IN popular and political imagination, Bihar has for long been characterized by the near absence of the state, and inefficient public institutions. Many saw this as a direct result of the rise of backward castes in North Indian politics in general, and Bihar in particular. Indeed, there existed a deliberate marginalization of development issues and a concomitant rise in criminality. However, to acknowledge this is not to deny the profound social and political changes unleashed by the political empowerment of hitherto marginalized groups. The rise of backward caste hold over Bihar’s polity in the late 1980s coincided with the rise of Janata Dal (JD) under Lalu Prasad Yadav in Bihar, and its consolidation happened under the government of Lalu Prasad Yadav-led faction of the Janata Dal, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).

Bihar politics has always been an enigma to the best of political observers. The ever changing caste dynamics, underlying political currents, political alliances and allegiances has meant that, to an outsider, Bihar politics forever remains trapped in rank opportunism cloaked as pragmatism. However, to an astute observer, this remains at best only a partial explanation.

Bihar’s political trajectory since independence can be classified into six phases. In the first phase (1952-1967), the Congress party, just like the rest of North India, had a near hegemonic hold over the political landscape in Bihar. The catch-all character of the Congress party support base hid the primarily upper caste character of its representatives. The second phase (1967-1972) signalled the advent of the backward castes in Bihar politics. In 1967, the first non-Congress government backed and supported mainly by the backward sections amongst the Bihar society, came to power in the state. However, what followed was an era of extreme political instability in the absence of a governing majority.¹ In the five years, the state was witness to as many as nine governments of different political parties, with an average duration of seven to eight months.²

 

In the 1972 state assembly elections, the Congress party staged a comeback, largely facilitated by a fragmented opposition. This was the beginning of the third phase (1972-1990) in Bihar politics. Though back in power and leading a single party majority government, the Congress party dominance of the political arena was a pale shadow of its absolute dominance in the first phase. Though the party remained in power right up till 1990, this phase of Congress rule was characterized by extreme factionalism within the party which resulted in a frequent change of guard. The era was witness to eleven governments, by different chief ministers, with an average duration of less than two years.³

The fourth phase (1990-1995) marked the rise of the Janata Dal under the leadership of Lalu Yadav. This period was witness to the complete marginalization and relegation of the Congress party as a minor player, and the ascent and near domination of Bihar politics by Lalu Yadav. The rise of Lalu Yadav and Janata Dal, just like the rise of leaders like Mulayam Singh Yadav and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, was no doubt facilitated by the extreme reaction and backlash by the upper castes to the acceptance of the Mandal Commission recommendations.

 

The recommendation of the Mandal Commission suggested preferential treatment and reservation for the backward caste groups in civil services and higher education, the traditional preserves of the upper castes in India. Lalu Yadav supported the recommendations passionately. This, along with Lalu Prasad’s firm anti-communal stand, earned him the gratitude and support of Muslims in Bihar. In due course, backward castes (especially Yadavs) and Muslims emerged as the core support base of the Lalu Yadav led Janata Dal, which kept Lalu, if not the Janata Dal, in power right upto the 2005 assembly elections. This phase was witness to the consolidation of anti-Congress forces.

The success of the Janata Dal in consolidating its base among the backward castes changed the social profile of the Bihar legislature. The 1990s saw the dominance of backward caste leaders in the legislative arena, a trend further underlined by the 2015 assembly results. This was also the time when the latent divisions within the Janata Dal surfaced and led to splits in the party. The first split happened in 1994, just before the 1995 assembly elections, when Nitish Kumar and George Fernandes left the party and formed the Samta Party. This heralded the beginning of the fifth phase (1995-2015) in Bihar politics.

In 1997, Lalu Yadav resigned from the chief minister’s post amidst allegation of financial irregularities, nepotism and corruption. He installed his wife as a proxy chief minister, split from the parent party (Janata Dal) and formed a separate one – the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). The year 1999 was to witness another split in the Janata Dal when the faction led by Sharad Yadav decided to leave the party on the question of supporting the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance, both in Bihar and at the Centre. The Sharad Yadav faction of the Janata Dal was christened Janata Dal (United) [Table 1].

