IN his lengthy and readable 2011 profile of Muthuvel Karunanidhi, titled The Last Lear, Vinod Jose tells a story of ‘the grand patriarch of Dravidian politics’ replete with ‘family rivalries, big money, television power, greed, violent reprisal and outsized influence in Delhi’.¹ The words ‘autocrat’ and ‘authoritarian’ are not used in this profile of a leader who has been chief minister of the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu five times and has led the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) since 1969. Yet the reader is left with the impression that Karunanidhi rules over a party in which courtly politics and corruption has triumphed over the politics of social reform initially espoused by the DMK.

We take a slightly different view. The DMK is marked by personalism and is certainly hierarchical.² However, we argue that while Karunanidhi’s leadership has weakened democracy in Tamil Nadu in certain ways, he has stopped short of being autocratic, and possibly, in other ways, has enabled democratic politics to develop. Karunanidhi’s style of politics is earthy, and the culture of the DMK under his leadership is popular and accessible. In several ways the DMK has helped make politics in Tamil Nadu more egalitarian. However, Karunanidhi has not always been insistent on the niceties of procedural democracy.

Karunanidhi’s style of leadership (in particular, his holding back from autocracy) makes him different from his principal opponent in Tamil Nadu politics – the AIADMK and its recently deceased leader, Jayalalithaa. The DMK and AIADMK converge in some ways – for example MGR established a tradition of not attending the state assembly when in opposition and this was also followed in the AIADMK by Jayalalithaa. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the two parties are identical in their form and attitude to democratic practice. The DMK is a party in which there is a degree of pluralism and deliberation. The formal powers of the AIADMK general secretary are absolute and Jayalalithaa often used those powers to abruptly reshuffle the party hierarchy.

 

We begin this essay by reviewing Karunanidhi’s career, the culture of the DMK, and his contribution to intra-party democracy, before turning to a consideration of the procedural aspect of democracy in Tamil Nadu.

Karunanidhi has enjoyed extra-ordinary longevity. Born in 1924, he is said to have entered politics at the age of 14, organizing a meeting to oppose the introduction of Hindi as a compulsory subject in the schools of the Madras Presidency.³ Karunanidhi was a founder member of the political party, the DMK, which split from the Dravida Kazhagam social reform movement in 1949. He still claims to adhere to the aims of the Dravidian movement which include promoting equality, defending the Tamil language, and seeking state autonomy.

In 1953 Karunanidhi was arrested and imprisoned in connection with Tamil language protests. He was again incarcerated in 1965 in connection with anti-Hindi protests (he was the leader of the DMK students’ wing). He won his first election to the state legislative assembly in 1957 and joined the cabinet of the DMK government in 1967. When C.N. Annadurai, the founding leader of the DMK, died in 1969, Karunanidhi emerged as leader after a short power struggle. He is respectfully addressed as Kalaignar (the creator or artist) to acknowledge his literary contributions (which include screenwriting, poetry, commentary on classical Tamil literature and modern versions of several classic works).⁴

 

Karunanidhi’s early political experience was within the Dravidian movement. This progressive movement argued for caste equality, better status for women, and opening up public debate.⁵ Within the DMK there was some effort to diminish the social influence of caste, with caste names much less used after the 1960s, and a normative presumption against making public claims for caste privilege gained some currency. The status of many among the backward castes improved as they gained recognition in education, business, and government employment.

The political elite of Tamil Nadu has been reconstituted as several generations of Dravidian politicians, many elected on DMK tickets or who defected from the DMK to the AIADMK after 1972, have dominated the state assembly since 1967. The backward castes are very well represented in both the assembly and the state cabinet. Karunanidhi takes great pride in his backward caste identity. He claims the DMK inverted social hierarchy in politics, illustrated in his anecdote that, when criticized for leading a ‘third rate’ (moondram thara) government, he clarified that he ran a ‘fourth rate’ (nangam thara) government. In other words, shudras, in the fourth rank of the varna hierarchy, rule the state.⁶

 

In spite of the progressive orientation of the Dravidian movement Karunanidhi has a mixed record in upholding democracy within the DMK. The leading positions held by members of his family has attracted most commentary. The unity of the party was strained between 2007 and 2014 as two of Karunanidhi’s sons, M.K. Azhagiri and M.K. Stalin positioned themselves to succeed their father as party president. Stalin eventually won the contest and is currently acting president of the party.

