THE recent rapprochement between Japan and India has been one of the most significant geostrategic developments in Asia. Under Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi, both countries have expanded and deepened cooperation across a variety of sectors. Under the ‘India and Japan Vision 2025’, they have launched major efforts to increase interdependence, including the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) linking East Asia to the Indian Ocean region, and vowed to work together in third countries and regions.

Underlining their commitment to fostering ‘peace and prosperity’ in the ‘Indo-Pacific region’, Abe and Modi’s ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ reflects two underlying assumptions. First that it is no longer feasible, nor desirable, to treat economics and security separately and that, therefore, infrastructure, trade and investment deals all come with significant strategic implications. China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative has underscored this point and encouraged Japan, India and other countries to develop alternative connectivity projects, such as the AAGC.

The second assumption is of a geographic nature and relates to the rising centrality of the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean regions to ensure ‘peace and prosperity’ in the Indo-Pacific region. As a crucial link area between South and Southeast Asia, the Bay of Bengal is a key bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This is why Abe and Modi have committed to seek ‘synergy between India’s "Act East" policy and Japan’s "Partnership for Quality Infrastructure".’¹

Overcoming decades of reluctance and hesitation on both sides, Tokyo and New Delhi have thus embraced a bold agenda that no longer treats ‘geostrategy’ or ‘security’ as issues that are taboo in their dialogues. As they spell out a clear and alternative vision for the Indo-Pacific, Japan and India have, for the first time, identified a common geostrategic environment and are committed to working together to shape it.

This convergence explains why deeper security cooperation between Japan and India has recently become increasingly plausible, especially in the Bay of Bengal region. For example, in a July 2017 address in Singapore, Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar said that ‘as a country that shares similar values and principles, Japan is comfortable partnering [with] India as it assumes greater security responsibilities. We also see the enhanced synergy between Japan and India on connectivity and maritime security as a positive for ASEAN nations.’²

Japan-India security cooperation in the Bay of Bengal comprises several existing and planned joint projects. This paper will examine three questions: First, what security activities have Japan-India already conducted in the Bay of Bengal? Second, what factors are driving this security convergence? And third, how can Japan and India translate their broader strategic convergence into joint projects on the ground?

 

Prime Ministers Abe and Modi are not reinventing the wheel of Japan-India security cooperation. Tokyo and New Delhi have a long history of engagement, which accelerated in the 2000s and has led to small but significant achievements. In 2012, Japan and India began joint naval exercises as an annual bilateral exercise, called Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX). The India-U.S. Malabar exercises decided to include Japan as a regular member since 2016. The Bay of Bengal was the location of these exercises when India was the host. In 2017, Japan’s largest warship, Izumo, joined the Malabar exercises in the Bay of Bengal alongside India’s INS Vikramaditya.³ It was the first occasion for Japan to dispatch such a huge helicopter carrier to the Bay of Bengal.

 

India plans to buy the US-2 Shin Maywa aircraft from Japan for its navy. The deal would represent Japan’s largest overseas defence deal since it lifted its decades long self-imposed ban on defense exports in 2014. It would additionally represent an important milestone in the Japan-India strategic relationship. For India, the short take-off capable Shin Maywa US-2 would add an important search and rescue capability in the Indian Ocean region. India may base the aircraft at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal among other sites; the 4,500 km range of the aircraft would allow the US-2 aircraft to support civilian and naval vessels alike deep in the Indian Ocean. In addition to the conclusion of the long pending US-2 deal, there are other prospects for Japan-India defence commercial cooperation. Earlier last summer, Japan’s Mitsubishi-Kawasaki consortium received a Request for Information (RFI) from the Indian Navy for a USD 8 billion advanced Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) attack submarine contract.⁴

Such defence cooperation makes military ties between Japan and India quite remarkable. However, infrastructure projects are an important aspect of Japan-India cooperation. Japan and India have negotiated a strategic road construction project in Northeast India. The September 2017 Japan-India Joint Statement ‘Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific’ mentioned that the ‘two prime ministers welcomed the Japan-India cooperation on development of India’s North-Eastern Region (NER) as a concrete symbol of developing synergies between India’s Act East policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy.’⁵

Some media reports indicate that Japan has decided to support radar facilities and power plants in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in India.⁶ Japan is also planning to build a fibre cable connection between mainland India and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In addition, Japan is investing in port construction in the coastal area of the Bay of Bengal, including the Trincomalee port in Sri Lanka.

