and also by demarcating large areas as forest lands.

 

As a response to this situation, the Bodos strengthened and revived their aspirations for autonomy by launching the movement for a separate state of Udayachal as early as 1967. The demand for Udayachal was launched and carried forward by the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA). It was meant to address the long-standing neglect and apathy faced by the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) populations living in Assam. In the same year, the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) was formed. In the initial years, ABSU played a supportive role in the political moves of the PTCA.

Similar to the demand for a separate state of Udayachal, there was a parallel movement launched by the BSS for using the Roman script in Bodo medium schools. Though this movement was inspired by Article 29 of the Constitution of India (that guarantees the right of all languages to have a script), the Government of Assam spewed venom and violence on peaceful demonstrators seeking permission for using the Roman script.

This movement in the 1970s was the first mass mobilization that brought the Bodo masses in confrontation with the state machinery that had treated them with much impunity. A total of 15 lives were lost at the hands of the state forces. Though this movement was not able to achieve its objective of using the Roman script in Bodo-medium education, it taught the Bodos a bitter lesson: the Bodo language was held in disdain and that it had no scope for sustenance and development within the educational schema of the Assam state.

By the late 1970s and early ’80s, Bodo leaders of the BSS, PTCA and ABSU showcased different ideological hues in addressing the hunger and thirst of the Bodos. For instance, Bodofa Upendranath Brahma took leadership of the ABSU and upped the ante in 1987 by calling for ‘Divide Assam 50:50’ and ‘Live and let live’. This demand was put forth within the purview of provisions enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution of India. As one can see, these two slogans have reverberated through the length and breadth of Bodo inhabited areas across Assam.

 

The entire northern bank of the river Brahmaputra has been claimed for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland. The dynamic leadership of the Bodofa caught the imagination of every Bodo person living in villages, towns and cities. Ever since, the Bodoland movement for a separate statehood became a truly mass revolution: it became a virtue for every Bodo to aspire and to ‘do or die’ for Bodoland. During the same decade, Udangshrini Alari Premsingh Brahma launched the Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF) that sought to achieve separate statehood for the Bodos through an armed struggle. Yet again, the Bodo Security Force, later renamed as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), was formed by Ranjan Daimary in the year 1986 to fight for the sovereign state of Bodoland.

Thus, the Bodo struggle entered a new phase in the 1980s and showcased the emergence of all strands of ideological hues: moderate to extremist, and non-violent protests to violent armed struggles as the means for achieving the single target – a separate state of Bodoland. While the movement saw no dearth of participation and supply of volunteers, it was also the phase when Bodo women were raped, villages plundered and hundreds killed and thousands prosecuted. The brutalities let loose by the state forces knew no bounds. The ‘police’ engaged in unprovoked torture and killings – children, women and men – even standing crops, weaving looms, cattle and poultry were not spared.

The situation precipitated to such an extent that the ‘gun’ and ‘khaki’ became symbols of state machinery in Bodo areas. The governments at the Centre and the state engaged in a string of mudslinging tirades, each blaming the other. However, the continued struggle of the Bodos forced the state and central governments to take notice and come to the table. This prompted the Bodoland Autonomous Council Accord of 1993, the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord 2003, and now the Bodoland Territorial Region Accord 2020.

 

As per the provisions of the accord, the Bodoland Territorial Area district, the autonomous region governed Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), will be known as the Bodoland Territorial Region after demarcation of the boundary. The number of council members will be increased to 60 from its current 46 members, as more Bodo populated areas are to be included later. The accord promises more legislative and administrative powers to the council. The government promises to set up more development institutions including central universities, medical colleges, sports centres, and vocational training institutes. In addition, a Bodo-Kachari Welfare Council will be created for Bodo people outside the BTR, on the lines of other existing Councils for Plains Tribes.

This accord is expected to address the development aspirations of large numbers of Bodos living outside the BTR, but does not provide any constitutional safeguards as the council will remain outside the ambit of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. What is worrying is that the technical details of the accord are not definitive in nature. It appears like a political promise, the implementation of which will depend entirely on the goodwill of the central and state governments.

The existing accord provides for the demarcation of the Bodoland Territorial Region which falls drastically short of the original demand. This has created much consternation among Bodo villages that were not included in the earlier BTC Accord of 2003. The BTR Accord though, has been opened up for further political manoeuvre, but the inclusion of contiguous areas into the existing Bodoland Territorial Area Districts is unlikely to happen anytime soon. More importantly, in all the three peace accords, the government has completely failed to give a final touch to the issue. There is no finality even in the new accord. It would not be inappropriate to point out that the government has administered a pain reliever rather than treating the disease.

 

In the process of negotiations and peace building in the Bodoland region, Bodo leaders had to compromise on the primary political goal of a separate state in return for a development and economic package, which the region has been deprived of for several decades. Moreover, the inability of the government to give general amnesty to all members of the NDFB has not gone down well. This accord is a complete let-down for Bodo political aspirations. It is merely a trade-off for general development needs. It has not contributed to the political empowerment of the council as there is no mention about specific reservations in the council, the state assembly and parliamentary seats for the Bodos.

Moreover, the Assam government’s proposal to grant ST status to the six-non tribal communities – Chutia, Motok, Moran, Koch-Rajbongshi, Tai-Ahom and Tea Tribes – has the potential to keep the Bodos out of power in the BTC and push Bodo groups to revive their demand. There are already indications that the new Bodo accord is not a closure of the statehood movement by Bodo organizations. The influential student body ABSU has only suspended the demand, not given it up. The primary goal is statehood, and nothing short of this will satisfy the community. The failure to implement the accord will only hasten the next phase of the freedom struggle. It is in the interest of the region that the government finds a more pragmatic political solution to address the concerns of the Bodos.

Thus, on critical examination, the BTR Accord is a compromise on the part of the Bodo leaders who have absolved the demand for a separate state of Bodoland. However, this accord also comes as a symbolic instrument that seeks to alter the dominant and oppressive narratives around the Bodos. The biggest alteration in the narrative comes in the form of a negation of the isolation-assimilation-exclusion framework pursued by the state in dealing with the Bodos thus far. This is bound to have implications in the larger state-tribal relations and negotiations elsewhere in India. Another powerful stereotype this accord has served to dismantle is the imagery of the Bodos as being a ‘ferocious’, ‘violent’ and ‘bloodthirsty’ tribal group. The laying of arms by all factions of NDFB as a result of this accord has ushered in the dawn of a new era in the Bodo polity. It will deepen the democratic processes in Bodoland. This takes us a full circle around the Bodoland movement: working with the state to a non-violent mass movement to violent movement to working with the state once again. Much has been lost, many have lost, and now much awaits to be gained. A sincere implementation of the third Bodo peace accord has the potential to be the key.