DESPITE not being a resident Indian Ocean power, since it has no seaboard astride those vast waters, China has in recent years intensified its naval forays into the region. By the end of 2018, Beijing will celebrate the tenth year of naval involvement with counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. It looks poised to expand an already impressive presence in the Indian Ocean, in part facilitated by its first ever overseas military base in Djibouti. That would, most plausibly in the eyes of Beijing, be commensurate with the growing repertoire of overseas national interests it has in Africa and Middle East, especially those concerning energy security.

Indeed, China’s energy security interests continue to be well vested in Africa and Middle East, from where it respectively obtained 67.9 and 184.¹ out of the total of 382.6 million tonnes of imported crude.1 President Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ notion envisioned a strong and prosperous China that is buttressed on both military might and socioeconomic progress, which would be attained by alleviating poverty – a goal for 2018 stated in a document released after a Communist Party of China (CPC) Politburo meeting.²

But the same document appears to gear towards a more sustainable, eco-friendly, long-term form of socioeconomic development. In this respect, one of Beijing’s multi-pronged energy security approaches is to reduce energy intensity – with the goal of 15% reduction by the end of the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-20) and stabilize annual energy consumption under 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent by 2020, and growth pitched at 2.5% on each average year over the time frame.³ The strategy to ensure energy supply security is also multifaceted. Besides ramping up investment in renewable energy (680 gw by 2020), Beijing has also attempted to expand and diversify its fossil energy sources, including deep sea energy drilling in not just Chinese waters but distant regions. To reduce reliance on energy imports, Beijing seeks to intensify efforts to explore domestic fossil fuel sources. But the Ministry of Land and Resources outlined dependence rates on oil and gas imports to remain within 70 and 50% respectively by 2035.⁴

 

Therefore, in the interim, to fuel socioeconomic development, Beijing finds it essential to secure foreign energy imports. In August 2017, Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli visited several African and Middle Eastern countries, some of whom being key energy suppliers. During the visit, he struck an agreement with Riyadh to promote energy cooperation,⁵ and sought with Kuwait, another major crude supplier, a ‘long-term and stable partnership over the supply and demand of energy’.⁶ Somewhat coincidentally, Beijing disengaged from the Doklam stand-off with New Delhi not long before Zhang’s visit. The spectre of renewed Himalayan hostilities between the two Asian giants often yields a scenario of the conflict extending to the maritime sphere – wherein China’s Indian Ocean energy lifelines could be held hostage by India.

To ameliorate this problem, diversifying sources away from the Indian Ocean becomes essential. In September 2017 for example, China and Russia agreed to expand energy links,⁷ with Beijing setting sights on Moscow’s Far Eastern energy supplies. However, given that its reliance on African and Middle Eastern sources would not be weaned off within the near future, a more robust strategy is required. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) thus serves as a strategic framework, with a major energy security dimension. In late 2017, Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Wang Shouwen stressed that the BRI ‘will help buttress energy security’, adding that ‘energy security is about stability’.⁸ Chinese energy corporations, backed financially by Beijing, have intensified overseas acquisitions to sustain supply stability, mainly in Africa and Middle East. For example, in October 2017, state-owned oil giants PetroChina and Sinopec have expressed interest to buy up to 5% of Saudi Aramco directly.⁹ According to China National Petroleum Corp., BRI partner countries altogether hold 131.51 billion tons, or 55%, of the world’s proven oil reserves as well as 142.15 trillion cubic meter, or 76% of gas reserves – which motivated Chinese oil giants to potentially place their projects under the BRI banner in order to secure preferential funding from Beijing.¹⁰

 

Given China’s energy security concerns, the Bay of Bengal looks set to remain a critical area of strategic vulnerability for China. Vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs) carrying Beijing’s energy imports will inevitably have to transit across the bay, through the Andaman and Nicobar Islands before entering the northernmost part of the Malacca Strait. This constitutes a ‘soft underbelly’ for China. Beijing’s approach to the Bay of Bengal falls into a similar pattern observed elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, which can be viewed as couched under the strategic framework of BRI, especially the 21st century Maritime Silk Road component that envisages not just energy security and investments but also the raison d’etre for maritime security.