 

While Japan and India have officially gone out of their way to dismiss suggestions that their strategic convergence is geared at containing China, there is little doubt that their actions are driven by Asia’s rapidly changing geostrategic environment. While economic motives, common values and a strong bilateral relationship do matter, it is a more capable and assertive China that offers the single most important driving force for the Japan-India partnership. Hence, the China factor cannot be overlooked while assessing Japan-India security cooperation. Tokyo is concerned about a United States that is not only less capable, but also less interested in providing the security umbrella that underpinned East Asia’s growth and stability since the 1950s. New Delhi, in turn, now faces an expanding Chinese sphere of influence overlapping with its own periphery.

 

Since 2013, there have been at least seven recorded deployments of Chinese submarines patrolling in the Bay of Bengal.⁷ China also exports sub-marines to countries around India. Bangladesh received two submarines from China in 2016. These activities indicate that China’s area of influence in the Bay of Bengal is going to expand. The Indian Navy will need to have sufficient ships to keep a regular watch over the location and purpose of other countries’ submarines, because these Chinese submarines can potentially attack India’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines and Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). This means that these submarines will, to a great extent, regulate India’s naval activities.

China’s strategic weakness, however, is that it does not have a naval port in the region. Therefore, under the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, China is investing in the development of many ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. If the Chinese Navy uses civilian ports as naval supply bases, it could successfully overcome its weakness of not having a naval port in the region.

 

Given their ambitious joint vision, Japan and India will now have to translate their road map into concrete projects on the ground. Building on existing plans, such cooperation must focus on a broader understanding of security and development of key infrastructure and connectivity projects that link the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region to Southeast, East Asia, and the Pacific Ocean in general. The geographic focus of these projects should, therefore, naturally emphasize the Bay of Bengal region. This section reviews three specific projects and areas that fulfil both these conditions.

Japan and India have negotiated a strategic road construction project in Northeast India. The main purpose of this project is to promote economic development. Moreover, it will ease India’s access to Southeast Asia by a land route. However, for countering Chinese influence, the project has two implications. First, if India improves governance in Northeast India, it can defend the India-China border area more easily.

Second, if road connectivity spurs trade between India and Southeast Asian countries, it is possible that this could mitigate China’s influence in Southeast Asia. Although Chinese policy towards the South China Sea have infringed upon claims of Southeast Asian countries, some countries have not taken a sufficiently strong stand against China. One reason is because their economy depends too much on trade with China. To neutralize China’s influence, Southeast Asia needs other trade partners. Consequently, road connectivity between India and Southeast Asia can have such an effect. Currently, Japan is building an East-West Economic Corridor from Vietnam to Myanmar. This Japan road network project can connect road projects in Northeastern India. The main target is to increase India-Southeast Asian trade.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands in India are strategically important. These islands are near the Malacca Strait and SLOCs. In 2001, India set up the Andaman and Nicobar Command, with army, navy and air force integrated headquarters. Further, India is modernizing infrastructure to deploy larger warships, patrol planes and transport planes. When contact was lost with a Malaysian airplane in the Indian Ocean in 2014, India dispatched warships to search for the plane from the islands.

 

No detailed official report has been published, but some media reports indicate that Japan has decided to support radar facilities and power plants in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands. Japan is also planning to build a fibre cable connection between mainland India and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Although these are civilian projects to resolve electric power shortage difficulties, a high probability exists that the project will have strategic implications related to China.

