INTERNAL political conflicts between the Myanmar armed forces (or the Tatmadaw) and political dissidents, on the one hand, and ethnic armed groups, on the other, have dominated much of international interest on Myanmar. Yet, a few other developments have also been drawing global attention to Myanmar and its significance in the Bay of Bengal (the bay hereafter).

In the late 1990s, stories about Chinese surveillance facilities in Myanmar’s Coco Islands and the opening up of oil and gas sector that began in the Yadana-Yatagun fields attracted interest among regional governments and the international community. In the first decade of the 21st century, Myanmar’s growing oil and gas exploration and the building up of tensions over maritime territorial disputes with neighbouring countries further heightened concerns. Since the country initiated political reforms in 2010, the plight of ‘the boat people’ involving the Rohingyas fleeing the country and the announcement of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor have once again brought to centrestage the critical role Myanmar plays in the geopolitics of the bay. Behind these headline stories lie deep-seated fears and concerns as well as hopes and visions of Myanmar on the bay.

Located in the northeast of the Indian Ocean with a 2,228 km long coastline, possessing hundreds of islands and with its major river systems flowing into the bay, Myanmar is a key littoral state. Historically, the bay had served as the gateway for Myanmar to the outside world that has established civilizational linkages. During the colonial period, Yangon city emerged as a port hub and acquired a cosmopolitan character, attracting people from all over world. In the post-independence period, and particularly after the Tatmadaw took over power in 1962, the country adopted an inward-looking approach and limited its external engagements.

Since the late 1980s, the bay reacquired significance in the strategic thinking of the ruling elite. This time the interests were driven largely by new security threat perceptions, interest to exploit the bay’s resources for development in line with the gradual initiation of economic liberalization and to use its assets to meet the country’s foreign policy objectives. These objectives remain a national priority in the reforms period as the nation plays catch-up. This article examines Myanmar’s response to the changing security and economic dynamics in the bay.

 

Myanmar’s security threat perceptions have been rapidly evolving in the past three decades. From an internally oriented security posture that focused largely on counter-insurgency, it transformed to an externally driven maritime security posture, both real and perceived. Since 1988, the year Myanmar witnessed a brutal suppression of democracy uprising, an idea that has greatly shaped the mindset of the Myanmar military elite was the fear of a US invasion for ‘regime change’. Andrew Selth, a long-time Tatmadaw watcher, has pointed to several instances suggesting that the fear of an external invasion of the Myanmar military regime was real.¹ Purchase of weapon systems, including radars and air defence weapons and placement of anti-aircraft artillery around Yangon to shifting of the country’s capital from Yangon, a port city, to Nay Pyi Taw, hundreds of kilometres inland, were all signs of the changing security perception.²

By the turn of the century, new maritime security concerns emerged when tensions surfaced over maritime territorial disputes with neighbouring Bangladesh and Thailand.³ The maritime territorial dispute, in an area supposed to hold huge reserves of oil and gas, led to naval confrontation with Bangladesh in 2008. (The dispute was settled peacefully by an international court in 2012.) In May the same year, calls to invoke ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) in response to the ineffective management of the military regime in the aftermath of the devastating Cyclone Nargis further intensified external threat perceptions as foreign warships loitered off Myanmar’s coast.⁴ Other non-traditional maritime security issues, ranging from over-fishing, piracy and maritime terrorism, have also raised concerns.

 

A new security threat that has been added to the increased maritime security challenges is the emergence of a Rohingya insurgent group with reports of linkages with global terror groups based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.⁵ The October 2017 attacks on border police posts along Myanmar-Bangladesh border by the Rohingya insurgents have heightened the security challenge emanating from outside the country using the maritime route and the likelihood of terrorists striking major cities. Despite severe international criticism over Myanmar Army’s atrocities and the quasi-democratic government’s inability to quell the situation in Rakhine state, there was no call to invoke the R2P. There has been no account to suggest that the Myanmar military was concerned about such an international action this time around. Nevertheless, the possibility that the Tatmadaw might have factored such a challenge cannot be ruled out.

 

In the late 1980s, Myanmar turned to the bay’s resources as it initiated limited economic liberalization. With a friendlier policy for foreign investors in the oil and gas industry a decade later, several major international companies secured contracts to explore and develop onshore and offshore oil and gas fields. With the lifting of economic sanctions in the reforms period and a further opening up of the sector, more foreign investors have secured oil and gas contracts.

