INDIAN foreign policy is a rather grandiose term for relations with three countries: China, Pakistan, and the US. India has diplomatic missions all over the world, but for the most part since 1947 Indian diplomats have been preoccupied with these key interlocutors. Much of what passes for Indian foreign policy in other places is New Delhi’s attempts to limit the influence of Beijing and Islamabad, and at least in the past decade, coordinate tacitly or explicitly with Washington. Taking stock of Indian foreign policy is therefore largely about New Delhi’s dealings with three capitals.

How was 2018, then, for India’s relations with China, Pakistan, and the US? The big foreign policy story was undoubtedly China: New Delhi moved back to a more normal, détente-like relationship with its northern neighbour after four hard-nosed years of interaction. With Pakistan, despite the coming to power of Imran Khan and a brief flirtation with more positive relations, it was business as usual – brittle and fractious. Relations with the US reside somewhere in between: the warmth has gone with Donald Trump in the White House, but an enduring strategic convergence kept things in some working order. In short, this was largely a year of diplomatic retrenchment.

Suddenly, after a difficult 4-5 years, China-India relations moved into a more positive phase in 2018. Differences over a number of nettle-some issues reduced, and the discourse between them grew more normal. Indeed, a Sino-Indian détente is quite visible: while the two powers are rivals, they are trying to manage the relationship better at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. At each level, a perceptible change has occurred since the Xi-Modi summit at Wuhan in April 2019.

At the bilateral level, the defining issue is of course the border quarrel. But there are at least two other matters that regularly come into play: New Delhi’s stand and actions on Tibet; and the flow of water in the Brahmaputra river. On all three issues, India and China have reduced differences and tensions.

After the stand off in the summer of 2017, Beijing and New Delhi took steps to improve communications between the governments and militaries to avoid a repeat of Doklam, the most serious confrontation since Sumdurong Chu in 1986-87. The two sides agreed that the leaderships would provide more ‘strategic guidance’ to their forces. In addition, dialogue at various levels would resume including between the Special Representatives and their defence and home ministers.

 

With respect to Tibet, in March-April and just weeks prior to the Wuhan meeting, New Delhi tried to reassure Beijing by ordering that no government functionary should attend the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Dalai’s exile. It also emphasized that the Dalai and Tibetans in exile were not permitted to carry out any political activities on Indian soil.

As for the Brahmaputra river-water flows, in May, China resumed providing hydrological data. For a year prior to this, in the wake of the Doklam crisis, despite the China-India agreement on the exchange of riverine data, it had stopped sending updates on water flows.

At the regional level, too, China and India tried to avoid stepping on each other’s toes. China’s relations with Pakistan are the most divisive issue here, but competition in the Indian Ocean area is also a worry as is Afghanistan.

Even though China and Pakistan continue to be ‘all-weather friends’, Beijing tried to meet some Indian concerns. These relate to New Delhi’s insistence that China should move against Pakistani support of terrorism. For at least three years, Indian diplomats and Prime Minister Modi have lobbied with China to take a stand on Islamabad’s unwillingness to curtail the activities of Hafeez Saeed and Masood Azhar, two well-known extremist leaders in Pakistan. Beijing has long blocked the UN from actions against both. However, China is now prepared to consider any further information on Masood Azhar that India is willing to provide; and in June it stayed neutral when Pakistan was put back on the ‘grey list’ of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which aims to curb money laundering and terror financing.

Pakistan is still a problem between China and India. For instance, on 31 October, New Delhi lodged a strong protest with both Beijing and Islamabad over the start of the bus route between Kashgar and Lahore, saying that the route traversed Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir which is legally part of India. Yet, since Wuhan, India has clearly reduced its public criticism of China’s Belt and Route Initiative (BRI).

 

China and India showed some sensitivity to each other’s concerns in other South Asian situations. In February 2018, it appeared the two were on collision course on the Maldives. China warned India not to intervene in the Maldives in the third week of February 2018, and later in that month PLA Navy ships were seen heading to the Indian Ocean through the Lombok Strait. At the same time, the Indian Navy was exercising in the Arabian Sea and Sunda Strait area. The Chinese navy eventually turned back, and in the event, India did not intervene in the Maldives. Both countries welcomed the new government that took power in the island state after the presidential elections on 23 September 2018.

