THE level of cooperation currently witnessed in Central Asia had last been seen in the early 2000s. The worldwide trend in the post-Cold War period has been the expansion and institutionalization of various forms of regional cooperation. As cooperation among Central Asian countries is in ascendance following the change of administration in Uzbekistan in 2016, the question arises as to whether the Central Asian countries will join the worldwide trend of regionalization and unite under a single political body. So far, none of the Central Asian countries have expressed a desire for a supranational institution and prefer to cooperate at the bilateral level to avoid the need for a regional organization. Therefore, it turns out that the major impediment to integration is not the persistence of disputes over borders and shared resources in the region, but rather a lack of desire to work under a supranational body. This does not entirely preclude all forms of regional integration; economic integration is in fact a reality.

The end of the Soviet Union caught Central Asian countries off guard. Interdependent infrastructure and mutually supplementing natural resources that worked to the benefit of the region prior to their independence became a cause for interstate disputes. Undefined borderlines compounded these frictions. Slowly, Central Asian states realized that they were caught between big players, thereby diminishing their individual voices. Their geographic location also poses a barrier to entering world markets easily, unless they cooperate to transit through each other’s territory. Closer regional cooperation, therefore, is necessary to ensure regional stability and development.

Central Asian politicians have come a long way to the current level of trust and amicable relations. A lot has changed and continues to change with regard to how Central Asian politicians perceive each other today. While work on various tracks to resolve regional issues has started – prominent among them are border delimitation and demarcation, intra-regional trade, and cross-border water resources – a lot more needs to be done to agree on and incorporate solutions at the institutional level. Until then these issues, coupled with Russia’s presence in the region, will contribute to the underlying distrust among Central Asian countries.

 

Unresolved borderlines have been a major point of contention in the region. At the inception of these countries in the mid-1920s, no clear borders were drawn. Under Soviet rule, given the emphasis on the region as a whole, porous borders were ignored. This changed following independence as sovereignty demanded clear borderlines. The countries found themselves in a deadlock as borderlines were cutting through residential areas and natural resources. The border demarcation and delimitation process has been a long and painful process for Central Asian countries.

When Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed the border demarcation agreement on 18 April 2018, then President Nursultan Nazarbayev pointedly stated that their two countries would become the only ones without border disputes in the region.¹ Indeed, other countries are still at various stages of negotiating their borderlines, with the dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan escalating lately. The latter has been a result of uncoordinated road construction, arbitrary road blockages, water sharing, or simply conflicts among local businesses.² The latest conflict between these two countries in March 2019 resulted in two deaths and several injured.³ This was far from a one-off incident – Central Asians border guards challenging each other’s citizens is a frequent occurrence.⁴

 

Contrary to this, Uzbekistan’s borders have been relatively peaceful lately due to President Mirziyoyev’s ‘Central Asia first’ foreign policy. The current Uzbek administration realizes that without defined borderlines, no major improvement in relations can be achieved. Ilkhom Nematov, Uzbekistan’s Ambassador on Special Assignments, who is involved in border negotiations, said that Tashkent conducted 65 border related meetings between August 2016 and August 2018 with its Central Asian neighbours.⁵ Almost half of those meetings took place with Kyrgyzstan, indicating the complexity of the issue.⁶

 

The region is slowly recovering from its autarkic trade practices of the past and cross-border trade is increasing, but a lot more needs to be accomplished. It is true that intra-regional trade was never high to begin with. At its peak, in the late 1980s, only 20 per cent of trade was intra-regional, after which it dropped to as low as 5 per cent in the 2000s.⁷ This was the result of inward looking policies of Central Asian countries that erected trade barriers and increased border restrictions. Further, the similar economic infrastructure among countries in the region and their inability to produce high value-added products drove them to look for other trade partners.⁸ Intra-regional trade has improved since then and currently stands at 10 per cent.⁹

Two authoritative studies conducted in the mid-2000s summed up regional trade issues that are still true. According to reports, the timelines of shipments of goods within the region and between the region and Western Europe are twice as much as the norm.¹⁰ Delays caused by long waiting time, declared and undeclared payments at the borders, and poor logistics are just some of the contributing factors, as the reports found. The resulting higher cost of shipment, coupled with the similar trade specialization of Central Asian countries, hampers trade within the region.