In their quest to dislodge Lalu Yadav and the RJD from Bihar, both the Samta Party and the JD(U) agreed to make common cause with the BJP. If the anti-Congress plank characterized the second and third phases of Bihar politics, the fourth phase marked the consolidation of backward caste politics in the legislative arena under Lalu-led Janata Dal, the fifth phase marked the coming together of anti-Lalu/RJD parties. This to some extent gave political legitimacy to the BJP and facilitated its advent as an important player in Bihar politics.⁴

The resentment against Lalu Yadav and the RJD was to some extent also the result of marginalization felt by upper castes as also backward castes other than the Yadavs in Bihar, such as the Kurmis and Keoris. A perception gained ground that the Yadavs had a disproportionate say and hold over state power and government largesse. Therefore, it is important to look at the successive splits in Janata Dal in Bihar as a quest by different caste groups to carve out a distinct political space for themselves through political parties of their own. In Bihar, by the late 1990s, the support base of political parties had more or less become confined to particular caste groups and no party could claim to represent a cross-section of voters. The coming together of parties with diverse ideologies and social bases, and the subsequent consolidation of coalition politics in the state, was borne out by this realization rather than rank opportunism.

 

The domination of the Yadavs under Lalu Prasad and the perceived alienation of the upper castes and the two major backward caste blocs, Kurmis and Keoris, facilitated political alignment between two major OBC blocs where the two major national parties – INC and the BJP, had to align with one or the other blocs as a junior partner.⁵

In the two consecutive Lok Sabha elections in 1998 and 1999, held after the formation of RJD, it did seem that the party had become vulnerable after the splits in the parent party, the Janata Dal. Though the party was number one by vote share in both the Lok Sabha elections, it came second and third by seat share (Table 2). Of the 38 RJD contestants in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, half of them had contested the previous election on the Janata Dal ticket and only eight of them managed to win their respective seats (Table 3). This was the first election after the formation of RJD in 1997.

Though RJD was still the largest party by vote share, its respectable tally was primarily the result of the Janata Dal cutting into anti-RJD votes. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 1999 Lok Sabha elections marked a further decline in RJD seat share. This development was facilitated by a coming together of two main anti-Lalu formations, the newly formed JD(U) and Samta Party against RJD.⁶ In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the party tally came down further to seven from the 17 it had won in 1998. This was mainly the result of a seat sharing arrangement between the BJP, Samta Party, and JD(U).

 

What is noteworthy is that in both the 1998 and 1999 elections, a large number of former candidates dropped by the RJD were not accommodated by other parties. This was certainly the case in 1999, when only one former RJD candidate was given a ticket by the JD(U). The fact that a large number of former Janata Dal and RJD candidates, 19 and 17 in the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections respectively, were simply dropped and not accommodated by any other party is indicative of the fact that in Bihar parties were becoming increasingly wary of accommodating those dropped by their parent party. This was reflective of the incompatibility between the parties with distinct social bases. Thus, the late 1990s saw the introduction of a large number of fresh faces in Bihar’s polity from across the social spectrum.

 

In the 2000 assembly elections, which followed the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, many expected RJD to lose. However, belying naysayers, RJD emerged as the single largest party in the legislative assembly (Table 4). The party retained its number one position both by vote and seat share, a marked improvement over its performance in the Lok Sabha elections. The results also underscored an important point that the bulk of Janata Dal organization in Bihar had sided with the RJD.