Currently all four commercial gas fields in Myanmar are offshore blocks – the Yadana project and the Yetagun field in the Andaman Sea; the Shwe Gas Project off the Rakhine coast; and the Zawtika project in the Gulf of Martaban. According to Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy, the country earned US$170 million monthly from natural gas exports to Thailand and China in 2015, accounting for about 40 per cent of the country’s income.⁶ The oil and gas sector has also emerged as one of the top sectors for foreign direct investment (FDI) which stood at more than US$ 69 billion in cumulative FDI as of January 2017.⁷ Currently, 20 foreign companies are involved in exploration and production activities in 36 offshore blocks.⁸

As part of the economic reforms in the 1990s, Myanmar adopted a new port development policy. The process of privatization and decentralization of the management and operation of ports was initiated to attract the private sector in port development.⁹ In the period since the country began transitioning to democracy, new laws on Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and foreign investment have been enacted to support the development of the port industry.

 

Myanmar has created three SEZs, namely, the Dawei SEZ in southern Tanintharyi region; the Kyaukphyu Economic and Technological Zone in western Rakhine state (a Chinese-led project that plans to build an industrial park and a deep-water port, the starting point of pipeline linking the coastal area with China’s inland cities); and the Thilawa SEZ near Yangon, a Japan-driven project. The SEZs have been created near the ports with the intention to develop these ports. Myanmar has proposed the Sittwe Economic Zone in Rakhine state where India has developed the port and from where the Kaladan multi-modal connectivity project plans to connect the Indian Northeast region with the bay. The SEZ plan in Sittwe is yet to take off.¹⁰

The islands of Myanmar have also been increasingly attracting interest for their potential as ‘the next frontier of Asian tourism.’¹¹ Since opening up, Myanmar has been drawing up plans to exploit the wild and pristine beaches of its islands to boost the tourism industry. The 800 ‘largely untouched’ islands, spreading over an area of 10,000 square miles, Mergui (Myeik) archipelago off southern Myanmar in the Andaman Sea are billed as a potential tourist destination. Several private companies have rushed in with new tourism projects to set up hotels, resorts, golf courses and so on.¹²

In December 2016, the government formed the Tanintharyi Tourism Development Committee under the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism to draw up a master plan for developing tourism in the region.¹³ However, the need to balance development with environmental conservation remains a dilemma. In fact, Myanmar intends to apply for Unesco world heritage status for the Mergui archipelago and such a goal may conflict with its desire to see the islands as a tourism hub. Protection of natural resources of the islands will be a key factor in Unesco’s selection process.

 

In the face of growing maritime opportunities and challenges, the Myanmar Navy has experienced rapid growth in the past recent years. Myanmar has been expanding and modernizing its navy with the aim to secure offshore resources, enforce maritime claims and ‘raise the stakes’ of conflict with ‘hostile neighbours and help act as a deterrent against invasion.’¹⁴ However, the fact remains that the Myanmar Navy is still a ‘smaller small navy.’¹⁵ That said, as Myanmar’s dependence on the bay grows, its navy has grown from playing a ‘coastal ‘brown water’ role into a force developing some oceanic ‘blue water’ capabilities.’¹⁶

 

The introduction of new classes of weapons include modern corvettes and five (light) frigates.¹⁷ New military infrastructure including dockyards were constructed. In 2001, Myanmar commissioned its locally built Anwrahta-class corvettes of displace 1100 tons and carry four Chinese built C-802 anti-ship missiles.¹⁸ In 2011, Myanmar commissioned the indigenously built Aung Zeya and displacing 2500 tons that incorporates Russian built Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missiles.¹⁹ In 2014 and 2015, two locally built stealth frigates, the Kyan Sittha-class, were commissioned.²⁰

In 2012, Myanmar purchased two second-hand Chinese Type 054/Jianghu II-class light frigates that carries Chinese built C-803 anti-ship missiles.²¹ The Myanmar Navy today operates 3 corvettes and 13 large missile boats of four classes, mostly armed with Chinese built C-802 anti-ship missiles.²² In 2014, there were reports about negotiations between Myanmar and Indonesia for purchase of landing platform dock (LDP) type large amphibious landing vessel.²³ Since then, there have been no reports on the progress of the deal.

