THE division of Andhra Pradesh, though some administrative formalities are yet to be completed, brings about a fundamental difference in peninsular India. For the first time since the linguistic division of states in 1956, South India will be a conglomeration of a Union Territory and five states, not four.

Even though some analysts lazily treat the region as one, the South, each of the constituent states reflect starkly different political realities. They are divided by language and dominated by regional forces or regional faces representing national political parties.

In the words of noted psephologist, Sandeep Shastri, ‘Southern India has often bucked the national trend. That is because, apart from strong regional party presence in states like Tamil Nadu, even national parties are seen through a strong regional prism and the local faces they project in Karnataka and Kerala.’ Historically, the BJP has never enjoyed more than a marginal presence in the region, except in the state of Karnataka. The Congress has experienced mixed fortunes; from veritable dominance in the early years, it has been forced to cede space to regional parties. In both Tamil Nadu (39 seats) and a united Andhra Pradesh (42 seats), regional parties enjoy a substantial presence. In T.N., the Dravidian parties have a complete hold and A.P. has seen bipolar contestation between Congress and the Telugu Desam Party.

In an era of coalition politics there is one fundamental fact. The more seats smaller parties win, the more powerful they will be in Delhi. In effect, stability of a coalition government at the Centre is usually directly proportional to the number of seats a national force that leads such a formation has and inversely proportional to the numbers smaller partners get. It is also important to understand how a national political figure, even one as controversial as Narendra Modi, is seen from a southern regional perspective and how the ‘regional satraps’ react to him. These two factors will be crucial in understanding or predicting a final outcome and through these two questions we could also gauge the extent of stability and character of a formation that might eventually rule Delhi in 2014.

In this context, the division of Andhra Pradesh introduces an enormous change. In 2004 and 2009, a united A.P. contributed substantially to the Congress’s final tally. The party won 29 of the 42 seats in 2004 and 33 in 2009. This added to stability at the Centre; this time, however, the field is wide open for regional parties.

The late Chief Minister Y.S. Rajashekar Reddy delivered victories for the Congress in 2004 and 2009. He acted as a strong ‘regional satrap’ in a party that does not traditionally encourage such faces. He held factions within the party with an ‘authoritarian grip’, but with his unexpected death in a helicopter crash in 2009, the Congress seems to have lost the Telugu plot.

 

Soon after Y.S.R. Reddy’s death, his son Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy demanded that he be appointed chief minister. The party high command refused and eventually Jagan broke away to form the YSR Congress (YSRCP). Jagan represents what has been Congress’s core caste vote base in the state – the Reddy community. He hails from the Rayalseema region where politics exemplifies a strong feudal character. The Congress party, in an effort to prevent alienation of that core caste base, appointed Kirankumar Reddy, who is also from Rayalseema, as chief minister. This, however, failed to curb Jagan’s political platform, which was built on the basis of sympathy for his father.

Jagan was later arrested on serious allegations of corruption by the CBI. He countered the charges, alleging ‘vendetta’ politics by the Congress. Jaganmohan’s bastion is Rayalseema and the coastal Andhra regions of the state, which together constitute what is called ‘Seemandhra’ and accounts for 25 Lok Sabha seats. The third region is Telangana with 17 seats. All three were merged in 1956 to form India’s first linguistic state.

Before independence, Telangana was ruled by the erstwhile Nawab of Hyderabad and the rest of Andhra Pradesh was largely administered by the British . Telangana was economically backward compared to coastal Andhra Pradesh and soon a movement for bifurcation and creation of a separate Telangana erupted, first in the 1960s and then again in the 1980s.

 

The Telangana agitation was reignited in 2009 under the leadership of K. Chandrashekar Rao, popularly called KCR, who launched the Telangana Rashtriya Samiti (TRS) on the slogan of a separate state. Violent protests and a ‘fast unto death’ by KCR saw the Congress buckling under pressure to announce a Telangana in December 2009, but in the face of even greater pressure from its party’s ‘united Andhra’ lobby, decided to backtrack.

Dharma Raju Kakani, a professional manager from Vijayawada in coastal Andhra, says, ‘All of us knew for the last four years that they will announce a Telangana before elections. But the way it happened in the end is just not acceptable and has left people even more angry.’

This is a widely shared sentiment across coastal Andhra and Rayalseema where the anti-bifurcation movement was at its strongest. The anger and disgust was both reflected and accentuated by ‘acrimonious’ scenes witnessed in Parliament during the passage of the Telangana Bill.