Beijing and New Delhi also showed restraint in the emerging Sri Lankan constitutional and political crisis which started on 26 October. China was fulsome about the appointment of former President Mahendra Rajapaksa as the new prime minister but kept a low profile after its initial statement. In the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s sacking, India urged that democratic norms be respected but did little else to intervene in the matter. Sensibly, China and India did not square off openly even though it appears that Sirisena’s action may have been prompted by Wickremesinghe’s closeness to New Delhi.

China and India showed that they are able not only to avoid conflict but also work positively together in South Asia. Both view the instability and extremism in Afghanistan as a threat to their security. For some years, New Delhi has worried that China’s influence there is growing, especially in the wake of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At Wuhan, however, the two decided to put their heads together. The first expression of cooperation on Afghanistan was the agreement to jointly train the country’s diplomats. The programme began in October. This is a small step, to be sure, but it is a signal that they are prepared to cooperate where their interests converge.

 

Finally, China and India have over the years converged and collaborated on the global economic system, climate change, and opposition to humanitarian intervention, among others. More recently, being at the receiving end of US economic pressures has brought them together. The US trade war is mostly directed at China, but India too was the object of raised tariffs. Both found themselves the target of visa restrictions. China is being targeted as part of the US’s attempt to limit Chinese influence mongering and its access to American high technology. India is in the US crosshairs as part of the crackdown on H1B employment visas. In addition, Washington wants both Beijing and New Delhi to stop buying Iranian oil and Russian weapons.

Not surprisingly, at Wuhan, China and India argued for ‘the importance of building an open, multipolar, pluralist and participatory global economic order which will enable all countries to pursue their development and contribute to the elimination of poverty and inequality in all regions of the world’ – this in opposition to what they regard as increasing US protectionism.

How long will the Sino-Indian détente last? Clearly, another border confrontation could upset the new spirit of accommodation. Regionally, a terror strike on India from Pakistan could once again lead to an explosive situation in the subcontinent, and China could be drawn into the resulting crisis.

The situation in the Maldives but even more so in Sri Lanka could be another source of China-India tensions. If, as some are expecting, the constitutional conflict in Sri Lanka is not resolved peacefully, New Delhi may be tempted to take a hand. This could lead one side or other in the island nation to turn to Beijing for help.

Globally, there is not much that divides the two, but Chinese support for Pakistani membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), hinted at during the visit of Prime Minister Imran Khan to China from 2-5 November, could inflame the Indian side which has had its application for membership categorically rejected by China. US pressures on India to take sides in the trade war and emerging ‘cold war’ could also cause the Sino-Indian détente to unravel.

For now, though, the two sides seem set on reducing points of friction and increasing their ability to manage differences.

 

India’s Pakistan policy in 2018 remained much the same: tying progress to Pakistan’s stance on terrorism and Kashmir; and spurning negotiations and meetings. Despite indications from Islamabad that it wanted to resume talks and build warmer ties, New Delhi, except for three brief moments, remained unmoved.

The first brief moment of warmth was in May when New Delhi offered a return to the 2003 ceasefire agreement. Since September 2016, the ceasefire along the Line of Control between the two militaries had collapsed. The terrorist attack on the Uri army camp was the precipitating factor here, followed by India’s so-called ‘surgical strike’ just days later. India’s ceasefire offer in May 2018 was tied to Ramadan and limited to the fasting month. Indian military operations – largely cross-border artillery fire – resumed in June 2018 after a spike in protests in Kashmir and the killing of the respected Kashmiri journalist, Shujaat Bukhari.

 

The second brief moment of warmth with Pakistan was in late July 2018 after Imran Khan’s election victory. While Khan has been a regular India-baiter, Narendra Modi did reach out to him, offering congratulations on his win. This came after Khan’s post-election statement promising that if India took one step towards negotiation and peace over Kashmir, Pakistan would take two.

The third brief moment of warmth occurred at the end of September. When Khan in a letter to Modi on September 14 suggested that the foreign ministers of the two sides meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, India replied affirmatively on September 20. The following day, however, New Delhi called off the talks, stating that the discovery of three dead policemen in Kashmir and Pakistan’s issuance of a postage stamp in the memory of the slain Kashmiri leader, Burhan Wani, made the meeting impossible.

