WATER serves as a growing source of tension in South Asia. Floods and droughts are routinely blamed on upstream riparians; water shortages are rarely interpreted as a result of local mismanagement. Water shortages in Delhi are routinely blamed on Haryana. True, if Haryana released more water there would be more water for Delhi. But at the same time several studies have found that water provision in Delhi is mismanaged and more than half of it is lost in leakages and waste. Demanding better local governance of water would provide a more constructive way forward.

The tendency to blame an upstream riparian for water shortages exists throughout South Asia; between states in India and provinces in Pakistan and between the various countries of the region. These debates are framed through the prism of a volume of water, and rarely through any discussion of how water is used.

Yet, there is also a growing understanding that rivers need to be treated more holistically. Within India there are numerous examples in which local communities manage scarce resources, agreeing not to grow water intensive crops, for instance, when water flow is low. The return of the Arvari river, in Rajasthan, is one example.

The river, near Alwar, had dried up in the 1930s as a result of widespread deforestation. The local ruler decided to cash in on his timber assets sensing that Independence was approaching. Water availability deteriorated with the onset of marble mining in the 1960s. The then drought-stricken region was home to marginalized villagers whose livelihoods were reliant on migration to urban areas. In the 1970s, a small group comprising four educated Indians moved to the area with the intention of providing education; their efforts failed and three of the four left.

An elderly villager apparently persuaded Rajendra Singh, the remaining member of the NGO, Tarun Bharat Sangh, to begin the construction of rainwater harvesting structures or johads. Rather than education, the local people needed water. The first structure was built in 1986 since which time over 400 more have been built in and around the 70 villages in the Arvari’s catchment area. As groundwater levels rose, in time the Arvari river started to come back to life, returning for a longer period each year from 1990.

The return of the river brought new challenges. In 1996 the villagers of Hamirpura found that the state government had given a contractor a licence to fish in the river. By law, rivers are government property but in this case the villagers themselves claimed ownership of the river that they had helped return to life.

In 1999, Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) facilitated the formation of an ‘Arvari Parliament’ or Arvari Sansad, an association of all the villages along the river’s course. The parliament adopted a constitution to manage the river, focusing on equity, justice and cooperation and ecological conservation. The parliament has regulated water use, and introduced laws both for the use of the river for irrigation and the use of groundwater. It has also diversified agriculture, promoting the cultivation of less water intensive crops such as oilseed and banning sugarcane and rice.

 

The parliament set a series of rules pertaining to water conservation. For instance, fishing in the Arvari can be done only for personal consumption; cattle from outside the region are banned from grazing. The parliament also encouraged local villagers to help surrounding areas construct water-harvesting structures to encourage the sense of a river community.

As well as the construction of johads, work has also been undertaken to stop hill run-off and soil erosion. Strong village level organizations (gram sabhas) which tackle a range of issues through collective decision making have played a crucial role. Gaining trust took many years, but the sense of ownership towards the resource engendered by the Arvari Sansad has enabled inclusive participation.

This is not to say that there have not been challenges. The Arvari Sansad’s rules do not have legal authority. Gaining trust between villages was difficult initially – some communities felt that the conservation measures compromised their interests. But by and large the Arvari river demonstrates that holistic river management is a feasible undertaking.

Looking at other successful water projects in South Asia, a number of features stand out. First, often water is not approached in an abstract manner, as is the case with trans-boundary discussions. Instead, water is approached as a resource that interacts with other outcomes. Thus, sanitation projects that focus solely on constructing toilets in villages often fail. The projects that educate the local community on the potential positive impact of water projects on health, and consequently on their livelihoods, are often the initiatives that succeed.

Internationally there is a growing focus on the resource nexus – on the interaction between food, energy and water. Recent studies highlight how pricing of one resource affects consumption of another and thus demands a more holistic policy approach. Perhaps the clearest example of the interaction between the three is in Punjab and Haryana. The provision of free electricity to farmers enables greater pumping of groundwater. This, in turn, allows farmers to grow the highest priced water intensive cash crops.

But the greater consumption of water affects the groundwater level. Falling groundwater levels require more electricity to pump water from deeper and deeper locations. While Punjabi farmers are wealthy, its electricity board is not. The high subsidy means the gap between revenue from consumers and the need for investment in upgrading infrastructure has widened with detrimental effect to services.

One of the most cited examples of cooperation between upstream and downstream water users is that of Sukhomajri, near Chandigarh, which became a model for community participation in development projects.

 

In 1974 sedimentation was becoming an increasing problem for the Sukhna lake in Chandigarh. The site of a major source of sedimentation was traced to the village of Sukhomajri and its surroundings. Around 50 hectares of agricultural land around Sukhomajri were rain-fed enabling single cropping. Land holdings were small and crop failures frequent. In turn, the villagers became dependent on animal husbandry; goats and cows freely grazed the nearby hills. Years of overgrazing meant that hill slopes were denuded, escalating the issue of soil erosion.