 

Divergent foreign policy priorities and political interests among Central Asian countries have impeded the development of seamless regional transportation. Transport infrastructure varies among countries in the region,¹¹ and they lack a steady stream of funds to bring them to the same level. In addition, there is an absence of a regional perspective when countries plan intra-regional transportation projects, with each country focusing on individual, rather than regional benefits.¹² Until recently, rivalries among the countries resulted in their competition to develop conflicting projects that failed to enable regional linkages.¹³

These problems are further complicated by the mini trade wars that the countries occasionally wage against each other. The latest took place between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan earlier this year, when the latter scrutinized goods coming from Kyrgyzstan resulting in long delays at the border.¹⁴ A similar incident had also occurred in 2017, when Kazakh border officials checked every truck coming from Kyrgyzstan.¹⁵

Sharing cross-border water resources has been a long-standing issue for the region. A river that traverses several countries usually starts in one country and flows downstream to others. A downstream country rarely welcomes any unilateral decision by an upstream country that affects the flow, and Central Asia is no different. In the past, Uzbekistan vehemently disputed the construction of two large hydroelectric plants, one in Kyrgyzstan and one in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan reasoned that these projects threaten its water supply.¹⁶ Until 2016, Uzbekistan maintained that Kyrgyzstan’s Kambar-Ata and Tajikistan’s Rogun dams could alter the hydrology in the region and push the existing water scarcity to ‘catastrophic levels’.¹⁷ Tashkent was also concerned about the seismic zones in which the dams are located, as it could lead to partial or complete flooding of residential areas and the ‘death of hundreds of thousands of people.’¹⁸

 

Since the change in Uzbek leadership in 2016, it has loosened its stance on the construction of these two plants and focuses on mutual benefits from the projects. Tashkent’s ‘Central Asia first’ foreign policy changed its outlook toward regional water issues as well.

 

Another factor contributing to regional disintegration could be Russia’s concerns about Central Asian countries coalescing to become a stronger force, thereby possibly challenging Russian influence. Regional divisions have, in fact, been playing to Russia’s advantage. Not long ago, Russia disbanded the Central Asian Union, which was the only attempt at creating a regional organization. It included a Central Asian Interstate Council, Council of Prime Ministers, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Ministers of Defence, and Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development.¹⁹ Established in 1993, it underwent several transformations but endured until it was merged with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union in 2005 at the initiative of President Vladimir Putin and then disbanded. To this day, the Central Asian Union was the first and the last time countries in the region had their own political coordinating body.²⁰

A logical question then arises about whether political integration will take place in Central Asia once border, water and transportation differences are resolved. The answer could still be no. President Mirziyoyev in his welcoming speech to the regional conference presciently titled ‘Central Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity’ laid out: ‘I would like to stress that we are not talking about establishing a new supranational organization in Central Asia.’²¹ To reiterate the message then-deputy foreign minister of Uzbekistan Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, and the current state advisor to President Mirziyoyev said, ‘It is early to talk about institutionalizing cooperation. Maybe in the future cooperation will proceed to a higher level. It could take decades; it could take shorter. Until then institutionalization is not in the agenda.’²²

Other countries in the region are also far from ready to delegate their sovereignty to a supranational body.²³ Reasons for the lack of desire to create a regional body are aplenty ranging from the lack of trust among regional politicians to the role of larger players from outside the region. Resolving outstanding regional issues bilaterally has worked for the countries so far, and that is the model they will probably continue using in the near future.

 

Currently, each country’s varying rules on transit, commerce and investment present challenges. However, they recognize the benefits of trade for economic growth. To achieve this, they are interested in pursuing economic diversification and greater economic cooperation. Following the recent progress in cooperation among the countries, economic unions with unified transportation tariffs are emerging as a reality but are currently limited to sub-groups and not the region as a whole. Expanding this carries great potential for leveraging the region’s landlocked nature to emerge as a transit point between Asia and Europe.

 

The post-Soviet period has demonstrated that regional integration is impossible without Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.²⁴ Their population size, economies and militaries precondition them for a leading role. Therefore, initiatives from Tashkent contributing to increased cooperation form one half of solutions for regional disintegration.

The recent activation of intra-regional relations took place following Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s ascendance to the presidency. He announced Uzbekistan’s new foreign policy concept, which identified the Central Asian region as the foremost priority. Tashkent indicated that it is committed to the resolution of intra-regional issues such as trade, transportation, trans-boundary water sharing, and border delimitation and demarcation.²⁵ The current administration is interested in settling differences to establish good neighbourly relations. This will also contribute to steady trade, transportation and communications along with access to markets.

