THE term ‘Greater Eurasia’ entered Russia’s official discourse with President Putin’s address at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2016. However, not only has the creation of a Greater Eurasia been debated in Russian academic literature since 2013, but also the ideas of what it means to be ‘Eurasian’ or the concept of ‘Eurasianism’ has been at the centre of Russian geopolitical debates for a while. Typically, ‘Eurasian’ refers to the forces in Russian society that oppose its westernization and propose a relatively ‘independent’ path for Russia. The concept of Greater Eurasia builds on this. Broadly, it proposes a vision for the continent that does not borrow from western thinking in the hope that Russia, along with its neighbours, can play a leading role.

In 2015, while the concept was still taking shape, Timofey Bordachev, a political scientist, summed up Russia’s potential role: ‘In core Eurasia – comprising of Siberian Russia, Kazakhstan, Middle Asia and western China – an autonomous growth pole will form and likely become one of the most important geopolitical areas in the first half of the 21st century… It will become a common area of Russian and Chinese strategic foreign policy.’¹ Two years later, President Putin expounded his vision for Greater Eurasia, highlighting it as Russia’s approach toward China’s integration agenda, then known as the One Belt One Road.

The Russian concept aims to improve links between states and economies, thereby transforming the political and economic landscapes of the continent to bring peace, stability, prosperity and a fundamentally new quality of life to Eurasia. He noted that this grand Eurasian partnership should be based on bringing together the potential of integration formats such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).²

Since then the concept has been at the centre of several debates among Russian officials as well as in think tanks and academia. Russia’s foremost aim, in proposing this concept, is to overcome its declining role in global politics. More specifically, it seeks to rhetorically accommodate for its shrinking influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly Central Asia, in the face of China’s rising influence. This focuses on both the BRI as well as Russia-China relations in general. Beyond this unifying idea, the concept is inconsistent. When it comes to the specifics of how these twin aims can be achieved, individual scholars and politicians put forward their own understanding and emphasis.

 

The broader discourse focuses on the growing importance of the Eurasian continent amid the declining importance of the US and transatlantic bonds. Europe’s role is defined vaguely. While it is sometimes excluded from Eurasia, at other times it forms the western limit of this space. Sergey Karaganov, a political scientist and a leading ideologist for Greater Eurasia, in an article on the concept explains that the aim of Greater Eurasia is the creation of a ‘continental system of development, cooperation and security from Jakarta or Tokyo to Lisbon, and from Delhi to Murmansk.’ He notes that this would compensate for the failed project of European security, providing a new format to solve disagreements in Europe and along the Chinese border, on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East’.³ Thus, Greater Eurasia presents a form of cooperation among Europe, Russia, Central, East, South and Southeast Asia or, in more practical terms, among the EU, EEU, SCO and ASEAN that does not yet exist, but needs to emerge.^4,5 

China’s rising importance, in particular, is a factor that affects the structure of this new consolidated geopolitical space. There are no clear answers on the location of the latter’s core. On the one hand, some experts argue that Russia will play this role. Tatiana Valovaya, the minister of integration and macroeconomics at the Eurasian Economic Commission, emphasizes that Greater Eurasia is today what Greater Europe used to be – the space addressed is the same, but its centre is shifting towards the East. She draws attention to the present opportunity for the (Russia-led) EAEU to take the lead, cautioning that if Russia missed this chance, in ten years this project may be known as ‘Big Asia’ centred around China.⁶ 

 

On the other hand, a more realistic argument is that while China will play a leading role, Russian interests lie with a stronger China that would counter American and European influence. According to Karaganov, China will be able to rise up to this task only if it overcomes what he calls ‘the Middle Kingdom Complex’, that is, China’s tendency to generate a belt of vassal states around it. To become the true leader of Greater Eurasia, China should learn to deal with neighbouring states on an equal footing.⁷ He also stresses that one of the major aims of Greater Eurasia should be to ‘embed’ China in a ‘net of cooperation, balances and agreements in order to prevent it from turning into a hegemon against which other European and Asian countries would inevitably join forces.’ This would also bring in external powers, which have fewer stakes in preserving the stability and peace on the continent.⁸ 

To achieve this aim, Russia would need to become a friendly balancer to China and a connecting link in the Eurasian continent. According to Bordachev, this could work out because both China and Russia face ‘tremendous pressure’ from the West and are therefore natural allies in opposing it.⁹ Another factor that works in Russia’s favour is that it is considered to be a major security provider on the continent.10 Providing security and keeping the West out of the continent, as it allegedly tries to ‘generate a rift between Moscow and Beijing’, also feature among the major aims of Greater Eurasia.