 

Under BRI auspices, China has called for the building of a Blue Partnership, which envisages engagement with partner countries along the ‘Road’ in ‘all-dimensional and broad-scoped maritime cooperation.’ Maritime security features prominently amongst the five cooperation priorities outlined, stating that China ‘will shoulder its due international obligations, participate in bilateral and multilateral maritime navigation security and crisis control mechanisms, and work with all parties to combat non-traditional security issues such as crimes on the sea.’¹¹ China’s Military Strategy renders a ready-made operational element to that: ‘In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defence and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defence’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defence’ with ‘open seas protection’, and build a combined, multifunctional and efficient marine combat force structure.’¹²

The best manifestation of this would be the PLA Navy’s participation in the counter-piracy missions since December 2008, providing escort for Syrian chemical weapons disposed under the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons auspices, and perhaps more prominently, the ‘Harmonious Mission’ voyages by the fleet’s ocean-going hospital ship Daishandao, also known as Hepingfangzhou (Peace Ark). More recently in November 2017, the frigate Yuncheng participated in the International Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise (IMMSAREX) carried out under the auspices of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in waters near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. This was the PLA Navy’s first ever participation in the exercises.¹³ All these are designed to shape China’s image as a keen advocate for international peace and security, exercised through the provision of common public goods.

 

With respect to the Bay of Bengal – towards Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka – Beijing’s approach has been more modest, though also comprehensive, when compared to those with Pakistan in particular. This multi-faceted strategy encompasses funding and investments into local port and infrastructure projects, aimed partly at providing suitable terminals for Chinese energy imports, thus reducing the need to traverse the Malacca Strait. For instance, in October 2017, China inked a framework agreement with Bangladesh for the construction of a 220 km long pipeline (146 km offshore, and 74 km overland) to transport oil from tankers on Moheshkhali island in the Bay of Bengal to a refinery in Chittagong for processing.¹⁴ This adds to other pre-existing ports such as Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu, for example.

Besides serving as terminals for transport of energy to China’s southwestern interior via overland pipelines, friendly port access in the Bay of Bengal also provides convenient stopovers and other commercial uses. Beijing recently added another feather to its cap with the 99-year lease of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, augmenting an already robust presence at the similarly Chinese backed Port of Colombo. Myanmar authorities recently announced that feasibility studies have been done to expand the port in Yangon with an eye on drawing Chinse commodity shipping.¹⁵ But there is speculation about Beijing’s real intent in its outreach to these countries. For example, in May 2017 it was reportedly eyeing up to 85% stake in the Kyaukpyu port.¹⁶ But negative local sentiments could potentially stymie plans,¹⁷ notwithstanding recently closer ties amidst the Rakhine crisis.

 

While the economic aspect of this outreach in the Bay of Bengal has been extensive, the same cannot be said of China’s naval engagements. The PLA Navy’s initial foray into the region was during its first ever foreign port calls from November 1985 to January 1986, when it deployed two warships to visit Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Since then, there was a gap of several decades before a spike in activity in the broader Indian Ocean region, especially after 2008. In the interim, such engagements were manifest largely in Chinese arms sales or transfers to these countries. This remains the most significant component of Beijing’s naval engagements with bay countries to date. As Table 1 shows, compared to India, China has been a major source of naval hardware for two out of the three Bay countries.