To bring regional leaders closer together, Mirziyoyev proposed meeting for an informal summit, which was then hosted by former Kazakh President Nazarbayev on 15 March 2018. While the meeting itself was limited to informal consultations without breakthroughs, it undoubtedly contributed to strengthening intra-regional cooperation.²⁶ Most significantly, given the leading role that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could play, their cooperation was more than symbolic. The second meeting, planned for the spring of 2019, was delayed without a clear indication of a later date. Overall, the Nur-Sultan meeting initiated the normalization of relations and could result in the second phase of integration in Central Asia, with the first being the inception of the Central Asian Union in 1993.

 

Mirziyoyev’s initial foreign trips were to Central Asian countries during which negotiations on defining borderlines with all countries were reopened. Not only has work on resolving disputed portions of the border been underway since then, but Tashkent has also initiated and signed agreements on the defined sections with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.²⁷ Further, Tashkent has relaxed restrictive border crossing regulations, abolished short-term visas for Tajik nationals, and opened several crossing points along the borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to stimulate cross-border traffic.²⁸ Just as important as border negotiations is Tashkent’s ongoing work on de-mining the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.²⁹

Negotiations on borderlines cannot be implemented without resolving transboundary water issues. Mirziyoyev did away with Tashkent’s acrimonious rhetoric on this issue and, following his first state visit to Bishkek in September 2017, announced that Uzbekistan will jointly build the Kambar-Ata hydroelectric project with Kyrgyzstan.³⁰ Mirziyoyev’s first visit to Dushanbe in March 2018 concluded with a similar announcement. Tashkent expressed interest in participating in the Rogun project subject to Dushanbe following international norms and construction standards.³¹ Although Tashkent’s concerns about regional water sharing remain, its heated language against these projects has faded.

 

The relaxation of border crossings coupled with the liberalization and unification of exchange rates has ushered in opportunities to increase trade within the region. On 11 November 2017, President Mirziyoyev himself drew attention to Uzbekistan’s increasing trade with other countries in the region.³² Indeed, in the first half of 2018, trade between Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries increased by 46 per cent compared to the same period in 2017.³³

Uzbekistan has been working on various transportation projects since the 1990s that promise the opening up of the landlocked region to world markets and linkages with larger transportation corridors. After President Mirziyoyev took office, he zeroed in on the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman and the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China transportation corridors.³⁴ Both projects are in the planning stage, but negotiations are underway to finalize details. Most significantly, the launch of the Farob-Turkmanobod bridge in 2017 established the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan link for the first project.³⁵ For the second project, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to hold technical meetings on areas that are delaying the project.³⁶

 

Given their proximity, the instability in Afghanistan is a shared concern and encourages regional leaders to coalesce around a single issue. Three of the Central Asian states border Afghanistan and the other two are not far apart. Mirziyoyev recognizes that security and stability in Central Asia depends on stabilizing Afghanistan.³⁷ Hence, Tashkent has moved beyond its earlier exclusive perception of Afghanistan as a territory from which terrorism, illicit drugs and instability emanate. Mirziyoyev’s administration has actively embraced its southern neighbour and is ready to facilitate a peace settlement.

 

Central Asian countries have different approaches to engaging with external powers, which draws from differences in their natural resource bases and economic status. What is common is that each of them attempts to maximize its own benefit without factoring in the region as a whole. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, are able to cooperate with Russia both within the institution and bilaterally. Further, barring Turkmenistan, all countries in the region are members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which in turn creates additional opportunities for engagement with extra-regional powers. To various degrees, the countries also cooperate with the European Union, the U.S., and India, the latter of which is welcomed as a democratic partner that is not attempting to dominate the region.

Central Asia’s politicians are shrewd – cognizant of the clash of interests among external powers, they seek to benefit from this competition. Thereby, from early on, countries in the region have maintained a balanced approach, which has helped maintain friendly relations with all external partners, particularly Russia, China and the West.³⁸

They actively balance Chinese and Russian interests in the region, with both states engaged in an undeclared competition for regional dominance. This competition has been amicable so far, with neither stepping on the other’s toes, allowing the region to benefit from the large amounts of aid and investment offered by Russia and China, which the West cannot offer. Recognizing each other’s interests, both powers have allowed each other to play an influential role in the region. Russia and China seem to have an unwritten agreement according to which Russia plays a leading role in the region’s politics and military affairs, while China fills in economic needs.³⁹

While Central Asian countries welcome Chinese and Russian investments, they also seek opportunities to cooperate with other partners. The region would want to see greater western engagement, but the latter’s interest ebbs and flows depending on developments in individual countries in the region and in the West. At the peak of counter-terrorism activities in Afghanistan, western interest in Central Asia was much higher. Back then the U.S. and the EU provided expansive technical assistance to the region, but the scale has reduced over time.

