Manmohan Singh’s decision to choose the summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) – five of the seven members of which are from South Asia – as his last foreign trip this March was not without significance. After two five-year terms in office he will retire, having decided not to contest elections any more. His presence at the two-day summit in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw, which was attended by a number of leaders from the region, should thus be seen as reinforcing a point that the Indian foreign policy establishment has been stressing for years – the intrinsic link between India’s future growth, development and stability with its neighbourhood.

Prime Minister Singh was keen before demitting office to make a final push for regional integration and engage with leaders from India’s immediate neighbourhood. And as the Manmohan Singh government’s 10-year term comes to an end, it also allows other neighbours to reassess the prevailing situation in South Asia and forecast the challenges that are likely to confront the new government in Delhi.

 

There are three broad aspects which need to be factored in while looking at the neighbourhood and how India’s relations with the countries in South Asia are likely to pan out. The first is the prevailing situation in these countries, their political actors and the role that they are likely to play in the coming days. The second pertains to the role of regional parties in India, many of whom are likely to be part of the coalition government at the Centre, and their response to policies the new Indian government may come up with to deal with the neighbours. And the third is the growing presence of China in South Asia and the role it is likely to play with countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood.

Since last year, India’s immediate neighbourhood has been in a state of transition. Six of the seven countries in South Asia have either held a presidential, a parliamentary or an important provincial election. This process is likely to come to an end with the Indian parliamentary elections that began in April and went up to the middle of May this year. But if the democratic process through which these changes in South Asia are underway is reason to celebrate, it has also highlighted some questions about the security and stability of the region – issues that can affect India in the coming days.

‘India’s approach in crafting a good neighbour policy with its South Asian sisters comes from the strategic calculation that our security does not exist in a vacuum,’ former Indian foreign secretary Nirupama Rao opined in a speech last year.¹ Indeed, India has been grappling for years with the problem of formulating a policy that is both effective and sustainable in dealing with the volatile region of South Asia. But so far New Delhi has been unable to come up with one. A part of the problem lies in the way India looks at its neighbours, and the other stems from how these countries look at India.

 

The importance of perceptions between India and its neighbours was highlighted by Defence Minister A.K. Antony in his speech at a conference on South Asia last year. ‘We hope that the perception about India will change gradually, as we make earnest efforts to build trust and confidence,’ he said. He pointed out that India has to factor in expectations of people from different states while framing its policy towards the region; likely the neighbours will also have to do the same. He added, ‘The issue that we need to focus on is how to make perceptions favourable to bring about a positive change in the region.’² Such observations may be self-evident, but have proved rather difficult to put into practice.

Many of the countries in the region have been on the boil for several years. Some have experienced long spells of violence and political instability. And, for the better part of the last six decades, most have been ruled by monarchs, autocrats or military dictators. Democracy is a relatively new phenomenon in South Asia. Though the current trend is to hold regular elections bringing elected representatives to power, these changes have rarely taken place peacefully. Moreover, many of these countries have not yet encouraged the growth and strengthening of the other important pillars of a democratic system, such as an independent judiciary, an unbiased and free media, and an active civil society.

There are widely held concerns that if the experiment with democracy fails, many of these countries may see the return of dictators and autocrats. In addition, there are a number of sub-nationalist groups, terrorist and religious fundamentalist outfits and hordes of non-state actors pursuing their own agendas. These forces, with a minimal stake in the democratic system, have been engaged in violent methods to change the existing order in their respective countries. If they succeed or gain an upper hand, that could lead to another prolonged period of violence and instability in these nations, which in turn would have a negative impact in the region and beyond.

 

India, for its part, may end up being badly hit by such developments. As a democracy that has large, porous borders with most of its neighbours and enjoys a pluralistic society, negative developments in the region can undermine India’s economic growth and development. It may even deepen the fissures within India and encourage fissiparous tendencies and secessionist forces, threatening the country’s political stability. Therefore, it is essential for India’s territorial integrity, political stability and economic growth and development to have a neighbourhood that is both peaceful and at peace with India.

Since 2013, much of South Block’s focus has been on the neighbourhood with many countries in the throes of a political transition. But in recent months India’s focus has shifted to developments within the country. This is likely to be the case till such time the parliamentary elections are completed and a new government comes to power. However, the challenges that the new government is likely to face will depend both on regional developments and on New Delhi’s response to them.

Let us first look at some developments in the neighbouring countries. The recent elections in the South Asia countries have introduced some new players. Delhi has engaged with a few of them in the past, but some are new and yet to formulate their approaches and find the right peg to deal with India. Many of their policies may also be dictated by developments in their own country. Hence, the coming months will be crucial for India and the region.