 

Myanmar received initial Chinese technical assistance that paved the way for gradual indigenization of its naval shipbuilding industry. New Myanmar warships are built in local yards but heavily feature Chinese systems. However, in recent years, the Myanmar Navy has clearly sourced from India and others such as Israel and Italy. By comparison, Bangladesh has a less developed domestic naval shipbuilding sector and continues to source completed warships, including a pair of submarines in November 2016 from China. However, Dhaka also sourced naval hardware from other countries such as Britain, Germany, South Korea and the U.S. With a few exceptions though, naval hardware from these non-Chinese sources tend to be second-hand equipment. Only from China can the Bangladesh Navy secure newbuild platforms more cheaply, and this looks set to remain the case even as it has started to build simpler military vessels (for example, small coastal patrol and landing craft) locally, such as in Khulna Shipyard. As another example of diversifying equipment sources, after having obtained patrol vessels from India, the Sri Lankan Navy discussed the potential purchase of frigates with Russia.¹⁸

Clearly Beijing seeks to build on these mostly military-technical links and include other activities, all contributing towards deepening political ties and fostering naval interoperability. Naval port calls often constitute the first step, their growing frequency made possible especially with the regular deployment of the PLA Navy’s escort task forces for counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean.¹⁹ Since 2008, with its expanding bluewater capability and capacity, the PLA Navy has been able to send more ships beyond the regular presence of these task forces, as Table 2 shows. Since 2016 for example, the PLA Navy has been able to send separate ships or task forces into the Indian Ocean, as seen in the case of the Changchun-Jingzhou-Chaohu flotilla which visited the Bay countries as part of its 180-days voyage to visit more than 20 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Oceania. The visit to Sri Lanka by the PLA Navy’s hydrographic survey vessel Qian Sanqiang in February 2017 reflects the expanding scope of naval activities undertaken in the Indian Ocean. So was the case of the later visit by training ship Qi Jiguang.

Table 2 also yields another interesting observation: the most frequent port of call has been Sri Lanka, at the Port of Colombo, which was heavily funded and supported by Beijing. China could have expected unfettered use of the facility given its investments – akin to getting a ‘bang for one’s buck’.²¹ But the PLA Navy calls on Colombo involved what would be itineraries typically undertaken by navies at foreign ports worldwide – namely, replenishment (fuel, food), crew rest and relaxation, minor repairs and basic maintenance work, official visits to host government institutions, and even socio-civic activities. But Chinese submarine visitations to Sri Lanka in 2014 were especially interesting – the one in September 2014 took place when Beijing and New Delhi were locked in a stand-off at Ladakh along the disputed Line of Actual Control. Similar visits were not observed in recent years due to successful lobbying of Colombo by New Delhi, which has registered serious concerns over such activity.²²

 

The PLA Navy’s visits to these bay countries have in recent years expanded modestly in scope – there is a clear attempt to foster interoperability by incorporating more opportunities for joint training activities. For example, in May 2017 the Changchun-Jingzhou-Chaohu flotilla conducted the first joint exercise with the Myanmar Navy as part of its four-day visit to Thilawa port. Though ships involved on both sides are state of the art, the exercise involved rather low-end training components such as fleet manoeuvre, inter-ship communication and search and rescue.²³ However, when on its own, the same flotilla undertook more complex and demanding training ‘under real combat conditions’, such as underway replenishment and live firing.²⁴ Such training activities have yet to materialize with the PLA Navy’s bay counterparts.

That said, China may be starting from a low base of naval engagements beyond equipment sales with bay countries, and which could have the potential of expanding in scope and complexity in the future. However, local geopolitical sensitivities could still stand in the way. For example, India has offered submarine training to Bangladesh. Even while courting Chinese investments and political support over the Rakhine problem, Myanmar has also reached out to India for enhanced naval engagements, including new equipment purchases, training and other maritime security capacity building initiatives.