 

India doesn’t need an introduction to Central Asia, with the relationship dating back to three millennia.⁴⁰ At present, Central Asian people are familiar with India owing to the popularity of its Bollywood movies and music, and lately, quality medical services that have been attracting medical tourists from the region.

Politically, Central Asian leaders recognize that their relations with India have not been linear – periods of renewed interest are usually followed by a pause, causing India’s cooperation with the region to lag behind that of China and Russia.⁴¹ It seems that every time India decides to renew its cooperation with the region, it tries to catch up with them. However, this is then followed by a period of disengagement. For instance, India modernized the Ayni airbase in Tajikistan in 2007 with the aim of gaining ownership of it, but negotiations have been unsuccessful so far.⁴² In addition, India’s interest in the region’s natural resources clash with China’s, which has progressed much further and already gained access to this resource wealth.

 

By virtue of their close location, India and the Central Asian countries are looking to cooperate economically, particularly on energy, given Indian needs. On their part, the countries in the region are witnessing the dynamic pace of India’s economic development and want to learn from the Indian experience. India is decades ahead of Central Asia in areas such as information technology, science and technology, and other knowledge industries – areas in which the region needs to develop capabilities to emerge as a global player. India has the ability to help build Central Asia’s capacities in these areas. Conversely, India’s growing energy demand can be fulfilled by the energy-rich Central Asian countries,⁴³ which are ready to supply to them.⁴⁴ India can bring in technology to help extract and use natural resources in a mutually beneficial manner.

Just like there is no regional project among Central Asian countries themselves, cooperation between India and Central Asia plays out at the bilateral, not regional, level. Recently, India acceded to the Ashgabat Agreement, which aims to create a transportation and transit corridor between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, and if implemented, this can stimulate engagement at the regional level.⁴⁵

 

India enjoys unique advantages compared to other external players while engaging with the region. This draws from India’s democratic and secular state, coupled with its lack of interest in imposing its political will on the region.⁴⁶ Ilkhom Nematov, Uzbekistan’s Ambassador on Special Assignments, speaking of relations with India said, ‘We have a great interest in close cooperation between our parliaments. India has a huge experience in parliamentarism as the largest democracy in the world. We want to study your experience in this field.’⁴⁷ Additionally, Central Asians want India to become their partner in stabilizing Afghanistan as both have high stakes in the country. The first ‘Central Asia-India-Afghanistan’ meeting held in 2019 at the foreign ministers’ level showed that the all sides are committed to this process.⁴⁸ In turn, India desires a peaceful and stable Central Asia to prevent any problems from spilling over into South Asia.

Uzbekistan initiated a number of positive changes with regard to regional cooperation following the change in its presidency in 2016. With the largest population in the region – every second Central Asian is an Uzbek national – Uzbek initiatives have tremendous implications across the region. Tashkent injected new vigour into the process of resolving decade-old issues to define borderlines, share cross-border water and revamp trade cooperation with each of its neighbours. In exchange, other countries in the region have also welcomed the new wave of cooperation in bilateral and trilateral formats.

The next steps for the countries will be to see this through and finalize state-level agreements, with onsite work as required, on these issues. This positive development will then serve as a conduit to also streamline regional trade policies and agreements on transportation projects. In addition, agreeing on final, or so-called irreversible, solutions will ensure that lingering issues do not serve as spoilers in the future. This will also strengthen the Central Asian countries’ position while dealing with external players in the region.

A lot remains to be done by the countries on domestic and regional matters. That could be why Central Asian leaders caution against assuming a precipitous creation of a regional organization following the recent renewal of cooperation. While it is true that a regional political organization might not be imminent, regional economic integration, whether by simplifying tariffs or cross-border trade rules, is a real possibility. This can bring in tangible benefits and that is what Central Asian countries would bet on.

 

Footnotes:

1. ‘Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Signed an Agreement on Demarcation of the State Border’, Kazakhstan Today TV Channel, 18 April 2018. https://www.kt.kz/rus/state/kazahstan _i_turkmenistan_ podpisali_soglashenie_ o_demarkacii_gosudarstvennoj_granici_ 1153637926.html (in Russian).

