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IN a recent book, Democracy on the Road: 25-Year Journey Through India (Penguin, 2019), investment guru and election buff Ruchir Sharma provides an engaging, and enigmatic, account of Indian democracy over the last quarter century. Drawing upon his travels with a cohort of election nerds – psephologists, journalists and analysts – popularly known as the ‘limousine liberals’, the account of encounters with politicians, opinion makers and the ‘common citizen’ in multiple settings across a large swathe of the country is surprisingly ‘deeply optimistic’. Surprising because the period under consideration has experienced some dramatic transformations whose fallouts have generated considerable anxiety about our prospects of survival as a liberal, constitutional democracy.

At the heart of this apprehension is the fear that unlike the early promise of a new era drawing upon the values of our independence struggle and subsequently captured in the Constitution, India, particularly under the current regime, is steadily being transformed into a less salubrious, intolerant, majoritarian society. The struggle for ‘India’s soul’ has infused the impending 2019 elections with a significance far beyond the normal contestations over who gets to form the next government.

Only a few weeks back most pollsters were predicting a fiercely contested election. The ruling BJP, and Prime Minister Modi, had significantly slipped from their comfortable roost as dissatisfaction, and anger has been growing over the inability to generate meaningful employment, growing agrarian distress, demonetisation and a poorly conceptualized and implemented GST regime severely damaging small and medium enterprises and informal economic activity. Further, a heavy-handed and narcissistic governing style accompanied by toxic rhetoric had resulted in escalated social conflict. The resultant unexpected electoral losses suffered by the ruling party in recent assembly elections served to fracture the air of invincibility surrounding the government. No longer does this seem the case.

The horrific terror strike in Phulwma killing over 40 para military personnel, arguably the biggest such incident in recent decades, stunned and angered the country. The mood changed and turned ugly as demands of revenge grew. Howsoever experts read the consequences of the retributory air strikes at terrorist training camps in Pakistan, this unprecedented and audacious move, a first since 1971, clearly dramatically bolstered Prime Minister Modi’s image as a no-nonsense, muscular nationalist willing to play high risk games to ‘salvage national honour and pride’. Equally quick-footed have been the government’s and the ruling party’s moves to capitalize, electorally, on the shift in popular mood, in particular by stressing on leadership quality difference between PM Modi and his opponents.

Does this then mean that 2019 is now done and dusted? No matter what current polls/surveys indicate, such a conclusion might well be premature. As history indicates, popular mood swings are fickle, possibly transient, and there are still some weeks before the first votes are cast. And even though the ruling BJP is far more adept – with organization, personnel, funds and strategy – at influencing opinions and firming up loose ends through skilful coalitions and alliances, it is conceivable that other issues where its performance record is somewhat shaky can kick in, dampening the current ‘national security’ advantage.

Ruchir Sharma reminds us that while ‘real power in India resides with the political class’, yet, ‘for all their clout, the odds are against Indian politicians holding on to their offices.’ Moreover, while single factors – high inflation, sprawling corruption, or a united opposition – can bring down the government, winning is more complicated; many factors need to fall in line. Joshi’s list includes tests of community, family, inflation, welfare, development and money, and critically, the selection of the candidate.

Unsurprisingly, he characterizes national elections in India, not as one plebiscitary contest but as a melange of many state/regional bouts reflecting different trends in different places. Overall, ‘winning campaigns in India need to understand the ties that bind Indian voters to community and family, their frustration with government and the slow pace of economic progress, the pain of rising prices, and their sense of disgust with both corruption and the justice system. Often challengers prevail by simply watching the incumbent fail on one or more of these tests.’

Decoding what matters to the voter is rarely straight-forward. In 2014, the BJP under Narendra Modi successfully sold a combination of ‘disgust’ with the incumbent UPA and ‘hope’ of a new India under a new leadership. In 2019, it seems to be falling back on stoking fear – if not Modi then chaos. Despite the many advantages it has over the opposition, the impending elections could still surprise, possibly denying the ruling coalition a second term in office.

Harsh Sethi