Faced with a Jagan onslaught, the Congress hoped to consolidate its position in the 17 seats of Telangana and went ahead with the bifurcation bill. In doing so, it has virtually lost all ground in the 25 seats of Seemandhra where, in effect, the battle would be between YSRCP which has consistently taken a strong anti-division stand and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP).

Though the TDP had initially supported division, it shifted positions in the last days leading up to the passage of the bill. It was a desperate attempt to save face on the ground in Seemandhra where it traditionally has a strong base amongst the numerically powerful Khamma caste. Both TDP and YSRCP have hit the election on the bifurcation issue calling it a ‘betrayal’. ‘The main villain is the Congress but the number two villain is the BJP in the division of A.P.,’ says Dinesh Akula, a Hyderabad based journalist.

 

The BJP is a marginal player in the state. It had taken a categorical position in favour of Telangana, consistent with the party’s stand on formation of smaller states. Intriguingly, however, despite this the YSRCP and TDP have made statements expressing openness to an alliance with the BJP. Both Naidu and Jagan have clearly declared they are not ‘anti-Modi’.

The TDP has been a traditional rival to the Congress in a united A.P. which was bipolar. Clearly an alliance with the Congress does not fall in its list of possibilities. Jagan’s foundation plank is ‘betrayal by the Congress’ and he too cannot go with the party, at least not in this election.

In this scenario, with anti-Congress as the dominant platform, the two regional parties appear to have little choice but to reach out to Modi. Lok Sabha M.P. from Hyderabad, Asaduddin Owaisi, says, ‘This is despite the fact that they are aware that minorities still see Modi as a polarizing figure and that the BJP supported the division of Andhra Pradesh.’

A backroom manager for Chandrababu Naidu’s son, Nara Lokesh, says, ‘The story is not over for Seemandhra and we will justify an alliance with BJP by projecting Modi as a central figure who could do justice to the people in terms of allocation of resources.’ Interestingly, Modi is projected as a political figure who goes beyond BJP as the party which supported the division.

‘We will justify it on the plank that a new state will need the Centre’s help and it is important to choose a leader who will be in power in Delhi,’ said a senior leader. It now seems certain that the BJP will go along with the TDP, fully aware that post poll Jagan remains a possibility if he gets more numbers.

 

The irony is that to the two regional players, Congress is the untouchable and Modi more acceptable than even the BJP as a pre-poll ally and this in a state dominated by the Congress in 2009. It also brings to fore the point that in a state dominated by regional forces, the debate is not over Modi’s politics or economics. The ‘Gujarat Model’ is often mentioned but not understood or even questioned. In effect, Modi exists as a personality here because the Congress has ceased to be an option.

Even the party’s last chief minister, Kirankumar Reddy, has quit and launched his own political outfit. It is a different matter that post-poll he might return to the Congress, but in these elections the Congress is seen as the losing side.

Owaisi suggests that, ‘With the focus on the division and an anti-Congress feeling, Modi’s politics is not the prime focus. However, it will cost parties who ally with him.’

Another irony faces the Congress in Telangana where the party hoped to sweep. It seems to have hit a roadblock. In August 2012, KCR had told this writer that, ‘I will merge the TRS with the Congress the day they announce a Telangana.’ Now that the deed is done, he has decided ‘no merger; an alliance if it works out, or else we will go alone.’

This means there will be a battle between the Congress and the TRS for the 17 seats, if no alliance/merger works out. And even if there is an arrangement, the Congress will have to part with many winning seats. The BJP should be delighted at the prospect of potential allies taking away a majority of the 33 seats that in 2009 went to their rival. Most analysts are struck by the Congress’ ability to create a situation of self-destruction.

The point is that the Congress faces an equally worrying situation in neighbouring Tamil Nadu as well. In fact, there is a serious question mark over the chances of even tall figures like Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, who represents the Sivaganga Lok Sabha seat in southern Tamil Nadu. Elections here have conventionally swung between M. Karunanidhi’s Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and J. Jayalalithaa’s All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. National parties have relied on them to win seats here.

 

In the last three Lok Sabha elections, the DMK has been the winning ally in Tamil Nadu’s 39 seats. In 1999, it partnered the NDA to win 26 seats. In 2004, it shifted to the UPA to win 37 and continued with the UPA to win 27 seats in 2009.

The stranglehold a regional party with numbers can have on a coalition was evident in the Congress-DMK relationship over the last ten years. The DMK demands for cabinet berths or its opposition to policy moves were arguably dictatorial in nature, given the threats to walk out unless accepted.

