FOR 23 years, beginning 1997, the Indo-Naga peace process has successfully navigated the churn in Indian politics. It has seen through several prime ministers and governments headed by different political parties at the Centre, including that of incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is a record of sorts when it comes to peaceful negotiation between two conflicting parties. The other thing to note is the broad support that the peace process enjoys from the establishment in Delhi, which is also exceptional. The signing of the Framework Agreement in 2015 between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim and Government of India is testimony to the mutual commitment in finding an amicable political solution to the decades old Naga issue.

Now, therefore, when everything looks favourable to conclude more than 23 years of ceasefire and political negotiation, why are we finding it so difficult to come out with an agreement on paper? This is the million-dollar question for which everybody needs an answer. Perhaps a reminder of how the Indo-Naga peace process has played out all these years is best described in these words: ‘Much talked about, highly cited by every prime minister since the 1990s, good media spectacle but low on outcome and delivery.’

It is worth remembering that after coming to power in 2014 the prime minister had instructed the new interlocutor, R.N. Ravi, to work out a proposed settlement that could be a final solution to the simmering Naga issue preferably within a year to 18 months. Why did this not happen? We are now into the second term of Prime Minister Modi’s tenure and a solution still eludes us.

There were earlier attempts to solve the Naga issue. A ceasefire brokered by the Church in Nagaland during the 1960s led to several rounds of talk between the Naga National Council (NNC) and the Government of India. However, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi could not solve it at the time because the Nagas refused to accept anything short of sovereignty.

Today there is a better understanding between India and the Nagas on their respective positions. This is evident from the Framework Agreement of 2015 signed by the GoI with the NSCN (IM) and the Agreed Position of 2017 with the seven Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs). The opportunity to resolve this old problem is there for the taking. But certain things in the peace process need to be reset.

 

One noteworthy aspect of the present ceasefire agreement (of 1997) and the peace process is the non-involvement of the Church. Much of civil society is also inactive, other than expressing support for the process. This is because unlike the previous Indo-Naga ceasefire where non-state actors were proactively involved throughout the deliberations, in 1997 when the ceasefire agreement was first made, the GoI followed a different approach by engaging with only the armed group NSCN (IM). Later, the Khaplang faction was brought into the ceasefire, though peace talks continued only with the Isak and Muivah group.

From the onset, the nature of dialogue between the GoI and NSCN (IM) was exclusive and the terms of negotiation were kept confidential. Even the duly elected state government was kept in the dark. The involvement of civil society was minimal – as an expression of support to the peace process. The occasional public consultation meetings would be held by the NSCN (IM) to provide a general outline of where negotiations were headed. Other than this there was no real attempt to provide any details about what was being discussed, either by Delhi or the Naga group. Perhaps there was a rationale to keeping the details of the dialogue away from public glare and daily scrutiny.

 

The only time when the Church and civil society got directly involved was when armed confrontation took place between the armed warring Naga groups. The years 2007 and 2008 were particularly bad as the commercial hub of Dimapur and its surroundings almost became a battleground for rival groups to seek and kill. The state of affairs was so severe that the Nagaland Baptist Churches Council (NBCC) described the factional infighting during this period as bringing ‘chaos and destruction’ in the state, lamenting that ‘Naga society is plunging evermore deeply into destructive divisions.’

Interestingly, the so-called ceasefire agreement and ground rules laid out did not help in containing factional killings. The government agencies, whether the high profile ceasefire monitoring group, Assam Rifles, the state police or even the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which was in charge of the peace process, could not provide any solution to the factional violence. It is at this point that the Naga community intervened by providing leadership and also a platform that would lead to cessation of hostilities between the armed warring Naga groups.

Representatives of the Naga political groups, frontal tribal hohos, the Church and civil society adopted a 10-point ‘Covenant of Common Hope’ during a period that came to be called the Naga Peace Summit III at Chiang Mai, Thailand, on 21 August 2008. This became the basis for the subsequent Covenant of Reconciliation that was signed on 13 June 2009 by top leaders of the armed Naga groups. All this took place under the initiative of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR).

Instituted on 24 February 2008, as one of the outcomes of the Naga Peace Convention organized by the Naga Shisha Hoho in Dimapur, the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) was christened on 25 March 2008 at Kohima with the support of 39 Naga frontal organizations and churches. Independent observers, government officials and even the security establishment in Delhi publicly admitted that killings arising out of factionalism had all but ended post 2009 because of FNR’s efforts. The FNR’s careful approach and ability to walk the tightrope, while dealing with the factions, helped to diffuse tensions. Most importantly, the trust that FNR was able to obtain from the armed groups allowed it to slowly extinguish the fire and fury that was fuelling the ground situation.

It is ironic that those outside the formal peace process played a crucial role in stopping the spiralling violence and restoring a semblance of peace and normalcy. The subsequent peace dividend that people have enjoyed is not only because of the ceasefire regime of the Government of India, but largely from spirit of the Covenant of Reconciliation, which the FNR helped to bring about. The involvement of the Church and frontal organizations has been valuable to the peace process.

 

With an atmosphere of peace returning to the Naga Hills, and with the signing of the Framework Agreement in 2015, many people had expected the issue to be finally resolved by the end of 2017, i.e. before the assembly election in Nagaland. However, the solution did not materialize and instead Nagaland faced another round of elections. The argument emanating from Delhi was that no deadline could be fixed for the Naga peace agreement. Instead, the ruling BJP party coined the slogan ‘election for solution’. Now, more than two years later, we are waiting for the peace agreement to be signed.