Despite these three positive moments, it was business as usual between India and Pakistan. New Delhi refused to deal with Pakistan until Islamabad ended its support of terrorism. Internationally, it continued its campaign against Islamabad. When the UN accused India of serious human rights violations in Kashmir in June, New Delhi rejected the charge and blamed Pakistan for aiding and abetting terrorism.

 

A few days after changing its mind on the UNGA meeting, New Delhi went out of its way to celebrate the two-year anniversary of the ‘surgical strike’ against Pakistan – this notwithstanding the fact that the strike is widely acknowledged to have achieved little or nothing of substance. The number of intrusions across the LOC, the number of infiltration-related deaths, and the constant insecurity of populations in the border areas have only increased over the past two years. At about this time, too, Army Chief Bipin Rawat and Defence Minister Seetharaman warned Pakistan of serious consequences over the killing and mutilation of a captured Indian soldier.

In short, barring a few positive interludes, relations with Pakistan have remained much the same: brittle and fractious. Over four years, the Modi government seems to have developed no plan on how to deal either with the militancy in Kashmir (which has seen some of the most serious violence in years) or the challenge of Pakistan. On Pakistan, it has yo-yoed between dramatic ad hoc flourishes – inviting Nawaz Sharif to Modi’s inauguration; Modi dropping in at Nawaz’s daughter’s wedding in 2015; Sushma Swaraj’s sudden visit to Pakistan in 2016; the 2015 and 2017 meetings between the National Security Advisers in Thailand – and routine ‘naming and shaming’ and threatening.

As many countries have discovered, Pakistan is the most difficult country in the world to handle. Having said that, the Modi government has shown no creativity in dealing with Islamabad. Nor does it display much courage. It uses Kashmir and Pakistan in domestic politics to advantage (as in 2016 during the Uttar Pradesh state elections) but shows no signs of strategic initiative.

While the government has tried to suggest that the surgical strike was a brave new policy, it is clear that it was not new at all and had been quietly authorized on several occasions by the UPA government as well. The Modi government has also suggested that local commanders along the LOC have been given permission to fire more or less at will, unlike the past. While this may indeed be a break from earlier practice, it has proven ineffective – as has the rather parallel Kashmir policy where the security forces have been empowered to take strong action and where the tide of militancy has only grown in response.

 

The year showed once again that India’s broad strategic convergence with the US on China’s rise is the ballast of the relationship. On the other hand, a decade after the nuclear deal, there is not much warmth between the two governments. The prime cause here is Donald Trump.

It is not just that Trump is cold, calculating, and transactional. Modi has been accused of being exactly the same. It is also not just that the US president is inconsistent and tactical. So is the Indian prime minister, judging by nearly five years of his China and Pakistan policies. It is not even that the American leader is obsessed with his domestic political base of ultra-nationalist voters. After all, Modi cultivates the same kind of base in India. Rather, it is that in Trump’s view India does not count for much and on economic issues it is a problem.

Trump’s biggest concern is China. Steve Bannon, Peter Navarro, and the strategic analyst Michael Pillsbury have sold him the idea that China has been embarked on a strategy of stealing, lying, and out competing the US for the past 40 years and that US dominance and competitiveness are under threat. This is a view that is not restricted to Trump – it is now widely shared in Washington, the US strategic community, and the American public. The question is what to do about it. Trump has increased US defence spending to ensure China can be contained. He has also launched a trade war ostensibly to get China to change its economic policies. If this is the objective, then Beijing can probably cut a deal eventually.

 

However, there are two other possibilities. The first is that China bashing is good for mobilizing his domestic base at least until his re-election and perhaps halfway into the second term. The second possibility is that he is trying to build US power and seriously damage Chinese capabilities by ‘decoupling’ sectors of the US economy – especially high technology and key supply-chains. In this view, Trump has launched a new cold war with the intention of containing if not defeating a strategic adversary. As the US used its economic and technological might to beat the Soviet Union, it should do the same to China.