The issue of high level dynastic succession should not obscure a sober assessment of the rest of the party organization. For the most of Karunanidhi’s career the DMK has been run in an orderly way. Individuals can build careers and work their way up to higher levels of the DMK. The lower levels of the party are normally run quite autonomously. While very senior leaders are elected unopposed many lower level posts, including the coveted position of district secretary, face more competitive elections. These officials expect to serve their terms and are not subject to arbitrary dismissal (as they are in the AIADMK).

 

But the pluralism of the DMK is tempered by a hierarchical culture. Party members are expected to show respect to senior leaders. Some very senior leaders have disagreed publicly with Karunanidhi and remained within the party. Less senior figures have been disciplined. In Salem district, a number of district secretaries were appointed (and not elected) to make it clear that local leaders were on watch, and Veerapandi Raja, who has a difficult relationship with Stalin, was given only a temporary appointment.

If intra-party democracy is taken to mean social equality among its elite then the DMK has its limitations. Women and Dalits are free to join the party. Some have progressed to senior positions or won legislative seats but they remain few in number.⁷ The internal culture of the DMK is in many ways very masculine.⁸ The extent to which the DMK has incorporated diverse social groups has been debated, with some consensus that the progressive potential of Dravidian politics has not been fully realized.⁹

Still, although Karunanidhi has dominated the party, he cannot be dismissed as a dictator. He has been relatively accessible, listened to the opinions of other leaders and consulted the second level leadership. There is an element of deliberation in the party even if it remains behind closed doors. This is confirmed by accounts of DMK cabinet meetings which were said to go ‘on for hours’ in contrast to the perfunctory meetings of AIADMK cabinets. Assembly deliberations between 2011 and 2016 were often curbed by Jayalalithaa’s use of Rule 110 (which allows statements to be given without debate).¹⁰

An assessment of procedural democracy in Tamil Nadu reveals a mixed record, which could be succinctly described as imperfect but recognizably democratic. As a leading politician in the state Karunanidhi’s personal contribution has been significant. We present our analysis under three headings: elections, rule of law and democratic rights. We recognize that these are overlapping categories but hold that the distinctions are useful for analytical purposes.

 

Elections in Tamil Nadu have generally been free and fair. The regular alternation in office of the DMK and its offshoot, the AIADMK attest to this. Unlike some other Indian states, Tamil politicians have not been able to establish personal fiefdoms or skew election results in their favour. This is not to say that parties in the state always abide by election rules. There is evidence that Karunanidhi has tolerated, and even encouraged, giving cash to voters. One former DMK leader recalled that the 1974 Pondicherry election was the first time the DMK decided to give ten rupees for each vote.¹¹ Other parties are reported to have given money to voters in Tamil Nadu earlier than this and the practice has continued and been expanded.¹² There were serious allegations of DMK rigging the Chennai municipal elections in 2006. Yet when the courts delivered a split verdict on the issue Karunanidhi called for DMK councillors to resign and facilitate fresh elections.

 

When we speak of the rule of law we take that to mean that institutions should function in line with published rules which includes some institutional separation of powers between executive, legislature and judiciary.¹³ This is the weakest aspect of democratic practice in Tamil Nadu. The overall institutional design is formally democratic with codified rules that state officials and politicians are expected to abide by. Tamil Nadu has a reputation for efficient public administration that functions to a good standard. Government officials are held accountable by citizens, legislators and the press. However the bureaucracy and the judiciary have to an extent been politicized with politicians using transfers and appointments to exert influence. In one well known case, Judge S. Ashok Kumar was set to leave the Madras High Court having lost the confidence of fellow judges, however it is said he continued in service following pressure from the DMK on the central government.¹⁴

 

Tamil Nadu does not have a predatory regime but corruption is a serious problem.¹⁵ Politicians are known to ‘help’ favoured businesses and well connected individuals. Methods for allocating public contracts are sometimes rudimentary creating opportunities for kickbacks from contractors. Measures to prevent this activity are largely ineffective. The ‘rules of the game’ in corruption cases are that a light punishment is administered after the party has left office. This consists of a police search of a politician’s properties, possibly an arrest and framing of charges. An arrest might be followed by a pre-hearing detention of a few weeks and then bail. Convictions rarely happen and only when special courts take cases forward.

DMK politicians are only occasionally disciplined by their own party. Karunanidhi has temporarily suspended a handful of DMK officials but avoided taking serious action. Corruption by elected officials took a serious turn under the DMK government between 2006 and 2011. A particular problem was ‘land grabbing’ where owners of land were put under pressure to sell land, often at rates below the market value. The newly elected AIADMK government set up special courts and jailed hundreds of individuals. Nearly ten thousand complaints were reported to the police by mid-September 2011 and a large number arrested including well known leaders of the DMK. These arrests have not been followed by convictions.