 

The strategic significance of Myanmar’s islands have long been recognized, particularly the Coco Islands which form part of the Andaman and the Nicobar chain. In the past, remoteness ensured that the islands served as a penal colony.²⁴ India had raised concerns when in the 1990s reports emerged that China was building naval bases in the Great Coco Island and Little Coco Island with installation of radar and signal intelligence facilities. These claims were put to rest in 2005. Indian defence officials visited the islands at the invitation of the Myanmar government and later in 2009 the then Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command Vice Admiral Anup Singh reiterated the Myanmar government’s clarification that ‘there was no Chinese presence in Coco Islands.’²⁵

According to report based on satellite imagery, up until early 2009 there was little evidence to suggest any large base or military activity in the Coco Islands, though Myanmar had operated a small naval base on Great Coco Island.²⁶ A recent report using satellite imagery indicates that since 2009 new activities involving land reclamation, airport expansion, a new apron, a control tower, a naval pier expansion and a new radar station have taken place, though the report did not specify the exact island of the three Coco Islands.²⁷ Going by this report, it is likely that Myanmar has been upgrading its infrastructure on the Great Coco Island in line with its new maritime security interests, possibly with Chinese technical assistance. The report cautions that in the context of ‘Chinese ambitions in the IOR and its assiduous expansionism’, there is a ‘strong need to monitor all activities in the IOR, especially at the Coco Island.’²⁸

 

Along with modernizing and upgrading the navy, another dimension of preparing the Myanmar Navy to address the growing maritime challenges is increased naval engagements and cooperation with foreign navies. With the induction of longer-range sea-going platforms, Myanmar has begun participating in multilateral operations and training exercises with other foreign navies. In 2003, the Myanmar Navy for the first time participated in the biennial multinational naval exercise, MILAN, hosted by India. As the Myanmar Navy modernizes and enhance naval engagements, there is a view in Southeast Asia that it will contribute to ‘shared responsibility’ and ‘further bolster collective pool of assets that can be utilized by the [ASEAN] regional grouping for future contingencies.’²⁹

 

Geography has placed Myanmar at an intersection, making it a potential alternative route to access the Indian Ocean and from the sea to continental Asia. The geostrategic value of such a route lies in the fact that it allows for bypassing the strategic Strait of Malacca. China sees Myanmar as a ‘land bridge’ to reach the Indian Ocean. India sees it as an ‘economic bridge between India and China and between South and Southeast Asia’.³⁰ Myanmar is aware of its value. Capturing this geostrategic position, the Burmese scholar Thant Myint-U titled his book, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. Myanmar’s leaders have talked about the potential of it emerging as a ‘bridge’. At the same time, Myanmar is also conscious of the dangers its geographic positioning could create for the country.

Responding to a question at a media conference in Bangkok in 2012, much before coming to power, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi said: ‘I am always concerned when Burma is seen as a battleground for the United States and China.’³¹ It is against this backdrop that the recently agreed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) assumes importance.

China may have only realized the CMEC today, but its planning began three decades ago. In 1985, a Chinese vice-minister of communication outlined the ‘ideas of opening’ Southwest China through Myanmar.³² Since then China’s southward drive has begun to gain momentum with new strategies and initiatives.³³ The idea of the CMEC ‘predates’ the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),³⁴ but it has now become a vital part. When China began building oil and gas pipelines connecting the bay to Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province, many observed that this was an effort to address the Chinese ‘Malacca Dilemma’. The timing of the announcement of the CMEC is significant, as it comes at a time when Myanmar is facing severe international criticism over the Rohingya crisis forcing it to turn to China for support and when the four-nation transborder initiative, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar-Economic Corridor, has seen little progress.

Myanmar’s security outlook has been rapidly changing in the recent years. As it further integrates its maritime security posture in its economic and strategic planning, two factors will determine the country’s maritime strategy. With the port-led development model, its dependence on the bay will further grow in the coming years as the country speeds up economic development. This will imply a more enhanced naval role and engagement. Second, given the increasing role of external players in the bay with interests in resources and corridors – roads, railways and pipelines – Myanmar’s security interests will be further tied to the interests of other countries. While Myanmar’s role in regional economic integration and cooperation may increase in future, balancing the overlapping interests of major powers will remain a foreign policy challenge.

 

Footnotes:

1. Andrew Selth, ‘Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30(3), 2008, pp. 379-402. Also, see Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Tatmadaw and Myanmar Security Challenges’, in Asia Pacific Security Outlook and its Implications for the Defence Sector. NIDS Joint Research Series No. 5, National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo, 2010, pp. 124-142.

