THE Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has remained a mystery for over ninety years – not because of its organic complexity but by design. The organization started out with the singular idea of shakhas designed as crucibles for fashioning a sort of ‘new Hindutvawaadi man’ but over the years it has evolved into a hydra like entity in order to survive and thrive. It has spread itself across causes, institutions, and social sectors in order to exist in different avatars that speak in different tones, but work towards the same end goal – replacing the Constitutional idea of India with their idea of an ideal Hindu Rashtra – where both an ideal Hindu and an ideal nationalist are defined by them, and are in essence the same.

An elaborate façade of smoke and mirrors allows the RSS to reveal and conceal its means and ends as it thinks fit. Part of the reason behind this heavily guarded façade is that they are yet to psychologically recover from bans imposed on the organization after Gandhi’s assassination, during the Emergency, and again, after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. In fact, its leadership decided to participate actively in the 2014 general elections largely because they were apprehensive of another ban in the wake of allegations of ‘Saffron terror’.

Post-2014, with a government that owes allegiance to the RSS in power, it has little reason to fear a ban, and yet it remains vigilant about its image – because as its stranglehold over the establishment increases, so do the costs of revealing its true character. Therefore, until members of the organization are completely and exclusively entrenched, its leadership is wary of drawing unnecessary attention to the fact that their actions and aims contradict India’s Constitutional morality.

There is also concern about funding. In June last year the CIA World Factbook listed RSS affiliates, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal as ‘religious militant organizations’. Given that much of their funding comes from NRIs, who despite being sympathetic to their ideology, cannot afford to ignore the CIA’s classification, the RSS understands the value of maintaining a moderate façade behind which its real work can continue unexamined.

Consequently, there is a concerted campaign to project the RSS as a moderate organization dedicated to social cohesion and committed to India’s Constitutional ideals. This campaign is being carried out directly by the organization, and through its proxies. In order to delineate the chasm between projected fiction and ground realities, let us take one example of each.

For one, the heavily publicized three-day lecture series by their supreme leader, Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat held in September 2018 at Vigyan Bhawan in Delhi to explain the RSS’s vision of India. These lectures were aimed at managing the RSS’s image in the media and the outside world, and present a stark contrast, not just to what the RSS believes and does, but also to what Bhagwat himself has said on other occasions when addressing insiders who work towards RSS’s end goal.

And, secondly, a new book by Walter Anderson and Shridhar Damle, RSS: A View to the Inside, that purports to be an independent account but, by and large, reproduces the strategically constructed narrative of the insiders.

 

The broad strategy is twofold. First, an attempt to whitewash the past. Bhagwat spoke of the RSS’s founder K.B. Hedgewar’s enormous contribution to the freedom struggle, the RSS’s devotion to the national flag from the moment it was adopted, and claimed that Hedgewar’s successor, M.S. Golwalkar’s radical book, We or Our Nationhood Defined, does not reflect the author’s own views. All three claims have no basis in established historical records. This is where the second strategy comes in. For those who are not convinced by this revisionism, RSS leaders and their proxies argue that the organization has become more moderate and progressive over time.

At Vigyan Bhawan, Bhagwat said that the RSS is open to changing its views with time. Anderson and Damle make a more sweeping claim – that since the 1970s the RSS has undergone a ‘sea change’ to become an organization that is open to all, based merely on the fact that the RSS leadership made token conciliatory remarks in favour of Muslims in the post-Emergency era to make themselves more palatable to the anti-Congress political factions.

As an example of the ‘sea-change’ the authors hold up the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM) – a forum for Muslims started by the RSS but not acknowledged as an official affiliate. According to the authors, MRM was started ‘to bring Muslims closer to what RSS considers national mainstream’. They go on to list MRM’s activities as organizing campaigns for cow protection, scrapping Article 370 in Kashmir, and constructing a temple in Ayodhya – without attempting to explain how these issues might help Indian Muslims. If one tries to reconcile the RSS’s actions with the stated intent of the MRM, innumerable such questions will arise – questions that are not all that difficult to answer either. Even a cursory look at the timing and membership of the MRM suggests that the real reason it was founded was to try and consolidate Shia and Bohra votes against Sunni votes, and to put up an ‘inclusive’ front amidst the uproar against the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat (MRM was founded in December 2002).

 

Truth is, the RSS’s ideology of Hindutva and its goal have not changed from its inception. Hindu supremacy and anti-Muslim bigotry remain the central pillars of their mission to remake India as a Hindu Rashtra. What has evolved is the means to this end. They vary according to the affiliate, arena, and time in question and have become increasingly sophisticated. Part of this sophistication is the sophistry – the RSS’s official discourse has incorporated political correctness underpinned by dog-whistle signals.