Even on dangerous ideological issues that have an emotional impact on the Congress, the DMK’s political needs had forced the party to buckle down and remain silent. In the run-up to the 2009 Lok Sabha election, DMK President M. Karunanidhi, in a television interview to NDTV, called the late LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran a ‘good friend’. At the time, the LTTE was in the last stages of defeat by the Sri Lankan forces and Karunanidhi faced criticism from fringe pro-LTTE groups in the state. The statement came despite the DMK being a Congress ally and Prabhakaran a ‘proclaimed offender’ in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination. AIADMK chief J. Jayalalithaa had immediately thundered, ‘How can Sonia Gandhi remain silent?’

 

The DMK’s slide began with the 2G scam and the subsequent arrest of Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi as a key accused. It suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Jayalalithaa in the 2011 assembly polls and was pushed to third place. Actor turned politician Vijayakanth’s party, the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam or DMDK had an alliance with Jayalalithaa and won 29 seats, with 203 going to the AIADMK’s kitty!

The DMK once again took an aggressive posture on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue, hoping that this would help political recovery. But Jayalalithaa, who held a strong anti-LTTE position till 2009, has usurped that issue. Ever since she came to power, her actions have been aimed at rubbishing Karunanidhi’s claims of being a leader of the Tamils around the world. First, she played to the gallery by refusing to allow Sri Lankan cricketers to play IPL matches in Chennai, and later banned the screening of the film Madras Café, based on the LTTE’s role in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, in the state.

Now J. Jayalalithaa has hit the campaign trail after being at the forefront of the demand for release of seven convicts, four of whose death sentences were commuted and three who were sentenced to life, in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. She declared that they would be released and sent a letter to the Centre. The matter is now in the Supreme Court.

Ever since Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, Tamil Nadu politics has drawn a distinct line between sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils and public support for the LTTE. Several politicians, like MDMK General Secretary Vaiko, have repeatedly been arrested for making pro-LTTE speeches. After all, support for a terrorist group on Indian soil is illegal.

 

The elimination of the LTTE, which was the principal voice of the Sri Lankan Tamils, in 2009, changed the dynamics of the issue. The line between sympathy for a humanitarian issue and support for acts of terror committed by a group that dominated the debate till then started blurring. This, in turn, has led to political posturing that can only be described as disconcerting.

Fringe groups and pro-LTTE voices have always enjoyed space in Tamil Nadu. Despite official silence on the matter, it is well-known that India had helped bolster the LTTE in the late 1970s and ’80s and the group enjoyed strong ties in Tamil Nadu. Even after the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, these fringe groups remained active, though they were not allowed to dictate the mainstream political agenda. The boundary lines were drawn by the two main political forces with the Centre keeping a close watch. Unfortunately, this compact seems to have come unstuck.

It is in this scenario that Jayalalithaa has sought to position herself as a possible candidate for the top job in Delhi. She hopes to use ‘a Tamilian for PM’ card to woo the electorate. However, in a post-poll scenario, if the numbers so dictate, she might well decide to support Modi. A senior journalist who had mediated between Modi and Jayalalithaa says, ‘She seems to be seriously pursuing her chances in Delhi and that rules out a pre-poll pact. Post-poll, if the numbers demand, she may not resist an alliance.’

 

Faced with this onslaught, the DMK’s only hope was to forge a strong local alliance, but that was not to be. The party tried to woo actor turned politician Vijayakanth’s Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam or DMDK, with an estimated transferable vote base of 7 to 8 per cent. But, Vijayakanth has finalized an alliance with the BJP to form a third front.

Pushed into a corner, DMK Chief M. Karunanidhi, at a recent press conference in Chennai, called Modi a ‘good friend’. A senior DMK leader admitted, ‘We need to be on the right side of Delhi. That is our only insurance against Jayalalithaa.’ This despite serious concerns in the party that any truck with Modi could ‘alienate its traditional minority vote base and some of its small allies.’

Ironically, it is this reality that has impelled Karunanidhi who called Prabhakaran a ‘good friend’ in 2009, to call Narendra Modi a ‘good friend’ in March 2014! An octogenarian politician, who has dominated Dravidian politics for over six decades, he is now being forced to reach out to a party that so far has never had relevance in the state!

It also underscores another point. Regardless of who wins more seats, Jayalalithaa or Karunanidhi, both would be belligerent regional allies, virtually dictating political acceptability and even foreign policy on Sri Lanka. They would also demand their pound of flesh and influence policy decisions according to their political needs. The fact that they will determine the outcome in the state’s 39 seats makes them difficult allies to deal with.