As described above, China’s submarines venture into the Bay of Bengal. These submarines sail from Hainan Island of China though the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Therefore, to track China’s submarine activities, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are an excellent location. Since 1993, India has engaged in joint exercises with Singapore. Since 2002, India has started joint patrols with Indonesia. In 2005, the India-Thailand joint patrol began. Now, India will join the Malacca Strait Patrol Group, which comprises forces from Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.⁸

 

Recent media reports have described that the Japan, India, and the U.S. are planning to install a submarine detecting sensor system along the coastline of the Bay of Bengal.⁹ Further, the India and the U.S. are negotiating to share information when Chinese submarines leave from Hainan for the Indian Ocean. If Japan invests in infrastructure projects in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would enhance India’s naval capability to detect Chinese submarine activity.

The Japan-India Trincomalee port project could also help neutralize China’s influence. China is building the Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka. Although Hambantota is an advantage for China to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, there is a weak point. Few commercial ships use the port, because no large city is near Hambantota port. If there were a big city near the port, ships could use it to unload cargo for a consuming area. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, except for Colombo, no other large city has sufficient capacity. Colombo has a port. Furthermore, between Hambantota to Colombo, the road connection is poor. Therefore, most ships use Colombo instead of the one at Hambantota.

In addition, the condition of the Hambantota port is insufficient for use as a hub. For example, large ships coming from Europe unload their cargo at Hambantota port. Then other ships reload the cargo to go to Bangladesh, Myanmar and so on. Most ships have not used the port because there is nothing nearby except a big international airport, a five-star hotel and a small town. If a large city was situated close by, ship crews could rest before proceeding to another destination. However, no facilities exist in Hambantota. Instead, most ships use Colombo port as a hub.

 

However, because Hambantota is located near SLOCs, the port can be used as a naval port. When the Sri Lanka government decided to lease Hambantota port to China for ninety-nine years, Japan, India and US expressed concern about this project. Due to opposition from Japan, India, and the U.S., the Sri Lanka government decided to retain the right to inspect ships entering the port. When China uses Hambantota as a naval supply base, the Sri Lanka government can identify and refuse entry if the Sri Lanka government so wishes.¹⁰

Compared to the Hambantota port, the Japan-India Trincomalee port project holds greater strategic potential. Surrounded by natural ‘walls’, the port can protect ships from natural disasters such as tsunamis or cyclones. Further, the sea depth surrounding the port is greater than twenty-five meters, sufficient for all conventional naval forces, including aircraft carriers.

Unlike the Hambantota port, which is next to the main SLOCs, Trincomalee port is located on the east side of Sri Lanka where most ships do not ply. Yet, Trincomalee offers better access to Bangladesh, Myanmar, or other coastal countries around the Bay of Bengal. Consequently, a ship can use Trincomalee as a hub and unload cargo at the port and then reload to ships servicing other coastal countries in the Bay of Bengal. In addition, the Trincomalee project promotes the economy of the east side of the island which was destroyed during the civil war of 1983-2009. From the view of internal stability, the project is advantageous for Sri Lanka.

 

For the reasons described above, the Trincomalee port project is more beneficial than the Hambantota port project for Sri Lanka. If it succeeds, then the importance of Hambantota port for Sri Lanka will decline. In April 2017, when the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe visited Japan, Japan granted aid of nine million US dollars aimed at providing facilities for the improved management of the Trincomalee port.¹¹ Furthermore, in May 2017, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka, the two countries agreed that at least seventy-three of the ninety-nine oil storage tanks in Trincomalee should be managed jointly.¹² Because oil storage management determines how the port is used, this agreement is an important step.

Japan-India security cooperation has accelerated in the twenty-first century after both countries began facing a more capable and assertive China. Hence, the China factor cannot be overlooked while assessing Japan-India security cooperation and is the single most important cause for the strategic convergence between Tokyo and New Delhi.