The Government of Tamil Nadu has legislation to protect dalits from caste discrimination. However, enforcement of the Prevention of Atrocities Act is often ineffectual,¹⁶ though the DMK is said to have a better record of implementation than the AIADMK. Karunanidhi claims to stand for social justice with regards to caste but his position on dalit issues has been ambiguous and has often kept in mind the views of the dominant castes with whom the dalits come into conflict.¹⁷ He was widely criticized in 2006 for coded comments in a campaign speech that were construed as anti-dalit.¹⁸ In many other areas the state in Tamil Nadu is responsive to public concerns. The populist ideology of both ruling parties encourages them to demonstrate they are ‘people oriented’.¹⁹ However, the DMK under Karunanidhi’s leadership has not dealt effectively with serious corruption, and this was particularly true of the 2006-2011 period in office.

 

In order for a democratic system to work citizens need to be able to deliberate, debate and hold the state accountable which means politicians should support ‘the important legal freedoms of speech, assembly, organization and the press’.²⁰ The public arena for debate is partially open in Tamil Nadu. Media outlets have proliferated since the early 1990s. Many television channels have partisan links, including Kalaignar TV that is part owned by Karunanidhi’s wife and daughter. In 2011 the DMK was criticized for interfering in the film industry while it was in power. DMK politicians and allied businesses sought to use their influence for commercial gain. Sufficient independent ownership of print outlets, including several combative Tamil magazines, gives some balance to media coverage of politics.

 

As an atheist and writer Karunanidhi has often been supportive of intellectual and artistic freedoms, and tolerated those with religious views. However as a pragmatic politician he has also been equivocal. In the case of Khushboo, who was assailed by several Tamil politicians in 2005 for comments about pre-marital sex, Karunanidhi took two months to offer muted support. Neither was he prompt to comment on the case of the persecuted writer Perumal Murugan in January 2015.

In terms of the freedom of the press the DMK is relatively tolerant of criticism but this has not been an absolute commitment. When last in power (2006-2011) the DMK government filed 40 defamation cases against critics of the regime and various outlets reporting critical views. Its supporters would want to mention that this was far less than the subsequent AIADMK government (2011-2016). The Supreme Court took exception to the 213 defamations cases filed by the AIADMK government between 2011 and 2016.²¹ Less coercive ways of influencing the press are available in the form of state schemes for journalists’ welfare. Karunanidhi initiated a plan to provide 135 subsidized houses and flats in Chennai, though to his chagrin the scheme was finally implemented by the AIADMK.²² Civil society is very active in Tamil Nadu with many voluntary associations and NGOs contributing to civic life.

 

In its early years the DMK made its own contribution to expanding space for public debate through its ‘talk shops’ but when in power in the 1970s its relations with other associations, such as trade unions and farmers’ associations became more adversarial and in some cases repressive.23 The DMK has promoted its own trade union, the LPF in an attempt to mobilize working class support and dilute the influence of other unions. When in opposition Karunanidhi has collaborated with civil society organizations, including seeking Indira Gandhi’s intervention on behalf of members of the farmers’ movement arrested by the AIADMK government. Between 2006 and 2011 the DMK government hoped that an expansion of self-help groups would help the party extend its influence. Nevertheless social movements and advocacy groups remain active.

During the span of Karunanidhi’s political career Tamil society has become more open and egalitarian. The growth of the DMK accelerated political change in South India, occurring as it did during the very period in which mass democracy began to take hold. The DMK recruited activists and sympathizers from modest social and economic backgrounds, creating what Subramanian describes as a ‘plebeian party’ that contrasted with the elite-dominated Congress.²⁴ The DMK contributed to making politics an activity in which ordinary people could participate. Karunanidhi cannot take all the credit for these developments, especially as some changes were initiated in the early years of the DMK when he was a second level leader. Even so, under his leadership, the DMK has made some attempts to promote social equality.

 

In recent years, the DMK has contributed to expanding the provision of a welfare safety net in the state.²⁵ In these ways the substantive aspect of democracy in Tamil Nadu has been advanced.²⁶ Karunanidhi’s contributions to developing the procedural aspects of democracy in Tamil Nadu have been more ambiguous. He is a pragmatic and, at times, ruthless politician who has often chosen party advantage over procedural correctness. Even so his ruthlessness has not normally been vindictive and political violence, while it is not absent, is not commonplace in Tamil Nadu.

