Comment

WHAT marks out the Lok Sabha elections of 2014 as unique is that contrary to most projections, the Congress party, which had won the 2009 elections because the voters had expressed their approval for its performance from 2004 to 2009, managed to so alienate the voters that it won only 44 seats in a Lok Sabha of 543 members and a mere 19.3% of votes cast. Note that these elections, unlike the post-Emergency elections of 1977 or the post-Indira Gandhi assassination in 1984, were not held under any extraordinary circumstances. Possibly this is why the results continue to intrigue and merit deeper analysis.

A few significant political developments which took place between 2009 to 2014 seem to have added to the growing dissatisfaction in every major section and strata of society. The Anna Hazare-led anti-corruption movement, following a series of allegations, placed the UPA-2 coalition government in the dock and made the issue of corruption a central part of national public discourse. This ‘spontaneous’ anti-corruption struggle not only gathered support, it also unnerved the government which had no idea how to handle the challenge, taking a full two years to introduce a Lokpal law on the statute books in 2013.

As a result both the government and party lost all initiative and their response to growing public discontent, in particular rising food prices, was at best reactive if not apologetic. The situation demanded firm handling by the political leadership, but instead of showing any collective capacity to deal with the emerging challenges, the party high command even lost control over its own senior cabinet ministers and leaders of coalition partners. The perception of a weak and rudderless government in power soon became widespread both domestically and internationally. The Time Magazine in its 8 July 2012 issue noted that Manmohan Singh was ‘an under-performer’, ‘unwilling to stick his neck out’ on reforms. Worse, that ‘…investors at home and abroad are beginning to get cold feet.’ This ‘sharing of power’ between Sonia and Manmohan Singh has made the prime minister ‘a man in shadow’. It was not only international investors or the big industrial houses, but even the upwardly mobile middle classes, otherwise major beneficiaries of the globalization and liberalization economic policies of the Manmohan Singh government, who felt completely disenchanted with the vacillating, confused and directionless Congress leadership of the UPA-2 government.

Leading captains of industry wrote an open letter to Manmohan Singh accusing his government of ‘suffering from policy paralysis.’ It was ironic that even cabinet ministers were unwilling to take important policy decisions, possibly because they felt vulnerable under the prevailing anti-government sentiment. The former Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister, Veerapa Moily, openly expressed his reluctance to face oil and gas import lobbies. ‘I am telling you with all sense of responsibility that we are floating on oil and gas in this country. We are not exploring it, instead we are putting every obstruction to it. There are delays caused by bureaucrats in decision making and there are lobbies which don’t want us to stop imports.’ The UPA government repeatedly expressed its inability to ‘move forward’ and Manmohan Singh himself admitted that the ‘reforms must be backed by strong political support to succeed and push growth… there has to be willingness to take political risks in launching new initiatives.’

This milieu of pessimism and cynicism created a ripe situation for a challenger to emerge on the public scene, a leader and a party that could replace and displace the failed Congress government. Inherent in the logic of a competitive political system based on universal adult franchise is that dissatisfied voters look towards an ‘alternative’ political formation to replace a non-performing party-in-government. This is precisely what happened in India when the RSS-led, controlled and guided BJP decided to nominate Narendra Modi, the former chief minister of Gujarat, first as chief election campaigner in 2013 and later, as the prime ministerial candidate. The RSS-backed Narendra Modi arrived on the scene to confront the crisis-ridden, vacillating and ambivalent Congress party whose political credibility had rapidly begun to erode from 2011. Both the opposition to the Congress and unqualified support for Narendra Modi was spearheaded by the leaders of big industry and business who, along with the upwardly mobile entrepreneurial and aspirational upper middle classes, completely abandoned, even deserted, the Congress in favour of Modi whom they perceived as a ‘doer’ and an energetic leader. Deepak Parekh, who while commenting on Manmohan Singh’s Cabinet Committee or Investment, had observed that, ‘I don’t see Indian or foreign companies making large investments’, by contrast welcomed the BJP election manifesto as ‘a blueprint for governance’ and a ‘fine piece of work’. He went on: ‘The common man wants a better future and respite from corruption. Many of us are convinced that Modi has the attributes to deliver on governance and implement business reforms.’

It was not just the business leaders, but the youth of India too was disenchanted with the UPA government. The National Sample Survey Data on Employment for 2011-12 revealed that (i) about 16.3% of urban males who are graduates or above, up to the age group of 29 years ‘are unemployed’; (ii) the unemployment goes up another 12.5% if diploma and certificate holders are added; and (iii) one in every four men (with a graduate degree and vocational education) in this ‘age group’ is unemployed. This combination of extreme dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime and high expectations of improvement from the challenger is what explains this extraordinary electoral result.

India is no exception to a general rule of representative democracy that in class divided, unequal societies, it is the leading class which ‘manufactures’ approval or disapproval for or against a party at the time of elections and the poorer voters also go along because they buy into the promised, even if ‘illusory’, gains. It should thus come as no surprise that the Gujarat model of development, seen as efficient and supportive of wealth creation, received an enthusiastic and the positive response from the better-off sections in the country. The real beneficiaries of the UPA government not only turned against the Congress and opted for Modi, but with the help of the media, built up Modi as the new leader. The Lok Sabha elections of 2014 thus became ‘Modi-centred’. It was left to Nitish Kumar, the Chief Minister of Bihar, who observed that the ‘Corporates have entered political discourse’ and that ‘we can see its direct impact... Independent media is an institution, and if it gets influenced such that the choices and wishes of some individuals are presented as the popular will, there can be temporary confusion.’

The Centre for Media Studies report points out that Modi’s presence and projection in the media started with 335 minutes in the first fortnight of March 2014 to 1,197 minutes to the last fortnight of March. During the two month campaign period, overall, ‘Modi had 2,575 minutes or 33.21% of media time.’ Further, more than ‘a third of all prime time television coverage during this Lok Sabha elections’ was Modi-centred. Prabhakar Sinha, CMS Media Lab coordinator, stated that ‘our numbers for the first week of May show that the amount of time given to coverage of Mr. Modi has risen even further and would by 40% exceed the time given to all other politicians.’ The daily reach of Modi’s election campaign extended from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Amritsar to Aizwal because his campaign speeches were noticed by the people of India on television. It was Modi’s election and he was everywhere.

Finally, what about the relevance and role of ideological polarization between secularism and Hindu communalism during elections? Has India already become a Hindu society and state with the decisive victory of a RSS-led, controlled and guided Sangh Parivar and BJP? Is Modi presiding over the making of a Hindu state in India? Why did ideological polarization between secular and Hindu communal forces fail to exercise an impact on Indian voters? A quick summing up of the blurring of ideological distinctions during the elections was provided by Arvind Kejriwal of the Aam Aadmi Party who observed that there was little difference between the Congress or the BJP: (a) They (the BJP and Congress) are only interested in toeing the line of big industrialists; (b) The two parties are trying to sell India to multinationals; (c) We (AAP) are neither Left or Right; we are practical; and (d) If we find solutions in the Left, we will take them; if we get them from the Right, we will take it from them.

A widely shared public sentiment is that the conventional distinction between Left and Right or secularism and communalism may have become irrelevant in the second decade of the 21st century and what India needs is good governance. Modi’s promise of ‘minimum government’ and ‘maximum governance’ perhaps best captures the present reality of India.

C.P. Bhambhri