2. ‘The Conflict on the Border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: The Parties Exchanged Accusations’, 24.kg, 13 February 2018. https://24.kg/obschestvo/75988_konflikt_ %20nagranitse_kyirgyizstana_itadjikistana_ %20storonyi_obmenyalis_obvineniyami/ (in Russian); ‘Tajik-Kyrgyz Border Conflicts in the Absence of Maps’, Centre 1, 15 November 2016. https://centre1.com/tajikistan/tadzhiksko-kyrgyzskaya-granitsa-konflikty-v-otsutstvii-kart/ (in Russian); Anora Sarkorova, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Problems Remain at the Border’, BBC, 16 May 2014. https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/05/140516_tajik_kyrgyz_border_ report (in Russian).

3. Alina Zhetigenova, ‘Shooting on the Border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: How the Conflict Unfolded’, Currenttime, 15 March 2019. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/kyrgyzstan-tadjikistan-dorder-shutting/29821114. html (in Russian).

4. It should be noted that Uzbekistan recently started clearing mines from its border with Tajikistan.

5. ‘Accelerating the Completion of Legal Registration of the State Border with Central Asian Countries is an Important Priority of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy’, Xalq So’zi, 15 August 2018. http://xs.uz/ru/post/casia (in Russian).

6. Ibid.

7. Johannes Linn, ‘Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?’ Eurasian Development Bank, 2012, p. 99.

8. Ibid.

9. Eldor Aripov, ‘What is Really Happening in Central Asia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 January 2019. http://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-01-13/11_7480_dip06.html (in Russian).

10. ‘Central Asia: Increasing Gains from Trade Through Regional Cooperation in Trade Policy, Transport, and Customs Transit’, Asian Development Bank, 2006; Central Asia Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme, 2005.

11. Azamatjon Zohidov, ‘Alternative Transport Corridors in Central Asia: Factors, Interdependence and Integration Problems’, Central Asia and Caucasus 1, 2014 (in Russian).

12. ‘Expert: Central Asia has Nothing to Brag About in Terms of Integration’, Sputnik, 8 May 2018. https://uz.sputniknews.ru/ analytics/20180508/8148300/ca-integraciya.html (in Russian).

13. Ibid.

14. Tatyana Kudravtseva, ‘The Situation on the Border: Kazakhstan Wants Money, Kyrgyzstan Suffers Losses’, 24.kg, 5 April 2019. https://24.kg/ekonomika/114013_ situatsiya_nagranitse_kazahstan_hochet _ deneg_kyirgyizstan_terpit_ubyitki/

15. Ibid.

16. Arkadiy Dubnov, ‘Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2018.

17. ‘The Construction of Large Dams is a Threat to Ecology and Social Development’, Pravda Vostoka, 17 August 2016. https://mfa.uz/ru/press/news/2016/08/8089/ (in Russian).

18. Ibid.; ‘The Prime Minister of Uzbekistan has Sent a Letter of Protest to the Tajik Government Regarding the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant’, Kun.uz, 17 July 2016. https://kun.uz/63627317 (in Uzbek).

19. Evgeniya Makhmutova, ‘Central Asia In Search for its Own Integration Model’, Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta 4, 2018 (in Russian).

20. S. Bilahari Kausikan, Frederick Starr and Yang Cheng, ‘Central Asia: All Together Now’, The American Interest 16, 2017. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/06/16/central-asia-all-together-now/

21. ‘Speech of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoev at the Inter-national Conference on the Theme "Central Asia: the only history and common future, cooperation in the field of development and development" in Samarkand’, Uzbekistan News Agency, 11 November 2017. http://uza.uz/oz/politics/zbekiston-respublikasi-prezidenti-shavkat-mirziyeevning-sama-10-11-2017 (in Uzbek).

22. ‘Abduvakhitov: The Railway China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan is Needed Throughout Central Asia’, Sputnik, 23 July 2018. https://ru.sputnik.kg/Radio/20180723/1040297991/zheleznaya-doroga-kitaj-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan.html (in Russian).

23. ‘Why Talk About Central Asian Unity: This is a Myth’, Sputnik, 1 May 2018 (in Russian).