Bhagwat in his speech at Vigyan Bhawan said that Hindutva is not anti-Muslim because Indian Muslims share a common culture with Hindus and, are in fact, Hindus, whether they accept it or not. Except, he did not spell out the caveat as clearly as some of his predecessors have – in order to belong in India, Muslims have to be ‘Hinduized’. This spurs the false binary of patriotic and anti-national Muslims.

Bhagwat’s insidious half-truths were woven through with barefaced lies. He said that the RSS opposes the word ‘minority’ because it creates a false divide between communities. This is a classic half-truth. The RSS opposes the term ‘minority’ but only because they unreasonably believe that the minority status allows minorities to demand ‘concessions’ from political parties in lieu of votes to the disadvantage of Hindus. He went on to say that Muslims need not fear the RSS because in areas where shakhas are run Muslims are safer. This is a barefaced lie. Shakhas, particularly those in areas with a significant Muslim population, often disrupt Muslim festivals and prayers, put up a show of aggression, and raise provocative slogans.

 

The RSS’s bigotry is ideological, but also tactical. Bhagwat said their only aims are ‘vyakti nirman’ and ‘organization of society’. Organization is another word for consolidation of a majority that reclaims India as a Hindu nation, and vyakti nirman stands for the creation of an ideal foot soldier who unquestioningly subscribes to the RSS’s ideology and is the building block of the consolidated society the RSS wants to create. Except, the most effective way to consolidate vastly diverse Hindus is to create a common enemy, and a sense of victimhood associated with that enemy. Therefore, the RSS weaponizes historic communal faultlines, ensuring they only widen over time.

However, the sense of a common enemy is not enough to bridge the caste faultlines within the Hindu community. Over the years, as Dalit politics and activism grew from strength to strength, the RSS began to see that they could not afford to alienate Dalits if they wanted a unified Hindu support base, much less ‘lose’ them to either Islam or Christianity. So, 1980s onwards, the top leadership began to outwardly adopt a more progressive attitude to caste.

Anderson and Damle go so far as to say that RSS’s ideology has never been casteist. Bhagwat, however, acknowledged that the organization has historically been dominated by Brahmins, but that is changing because they believe in a Hindu society undifferentiated by caste. These assertions beg difficult questions.

 

Why does the RSS leadership continue to be predominantly upper caste? Why did the RSS historically oppose Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and the idea of caste-based reservations? Why did senior RSS ideologues, including Golwalkar, approvingly quote the Manu Smriti in the past? Why have those who subscribe to the RSS’s beliefs been implicated in violence against Dalits, right up until the Bhima Koregaon violence? When the RSS’s posturing on caste is juxtaposed against these questions, a clearer picture emerges.

The RSS wants to co-opt Dalits for their own agenda and on their own terms. To that end, they have strengthened their Dalit outreach through their affiliate, Samajik Samrasta Manch. However, it is critical to note the usage of samrasta (harmony), over samanta (equality). They seek harmonious existence with Dalits, not equality. The RSS opposes untouchability and caste based discrimination, particularly in religious places to the extent necessary to consolidate the Hindu community, but not caste hierarchy itself.

And to enable harmonious existence, in the words of Bhagwat, and Anderson and Damle, the RSS ‘ignores caste’. But ‘ignoring caste’ is in direct conflict with making reparations for historical injustice and striving towards true equality.

If the good Muslim is one who accepts the Hindu as ‘big brother’ and subscribes to Hindu cultural traditions, the good Dalit is one who unquestioningly becomes a cog in the wheel of the RSS’s mission, and the bad Dalit, like the bad Muslim, is one who, empowered by constitutional rights, claims agency over her own identity and destiny.

This false binary is mirrored in the RSS’s idea of patriotism. During the lecture Bhagwat said, ‘Howsoever you wish, you must do something, small or big, in the direction of making this country achieve its utmost glory. You don’t have to follow our ways.’ His liberal proclamation is impossible to reconcile with how narrowly and vehemently the RSS and its affiliates have sought to define nationalism, particularly in the last four years.

 

In his annual Vijaydashami address, that sets the actual agenda for the Sangh, Bhagwat was far less accepting. He took on the ‘neo-left’ thought leaders who are ‘established in social and other media, intellectual circles and other institutions’, and defend ‘anti-national’ activities ‘through intellectual and other methods.’ While he did not name names, it is not difficult to conclude that the kind of activists and intellectuals targeted here are not anti-India but oppose the RSS’s idea of India.

