The problem

FOREIGN policy and national security have seldom figured prominently in Indian elections. Good performance on these fronts apparently goes unrewarded, while poor performance goes unpunished by the electorate. Evidence from surveys amply confirms the low electoral salience of foreign and security policies. Even emotive issues such as Pakistan or terrorism have often failed to pay political dividends to any party at the polls. Similarly, at the state level, where particular foreign policy issues might have local resonance and implication, they have rarely been the main determinant of electoral outcomes. The elections of 2014 are continuous with this trend. Not a single external issue was flagged as important by the numerous surveys conducted in the run up to the elections.

The reasons for such political behaviour – which incidentally confounds the expectations of political science – need not detain us here. Its implications are, however, important. For one, it means that none of the political parties give much thought to foreign and security issues. Take the manifesto of the victorious BJP. The references to foreign and defence policies in this document are no more than platitudes. Little thought has been given to the global or regional strategic contexts, and the laundry list of policy initiatives displays no sense of priorities. Nor is there any appreciation of the range of tools that India must cultivate to expand its influence on the international stage.

Further, what passes for ‘debate’ on these areas turns out to be little more than partisan point scoring in electoral season. Several former diplomats and officials have been prominent in criticizing the UPA’s record in rather sweeping terms – even when these policies demonstrate continuity with those under earlier governments and, arguably, greater consistency. The desire to score debating points extends to the manifestos too. The BJP claims that ‘the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress.’ Yet the manifesto only calls for a continuation of the posture of ‘credible deterrence’.

All this is perhaps unsurprising in the context of an election. Yet the salient fact is that the new government will have to come to grips with foreign and security policies rather quickly. India’s external engagements are crucial to its ability to carry out its ambitious agenda of internal transformation. Ensuring a secure periphery and an enabling global context will remain key priorities for the new government – much as it has been for its predecessors. Even as the government focuses on pressing domestic issues, it should not lose sight of the close intertwining of domestic and foreign policies.

Over the past twenty years, India’s foreign policy has dealt quite successfully with changes from the Cold War international system to one under United States’ primacy. During this period, the Indian economy has also integrated with, and enormously benefited from, globalization. If India is seen as a rising power today, it is largely because of its ability to manage these two transitions with a degree of dexterity. Yet the international order with which we have grown comfortable is undergoing subtle yet significant changes. This transition is happening at several levels and will play out to different timelines. But it will pose challenges for Indian foreign policy that are arguably as pressing as the ones we faced in the beginning of the 1990s.

For a start, there is a need to understand the nature of the large strategic shifts that are currently taking place and against the background of which Indian foreign policy will have to be crafted. Important shifts, however, are not just a feature of the wider global context. India’s immediate and extended neighbourhoods are in the throes of change with far-reaching implications for us. South Asia is arguably at a more critical crossroads now than at any point in the past five years. Nowhere is this truer than in Afghanistan which is witnessing simultaneous political and security transitions. West Asia too is beset by political turmoil following the Arab Spring and strategic competition unleashed by internal conflicts and external interventions.

Perhaps the foremost strategic challenge for India is the rise of China. For the first time in our history we have a great power on our immediate borders. The rise of China presents three sets of challenges for India. First, there is the unsettled boundary that has in the past resulted in a war as well as several armed stand-offs between the countries. Second, there is China’s increasing footprint in India’s immediate periphery. And third, there is China’s rising profile globally, and especially in Asia. The relationship, however, is not merely competitive. Economic linkages between the two countries are strong and growing, and they have found avenues for cooperation on several global issues. Arriving at an optimum policy mix of engagement and balancing will remain a challenge for New Delhi. In so doing, India’s relations with the US will loom large. However, the Indo-US relationship is arguably at its lowest point since the Indian nuclear tests of 1998. Revivifying ties with the US will have to be accorded high priority and given considerable thought.

Regions and relationships apart, the new government will have to focus on a range of economic, security and foreign policy issues that have considerable strategic significance. Securing access to resources – energy, food, water – will be critical to India’s internal development and hence an important facet of its external policy. Dealing with the international trading system, which is witnessing significant changes, is another key area where external engagement has serious internal consequences for us.To ensure a stable external environment and enhance its international influence, New Delhi will have to foster and wield a range of capabilities in the conventional military domain, in cyberspace, and in newer areas like development assistance and economic aid.

In none of these areas does the new government begin with a blank slate. It will have to adapt, modify and build on existing approaches and policies. At the same time, certain issues like structural reforms in defence and harmonization of civil-military relations will need more energetic attention. This issue of Seminar takes stock of the central challenges in foreign and security policy that confront the government and aims to spur a debate on how best to manage them.