Thus, the 2000 assembly election gave legitimacy to RJD’s claim as the true successor of the Janata Dal in Bihar, a fact corroborated by the evidence on the ground – as many as 116 of the 249 Janata Dal candidates in the 1995 assembly elections contested on the RJD ticket. Seventy five per cent (93/124) of the winning candidates of the 1995 assembly elections fought the election on RJD tickets, and 51 of them managed to retain their seats. Only 39 JD candidates from the previous assembly were accommodated by other parties. A large majority of them contested the election on either JD(U) on Samta Party tickets, only 12 of the 26 Janata Dal candidates nominated by the two parties managed to win their seats (Table 5).

Just like the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, a large number of Janata Dal candidates were simply dropped and not accommodated by any other party. A large majority of those dropped were from the region which eventually became Jharkhand and where RJD had little organizational base. This was the main reason why RJD readily overcame its initial opposition to the carving out of the new state of Jharkhand and facilitated its creation. The creation of Jharkhand catapulted RJD into a comfortable majority in the state assembly, albeit as part of a coalition arrangement between RJD, INC, CPI, CPM, and BSP, as the number of seats in the state legislature came down from 324 to 243 (Tables 6 & 7).

Perhaps the improved performance of the RJD in the 2000 assembly elections can also be accounted for by the fact that RJD managed to retain a hold over its core group of supporters – Yadavs and Muslims. The RJD benefited from the failure of the opposition parties to make inroads among the diehard supporters of the ruling party.⁷ In a fragmented political scenario, this gave the party a marginal edge over the opposition parties.

 

Lalu Yadav’s biggest contribution to Bihar society and polity has been the demolition of upper caste hegemony. He has been at the centre of Bihar politics since 1990. It will not be an exaggeration to say he has been the fulcrum around which Bihar politics has revolved for more than two decades. However, this certainly came at a cost. The single-minded pursuit of social empowerment, once political empowerment had been achieved, was at the cost of governance. Lalu Prasad was astute enough to realize the continued hold the upper castes exerted on state administration. There are accounts galore of the manner in which the RJD chief treated senior bureaucrats with disdain and also frequently had them transferred in an attempt to cut bureaucracy down to size.⁸ His approach to achieve the goal of social empowerment was to promote and encourage members belonging to OBCs, Muslims, and Scheduled Castes in the state bureaucracy. There was a clear power shift away from the machination of upper caste dominated state bureaucracy towards lower caste bureaucrats and political networks.⁹

This was also a period which witnessed a marked increase in the number of political candidates with criminal antecedents, especially among the backward caste groups, a large number being patronized by the ruling party. In Bihar, just like the rest of North India, this was a practice not restricted to the newly politicized groups. The upper caste politicians, who were past masters in the art of using muscle power to consolidate their political hold and assert their social status, continued to do so. Therefore, both strategically and politically, it made sense for RJD to rely on backward caste strongmen as they brought credibility to the promise of protecting their co-ethnics and their interests, often through violent means, while simultaneously strengthening the political base of the party. This was especially the case in Bihar with a political landscape dotted with innumerable social divisions and violent caste conflicts.¹⁰

 

The politicization of lower castes in Bihar benefited Lalu Prasad Yadav the most and kept him in power, both directly and indirectly, for almost fifteen years. However, the state government and the political party disproportionately depended upon the elite amongst the backward castes – mostly the Yadavs. This bred resentment across caste and class category. Though Lalu Yadav and his party did succeed in dismantling the old order, they singularly failed to provide an alternative model of welfare and governance. Thus, not only was there complete chaos in terms of the law and order situation, but public service delivery also suffered, which resulted in continuing misery and deprivation for a large majority of people. Not surprisingly, the RJD government came to be characterized by nepotism, patronage and alienation of a large section among its support base among the backward castes, Muslims and Dalits. It was certainly a case of ‘Yadavization’ of backward caste politics in Bihar and bred resentment because of its non-accommodative-ness.¹¹ It was eventually this resentment against Yadav domination which led to the RJD’s fall in 2005.