Persistent requests for villagers to stop grazing cattle and cutting vegetation were ignored, leading to the need for a deeper engagement with the villagers. This revealed their aspiration for a stable supply of water. Four earthen dams were constructed between 1976 and 1985; when the benefits from the watershed started to accrue to the villagers, the government team made a number of deals with them, the main one being that in return for the water they would stop grazing their animals in certain areas.

As well as constructing trenches and check dams, overgrazed areas were replanted with trees and grass. The villagers were persuaded to use dead wood for fuel, rather than the new trees. Social fencing allowed villagers to reduce their dependence on unsustainable grazing practices and agricultural productivity rose dramatically.

 

In 1979 the Water Users’ Association, later the Hill Resource Management Society (HRMS), was registered; local people took over the sale of grass (used in paper mills) from private contractors. These funds, along with a share of revenue from timber, funded the HRMS which was reinvested in maintenance of the dam and its pipelines. Local farmers paid fees for water from the pond.

The whole process was not without challenges. These included a lack of communication between locals and the forest department as well as the lack of legal authority for local people. But overall these initiatives were clearly a success; local land users who had been primarily concerned with the daily struggle for survival had not perceived of soil and water conservation as an immediate priority. After initial attempts to conserve water and de-silt water resources through mechanical and technical solutions failed, the focus shifted to providing immediate and direct economic benefits to local people to meet their basic needs. The resulting economic benefits provided momentum for conservation efforts.

The notion of water as a common pool resource became implicit to a number of other similar projects requiring an agreement to be reached regarding the sharing of forest produce, the allocation of irrigation water and other joint management activities.

So there are instances in which water is treated holistically, as a resource interlinked to other issues such as health, or livelihood, or the environment. And yet, in trans-boundary negotiations in South Asia, these aspects are largely absent. How water is consumed is seen as a domestic sovereign issue, not a matter up for discussion with neighbours. And yet, if rivers and river systems are to be treated holistically, conversations regarding water need to be expanded.

 

The notion of water as a security concern does little to engender trust. Islamists in Pakistan routinely blame India both for floods and water shortages. In Bangladesh, fears over Indian engineering projects – notably the River Linking Project – are seen as threats. Many Nepalese routinely blame India for their failure to develop water infrastructure. Similarly, Afghans blame Pakistan and Iran for their lack of dams and storage capacity. China’s announcement regarding its plans for dam construction on the Tsangpo, the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, put India in the position of some of its neighbours, being at the whim of a politically powerful upper riparian.

While access to domestic water is seen through the prism of a threat, it is hard for domestic politicians in South Asia to reach agreements with neighbouring countries in which one or other partner would be seen to gain access to a lower amount of water than the status quo. Two possible solutions to address this dilemma present themselves. First, that enhancing domestic water security would help facilitate greater understanding and agreement between states. Though challenging, it is far from implausible. If local water providers tightened up leakages and improved water governance, water availability would increase. Second, the issue of trans-boundary water needs to be broader, and to move beyond its current focus on water volumes to encompass issues such as the environment, the economy and so forth.

Again there are examples within South Asia where this works. South Asia’s fastest growing economy, Bhutan, has become rich on the back of its hydropower. Generally seen as an environmental success story, the export of electricity to India through a number of large and small projects has led to sustained economic growth.

 

Nepal and Bangladesh suffer from a feeling of insecurity in relation to their larger neighbour, India. That Bhutan is so much smaller than either in some way makes it easier to accept the power disparity. Even so, many Nepalese believe that the lessons of Bhutan’s success could be applied to their own country for mutual benefit.

This highlights the question of trust between countries, and the extent to which water can be used as a confidence building measure to ease conflict in other areas. Historically, Pakistan’s position towards Kashmir was that were Kashmir to be ‘resolved’, other sources of conflict would be more readily addressed. India argued that Kashmir could not be discussed until the overall political climate between the two countries was better. Out of this stalemate came the composite dialogue.

A similar question could be addressed to the issue of water. Can water be ‘resolved’ before the over-arching political climate improves? Or, if the political climate improved, would water become easier to resolve?

The answer would seem to vary according to the bilateral relationship. In the case of Bangladesh, water is foremost among the issues that define its relationship with India. Water is intensely political. Consequently, improving the water relationship would improve the political climate. Water does not dominate Nepal’s relationship with India in the same way, but this bilateral water relationship offers the most obvious and clear-cut opportunity for mutual benefit.

 

In relation to Pakistan the answer is less clear-cut. In part this stems from misinformation within Pakistan (though misinformation regarding water is widespread throughout the region). But Pakistan’s concerns with water from India relate directly to Kashmir and its concerns over Indian dam construction therein. Intuitively, water will remain a thorny issue until the political relationship improves.

Improving regional cooperation on water issues faces many challenges. But in the years to come population growth, leading to rising demand for water, and the impact of climate change are likely to combine to deepen that challenge. The current politically charged debate over trans-boundary water resources in South Asia means that diplomacy has led to a series of dead-ends. Successes at the local level suggest potential for reframing the water debate into a shared agenda for meeting social and development goals through complementary water management practices. This holistic approach could transform regional the water resource agenda from zero-sum to win-win.