It is interesting then to see how a national figure like Modi is seen amidst a crowd of regional faces. Note that the BJP has forged a third front in the state with actor-politician Viajaykanth. R. Kannan, a cab driver in Chennai puts it bluntly. He says, ‘We will cast votes only between Amma, Kalaignar or other local players, but we also want to know how this will matter in Delhi. We do not understand the ‘Gujarat Model’ but certainly the ‘Congress Model’ is a disaster.’

 

The trouble is that like in Andhra Pradesh, none of the Dravidian parties oppose Modi. In their desire to be open for pre- or post-poll equations, none of them have questioned his ‘authoritarian’ style of politics or allegations against him in the Gujarat riots. This has ensured that there is no substantial debate over the ‘Gujarat Model’ of growth; what dominates voters’ mind-space is resentment with Congress and a constant mention of the Modi name. It is as if Modi exists because the Congress is not seen as a viable option.

Yet, despite the domination of regional and local concerns, voters also want to know how all this will add up and where we are headed as a country. Once that is factored in there seems to be no other option in front of them but to be on the winning side in Delhi.

In addition, the aggressive campaigning against the incumbent central government seems to have immediate voter appeal. Jayalalithaa’s campaign, for instance, is focused on ‘throwing out the central government’ and that is the same as Modi’s slogan! This could be one reason why, even though the BJP has little support in Tamil Nadu, opinion polls indicate a sizeable support for Modi (the CSDS-CNN IBN polls have shown up to 14 per cent points for Modi in T.N.). It is not necessarily about Modi; it is more about filling the vacuum created by the declining image of the Congress. Whether or not an electoral strategy based on this sentiment will translate into seats, the reality cannot be denied.

The trouble is that both in A.P. and T.N., the BJP neither has local leadership nor party presence to emerge as a player on its own. This makes it more vulnerable and dependent on regional parties. In state assembly elections, regional parties will not need the BJP, making the national party dependent on forces that are more obsessed with winning the local contest than helping the emergence of a cohesive national coalition. In 2014, 81 parliamentary seats in South India (39 in T.N., 25 in Seemandhra and 17 in Telangana) will throw up regional parties with the numbers to determine national politics. That by itself will only add to instability.

 

Even in the southern states of Karnataka and Kerala, where the battle is bipolar between two national forces (earlier the Congress and Janata Dal and lately, the Congress and BJP in Karnataka; the Left Front and the Congress led Front in Kerala), electoral politics departs from the national trend. The national parties here reflect a regional flavour, with regional issues taking precedence. Even when there was an enormous national wave, like in 1977 after the Emergency, the Congress managed a huge win in Karnataka.

At the moment the man leading the Congress charge in Karnataka is Chief Minister Siddaramiah. He rose from the ranks of a fiercely anti-Congress Janata movement. He served with Janata Party stalwarts like the late Ramakrishna Hegde and shifted to the Congress as recently as 2005. He walked out of former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda’s Janata Dal (Secular) after Gowda chose his son H.D. Kumaraswamy as the leader.

Siddaramiah belongs to the OBC Kuruba community and under his leadership the Congress forged an alliance of OBCs, Dalits and Muslims to defeat a ‘corruption struck and split’ BJP in the 2013 assembly elections. The fact that he was chosen as chief minister reflected a departure from an extant Congress culture where what matters is ‘long term loyalty with outsiders remaining outsiders.’

It is believed that he was given the chief minister’s post on the understanding that he would deliver at least 20 of the 28 seats from Karnataka in the Lok Sabha election. But, can he?

Sandeep Shastri says, ‘You have to extend the southern regional party feeling to Karnataka and Kerala. Here national parties matter because of strong regional faces they have. That is what makes Siddaramiah or Yeddyurappa important.’

 

Unlike Siddaramiah who shifted from a regional party to a national one, B.S. Yeddyurappa grew from the ranks of the RSS. He led the BJP to its first victory in a southern state in 2008, but had to step down as chief minister after serious allegations of corruption. A belligerent regional satrap who rebelled and walked out, splitting the party, Yeddyurappa belongs to the Lingayat sect which has a numerical majority in the state. He had consolidated the Lingayat vote for the BJP and his departure split that vote, resulting in defeat to the Congress in the assembly polls of 2013. This is why Narendra Modi ensured that Yeddyurappa returned to the BJP.

Modi himself has an appeal and electoral salience in Karnataka, specifically in the urban middle class pockets of Bangalore. But he too will have to rely on the charisma of his party’s ‘regional satraps’ to deliver results.

