DIFFERENCES in opinion over the U.S. policy toward Pakistan have long featured in bilateral relations. The debate over how to engage Pakistan has intensified and cooled over time but never since 2001 has it abated. Disagreements within American policy circles and segments of the public have grown as the conflict in Afghanistan has dragged on and Pakistan has been accused of prolonging the insurgency. The competing arguments centre on how best to achieve Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting violent extremist groups on its soil, particularly in its breaking ties to groups believed to be abetting terrorism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. A deeper concern is that terrorists may have their eyes on the country’s nuclear arsenal and might again use a presence in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre to plan attacks on the U.S.

In recent years several developments in Pakistan and its region, as well as in the United States, have influenced the debate and to some extent recast it. The deteriorating military picture in Afghanistan together with the Trump administration’s revised strategic approach to the conflict has heightened U.S. criticism of Pakistan. The continuing drift of the United States toward closer economic and security ties with India has also helped to shape the policy debate over Pakistan. So too has the increased Chinese, and to a lesser extent Russian, involvement with Pakistan, both having thrown into question the decades long American partnership with Pakistan. The August 2018 elections of a government in Pakistan headed by a populist charismatic prime minister previously known for his denigration of U.S. policies on terrorism has added new uncertainty to the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Pakistan largely fell off the map for the United States during the 1990s when military assistance was abruptly cut off and development aid disappeared almost entirely. In the wake of the Soviet’s 1989 withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s saliency for the American public similarly diminished. Only as Pakistan re-entered U.S. strategic thinking post 9/11 did American public attention turn again toward Pakistan. In the time since, discussions of Pakistan in the U.S. public forum have generally assumed a negative tone. Yet, aside from the Pakistani diaspora community, Americans know little about the country and do not feel deeply about its policies or its people. Only occasionally does Pakistan find its way into the national press and magazines where it is most likely to be referenced in stories about Afghanistan.

To the extent that Pakistan strongly enters the public’s consciousness, it comes with high profile events such as the discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden, the religious extremists’ attack on schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai, or the occasional press stories on blasphemy and denials of human rights. Worth noting, for the present at least, differences over a Pakistan policy have been spared from partisan divide.

Serious discussion of U.S. policy choices toward Pakistan occurs mainly within the walls of government, among the denizens of the Pentagon and State Department, members of Congress and the intelligence community, and several Washington based think tanks. Overall, inside government circles there are feelings of irritation and frustration with Pakistan. It is a widely shared view that Pakistan only selectively cooperates with the United States and by its double-dealing cannot be trusted. Little consensus exists, however, over what measures might be taken to improve relations with Pakistan. Much of the debate centres on the extent to which coercion should be applied to force Pakistan’s greater cooperation. Differences range from those who argue for an almost complete break in ties with Pakistan to those who, despite their disappointments with Pakistan, see engagement as essential to U.S strategic aims in the region.

 

The most extreme view argues for what would amount to an American divorce from Pakistan.¹ This policy line would declare Pakistan a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ which under American law would preclude it from receiving U.S. provided aid, economic and development as well as military. The strongest advocates of a sharp break express resentment over giving aid to a country seen as largely uncooperative in fighting terrorism, and whose citizens seem to show little appreciation for the assistance. Insisting that Pakistan cannot be treated in any way as a partner or an ally, they appear ready to accept an adversarial relationship. With India, proponents argue for strengthening strategic and economic ties, including recognition of the contentious Line of Control, the 1949 ceasefire line, as the international border.

Another policy line also favours a hard line but acknowledges risks in harsher policies toward Pakistan. It contends that the U.S. holds considerable leverage over Pakistan that has not been fully and effectively used. While looking for ways to find common purpose and gain cooperation through new inducements, this approach lays greater stock on raising the costs to Pakistan for resisting U.S. demands.² The designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism is not ruled out as an option. Short of that step, a revoking of Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO military ally is advocated. This approach encourages working more closely with other countries to put pressure on Pakistan, and also endorses the prioritizing of American relations with Pakistan’s civilian leadership.

 

A third view stresses the importance of a working relationship with Pakistan and fears the consequences of disengagement. It rejects the idea that isolating and stigmatizing Pakistan will produce the outcomes that the Americans seek.³ It argues that punitive measures have not succeeded and that a too heavy-handed approach further alienates Pakistan’s policy makers and public, and benefits the country’s extremist groups. Advocates of a softer line point out the importance of Pakistan to the mission in Afghanistan, and the necessity of gaining a better understanding of Pakistan’s strategic anxieties, particularly regarding India.

The three policy lines often disagree over specific issues. Among them are the role Pakistan should have in an Afghan peace process, and the extent of Pakistan’s ability to sway the Afghan Taliban’s decision to negotiate. There is debate as well over whether the United States could manage logistically were Pakistan to deny provision of air and ground routes for American forces in Afghanistan. Differences also exist on the effectiveness of inducements to influence Pakistan’s policies and what carrots if any should be offered. Those sympathetic to one or another of the policy prescriptions for Pakistan also often have dissimilar views on whether the United States can help in resolving the disputes Pakistan has with India and Afghanistan.