To understand the RSS’s idea of India comprehensively, one has to return to the idea of Hindutva. At Vigyan Bhawan, Bhagwat said that Hindu dharma deals with the core values of ‘unity in diversity, synthesis, sacrifice, self-restraint, and gratitude’ and is not about ‘religion’ or ‘ritual’. Toeing this line, Anderson and Damle go so far as to say that the RSS rarely exhibits religious symbols and favours no sect in particular.

These claims are difficult to reconcile with the fact that in the 1990s the RSS and BJP rose on the back of a movement that has been accompanied by a campaign to present Ram as a national symbol of Hindu pride when he is but one of the many deities worshipped by Hindus; with the RSS’s attempts to make tribals give up their deities and adopt rituals associated with Brahminical traditions; with the fact that in the RSS’s imagination the nation is portrayed as a Hindu goddess; and that RSS members claim moral superiority of vegetarian Hindus. By all accounts, the RSS cannot even embrace the diversity prevalent within the Hindu community, much less between different religions practiced by Indians.

 

Bhagwat said that India is a Hindu Rashtra because the ‘boundaries of the country have undergone so many changes that the sanatan dharma is the only accurate marker of its identity.’ This idea of India is essentially majoritarian because it posits that its culture is not syncretic but ‘authentically ancient Hindu.’ Moreover, the premise that all Indians must identify with one ‘common culture’ goes against the essence of the liberties enshrined in the Constitution. And yet, Bhagwat read the Preamble of the Constitution out loud at Vigyan Bhawan and said that the RSS has never taken a stand against the Constitution.

This is monumental subterfuge from an organization that harbours a serious ambition of amending the Constitution and has continually undermined its letter and spirit.

The structure of the organization enables the subterfuge. The RSS has a complex but relatively small leadership structure that is known to the public. But the majority of its constituents are ordinary swayamsevaks, who, the organization claims, it maintains no records of because, in Bhagwat’s words, ‘everyone is free to come and go as they please.’ Furthermore, he emphasised that the Sangh is only responsible for ‘imparting values’. Thereafter, swayamsevaks are free to translate the values into actions as they see fit. In the guise of openness and independence the leadership thus reserves the ability to distance itself from the actions of its cadres, if and when needed.

 

Some swayamsevaks also go on to form affiliate organizations. The RSS recognizes 36 affiliates (including the BJP) as official but the total number is closer to 100. Again, the RSS claims that it only imparts values, guidance, and advice to the office-bearers of the affiliates but they are essentially free to work as they please towards nation-building.

This plausible deniability is helpful when the means to the end are illegal or unconstitutional. RSS leaders have maintained that they do not condone violence. The essential question then is – why have RSS members been implicated in acts of brutal violence for decades on end? This is the sort of question Anderson and Damle’s book might have asked. Instead, much like the leaders of the RSS, it brazenly sidesteps it.

The authors write that the Bajrang Dal has ‘transformed the VHP into a populist organization with a broader activist agenda… to oppose activities that denigrate the country, Hindu faith, and cultural norms’, without any mention of crimes its members have been implicated in – including the 2002 riots in Gujarat, the murders of Graham Staines and his children, and several instances of cultural policing by violent means.

This omission of criminal antecedents is not limited to the Bajrang Dal. The authors write about Muslim Rashtriya Manch and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram without mentioning that the convenor of the former, Indresh Kumar, and a senior operative of the latter, Swami Aseemanand, were key accused in the bombings of Muslim holy places.

 

Elsewhere, the authors portray the Gujarat riots of 2002 as organic mob violence without any mention of the involvement of members of the VHP and the RSS. This follows the RSS’s line. The leadership dissociates itself from violence against minorities but justifies it by saying that mobs are merely retaliating because they are victimized by belligerent Muslims.

Similarly, the RSS claims that on the 6th of December, 1992, the VHP merely wanted to organize a peaceful bhoomipoojan in Ayodhya but the crowds lost control and acted spontaneously. Anderson and Damle write that the RSS denies any role in the felling of the mosque without as much as acknowledging that the Liberhan Commission Report and any number of journalistic accounts have established that the demolition was a pre-planned conspiracy by the RSS and the BJP.