This was all the more surprising because following up on its performance in 2000 assembly elections, the party had performed remarkably well in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. This was significant because in 2003, the Samta Party, JD(U), and Lok Shakti had formally merged under the umbrella of JD(U), and RJD and its allies had faced joint opposition. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, RJD won 22 of the 26 seats contested in alliance with INC, NCP, and LJP. To a great extent the drubbing that the party received both in February 2005 and October 2005 assembly elections was due to the failure of RJD to accommodate the interests of the Lok Jan Shakti Party of Ram Vilas Paswan.

In the October 2005 assembly elections, the NDA finally managed to win the election with a convincing margin. The failure to bring LJP into its fold, and faced with a joint opposition saw the RJD relegated to the third position, though it still remained the largest party by vote share.

 

In the Nitish Kumar-led NDA, RJD faced a formidable opponent comprising of BJP’s Hindu upper caste base, and JD(U) base among extremely deprived sections of the backward castes (EBC’s). This was a masterstroke by Nitish Kumar which weaned away a large section of the non-Yadav backward castes. Nitish Kumar further consolidated his hold by bringing the most backward among the Dalits within the NDA fold by selective and ingenuous targeting of direct benefits to them.

This new social-coalition was formidable enough to win a majority of seats in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and improve upon its tally in the 2010 assembly elections. Lalu, the man who was central to Bihar politics for more than two decades, had been relegated to the political margins. His party won only four seats in the Lok Sabha elections and was restricted to 22 seats in the assembly elections (Tables 2 & 3). For the first time, the RJD was down to the number two position by vote share and number three by seat share. If the 2005 assembly elections heralded the exit of the RJD from the political centre stage in Bihar, the party’s performance in 2009 and 2010 elections underlined its complete political marginalization in state politics. Thus, RJD’s run in Bihar politics came to a grinding halt and for many the decline in RJD’s political fortune appeared terminal, with very little hope of recovery.

In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, RJD’s performance was a repeat of the 2009 elections and the party once again managed to win only four seats, and remained number two and three by vote share and seat share. However, 2014 was not 2009 or 2010, and almost a year before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in June 2013, the Nitish Kumar-led NDA coalition fell apart over BJP’s decision to name Narendra Modi as its prime ministerial candidate. Incidentally, this was also the year when RJD chief Lalu Prasad Yadav was convicted in a fodder scam case, which led to his immediate disqualification from the Lok Sabha and a ban from contesting an election for at least six years. Thus, 2014 was a crucial electoral test both for RJD and JD(U). The two parties performed miserably in the general elections, winning four and two of Bihar’s 40 parliamentary seats respectively. The BJP and its allies managed to win a majority of Lok Sabha seats with nearly 39% of the votes. The vote share of the RJD and JD(U) was 20 and 16% respectively, to the BJP’s 39%. The combined total of JD(U), RJD and INC put together at 45% was much larger than NDA’s 39%.

 

Hence, electorally it made sense for these parties to come together on a common platform to take on the BJP and its allies. This realization marked the beginning of the sixth phase in Bihar politics. Thus, not discounting the ideological claims, seeking a political understanding was also a question of political survival for both JD(U) and RJD as the difference between the combined vote share of RJD, JD(U) and INC and the BJP had narrowed from 26% in 2004 to 5% in 2014.¹²

The 2014 debacle came with a silver lining for the RJD. To an astute politician like Lalu Prasad Yadav, it provided an opportunity to reclaim its central position in Bihar politics. There was a practical reason too for RJD to be receptive towards the overtures made by the JD(U). With Lalu himself not eligible to contest any form of elections, and Rabri Devi’s unwillingness to once again take a plunge in an electoral battle on behalf of her husband, the RJD chief had little choice but to agree to fight the 2015 assembly elections in alliance with JD(U) under the leadership of Nitish Kumar.¹³

 

Since the 1990 assembly elections, Lalu Prasad Yadav has been central to Bihar politics and at least till 2005, the political class was merely reacting to the agenda set by him and his party, the RJD. I would suggest that this has continued right up to the 2015 assembly election, primarily because of the manner in which the BJP sought to turn the electoral fight into a contest between Lalu and the NDA. If earlier it was the anti-Lalu sentiment which had guided the alliance formation in the state, in the sixth phase it was the aversion to the BJP on the part of the RJD, Congress and, more recently the JD(U), that facilitated the alliance formation and led to a reconfiguration of the political landscape.

