Democratic decentralization
L.C. JAIN †
IT is widely recognized now that the social, economic and political progress of the country is being obstructed, if not strangulated, by unwarranted and unconstitutional centralization or concentration of decision-making powers in a few hands at the Centre. It is also being realized that so long as this obstruction is not removed, the country will not be able to meet the challenges of mounting inequality, poverty and unemployment, nor the minimum expectations of a rising population. Nor will it succeed in mobilizing the requisite human and material resources for achieving a higher and sustained standard of living.
The assumption of an indiscriminate and avoidable load upon itself has crippled the capability of the Centre for performing crucial functions which, according to the Constitution and in the objective conditions of the country, it alone can and is expected to perform, such as in the areas of defence, external affairs, communications, infrastructure, public sector, price management, foreign trade and the prevention of smuggling. The record of the central government in the discharge of these vital functions has, to say the least, been unsatisfactory.
Unrestrained and unprincipled centralization of power has also prevented purposive direction of planned development in favour of the needs and priorities of the common people, especially those plagued by inequality and poverty. Indeed, it has made it relatively easy for big business tycoons, in collusion with the rulers at the Centre, to subvert and pervert development priorities to the detriment of the common people. This is also the root of corruption.
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xcessive centralization of power and authority in the hands of a few at the Centre has also enabled the rulers to denude even such a sovereign institution as the Parliament of its true role and dignity. To illustrate: ill-conceived legislation is thrust upon Parliament for instant approval; taxes are levied without its prior consent; huge deficits, far beyond approved budgets are incurred; and the reports of the statutory offices of the Election Commission, the CAG, the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and those of the parliamentary committees themselves, are not fully disclosed or discussed. Similarly, other vital institutions forming the core of our parliamentary democracy are being debased through the naked and arrogant use of central power, as for example, the subversion of the institution of governors of the states, the press, the electronic media, the civil service and even the judiciary.Centralization has thus emerged as enemy number one of national progress and of people’s aspirations on the one hand, and of the delicate system of checks and balances designed by the founding fathers of our republic on the other. The continued grabbing of powers and functions by the Centre has weakened the Centre itself in the performance of the vital tasks entrusted to it. It has also rendered its principal constituents, namely, the states, weak, not to speak of the erosion of such institutions as the panchayats, municipalities, cooperatives and voluntary organizations which form the core of representative peoples’ institutions within each state.
Overall, centralization has disrupted the growth of a harmonious political system, debilitated the economy and accentuated disparities by an unabashed pampering of the rich at the expense of the poor. It has replaced culture by corruption. Worst of all, it has caused extensive damage to environmental resources – fundamental to the very survival of our population, especially the poorest sections who are critically dependent for their subsistence on these resources.
The remedy lies in a rational albeit drastic redistribution or decentralization of the functions, resources and powers of government between the states and the district/village panchayats. Without a drastic decentralization and rationalization of the existing functions, resources and powers of the central government, there can be no genuine and meaningful growth of democratic decentralization at the grassroots level.
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dispassionate examination of the 64th Amendment shows that it has confined its proposals for the building up of panchayati raj essentially to one measure, that is, mandatory periodical elections of panchayats. The elections are necessary but not sufficient. There is no provision whatsoever for the devolution of the functions and powers which the Centre has concentrated in its hands. Panchayats have thus been bestowed more with slogans than substance and, as envisaged by the 64th Amendment, will be like empty boxes in respect of their basic function, that is, economic development with social justice.Even if we were to overlook the track record of the Congress (I) in relation to the establishment, or rather, non-establishment of panchayats in the states ruled by it which account for the bulk of India’s population, and believe that it has sincerely been converted to the philosophy of decentralization even at this late hour, the gaping holes in the scheme presented by it does not inspire much confidence: it has not proposed even a half-hearted first step in the direction of decentralization.
All that it proposes is a secondary step of asking the states to decentralize and devolve their powers/functions/resources to panchayats. But without a prior retransfer of powers of the states arrogated by the Centre over the years, this will not lead to meaningful results. Dr Malcolm Adisheshiah has pointed out that ‘in agriculture which is wholly a state subject, the Union plan share is 39 per cent of total plan resources in 1987-88; in village and small industries, another state subject, the Union share is 46.7 per cent, in rural development 54.02 per cent, in social and women’s welfare 100 per cent.’
The data for Karnataka shows that in the recent three-year period ending 1989-90, where central contribution should logically and relatively be the highest, namely in power and irrigation, it is less than half of the total percentage investment by Karnataka in these sectors. In contrast, in the subjects most eligible for decentralization, which have indeed been transferred by Karnataka to the panchayats, Central participation is as high as 66 per cent. The scheme proposed by the centre (64th Amendment) is thus a fractured one. It is certain that soon after their election, the panchayats will be plunged into unimaginable frustration which in turn will put the entire pace of socio-economic development in reverse gear.