 

The military dimension has loomed large through the history of American ties to Pakistan. During the Cold War, Pakistan as an alliance partner was conceived of as a necessary link in the U.S.’s containment policy of the Soviet Union. After a cooling of U.S.-Pakistan relations during the 1970s, the rationale for a military-to-military partnership was reasserted following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan mainly for the purpose of arming Afghan insurgents to fight the Red Army. When the United States again engaged in the region in October 2001, it was to enlist Pakistan in military operations, this time to defeat al-Qaeda and its Taliban protector, and help stabilize Afghanistan. In each instance American policy toward Pakistan was almost entirely through a military lens, focused on military needs and priorities.

The U.S. military developed over time close and even warm ties with Pakistan’s senior army officers and its intelligence wing, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) directorate. These bonds have conspicuously weakened as the military picture in Afghanistan has darkened. A military victory is thought of as impossible so long as the insurgency’s fighters and leadership, particularly the Haqqani network, continue to find refuge and receive support across the border in Pakistan.

The State Department had until 2010 taken a decidedly back seat on formulating Pakistan policy. Naming Richard Holbrooke as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan gave the Department a diplomatic role meant to complement the then underway U.S. military’s surge in Afghanistan. Holbrooke’s team under-took the job of searching for Taliban interlocutors and enlisting Pakistan’s assistance in bringing the insurgents to the negotiating table. High-level diplomatic visits and public pronouncements all conveyed the same message to Pakistan, that it should ‘do more’ to advance the peace process.

 

Military gains on the ground in Afghanistan were expected to prepare the ground for a political solution to the conflict. Additional U.S. efforts were directed at encouraging neighbouring states concerned about the possible export of terrorism from Afghanistan and the economic costs of regional instability to collectively press the Taliban to negotiate.

In the executive branch, impatience with Pakistan increased as well. President Trump famously tweeted on the first day of 2018 that ‘the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!’⁴ This message set the tone for U.S.-Pakistan relations going forward. It was reinforced on 19 November when the president claimed in a tweet, ‘Pakistan does nothing for the United States’.⁵ Although other members of the administration have regularly tried to soften the policy implications of such messages, they nevertheless gave full display to the frustration in the executive branch that has been followed up by actions designed to punish Pakistan, as described below.

 

The intelligence community has valued its connections with Pakistan counterparts that formed during the jihad of the 1980s. Post-2001, the CIA has cooperated with the ISI operationally in the CIA run drone programmes by providing launching sites in Pakistan. Intelligence sharing has long been a staple in the relationship. The United States has not always taken Pakistan into confidence, and the ISI and others have been accused of leaking information. Trust suffered badly with the discovery of Osama bin Laden’s hideout deep inside Pakistan and its suggestion of an apparent high-level ISI cover-up. The deep estrangement has never fully recovered even as Pakistan and the United States continue at times to collaborate in targeting mutual terrorist enemies. In general, U.S. suspicions are more than matched within Pakistan’s intelligence and military circles.

Several of Washington’s think tanks regularly present panels and symposiums and issue reports critiquing American policies toward Pakistan. The extent to which these activities help to shape public policy is probably limited. The exception is a February 2017 co-authored report based on interviews by a group of analysts that surveyed the views of the policy community on Pakistan.⁶ It called for tougher measures to induce Pakistan to cooperate on Afghanistan and India and closely reflects the second policy approach mentioned above. It is not incidental that one of the authors of the report was subsequently appointed as Senior Director on the Trump administration’s National Security Council with responsibility for Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Congressional actions reflect continued irritation with Pakistan over what is believed to be the close ties of Pakistan’s security services with the Haqqani network and more broadly the perceived unwillingness by Pakistan to use its leverage to force a negotiated end to the Afghan conflict. An influential Indian caucus among members in the U.S. House of Representatives has regularly pushed for a harder line with Pakistan and alleged inadequate protections of Pakistan’s ethnic and religious minorities, namely Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis. The House caucus defending Pakistan is smaller and generally less effective. Pakistan relies on more engaging diaspora groups and public relations firms to plead its case with the American Congress, administration and public.

 

For the time being, those in Washington responsible for shaping policies toward Pakistan have shrunk away from advocating a sharp break in ties. Even so, the U.S. has adopted under the Trump presidency a more aggressive approach toward Pakistan. To match its rhetoric, the costs to Pakistan for its Afghan and national security policies have been raised. The United States has removed most of what had been meant as incentives and employed new sticks. With overwhelming majorities in both houses, the U.S. removed and then reprogrammed most of what had been allocated in the 2017 National Defence Authorization Act for the Coalition Support Fund. The fund was created to reimburse Pakistan for taking action against terrorist groups in the tribal regions. The Pakistan military was accused of continuing to harbour insurgent groups that attack American forces in Afghanistan. A total of $1.66 billion in security assistance has been suspended. This cut includes the funding for Pakistani military officers to participate in the U.S. in the much praised International Military Education Training programme (IMET).