24. Ibid.; Farkhod Tolipov, ‘Central Asia: The Disintegration Theory’, in Central Asia at 25: Looking Back, Moving Forward, A collection of essays from Central Asia, Central Asia Programme, May 2017. www.centralasia-program.org

25. ‘Foreign Policy’, Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan (undated). https://mfa.uz/ru/ cooperation/

26. ‘Rare Central Asian Summit Signals Regional Thaw’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 March 2018. https://www.rferl. org/a/central-asian-summit-astana-kazakhstan-uzbekistan-tajikistan-kyrgyzstan-turkmenistan/29101686.html

27. Eldor Aripov, ‘What is Really Happening in Central Asia’, InoZpress, 15 January 2019. http://inozpress.kg/news/view/id/53722 (in Russian).

28. Ibid.

29. ‘Uzbekistan Begins Clearing its Border with Tajikistan’, Asia Plus, 9 October 2018. https://news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20181009/uzbekistan-pristupil-k-razminiro-vaniyusvoei-granitsi-s-tadzhikistanom (in Russian).

30. ‘Mirziyoyev: Uzbekistan will Build Kambarata Hydroelectric Power Plant with Kyrgyzstan’, Kun.uz, 6 September 2017. https://kun.uz/39057266 (in Uzbek).

31. ‘A Joint Statement by Mirziyoyev and Rahmon, Including the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant, Was Also Adopted’, Kun.uz, 10 March 2018. https://kun.uz/38788523 (in Uzbek).

32. Speech of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the international conference on ‘Central Asia: Common History and Common Future, Sustainable Development and Cooperation’ in Samarkand.

33. ‘Uzbekistan’s Trade Turnover With the Countries of Central Asia Grew by Almost 50% Since the Beginning of the Year’, Podrobno.uz, 13 July 2018. https://podrobno. uz/cat/economic/tovarooborot-uzbekistana-so-strana/ (in Uzbek).

34. Speech of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the international conference on ‘Central Asia: Common History and Common Future, Sustainable Development and Cooperation’ in Samarkand.

35. ‘Visits to Turkmenistan: Uzbekistan is Seeking Access to Seaports’, Kun.uz, 23 May 2017. https://kun.uz/67763298 (in Uzbek).

36. ‘The Chinese Side is Studying Materials for the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Project’, Kun.uz, 2 September 2018. https://kun.uz/news/2018/02/09/hitoj-tomoni-hitoj-kirgiziston-uzbekiston-temir-juli-kurilisi-lojiasi-bujica-materiallarni-urgan-mokda (in Uzbek).

37. ‘Shavkat Mirziyoyev: We Should Refrain From Categorizing Security Threats as "Theirs and Ours" and Practise "Holistic Security"’, Uzbekistan News Agency, 11 November 2019. http://uza.uz/oz/politics/shavkat-mirziyeev-khavfsizlikka-ta-didlarni-ziniki-va-zgalar-11-11-2017 (in Uzbek).

38. S. Bilahari Kausikan, Frederick Starr and Yang Cheng, ‘Central Asia: All Together Now.’

39. Arkadiy Dubnov, ‘Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2018.

40. Nirmala Joshi, ‘Reconnecting India and Central Asia’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2010. https://www.silkroadstudies. org/resources/pdf/Monographs/2010_ 03_MONO_Joshi_India-Central-Asia.pdf

41. Roman Karbozin, ‘India in Central Asia: The Fate of a Latecomer’, Economic Review, 5 August 2013 (in Russian).

42. ‘Will Kremlin Give Delhi Aini Airfield?’, Asia-Plus, 15 July 2015. https://asiaplustj. info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/20150715/kreml-ustupit-deli-aerodrom-aini (in Russian).

43. Nirmala Joshi, ‘Reconnecting India and Central Asia’, op. cit., fn. 40.

44. ‘Uzbekistan has Something to Offer Indian Business’, Economic Review, 17 August 2018 (in Russian).

45. P. Stobdan, ‘Significance of India Joining the Ashgabat Agreement’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 12 February 2018. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/significance-of-india-joining-the-ashgabat-agreement_p-stobdan-120218

46. Roman Muzalevsky, ‘Unlocking India’s Strategic Potential in Central Asia’, Strategic Studies Institute 25(4), 2015.

47: ‘Uzbekistan-India Partnership is an Important Factor for Regional Stability: Ilkhomjon Nematov’, The Economic Times, 25 September 2018. https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/uzbekistan-india-partnership-is-an-important-factor-for-regional-stability-ilkhomjon-nematov/articleshow/65935459.cms?

48. ‘The First Ministerial Meeting Has Ended in Samarkand’, Kun.uz, 13 January 2019. https://kun.uz/76516938 (in Russian).