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o create the conditions necessary for the success of democratic decentralization at the grassroots, a coherent and systematic approach is required. This necessitates several effective steps. The first of these is political consensus to ensure that elections to panchayats do not result in avoidable confrontation. It is imperative to generate a spirit of amity among different political parties. For this purpose, it is necessary to involve all parties in a consultative process to formulate the legislative, administrative and financial arrangements required for the growth of autonomous and dignified panchayati raj institutions on the one hand, and an electoral code to be observed by the political parties on the other.Meanwhile the Congress (I) will need to abjure the temptation of playing politics with panchayat raj and be more aware about the deleterious consequences of its adventurism. The aggressive and partisan posture it has adopted in the sphere of panchayats is not in the larger interests of the country as it may introduce avoidable animus in panchayat elections and accentuate conflicts at the village level.
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his is particularly unfortunate when the Congress (I) could well have emulated the very cordial and cooperative process adopted by the Janata government in Karnataka. When the latter introduced panchayat raj in that state, it involved all political parties, including the Congress (I), initially for formulating the legislative and administrative arrangements, and thereafter for running the system smoothly after the first elections in 1987.Apart from generation of amity, Karnataka’s scheme was marked by two other vital features. The first was the systematic transformation of rural society by providing, for the first time in the country, for reservation of seats for the election of women (25 per cent) and SCs and STs (18 per cent). This resulted in 12,000 elected women and 9000 elected representatives of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from a total of 56,000 elected mandal panchayat members. A similar provision was made for elections to the zilla parishads.
The second was the accountability of the bureaucratic structure to the panchayati raj institutions. The second feature introduced a two-way planning process. There is no value in decentralization unless development planning can be made subservient to the needs and priorities of the common people through an expensive consultative process between the Centre and the states, and between the states and the panchayat raj institutions.
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s of today, even the state governments have no ‘autonomous’ area available to them for planning. They have to wait in the corridors of Yojana Bhawan, year after year, for what are called annual plan discussions to determine sectorial outlays in minute detail. Anyone familiar with the drill knows that state officials are expected to satisfy their respective commissions about each of their schemes through their personal presence in the capital. These include almost all the subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule of the 64th Amendment. Thus directors of agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, sericulture, village industries, primary health care, elementary education, adult education et al, are all to be seen trooping into Delhi annually. As things stand the ‘self-governments’ to be created by the 64th Amendment will be compelled to wait at Yojana Bhawan, whether they wait at the state capitals or not. They have not been given any autonomy in planning, even in matters which are best suited to local decision-making.A strong misconception prevails in many quarters that local planning may distort national priorities. This is a facile view. For national planning cannot conceivably run contrary to local needs and priorities; nor can a good national plan be conceived in ignorance of what such local needs and priorities are. Given the commitment to establish ‘self-governing’ panchayats within a year, the planning process must be amended, requiring the states to bring to the Planning Commission only a broad outline of the state plan in respect of subjects endowed to the panchayati raj system, and the subjects of detailed discussions at Yojana Bhawan confined to investments on major infrastructure or projects having inter-state or wider linkage.
A corollary of this is that the system of centrally sponsored schemes must be abolished. It is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of panchayati raj, namely, to enrich development with village sponsored or panchayati raj sponsored schemes. Sponsorship of schemes by the panchayats requires that they receive untied funds and remain free to apply their minds on how best to match the limited available resources with the local order of priorities. In order that the state governments can make available these funds, it is essential that the centre takes the first step and stops tying state plans’ hand and foot by changing the existing rigid sectorial pattern of central aid to the states.
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ncidentally, the present pattern where the states are compelled by central planning to commit a major chunk of their resources to infrastructure, leaving themselves with measly sums for poverty alleviation and minimum needs, has been evolved not because it leads to an efficient use of resources but because it suits the central leaders. While on tour of the opposition ruled states, the P.M. and his colleagues invariably regale public meetings with statements like ‘Your state government is not bothered about removing poverty and unemployment; it is only the Centre which feels for the poor and is paying for such and such programme.’ This is a debasement of both the political environment and planning efficiency.If the 64th Amendment is sincere in its intention to decentralize, then central funding must concentrate on infrastructure investments for power, major irrigation, transport and the like, with a much larger contribution by the centre to the states for such investments than at present. Per contra, poverty alleviation and minimum needs should be the first charge on state resources, the residue, supplemented by central aid, being applied to infrastructure. Such a change in the pattern of assistance will also reinforce the changes in the planning process referred to earlier. It will also eliminate in one stroke the need for CAG’s men to wander from village to village auditing centrally-sponsored schemes. Their energies will thus be released for the policing of massive leakages in central government expenditure taking place right under their noses.
Then there is the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy. The 64th Amendment has skirted this vital issue altogether. Unless bureaucracy is made to yield the place of primacy to the elected panchayats, the latter will flounder.
To end, the excessive centralization fostered by prolonged Congress occupancy of New Delhi, is India’s enemy number one. We must accord the highest priority to rid the nation of this enemy. In its place, we must introduce a dynamic and rational scheme of democratic decentralization from the centre to the villages which is essential for tackling the complex and chronic problems of inequality, poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, corruption, cynicism and the growing dependency of society on the state. In short, we must create conditions in which the country can progress in its chosen direction and the people at large can pursue a productive, fruitful and creative life.
Seminar 360, ‘The Panchayati Revival’, August 1989, pp. 38-40.