 

The United States has also worked with international partners to diplomatically isolate and punish Pakistan. Most visibly in June 2018, with the United States and Britain as co-sponsors, the 37-nation Financial Action Task Force (FATF) affirmed its earlier vote to place Pakistan on a ‘gray list’ for failing to take sufficient efforts to curb terrorist financial transactions. The decision came just as it was welcoming a new Pakistani government faced with a severe economic crisis that would soon be considering applying for an IMF loan. FATF’s action complicates Pakistan’s international financial transactions and could act to discourage foreign investment. The listing has reportedly upset the Pakistan government far more than the cut-offs in U.S. aid.

In conclusion, the sharp differences over policy toward Pakistan can be traced to a large extent to the absence of a broad U.S. strategy for Pakistan and its region. Such strategic thinking would further a more thorough and careful assessment of the U.S. national interest stakes and allow for a careful crafting of policies needed to advance American long-term interests. As Stephen Hadley and Moeed Yusuf argue, a more strategic approach would offer a better basis on which the U.S. and Pakistan can find their common priorities.⁷ In addition to helping identify those areas of policy on which the U.S. and Pakistan can have meaningful cooperation, it can better reveal areas where their national interests do not overlap and may be incompatible.

A more strategic U.S. approach toward Pakistan could also encourage a view of relations that goes beyond its current preoccupation with the war in Afghanistan. It would incorporate, for example, a consideration of the implications of retaining U.S. influence in the region in avoiding a major conflict between Pakistan and India. It could take fuller account of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and possible fallout, literally and figuratively, through the subcontinent. Holding Pakistan in the American orbit is viewed by some as necessary for the United States to maintain a long-term presence in the region for the purpose of monitoring and checking Iran, Russia and China. A more strategic view would also help weigh the benefits of tough U.S. actions against the possibility they might raise the stock of Pakistani militant extremists actively opposed to cooperation with the United States.

 

With a broadened perspective the United States can better design a carefully calibrated increase in pressure aimed at increasing Pakistan’s cooperation. Wide agreement exists over the need for applying well targeted penalties. But policies that count almost entirely on making objectionable behaviour costly must account for such emotive factors as respect, honour and sovereignty. By ignoring these less measurable factors, American punitive actions have intensified both elite and public anger toward the United States and otherwise proven counterproductive. As a result of its growing alienation, Pakistan has fallen into the further economic and political embrace of China and opened doors to cooperation with Russia. Worsening relations with the United States have also complicated finding a successful political outcome in Afghanistan. For all of Pakistan’s uncooperative behaviour, turning it into a virtual enemy could create far worse problems in Afghanistan.

 

The United States could also explore new incentives with Pakistan. It can consider re-examining policies that, not without reason, are seen as discriminatory, particularly trade practices involving textile exports. As the U.S. grants exemptions to India and Afghanistan allowing the use of Iran’s Chabahar port, obstacles could be removed to the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to energy hungry Pakistan. Without ignoring Pakistan’s past history as a nuclear proliferator, it might be worthwhile to explore ways to balance the U.S.’s nuclear agreement with India with one designed for Pakistan. Few actions would be more welcomed by Pakistan than the United States’ showing interest in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Debate over policies toward Pakistan will persist as long as the United States views involvement in the region as in its vital national interest. It would be difficult to justify today the kind of disengagement from Pakistan and the region that occurred in the decade following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The U.S. was unconcerned then with the threat of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent and Pakistan as a breeding ground for terrorists. The civil war that raged in Afghanistan showed at the time little danger of expanding. Furthermore, in the 1990s, Russia and China did not loom as major actors in a great game over the future in South-West Asia, and Iran was mostly on the sidelines. As long as an unresolved conflict in Afghanistan continues to distort the U.S. focus, a stable, realistic, and constructive U.S. relationship with Pakistan cannot emerge.

 

Footnotes:

1. https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/pakistans-anxieties-are-incurable-so-stop-trying-to-cure-them/

2. https://www.hudson.org/research/13305- a-new-u-s-approach-to-pakistan-enforcing-aid-conditions-without-cutting-ties

3. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ archive/1202915/u-s-pakistan-relations- and-the-big-stick/

4. https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/01/politics/donald-trump-2018-pakistan/index.html

5. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/world/asia/pakistan-trump-imran-khan.html

6. https://www.hudson.org/research/13305- a-new-u-s-approach-to-pakistan-enforcing-aid-conditions-without-cutting-ties

7. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/afghanistan-pakistan-taliban.html