A possible explanation to the problem with the Indo-Naga peace process and the complexity surrounding it is that the people in Nagaland do not know anything about the Framework Agreement. Repeated demands to disclose its details have fallen on deaf ears. And since its contents are unknown, people don’t know what the solution is all about, and therefore they are unwilling to support it. Despite the strong sentiment of the Naga public for an early solution, the fact that many tribal hohos in Nagaland decided not to boycott the elections in 2018 was a clear sign of the growing distrust with the peace process.

 

While electoral politics and national security considerations were the two existential factors that were always present in the Indo-Naga peace process, the new third dimension that seeks to influence and sway the process is undoubtedly the role of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

The usual hardline positions taken by the intelligence and security agencies in India is in consonance with the equally hawkish nationalist stand of the RSS, the right wing, Hindu nationalist, paramilitary volunteer organization that is widely regarded as the parent organization of the ruling political party of India, the Bharatiya Janata Party.

The RSS’ influence is a matter of fact and not of fiction any more. Not surprisingly, the NSCN (IM), which had signed the Framework Agreement, came out with the disclosure last year about how the RSS was trying to ‘imagine a Hindu nation state’ and that the outcome of a possible ‘Naga homeland’ was seen as ‘threatening the RSS Hindu dream.’ The suspicions towards ‘Christian provinces’ by the RSS and the thought of further expansion beyond present Nagaland is perhaps a reason for the hardline stand of the Modi government on Naga integration, including a separate flag and constitution.

On the other hand, the Naga Political Groups, especially the NSCN (IM), after engaging in political negotiations with Delhi for the last twenty odd years, may not want to alienate public support with a solution that does not meet its own high expectations. From the high position of sovereignty and integration to negotiating for a middle path solution involving shared sovereignty and pan-Naga hoho, the buzz is now around an economic and rehabilitation package. The fear that this may not fulfil the aspirations of the Naga people could be holding the NSCN (IM) back.

Interestingly, the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) has recently articulated similar concerns. According to the NPMHR, over long years of political negotiations, India has come to terms with some of the issues that are dear to the Nagas. However, the Government of India was attempting to undo its very own ‘agreed upon’ principles. The NPMHR says that this was again proven when India wanted to push for a solution ‘within its convenient parameters if Nagas want solution and not election.’ It does appear that as far as the Naga position is concerned, the scope for negotiation and settlement is becoming dimmer by the day.

 

One pertinent question in this context is whether there is a vested interest, especially within the security establishment, to prolong negotiations in an effort to wear out the Naga political group(s). After the death of A.Z. Phizo, the Naga movement has lost three veterans in recent months – Isak Chishi Swu, S.S. Khaplang and General Khole Konyak. Of them, only Th Muivah is alive and he is not getting younger.

The Government of India holding separate talks with the NSCN (IM) on the one hand, and the seven NNPGs on the other, have polarized the situation on the ground. There is deep suspicion that the Indian intelligence and security establishments are working to keep the Naga community divided. This will serve to weaken the Naga struggle and create more confusion and division within the people.

The Government of India interlocutor R.N. Ravi has continually maintained that Delhi will not fragment the Naga issue and all factions must be on board for a single agreement. Nevertheless, the approach of the interlocutor, to engage with only a select group of tribal hohos and sideline most other Naga civil society groups, will not help in creating trust and unity. This is making it difficult for Naga groups to come together. The interlocutor would do well by not polarizing the situation by pitting one group against the other. A course correction is required to connect and not separate the parallel talks currently ongoing under his watch.

 

The compulsion of electoral politics, including the growing influence of the RSS along with the national security predicament, has again delayed a much-needed political initiative on the Naga issue. The secrecy surrounding the negotiation process between the NSCN(IM) and the GoI does not help in creating a favourable platform for public support. One aspect that stands out quite clearly is the need for a new approach to the peace process. There have been well meaning suggestions coming from Naga think tanks that some kind of modality to consult, converge and conclude the peace talks has to be found by the Nagas themselves, in the interest of a peaceful, inclusive and honourable solution. It is clear that both the Government of India, represented by its interlocutor, and Naga negotiators, represented by the NSCN(IM) and the Working Group of seven other Naga Political Groups (NNPGs), are under pressure and finding it difficult to conclude the peace process with a single agreement.

Given the deep divisions within the tribal landscape, one suggestion doing the rounds is that the Naga churches must take the initiative to rally support of the tribal hohos and mass based civil society, and work for the convergence of talks. This is seen as crucial to facilitate the signing of a single agreement, which the Interlocutor has been insisting on.

The Naga churches must step in to facilitate a meeting point between the two conflicting groups – the NSCN(IM) and the seven NNPGs. This division is not helping the Naga people’s desire for an early, honorable and inclusive solution. The immediate work for peace requires the leadership of the Naga churches, which the GoI must also recognize and support. The longer India and the Nagas wait for a perfect solution, the more complex, improbable, and uncertain things are likely to become. The present opportunity for a solution should therefore not be frittered away.

Unlike in the recent past, Prime Minister Modi is not constrained or entangled by the compulsions of coalition politics. The proposed peace accord with the Nagas can be a model of dialogue and peacemaking in resolving similar disputes elsewhere. Its importance will rest in the new security paradigm that it brings, along with the novelty it would give to the working of the Indian federation.

India and the Nagas must look deeper to understand each other’s needs and aspirations as the only way forward towards a honourable solution. Both must honour each other’s commitments to a peaceful resolution to this decades old conflict.