The book, however, is no match for the RSS’s own continued double-speak on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. In his lecture series Bhagwat said that while he would like to see a Ram temple in Ayodhya it is not for him to say whether the government should pass a law to build one and whether another public agitation is called for. In his Vijaydashmi address, however, Bhagwat not only put the onus of building the temple firmly on the government, he also ominously proclaimed that ‘it is in nobody’s interest to test the patience of the society.’ Just over a month later, while addressing the Hunkar rally in Nagpur, his pitch was even sharper. He openly called for an agitation, saying, ‘When the site had what we did not want there, we had to fight... Today we need the same courage and resolve.’

This bravado puts paid to the theory of ‘unplanned demolition by a spontaneous mob.’ Complementary to that myth is the idea of a ‘radical right’, unrelated to the RSS, that Anderson and Damle claim is derailing the RSS and BJP’s ‘focus on pragmatism and good governance.’ According to them this so-called radical right is responsible for hate speech, threatening civil liberties, and violently suppressing Constitutional rights across the country. They make no effort to examine who makes up this radical right and how deep its links are with the RSS and its ideology.

 

This idea truly comes into its own in the context of cow vigilantes. At Vigyan Bhawan, Bhagwat said that those who have been part of the lynchings should be brought to book. But on the ground, Bajrang Dal members extort money from cattle transporters – particularly from minority run businesses, and have been implicated in cow protection related violence – most recently in the murder of a police officer in Uttar Pradesh.

Moreover, RSS members routinely express tacit or covert support for lynch mobs. Take for instance, Modi government’s MoS for Culture and RSS member Mahesh Sharma who said, when Mohammad Akhlaq was lynched on suspicion of having cooked beef, that the deceased’s family should be grateful that the mob had only killed Akhlaq and not molested his daughter. Modi himself, along with BJP President Amit Shah, routinely attacks the Congress party on two counts – favouring Muslims and cow slaughter – linking the two in the minds of their followers through virulent election campaign speeches.

The book quotes Bhagwat and Modi’s public denouncements of cow protection related lynchings and, as mentioned above, tries to establish a false dichotomy between the agenda of an elusive radical right and the RSS’s social projects aimed at nation building through character building, when in fact the social projects run by the RSS are the breeding grounds of the radical agenda that often manifests itself in the violence that the organization’s leaders are quick to disown.

 

One of the RSS’s key projects is education. They run thousands of schools under a number of their affiliates. On the face of it, the RSS performs an important social service by providing subsidized education to some of the most disenfranchized sections of the society – particularly in far-flung tribal areas. But the RSS’s social service clearly prioritizes its own agenda over the genuine welfare of marginalized communities – preventing the religious conversion of tribals, consolidating a vote bank for the BJP, and breeding communal hatred against minorities.

The RSS leadership has been pressing for the appointment of its ideologues to higher education institutes and an overhaul of the national education policy to bring it in line with ‘Indian values’. At Vigyan Bhawan, Bhagwat spoke of an ideal curriculum that imparts knowledge of the Vedas, Puranas, Upanishads, and the epics. ‘Key values of texts from other religions may also be included,’ he added, generously. In practice, however, in villages where RSS affiliates run schools, they attempt to instill hatred in the minds of impressionable children and the textbooks carry canards such as Muslims and Christian priests are out to destroy Hindus, that Muslims believe in beheading Hindus, and that in order to save the country Hindus must keep minorities in check.

Even outside of remote areas, the RSS’s education project is clearly political – recent changes in government school textbooks are aimed at excising Congress leaders, particularly Nehru, from history textbooks, and glorifying Modi as an extraordinary nationalist hero. Rajasthan’s seventh-grade book even directs students to ‘prepare a chart of the advertisements published by the government about its different schemes and with the help of your teacher discuss the benefits of these schemes.’ And in Gujarat, the new twelfth-grade history book praises Hitler at length.

Even so, Anderson and Damle paint an innocuous picture of RSS’s education project. They write, ‘it was our impression that these schools engender a sense of communal solidarity’ and that the end goal of the RSS’s extensive education programme is ‘social harmony and Hindu unity.’

 

Louder than all the assertions in their book are the questions they fail to ask and the facts they fail to mention – perhaps most critically the fact that Damle is actually an office bearer and long-term member of the RSS. The book does not acknowledge that anywhere.

Similarly, Bhagwat’s articulate sophistry at Vigyan Bhawan has been drowned out by cadres who took to the streets of Delhi on the 9th of December shouting, ‘Ek Dhakka Aur Do, Jama Masjid Tod Do’. The naked aggression and bigoted cries of over a lakh of swayamsevaks asking the government to defy the Constitution and the Supreme Court, and threatening illegal action, negated every claim made by their leader to present the RSS as an inclusive and law abiding organization.