If Trump is unleashing a cold war, what he and his advisers are in effect challenging is the long-held proposition that China cannot be dealt with in the same way as the Soviet Union because of the deep economic interdependence between the American and Chinese economies. By decoupling from China, the US would hope to reduce interdependence, rebuild its manufacturing strength, and stave off China’s technological rise. Perhaps in addition the strategy would so damage the Chinese economy that domestic unrest would break out and regime change might result. This last consequence would clearly be a potentially explosive development and fraught with risk; but then Trump and this group of China advisers are risk takers.

 

At any rate, whatever Trump’s game plan, nowhere in it is India of any great importance. The US president simply does not believe much in alliances – either in Europe or East Asia. He has insulted and mocked his allies in both regions. He is unilateralist and feels America can handle its security challenges, primarily emanating from China, on its own. If so, India does not matter. It is instructive that where India could count, namely, in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), Trump has said nothing of substance, leaving it to lesser members of his administration to keep the US-India axis against China going.

While Trump has little time for India as a strategic partner, he does view India as a strategic economic problem. Like China, though not on the same scale obviously, India has a range of what he considers unfair trade and investment practices that he wants to see stopped. On top of this, Indian professionals enter the US and ‘take’ American jobs, which does not go down well with his base (or so he thinks). India also trades with the enemy (Iran) and buys arms from Russia when US systems are on offer. Trump has therefore slapped tariffs on Indian products, reduced the number of H1B visas for Indian professionals, and will sanction India if at some point it does not reduce its purchase of Iranian oil and Russian arms.

 

In summary, India’s China policy has moved back to where it should have all along been – in a low-key détente. Pakistan policy, despite some flashes, has remained a black hole of negativity. America policy has settled into a routinized strategic partnership without much warmth. If we compare this to what was seemingly promised and what Modi’s supporters exult in, namely, an energetic, creative, and brave new foreign policy that would garner India respect and security, then Indian foreign policy in 2018 was unedifying.

New Delhi’s somersault on China has surprised outsiders and diminished Modi and India’s standing. What caused the somersault is not understood and has raised questions about the ability of India to think things through and see them through as well.

The stultified nature of Indian policy on Pakistan does not do India much credit. Nor has it made the country more secure; indeed, quite the opposite. With his solid majority in parliament, Modi could have taken some bold decisions on Pakistan. In particular, he could have come to agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek. The confrontation on Siachen makes no sense. Indian soldiers are put at extreme risk atop the glacier for no real strategic purpose or gain. It is no dishonour to come to an agreement with Pakistan on it. Sir Creek too is eminently solvable. As early as 1989, the two countries had fashioned an agreement on both disputes from which Rajiv Gandhi, to his discredit, retreated for domestic political reasons.

Agreements on both disputes would have helped de-fang opponents of India in Pakistan who argue that New Delhi is hegemonic and bullying. Modi, with his majority in the legislature, and his undoubted popularity and campaign skills, could have sold the agreements to the Indian public. He chose not to. Pakistan should stop its support of terrorism, but India’s dealings with it cannot be held hostage to the terrorism issue forever, any more than the cold war adversaries from 1945 to 1989 could hang everything on one issue. The present course on Pakistan is strategic abnegation of the highest order and does India no good.

 

Finally, on America, it should have been clear from November 2016 onwards that India would have a problem on its hands with Trump in the White House. The mood in New Delhi seemed to have been quite the opposite. It was not until the East Asia Summit meeting in 2017 between Trump and Modi that it became apparent that the US president was neither respectful nor reliable as a partner. Part of the correction on China policy no doubt occurred as a reaction. New Delhi has escaped US sanctions on Iran oil and the S-400 Russian missile purchases, but the exemption may not last. Clearly, the India-US relationship needs regular attention given Trump. Unfortunately, with the general elections around the corner, there will be no one in Delhi to attend to foreign policy till the summer of 2019.

Which brings us to a final point: the Modi foreign policy team has been one of the weakest teams India has fielded. Modi himself brought no experience to the table. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s speciality is South Asia and India’s borderlands. Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj had no foreign policy expertise either and in any case has played no role in policy formulation. Minister of State General V.K. Singh is indiscreet and more a liability than an asset. It is only by dint of the Ministry of External Affairs professionals that India has tided over the Modi years.