‘There is always a feeling of local versus outsider in South India and that is accentuated by the linguistic divide,’ according to Sanjeev Nityanand, an old Bangalorean and trade analyst.

 

Even as the two national parties hope that their local faces can trump those of the other, the state’s only regional force, former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda’s Janata Dal (Secular), is scrambling to find space on the national stage. Gowda has been trying to craft a non-Congress, non-BJP alliance on the national stage.

At the local level the Gowdas have so far dominated politics in what is known as the old Mysore region of the state (geographically areas around Mysore and Bangalore) with their hold over the Vokkaliga caste vote. This region accounts for nearly 14 of the state’s 28 seats and their caste base is consolidated here. Overall, however, it remains a close battle between the two main parties. Unlike in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, Modi’s politics and economics will be questioned and polarization on pro-versus anti-Modi lines is likely.

In fact there is a strange trend in the state. Since 1985, the party that won a larger share of the 28 Lok Sabha seats has sat in the opposition in Delhi! Even in 1977 post-emergency elections, Karnataka voted in favour of the Congress and then chief minister Devraj Urs had formed a caste alliance similar to what Siddaramiah has now. This is a trend the state’s present chief minister hopes will continue. In the end, this is one of the two southern states that will contribute to the kitty of either of the two national parties.

Interestingly, Kerala too, according to opinion polls, is expected to go the Congress way. Traditionally, the 20 seats in the state are a battle between the Congress-led coalition and Left-led coalition.

The state has had one of the most successful Communist movements in history. Under the leadership of the legendary E.M.S. Namboodiripad, it was the first democratically elected Communist government in the world in 1957. Ironically, today, it is the battle between comrades, former Chief Minister V.S. Achuthanandan and State Secretary of the CPI(M), Pinarayi Vijayan, that has left the CPI(M)-led front in a difficult position.

 

At 91, Achuthanandan is considered more popular with voters, but clearly does not enjoy the same popularity within the party. His rival Pinarayi Vijayan has a strong hold over the party and has tried to oust Achuthanandan. The battle reached its peak after the CPM came to power in Kerala in 2006 and Achuthanandan was made CM. The cabinet was divided on Vijayan versus V.S. lines. Yet, despite being the chief minister, when V.S. spoke publicly against Vijayan he was expelled from the politburo. In fact, he was almost denied a ticket to contest the 2011 polls. But, the party soon realized it needed him to woo voters and, despite the divisions in the party, he managed to take it close to victory. The Left Front lost the 2011 polls by a mere four seats (Congress-led UDF 72 and the LDF 68).

The United Democratic Front led by the Congress scraped through and Oomen Chandy was sworn in as chief minister. Even though the government faces allegations of corruption, Chandy’s understated personality and ability at backroom management has given it an edge in Kerala, this despite facing national and local anti-incumbency.

There are other factors that are at play as well according to Sandeep Shastri. He points out that, ‘Kerala has seen a good growth rate over the last 10 years and so the general sense of well-being benefits a ruling party.’

It may also reflect that the Left has to reinvent itself to accommodate changed economic realities. It may at some level be losing the goodwill it long enjoyed with its social justice platform. Increasingly, a large section of the urban population now sees economic growth as a solution to social troubles. This feeling may be restricted to the urban middle and upper classes, but in a state like Kerala, with high levels of urbanization, it is important. The fact that the country seems poised to choose between the right and centre may impel Kerala to lurch right, benefiting the centre!

‘We saw globalization much before it was even thought of in the rest of the country. That was the Gulf effect. Foreign brands or liquor did not amuse us,’ said R.K. Radhakrishnan, Chief of The Hindu’s Tamil Nadu Bureau and a keen Kerala observer. He adds that, ‘This time the Congress will benefit only because of infighting in the left.’

Having said that, Kerala, will see a split between two anti-Modi forces. This makes the Modi debate politically redundant and the national issue is expected to be the Centre’s track record and allegations of corruption.

 

In the ultimate analysis, it is in the 48 seats between Karnataka and Kerala that the Congress may find its best winning chance. The 81 seats between Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh are likely to be split between regional players, barring Telangana, where the Congress may touch double digits.

The sheer fact that the BJP does not have a presence in most of these states will make it more dependent on its allies to get the numbers. Ironically then, the ultimate test for Narendra Modi, who is accused of being deeply divisive, would be to evolve as a strong unifier of regional satraps. Though open to him, they will be difficult to handle and keeping them together will be essential for stability, whichever side wins.