 

The debates surrounding Greater Eurasia don’t simply focus on geopolitical issues. Another area of debate, which is conducted in more practical terms, focuses on the role of the EEU and the SCO, both of which are centred on Central Asia. The major argument here is that amid rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, the EEU has either to become stronger and more efficient or be overrun by China.¹¹ Here, several options are debated. The first is the expansion of the cooperation model offered by the EEU, i.e. close economic cooperation with other countries in the region. However, several Russian academicians and officials believe that this will undermine Russia’s dominant position in the union. They fear that Russia would lose its leverage the moment the EEU becomes overstretched or admits new members that are more powerful.

 

It is not only the EEU but another existing cooperation format, the SCO, that is also considered to be a good basis for the development and expansion of Greater Eurasia. Dmitry Trenin argues that it would be in Russia’s best interest to turn the SCO into the main consultative organization regarding the security questions in continental Asia. According to him, Russia could play a leading role in the SCO as it has the most experience in terms of diplomacy, military and intelligence work.¹² Other authors even claim that the SCO, as the biggest regional structure, should lay the foundation for economic cooperation in Greater Eurasia as well. In order for this to become a reality, however, an SCO based general economic development strategy would be required.¹³ 

In more concrete terms, Russian authors plead for the creation of its own peacekeeping forces for the SCO. This, so the logic goes, would make conflict settlement and conflict prevention on the continent possible without the engagement of ‘external actors’, i.e. the USA. They also stress on the need for strengthening SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), tighter military coordination among the member states and a joint containment of the threats posed by the further deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan.¹⁴ 

 

In practical terms, Russian experts emphasize freedom of trade and investment as a tool for fostering connectivity in Eurasia, which would ‘make it great again.’ Officials emphasize the importance of closer cooperation on financial markets, better connectivity through infrastructure, and reduction of administrative barriers to trade.¹⁵ Russian authors remain quite vague regarding the question of agency when it comes to implementing this cooperation. None of the existing cooperation mechanisms explicitly cite mechanisms which are to be used in order to further this cooperation. Considering how adamant Russia is about preserving national sovereignty, such cooperation most probably would need to be implemented through intergovernmental agreements.

According to Karaganov, this cooperation model shuns economic wars and protectionism, and should instead be based on an unconditional respect for sovereignty. Therefore, politically, it stands for the ‘traditional values of international law’, negating universalism, moral superiority and hegemony. Further, Russia’s concept is also supposed to accommodate cultural diversity and protect human rights. The latter, however, are understood in a rather unconventional way as they need to be upheld alongside the ‘rights of states and societies’, whatever that means.¹⁶ In effect, this explains the lack of pushback against human rights violations against the Uighurs in China.

There is also a significant focus on security issues as part of this concept. Intending to uphold military stability and prevent conflicts, the concept opposes the expansion of existing military alliance and the creation of new ones. It also supports the value of neutrality and non-alignment in the military realm. This is because, according to the logic of Greater Eurasia, choosing sides in major conflicts on the Eurasian continent is against Russian interests as it stands to benefit from maintaining good relations with China and India, North and South Korea or Iran and Saudi Arabia.¹⁷ 

 

Just as with other aspects of this concept, there is no consistency regarding the question of how Greater Eurasia should be promoted and implemented in real life. As overstretching the EEU or the SCO is not considered to be conductive, deepening Sino-Russian cooperation is largely considered to be the pathway towards Greater Eurasia. Among other things, this is expected to avert competition between the two for influence in Central Asia. Along similar lines, several proposals don’t specify actual integration across the continent, i.e. institutionalization of cooperation.¹⁸ Rather, they suggest loose mechanisms of coordination with – as mentioned above – a strong emphasis on preservation of national sovereignty.¹⁹ 

Karaganov, on the other hand, recommends several measures that need to be undertaken to facilitate the emergence of a Greater Eurasia. At the economic level, these include the creation of a coordinated transportation system across the continent, rating agencies and a Eurasian SWIFT coupled with strengthening the regional financial system and expanding trade in national currencies. He further suggests strengthening regional tools for humanitarian aid and emergency cooperation, which could be tested in Syria. To overcome ‘hostile information flows’, he floats the idea of creating an independent news agency, Eurasia News, which could provide information about and for the continent. Moreover, according to Karaganov, historical and cultural narratives that could help unify Eurasia should be fostered. The narratives he suggests are those of the Genghis Khan Empire, the Silk Road and the history of Byzantium.²⁰ 

 

Dmitry Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, provides a somewhat different view of Russia’s role in Eurasia. According to him, ‘Greater Eurasia’ indicates a tighter geopolitical space, in which Russia is centrally located geographically. The post-Soviet space, mostly understood as Eurasia in Russian thinking, is then the ‘smaller Eurasia’ and the entire Eurasian continent is merging into a ‘Greater Eurasia’ with its core in the East.²¹ Addressing the debate on whether Russia could be at the centre of this Greater Eurasia, he stresses that the major trade and transportation routes connecting Eurasia have historically run to the South of Russia’s border, which makes its claims groundless. He argues that Russia should not be developing a strategy for a Great Eurasia, but rather in it. It should develop a foreign policy that would make it possible to cooperate with both China and the West while maintaining its own independence. Greater Eurasia, in his understanding, is not a bloc that Russia belongs to, but rather a space within which Russia needs to find its place.²² 