It is imperative, therefore, for India to ensure that these new regimes do not formulate agendas and policies that go against its interests. Management of the neighbourhood through a meaningful, sustained and broad-based engagement with the key actors in these countries should be top priority for India’s foreign policy establishment.

 

In Bangladesh, the parliamentary elections that gave Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League a virtual ‘walk over’ to form the government have been widely criticized, both within the country and abroad. The Sheikh Hasina government, which has been conducting trials of the alleged ‘war crimes’ committed by Jamaat-e-Islami leaders during the liberation struggle of 1971, has not been able to break the alliance between the main opposition parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat.

The BNP had boycotted the January 2014 parliamentary elections and appears to be in no mood to join the political process – even if and when fresh elections are held. But the Awami League controlled elections will not gain legitimacy unless the BNP and other opposition parties participate in the process. It would demand rare political acumen and maturity for the leaders of Bangladesh to bury their differences and come to an agreement that will allow wider participation in the elections to choose a new government.

The failure of such an agreement may, however, encourage violence and political instability in Bangladesh. A long spell of such instability could not only adversely affect the country, but might also pave the way for the army to once again take control of running the country – not a healthy prospect either for the people of Bangladesh or India.

 

In Bhutan, a country with which India has long enjoyed strong and close ties, parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 2013. It was a crucial step for the Bhutanese monarch’s experiment to introduce some democratic measures to align his kingdom with other progressive countries. India has been aiding and closely watching developments in Bhutan. But India cannot take its eyes off the Bhutanese ball; for, even as it encourages Bhutan’s strides towards democracy, it needs to ensure that anti-India feelings do not take hold and grow among groups in the opposition. In effect, New Delhi will have to find ways of reaching out to, and engaging with, those sections that have not succeeded in coming to power and may be disillusioned with the democratic experiment.

Maldives saw a new President, Abdullah Yameen Abdul Gayoom, assume power after the December 2013 elections. Relations between Maldives and India had been considerably strained under his predecessor Mohammed Waheed. The latter’s decision to force out the Indian infrastructure company GMR, entrusted with building and running the national airport in the Maldives, was not taken kindly by India. There was serious worry in Delhi that elements in the Maldivian government were displaying a preference for China and allowing Beijing to strengthen its toehold in the island nation. Indian concerns were understandable for the Maldives falls within the island chain in the Indian Ocean and is in the important sea lane through which much of India’s commerce flows. The growing Chinese presence in the Maldivian islands is a cause of concern for India.

Soon after his election, President Yameen chose to come to India as his first foreign visit. The signal that the new regime in Male was willing to pursue close ties with Delhi and keep Indian sensitivities in mind, was clear during his talks with the Indian leadership during his visit to Delhi in January 2014. But India must ensure that it remains the key player in the Maldives and is not upstaged by any Maldivian politician or external force in the coming days.

 

After months of bickering and political rivalry, Nepal managed to hold elections to its constituent assembly. The Nepali Congress’ Sushil Koirala has taken over as the new prime minister. But the new constitution for the Republic is yet to be written. Various sections in Nepal remain apprehensive about the return of internecine violence and political instability that plagued the country during the decade-long fight between the army and the Maoists.

India continues to be the major player in Nepal and arguably has the ability to bring the various warring factions together. But it has also often been criticized for looming larger than life in Nepal’s internal affairs. It needs to tread carefully as the new government in Kathmandu tries to find its feet. Given the open and porous border with Nepal, India can ill-afford a return to political instability and violence in the country. New Delhi will have to ensure – with a light touch of diplomacy – that matters do not take a turn for the worse, whereby the interests of both countries are adversely affected. It also needs to ensure that as a first step in the right direction, the Nepalese political players are able to go ahead in writing a new constitution for the country by keeping their differences at bay.

 

Surprising most commentators, India decided to change its stand by abstaining on the West sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in March this year. On two previous occasions India had joined the western block to vote against Sri Lanka’s human rights record in the wake of Colombo’s war against the Tamil Tigers. The main reason for India’s abstention was the tenor of the resolution, which lay much store on intrusive international scrutiny in Sri Lankan affairs. This goes against the grain of the principle of engagement that New Delhi has pursued for years with countries both within the region and beyond. India does not want to be party to a resolution of this nature that can create a precedent and may be used against it in the future.

Yet, Sri Lanka will be mistaken if it reads the Indian stand as going soft on it or as endorsing policies that Colombo has adopted in dealing with the ethnic minorities, especially the Tamils. Delhi has been disappointed with the Rajapakse government’s penchant for dragging its feet over the issue of devolution of power to the Tamil minority. Despite holding a successful election last year in the Tamil dominated Northern Province of the island, there has been no serious movement towards addressing the political grievances of the Tamils.