It is in the area of intraparty democracy that Karunanidhi’s contribution has been most paradoxical. In spite of his plebeian inclinations hierarchical distinctions in the party have sharpened over time. He actively helped his family develop political and business careers to the extent that it has jeopardized party unity. Yet the DMK remains a robust organization where internal elections remain important and a degree of pluralism has been maintained. Karunanidhi’s personal ambitions have shaped but not overwhelmed the DMK.

 

Footnotes:

1. Vinod K. Jose, ‘The Last Lear’, The Caravan 3(4), April 2011.

2. Kanchan Chandra gives an account of how different forms of hierarchy have emerged in the Congress and BJP. ‘Emperor Modi Ended the Gandhi Dynasty’, Foreign Policy, 2016.

3. M. Karunanidhi, Nenjukku Neethi: Bagam-1. Thirumagal Nilayam, Chennai, 2007, pp. 38-46, 457.

4. C. Manikandan, ‘Caste in Political Recruitment: The Study of Two Major Dravidian Parties in Tamil Nadu’, PhD thesis, Pondicherry University, 2016.

5. V. Geetha and S.V. Rajadurai, Towards a Non-Brahmin Millennium: From Iyothee Thass to Periyar. Samya, Calcutta, 1998, pp. 381-2.

6. ‘House Adopts 4 Bills; Karunanidhi Deems it a Red Letter Day’, The Hindu, 1 June 2006.

7. C. Manikandan and A. Wyatt, ‘Elite Formation Within a Political Party: The Case of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 52(1), 2014, pp. 32-54.

8. S.V. Rajadurai and V. Geetha, ‘DMK Hegemony: The Cultural Limits to Political Consensus’, in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), Region, Religion, Caste, Gender and Culture in Contemporary India. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996, p. 568.

9. J. Harriss, ‘Whatever Happened to Cultural Nationalism in Tamil Nadu? A Reading of Current Events and the Recent Literature on Tamil Politics’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40(3), 2002, pp. 97-117; N. Subramanian, ‘Identity Politics and Social Pluralism: Political Sociology and Political Change in Tamil Nadu’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40(3), pp. 136-8.

10. R.K. Radhakrishnan, ‘Jayalalithaa and Governance’, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, 9 December 2016.

11. G. Viswanathan, ‘Enathu Arasiyal Payanam 9(3): Anna Kataipitiththa Utkatchi Jananayagam!’, Thuglak, 25 April 2013.

12. Most notoriously DMK supporters made payment of 5,000 rupees to voters in the Thirumangalam by-election of January 2009 though it is not known if the state level leadership sanctioned this.

13. D. Beetham, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization’, in D. Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 56.

14. M. Katju, ‘How a Corrupt Judge Continued in Madras High Court’, Times of India, 21 July 2014; ‘Karunanidhi Put Up Loyalists for Judges: Markandey Katju’, Deccan Chronicle, 11 August 2014.

15. J. Harriss and A. Wyatt, Business and Politics in Tamil Nadu. Simons Papers in Security and Development, No. 50/2016, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, March 2016.

16. M. Vijayabaskar and A. Wyatt, ‘Economic Change, Politics and Caste: The Case of the Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam’, Economic and Political Weekly 48(48), 2013, p. 109.

17. H. Gorringe, Panthers in Parliament: Dalits, Caste, and Political Power in South India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2017, p. 206.

18. ‘Karunanidhi Attempting to Instigate Caste Clashes: Vaiko’, 24 April 2006, http://www.rediff.com/election/2006/apr/24ptn1.htm

19. A. Wyatt, ‘Populism and Politics in Contemporary Tamil Nadu’, Contemporary South Asia 21(4), 2013, pp. 365-381.

20. G. Therborn, ‘The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy’, New Left Review 103, May-June 1977, p. 4.

21. ‘SC Raps Tamil Nadu Government for Choking Dissent’, The Hindu, 24 August 2016.

22. R.K. Radhakrishnan, ‘Jayalalithaa and Governance’, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, 9 December 2016.

23. N. Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 162-3, 211-16.

24. Ibid., pp. 144-9.

25. M. Vijayabaskar, ‘Populism and Collective Action’, Seminar 682, June 2016.

26. P. Heller, ‘Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India’, World Politics 52(4), 2000, pp. 484-519.