 

Economic and naval outreaches to the Bay of Bengal are fraught with limitations and cannot fully address China’s strategic angst over securing access to those vital SLOCs on which its national survival and prosperity so rely upon. Geography as a constant factor is clearly not in Beijing’s favour. Tankers heading to offload Chinese energy imports at those terminals in Bangladesh and Myanmar would still fall within the combat strike range of India’s shore based forces, especially those of the Eastern Naval Command and Eastern Air Command, not to mention the Andaman and Nicobar Islands outpost. This is why Beijing turned irate about an unprecedented, recent Indian war game code named ‘Defence of Andaman and Nicobar Islands Exercise (DANX)’.²⁵ A fiery editorial published by the jingoistic, CPC-affiliated Global Times branded the drill ‘irresponsible’.²⁶

 

This Chinese worry can be better understood when one notices that the PLA Navy’s forays into the Indian Ocean since 2008 all involved small three or four-ship flotillas, even though an unusual spike in total number of units was registered in July-August 2017 during the Doklam stand-off and ahead of the Indo-Japan-U.S. exercise Malabar.²⁷ But such sizeable presence over a sustained period could be more of an exception than the rule. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that all units present in the Indian Ocean at any point of time were capable of coordinating their actions or conduct joint operations beyond the task force level.

Conceivably the PLA Navy could in the near future deploy a full-fledged carrier battle group, but this force will still require shore based support especially in the event of an interstate contingency. The base in Djibouti would be too far away to reinforce any unit in the Bay of Bengal, and the ‘sea bridge’ remains well within Indian striking range as it stretches from the western Indian Ocean seaboard to the opposite eastern end of the bay. Likewise, support originating from Pakistan, such as Gwadar, could be fraught with risks for the same reason. Beijing could possibly build more overseas bases in the future, but the security and actual utility of these facilities in times of an Indian Ocean conflict could remain tenuous.²⁸

Without an Indian Ocean seaboard, China’s nearest military hub capable of responding to any contingency in the area would have to be Hainan island. But the lines of communication would be overly extended and vulnerable to interdiction since the PLA Navy South Sea Fleet must traverse foreign, and potentially hostile, waters in order to reach the Bay of Bengal. Besides the Malacca Strait, southerly alternatives such as the Lombok, Makassar and Sunda constitute strategic choke points that could be exploited by a well equipped and trained naval adversary adept in exploiting the local geographical conditions to its advantage.

It is not implausible that China may envision a possible scenario in which its SLOCs may be interdicted in the Bay of Bengal, yet it is unlikely to entertain the idea of getting into the thick of an outright naval confrontation. The constant geographical disadvantage is what China will have to confront in the long-term. This strategic vulnerability and angst that it faces cannot simply be ameliorated by just building more warships or striking more port and infrastructure deals with friendly Indian Ocean countries, not least those in the Bay of Bengal. Beijing would have to come to terms, if it has yet to, with the need to emphasize a more cooperative than competitive approach in securing its Indian Ocean interests.

 

Footnotes:

1. Data aggregated from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017, p. 24.

2. ‘China Eyes Progress Against Major Risks, Poverty, Pollution in 2018’, Xinhua News, 8 December 2017.

3. China 13th Renewable Energy Development Five Year Plan (2016-2020), National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, 19 December 2016 (publication in Chinese), available at http://www. nea.gov.cn/2016-12/19/c_135916140.htm

4. ‘China to Step Up Oil, Gas Exploration to Ease Reliance on Imports’, Xinhua News, 2 December 2017.

5. ‘China, Saudi Arabia Agree to Build Energy Cooperation Mechanisms’, Xinhua News, 25 August 2017.

6. ‘Chinese Vice Premier Calls for Stronger Energy Cooperation With Kuwait’, Xinhua News, 20 September 2017.

7. ‘China, Russia Agree to Expand Energy Cooperation’, Xinhua News, 25 August 2017.

8. ‘Chinese NOCs Jump on Belt and Road Bandwagon’, The Oil Daily, 27 November 2017.

9. Rania El Gamal and Alex Lawler, ‘Exclusive: China Offers to Buy 5 Per Cent of Saudi Aramco Directly – Sources’, Reuters News, 16 October 2017.

10. Quoted in Ibid.

11. ‘Full Text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative’, Xinhua News, 20 June 2017.