India fears that if Colombo continues to deny the Tamils their legitimate share in the Sri Lankan pie, then hard line Tamils will return to dominate the future discourse at the cost of the moderate and democratic sections. Such a development will be detrimental not only for the island’s interests, but also of India’s. That said, Sri Lanka is an important neighbour and India cannot afford to completely alienate it. India will have to nuance its position much more to ensure the situation does not deteriorate any further, while highlighting the urgent need for a healing touch to those adversely affected by the war.

 

India’s major regional concerns, however, stem from Pakistan. Friction and tension between the two countries has not been ameliorated with Nawaz Sharif coming to power after last year’s elections in Pakistan. Despite talks to promote trade and commerce in order to normalize relations, there have been frequent violations of the decade-long ceasefire along the Line of Control. This has added to the existing strain in relations, though the two sides attempt to find ways to engage with each other.

More worrying to Indian policy-makers is the sharp escalation in violent incidents within Pakistan. Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and al Qaeda affiliates have gained ground, targeting government and civilian assets and people at will. Despite the bravado, the Pakistani Army has so far failed to marginalize the TTP. There are worrying reports that suggest the TTP and other religious fundamentalist groups are dictating terms in negotiating with the government. What is worse, neither the civilian government nor the Pakistan Army has gained the upper hand in dealing with these forces. This has led to serious concern in India that the Pakistani establishment, under tremendous pressure from the TTP and other terror groups, may try and direct attention towards its neighbour. A large-scale terror attack in India at this stage could wreak havoc not only on India-Pakistan ties but on the region as a whole.

While the volatility and unpredictability of the security scenario in the South Asia region cannot be denied, its future will to a large extent depend on how India responds to the unfolding developments. ‘The security and stability of our countries are closely interlinked,’ said Manmohan Singh in a recent address to the South Asian leaders at the SAARC summit. ‘None of us can prosper in isolation to each other. We cannot afford to allow the many problems we face to stand in the way of ambitions and our dreams,’ he added.³ This sage advice given to the South Asian leaders speaks as much to the next government in India. For, depending on Delhi’s response, the existing tensions can either be heightened or lessened.

 

The trend of coalition politics in India has highlighted the importance of regional parties not only in formulating and executing key domestic policies, but also on issues related to foreign policy. If the past decade is anything to go by, it is clear that foreign policy, which had traditionally been in the domain of the Centre, is now increasingly being contested by regional leaders as well. This is truer when it comes to the policy of dealing with India’s neighbours in South Asia.

This may prove to be both an advantage and also a disadvantage. Trans-border issues like sharing the water of common rivers, fishermen or illegal migration and trade, can prove to be sticky and sensitive. But if the government at the Centre manages to make the bordering states and the regional parties stakeholders in its pursuit of good and mutually beneficial policies with the neighbours, they can yield rich dividends for India.

The other crucial test will be for India’s next prime minister. Over the past months there has been a growing demand in different sections of society to look for a ‘tough’ and ‘decisive’ leader to run the country’s affairs. But along with these attributes, the Indian prime minister will also have to show maturity in dealing with the complexities in India’s neighbourhood.

Diplomacy, patience and peaceful negotiations should not be abandoned in favour of decisions that may reaffirm the ‘tough’ and ‘decisive’ leader image, but in the bargain may cause the country dearly. While looking after India’s security to safeguard its people and its territory will continue to get top priority for the leadership in Delhi, it cannot be achieved by spewing venom at the neighbours and flexing muscles. A doctrine of ‘absolute security’ for one’s own country often ends up with ‘absolute insecurity’ for the neighbours. The pursuit of such policies can lead the country down a disastrous track which can easily derail India from its current trajectory of development and growth.

Instead, the task for the new government in India should be to adopt policies of meaningful engagement with its neighbours to resolve the outstanding and intractable issues. The perception of the neighbours will change only when they find Delhi seriously pursuing policies, not only for its own development and growth but also for the other South Asian nations. Meaningful peace and stability in the region can only become a reality when India manages to make all its neighbours a stakeholder in its own growth and success.

 

Footnotes:

1. Nirupama Rao, ‘India in a Tough Neighbourhood’, The Hindu, 20 December 2013.

2. A.K. Antony’s inaugural address at 7th South Asian Conference, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 30 October 2013. Accessed online at http://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/7thSouthAsianConference_ akantony

3. Speech at inaugural session of 17th SAARC summit, Addu (Maldives), 10 November 2011. Accesses online at http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1080