2. Ibid.

3. Jürgen Haacke, ‘Myanmar and Maritime Security’, Special Forum 4(1), LSE Research Online, May 2016.

4. Andrew Selth, 2008, op.cit.

5. Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State. International Crisis Group Report No. 283, 15 December 2016 at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim- insurgency-rakhine-state

6. ‘Govt Earns US$170 Million Monthly from Gas Exports’, The Myanmar Times, 15 June 2015 at https://www.mmtimes.com/business/15034-govt-earns-us-170-million-monthly-from-gas-exports.html

7. See ‘Burma – Oil and Gas’, Export.Gov, 27 July 2017 at https://www.export.gov/article?id=Burma-energy-oil-and-gas

8. Roman Vakulchuk, Kyaw Kyaw Hlaing, Edward Ziwa Naing, Indra Overland, Beni Suryadi, Sanjayan Velautham, Myanmar’s Attractiveness for Investment in the Energy Sector: A Comparative International Perspective. Myanmar Institute for Strategic and International Studies (MISIS), 2017.

9. Elly Win, Enkhtsetseg Ganbat, Kichan, Nam, ‘Port Governance Structure: The Port of Yangon’, KMI International Journal of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 7(1), June 2015, pp.1-15.

10. ‘Sittwe Economic Zone in Limbo as Foreign Investors Get Cold Feet’, The Myanmar Times, 30 June 2014 at https://www. mmtimes.com/business/10835-sittwe-economic-zone-in-limbo-as-international-investors-get-cold-feet.html

11. ‘The Lost World: Myanmar’s Mergui Islands’, The Financial Times, 13 April 2013 at https://www.ft.com/content/de15a14a-a357-11e2-ac00-00144feabdc0

12. ‘Four Islands Marked for Development in Burma’s Mergui Archipelago’, The Irrawaddy, 14 January 2014 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/four-islands-marked-development-burmas-mergui-archipelago.html

13. ‘Tanintharyi Tourism Committee to Draft Master Plan’, The Myanmar Times, 11 January 2017 at https://www.mmtimes.com/business/24492-tanintharyi-tourism- committee-to-draft-master-plan.html

14. Andrew Selth, 2008, op.cit, p. 386.

15. Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘"Smaller Small Navies" of Southeast Asia: Greater Regional Resilience?’, RSIS Commentary no. 161, 12 August 2014 at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CO14161.pdf

16. ‘Modernization of the Myanmar Navy.’ NATO Association of Canada, 17 August 2015 at http://natoassociation.ca/about-us/contributors-2/

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Koh Swee Lean Collin, 12 August 2014, op.cit.

24. Andrew Selth, ‘Burma’s Coco Islands: Rumours and Realities in the Indian Ocean.’ Working Paper Series, No. 101, November 2008, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong.

25. ‘India Takes Up with Myanmar Reports of China "Base" in Coco Islands’, DNA, 10 September 2009 at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-takes-up-with-myanmar-reports-of-china-base-in-coco-islands-1289045

26. Andrew Selth, 2008, op. cit.

27. Vinayak Bhat, ‘Strong Need to Monitor Activities in Strategic Coco Islands.’ Observer Research Foundation, 15 March 2017 at http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/strong-need-to-monitor-activities-in-strategic-coco-islands/

28. Ibid.

29. Koh Swee Lean Collin, 12 August 2014, op.cit.

30. ‘Indian PM Outlines Cooperation Vision’, The Myanmar Times, 4 June 2012 https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/ 666-indian-pm-outlines-cooperation-vision.html

31. ‘Aung San Suu Kyi: China and the U.S. Should Not Use Burma as "Battlefield"’, The China Times, 1 June 2012 at http://thechina-times.com/online/2012/06/3669.html.

32. Pan Qi, ‘Opening the Southwest: A Expert Opinion’, Beijing Review, 2 September 1985 found at http://www.massline.org/Peking Review/PR1985/PR1985-35S.pdf.

33. Hongwei Fan, ‘China’s "Look South": China-Myanmar Transport Corridor’, Ritrumeikan International Affairs 10, 2011, p. 45.

34. Bertil Linter, ‘Myanmar as China’s Corridor to the Sea’, Asia Times, 16 June 2017 at http://www.atimes.com/article/myanmar-chinas-corridor-sea/