12. China’s Military Strategy, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 2015, available at http://eng.mod. gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805. htm

13. The exercise was based on the scenario of an aeronautical disaster in the Bay of Bengal, involving a total of six warships, divided into three pairs each respectively responsible for conducting SAR over an area measuring 30 nm in length and 9 nm in width. ‘Frigate Yuncheng Participates in IMMSAREX Search-and-Rescue Drill’, Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, 29 November 2017.

14. This project counts amongst several Chinese initiatives for assisting in the development of Bangladesh infrastructure, including railway, information and communication technology. Naim-Ul-Karim, ‘China, Bangladesh Sign Framework Agreement on Oil Pipeline Project’, Xinhua News, 30 October 2017.

15. ‘Yangon’s Port Under Study for Expansion’, Eleven (Myanmar), 25 November 2017.

16. ‘Exclusive: China Seeks up to 85 Per Cent Stake in Strategic Port in Myanmar’, Reuters News, 5 May 2017.

17. See for example, ‘China’s $10 Billion Strategic Project in Myanmar Sparks Local Ire’, Reuters News, 9 June 2017. In October the same year, it was reported that Myanmar would receive a larger share of the profit in the port’s development, possibly as a way of soothing local sentiments. ‘Myanmar to Reap Greater Rewards in Deep-Sea Port Development Project’, Mizzima News, 25 October 2017.

18. ‘Russia, Sri Lanka Discuss Delivery Contract of Gepard 3.9 Frigates – FSMTC’, Sputnik News Service, 22 March 2017.

19. The most recent iteration being the 28th Escort Task Force, comprising the frigates Weifang and Yancheng, supported by the replenishment vessel Taihu, which departed from Qingdao in early December 2017. ‘28th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Sets Sail for Gulf of Aden’, Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, 5 December 2017.

20. The Liuzhou, Sanya and Qinghaihu belonged to the 21st Escort Task Force. The June 2017 visit to Sri Lanka also involved the delivery of flood relief to the country.

21. A Chinese scholar once told me that the Chinese government would expect such conditions so long it deems it within its rights as the funder of those projects. This raises the question of ownership (or de facto ownership) of such projects. The case of Pakistan’s Diamer-Bhasha dam could provide an interesting example: Islamabad reportedly withdrew this project from the CPEC framework over its disagreement about Chinese conditions regarding ownership. Shahbaz Rana, ‘Pakistan Stops Bid to Include Diamer-Bhasha Dam in CPEC’, The Express Tribune, 15 November 2017.

22. ‘Sri Lanka Rejects Chinese Request for Submarine Visit: Sources’, Reuters News, 11 May 2017.

23. Li Ruohan, ‘China, Myanmar Conduct Naval Drills’, Global Times, 22 May 2017.

24. ‘Chinese Naval Fleet Stages Live-Fire Drill in Indian Ocean’, Xinhua News, 25 August 2017.

25. The exercise simulated a scenario in which an island in the group was captured by the enemy, and involved air, land and sea forces conducting air and amphibious assaults. This war game was preceded a few days before by a coastal security exercise, Sagar Kavach. ‘India Conducts Exercise to "Free" Andaman’, Deccan Herald, 24 November 2017.

26. Zhang Hui, ‘Indian Ocean Military Drill Irresponsible: Experts’, Global Times, 26 November 2017.

27. Over 12 PLA Navy warships of various types, including submarines and intelligence-collection ships, were observed in the Indian Ocean during this period. Rahul Singh, ‘Chinese Warships Prowl Indian Ocean Ahead of Naval Drills by India, US and Japan’, Hindustan Times, 5 July 2017; see also Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, ‘14 Chinese Navy Ships Spotted in Indian Ocean, Indian Navy Monitoring Locations’, The Economic Times, 2 December 2017.

28. An unnamed PLA insider was quoted as saying that China needs more overseas military bases. Minnie Chan, ‘War and Peacekeeping’, South China Morning Post, 18 December 2017.