 

In all, the vague concept of Greater Eurasia has the aim of accommodating two major developments that Russia confronts in its foreign policy environment. The first is its inability to become a part of the western world, made worse by the deep rift that has emerged between Russia and Europe after the annexation of Crimea. The second is the rise of China, dramatically reducing Russia’s influence in Central Asia, its traditional sphere of influence.

The major shortcoming of the concept is neither its anti-westernism nor the utopian idea that a weaker Russia could nevertheless remain a security provider in the region. Worse, it is the expectation that independent countries across Eurasia, particularly China, would aspire for this particular form of cooperation and base their respective foreign policies on anti-westernism to the same extent that Russia does. Thus, it is highly probable that ‘Greater’ Eurasia may soon be geographically reduced to Russia. The first signs pointing towards this possibility can be found in the notion of Russia’s ‘strategic loneliness’ put forward by Dmitry Trenin, who argues that Russia may not become a part of Greater Eurasia.²³

 

Footnotes:

1. Quoted from: Li Xin, ‘Eurasian Partnership: A New Balance of Power?’ Analytical Media ‘Russian Studies’, 4 January 2018. Accessed 09 September 2019. http://greater-europe.org/archives/4098

2. Vladimir Putin, Address at the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Forum. Official Webpage of the Russian President, 14 May 2017. Accessed 09 September 2019 (in Russian).

3. Sergey Karaganov, ‘From the Pivot to the East to Great Eurasia’, Russia in Global Affairs, 30 May 2017. Accessed 9 September 2019.

4. Vycheslav Sutyrin, ‘Greater Eurasia in 10 Years Can Become Greater Asia Connected in China’, Eurasia Expert, 8 February 2018. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://eurasia. expert/bolshaya-evraziya-cherez-10-let-mozhet-prevratitsya-v-bolshuyu-aziyu-s-tochkoy-sborki-v-kitae/(in Russian).

5. Alexandra Kozlova, ‘Is the "Greater Eurasia" Project a Reality?’ Komsomolskaya Pravda, 6 September 2017. Accessed 9 September 2019 (in Russian).

6. Vycheslav Sutyrin, op. cit., fn. 4.

7. Sergey Karaganov, ‘What Will the World Look Like?’ Russia Newspaper, 14 February 2019. Accessed 9 September 2019 (in Russian).

8. Sergey Karaganov, op. cit., fn. 3.

9. Timofey Bordachev, ‘Creating Eurasia Together’, Izvestiya, 15 April 2015. Accessed 9 September 2019 (in Russian).

10. Sergey Karaganov, op. cit., fn. 3.

11. Vycheslav Sutyrin, op. cit., fn. 4.

12. Dmitri Trenin, ‘It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 25 April 2019. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/11/ru-pub-78328

13. Maria Shilina, ‘Is the SCO the Core of Greater Eurasia?’ Central Asian Analytical Network, 3 September 2018. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://caa-network.org/ archives/13976 (in Russian).

14. Sergey Luzyanin and Analtoliy Clemenko, ‘Grater Eurasia and the SCO: World Order, Security and Fight Against Terrorism’, in Relevant Problems of the SCO Development, Sochi, 2018. Accessed 9 September 2019. http://civilshos.ru/f/materials_2018.pdf (in Russian).

15. Alexandra Kozlova, op. cit., fn. 5.

16. Sergey Karaganov, op. cit., fn. 3.

17. Fedor Lukyanov, ‘It’s Not the Time to Choose’, Russian Newspaper, 13 August 2019. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://rg.ru/2019/08/13/lukianov-napravlenie-bolshaia-evraziia-stanovitsia-dlia-rossii-osnovnym.html (in Russian).

18. Rashid Alimov, ‘The Future of the Institutions of Greater Eurasia’, International Organizations Research Journal 13(3), 2018. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://iorj.hse. ru/data/2018/11/20/1141817308/%D0% 90%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0% BE%D0%B2.pdf (in Russian).

19. Rashid Alimov, ibid.

20. Sergey Karaganov, op. cit., fn. 3.

21. Dmitri Trenin, ‘Metamorphosis of the Greater Eurasia’, Military-Industrial Courier, 21 January 2013. Accessed 9 September 2019. https://vpk-news.ru/articles/14095 (in Russian)

22. Dmitri Trenin, op. cit., fn. 12.

23. Ibid.