Prime Ministers Abe and Modi have articulated a bold vision for a ‘peaceful and prosperous’ Indo-Pacific that no longer treats economics and security as separate dimensions. Their commitment to increase interdependence between the Indian and Pacific oceans accords relevance to the Bay of Bengal as a link region. If Japan and India want to translate their strategic partnership into concrete security cooperation, they will need to invest in developing connectivity and infrastructure projects that straddle the traditional economics-security divide and, at the same time, are located in the Bay of Bengal region.

Whether it is Japanese investments in transportation infrastructure in Northeast India, joint development efforts for the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, or collaboration to upgrade Sri Lanka’s deep water Trincomalee port as an alternative to China’s Hambantota port, Tokyo and New Delhi must commit adequate attention and resources to give their strategic vision a concrete and real expression on the ground.

As they strengthen their bilateral dialogue and cooperation, the time has also come to proactively further this cooperation trilaterally with the U.S., Australia, and other like-minded countries to ensure a stable, free and prosperous Bay of Bengal as a key pivot of the Indo-Pacific region.

 

Footnotes:

1. http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_ Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_ of_the_IndoPacific_R

2. Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, ‘Speech by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary to Mark 25 Years of India-Singapore Partnership at Shangri La Hotel, Singapore’, 11 July 2017. (http://www.mea. gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28609/Speech+by+Dr+S+JaishankarForeign+Secretary+to+mark+25+years+of+IndiaSingapore+Partnership+at+ Shangri+La+Hotel +Singapore+July+11+2017 ) (accessed on 27 December 2017)

3. T. Kelly and N. Kubo, ‘Exclusive: Japan Plans to Send Largest Warship to South China Sea, Sources Say’, Reuters, 14 March 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-navy-southchinasea-exclusive-idUSKBN 16K0UP (accessed on 27 December 2017).

4. Ankit Panda, ‘Will Japan and India Conclude a Long Pending US-2 Amphibious Aircraft Defence Deal?’ The Diplomat, 13 September 2017. (https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/will-india-and-japan-finally-conclude-a-long-pending-us-2-amphibious-aircraft-defense-deal/)

5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, ‘Japan-India Joint Statement: Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific’, 14 September 2017, http://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000289999.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2017).

6. Ellen Barry, ‘As India Collaborates With Japan on Islands, it Looks to Check China’, New York Times, 11 March 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/asia/india-japan-china-andaman-nicobar-islands.html

7. ‘Six Cases of Chinese Submarine Deployment in Indian Ocean in Four Years: Navy Chief Sunil Lanba’, The Indian Express, 30 March 2017, http://www.newindianexpress. com/states/tamil-nadu/2017/mar/30/six-cases-of-chinese-submarine-deployment-in-indian-ocean-in-four-years-navy-chief-sunil-lanba-1587558.html (accessed on 8 October 2017).

8. Ajay Banerjee, ‘India Set to Join Malacca Patrol Group’, The Tribune, 10 April 2017, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-set-to-join-malacca-patrol-group/389602.html (accessed on 27 December 2017).

9. Abhijit Singh, ‘India’s "Undersea Wall" in the Eastern Indian Ocean’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 14 June 2016, http://amti.csis.org/indias-undersea-wall-eastern-indian-ocean/ (accessed on 27 December 2017).

10. Aneez Shihar, ‘Exclusive: Sri Lanka’s Cabinet "Clears Port Deal" With China Firm After Concerns Addressed’, Reuters, 25 July 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-port/exclusive-sri-lankas-cabinet-clears-port-deal-with-china-firm-after-concerns-addressed-idUSKBN1AA0PI (accessed on 27 December 2017).

11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, ‘Japan-Sri Lanka Summit Meeting Joint Statement: Deepening and Expansion of the Comprehensive Partnership Between Japan and Sri Lanka’, MoFA, 12 April 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000249616.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2017).

12. ‘PM Narendra Modi’s Visit a Grand Success, Says Sri Lanka Minister’, The Hindustan Times, 17 May 2017, http://www.hindustan times.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modi-s-visit-a-grand-success-says-sri-lanka-minister/story-4rair1RfTsAkocLVPeAG8N.html (accessed on 27 December 2017).