The RJD alliances in the past have been highly unstable and characterized by the joining and leaving of parties, both before and after the election. In the past, RJD has rarely been accommodative of its allies and their political interests, especially when it came to the assembly elections.¹⁴ Therefore, in terms of accommodating the preferences of its allies, 2015 was a departure from the party’s past practice. This was primarily because the RJD was dealing with a party which was not only a major player in the state, but also the party in power. However, even then the RJD had an upper edge in matters of ticket distribution and seat sharing. The party wrested 24 seats from JD(U) and contested on the 49 seats won by the BJP in 2010. It repeated 40 candidates and fielded 45 new candidates. It decided to forgo its claim in 16 other seats contested by the party in the previous election. Most of the seats where the party dropped its claim were the ones where either JD(U) had won the election or RJD was on the third or an even lower position in 2010.

 

Therefore, it is not surprising that the seat sharing arrangement was such that both RJD and JD(U) ended with an equal number of seats, i.e., 101 each. RJD gave 48 tickets to Yadavs and 16 each to Muslims and SCs. Thus, a lion’s share of 78% of seats from the RJD pool went to the three communities. The ticket distribution was clearly aimed at consolidating the party’s hold over its core support base amongst the Yadavs, Dalits and Muslims.

In a bitterly fought electoral battle, the Nitish Kumar-led mahagathbandhan emerged victorious, with the alliance winning 178 seats of the 243 seats in the state assembly. The Lalu Prasad Yadav-led RJD won 80 of the 101 seats contested by the party. By any yardstick, this is a remarkable comeback for a party which was written off after the 2010 assembly election and the conviction of Lalu Prasad Yadav.

 

It is always too early to write off a party with a stable social base and a robust organization. Even in 2010, when the party performed miserably and managed to win only 22 seats, its vote share never dipped below 18%. In fact, in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the RJD vote share increased by almost 2.5% to 20.5%. The party contested 55 seats of the 119 where it was runner up in 2010; of these RJD won 44 seats with a strike rate of 80%. Most importantly, the number of seats where the party had been in third or lower position, even in 2009 Lok Sabha elections and the 2010 assembly elections when RJD performed miserably, was 4 in the Lok Sabha elections and 27 in the assembly elections. Thus, there always existed a possibility of a bounce back, and an alliance with JD(U) and INC provided RJD with one such opportunity ( Tables 2 & 3).

 

According to the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) data, RJD support base amongst the Yadavs and Muslims has been relatively stable, though the same cannot be said of its hold over the Dalit votes. The RJD support among Yadavs was at an all time high of 80% in February 2005 assembly elections, and fell to 53% in 2009 Lok Sabha election. The RJD support base among Muslims too has dwindled in recent years, from a peak of 55% in 2000 assembly elections to 21% and 25% in 2009 and 2010 Lok Sabha and assembly elections respectively. However, in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, RJD once again managed to regain its position among Muslims with 51% of Muslim votes. The RJD support base among EBCs has experienced constant erosion and was only stemmed in 2015 assembly elections due to the alliance with JD(U). Among the Dalits on the other hand, RJD has retained its hold throughout ,along with its allies, has been securing 20-30% of Dalit votes, with the exception of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. In the 2015 elections, there was a Yadav and Muslim consolidation behind RJD, and 74% of the Yadavs and 57% of Muslims along with 31% Dalits supported the RJD in the constituencies contested by the party. The overall support for the party among Yadavs, Muslims and Dalits was 43, 27, and 13% respectively amongst the three communities (Table 8).

Forty two of the 48 Yadav candidates nominated by the party won the election with a strike rate of 88%. Twelve Muslim candidates were elected on the RJD ticket with a strike rate of 75%; 13 Scheduled Castes candidates fielded by the party also won the election. Interestingly, the party decided not to field a Bhumihar and fielded only one Brahmin candidate. The overall strike rate for the RJD candidates belonging to Yadav, Dalits, and Muslims was 83% – same as their share in total number of successful candidates. Of the 101 seats contested by RJD, the RJD and BJP contested against each other in 74 seats and ended up winning 54 of them with a strike rate of 73%. The rest of the RJD seats came from winning all the seats but the one it fought against the other constituents of the NDA.¹⁵

The comeback made by the party is certainly remarkable but not surprising. Even in 2015, the RJD vote share has remained the same as in 2010. In a fragmented political system, under a first past the post system, one should be wary of writing off a party with a committed voting block and a stable vote share. The floating votes were added to the RJD kitty, and both the JD(U) and INC helped translate vote plurality into seats for the RJD. One could also read the RJD strategy in this election as the opposite of what BJP attempted and succeeded in 2014 general election i.e. forming a social and electoral coalition sans the Muslims. In the Bihar assembly elections, the RJD game plan was to carve out a social bloc independent of upper castes, notably the Brahmins and Bhumihars. The results clearly show that this strategy paid off electorally. However, how well the party will consolidate its hold over Bihar and what kind of effect it might have on national politics, remains a matter for the future.

 

Footnotes:

1. Milan Vaishnav, Battle for Bihar, URL:http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/30/battle-for-bihar/iid1 accessed on 20 December 2015.

2. Sanjay Kumar, ‘Coalition Politics in Bihar’ in E. Sridharan (ed.), Coalition Politics in India: Selected Issues at the Centre and the States. Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2014, p. 176.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 177.

5. Muneshwar Yadav, ‘Politics from Below’, Economic and Political Weekly 39(51), 18 December 2004.

6. Samta Party agreed to contest the 1999 election under the JD(U) symbol, though the formal merger only came about in 2003.

7. Sanjay Kumar, ‘The Return of the RJD’, Frontline 17(06), 18-31 March 2000, URL:http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1706/17060270.htm accessed on 20 December 2015.

8. Jeffrey Witsoe, ‘Corruption as Power: Caste and the Political Imagination of the Postcolonial State’, American Ethnologist 38, pp. 73-85. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2010.01293.x

9. Ibid.

10. Milan Vaishnav, Money, Muscle, and the Market for India’s Criminal Politicians, 2012, URL:https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/vaishnav accessed on 20 December 2015.

11. Manish K. Jha and Pushpendra, Governing Caste and Managing Conflict – Bihar, 1990-2011. Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, March 2012, URL: http://www.mcrg.ac.in/PP48.pdf accessed on 20 December 2015.

12. Praveen Chakravarty, ‘The 5% Poison Pill for Lalu Yadav’, India Spend, 16 June 2015, URL:http://www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/the-5-poison-pill-for-lalu-yadav-49667 accessed on 20th December, 2015.

13. ‘Lalu Prasad Yadav Makes Emphatic Comeback, to be Kingmaker in Bihar’, Economic Times, 8 November 2015, URL:http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-11-08/news/68108892_1_lalu-prasad-yadav-nitish-kumar-40-seats accessed on 20 December 2015.

14. Sanjay Kumar, ‘Coalition Politics in Bihar’, op. cit., p. 194.

15. Kabir Firaque, ‘Bihar Polls in Numbers: RJD, Cong , beat BJP harder than JD(U) does’, Indian Express, 9 November 2015, URL:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/bihar-polls-in-numbers-rjd-cong-beat-bjp-harder-than-jdu-does/ accessed on 20 December 2015.