Changing trends of electoral politics

SANDHYA GOSWAMI

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THE Assembly elections 2011 in Assam made political history. The incumbent Congress government headed by Tarun Gogoi, like that of his predecessor Bimala Prasad Chaliha, managed to win a third term, that too with a thumping majority, a rare achievement since ‘anti-incumbency’ in the states in India is more often the norm. This paper examines certain crucial questions which arise from the election results during the last three decades in the state. Has the context of electoral politics in Assam changed today? Is there a revival in the electoral fortunes of the Congress party? Have these gains been earned by the party itself? A review of the exiting socio-cultural scenario in the state might help us better understand these questions.

Assam presents a unique fusion of different racial and linguistic elements. As a result of the long-term migratory flow into the state, it is linguistically and ethnically the most diversified state in India. Major components of its social mosaic are the Hindus (67 per cent) and the Muslims (30.30 per cent). The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes represent 7.4 per cent and 12.1 per cent respectively (Census 2001). The major linguistic groups are the Assamese (57.8 per cent) and the Bengalis (21.6 per cent). The population of Assam is also divided into several categories such as immigrant Muslims, Hindus, Nepalese, and tea garden community.1 The linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity not only creates a tremendous scope for socio-cultural overlap but also political polarization on ethnic lines. Electoral politics in the state thus reflects the political significance of its multi-ethnic reality.

The Congress party dominated the electoral history of Assam from the first election of 1952, facing its first major setback in the assembly election of 1978, when it won only eight seats and polled a low 8.8 per cent of the valid votes. This election was held after the Janata Party’s ascent to power at the Centre, which resulted in corresponding changes in the political alignment in the state. The Janata Party under the leadership of Golap Borbora came to power with the support of the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) and some independents. The CPM and other left parties extended outside support to the government. However, the Janata government in Assam fell even before the 1980 Lok Sabha election, making way for a short-lived Congress ministry. This was when the Assam movement had already hit its peak.2 President’s rule was imposed in Assam. The 1983 assembly election was a political disaster. Though the Congress came to power, the government lacked popular legitimacy.

 

The 1985 election was ‘critical’ for it led to a reconfiguration of the party system and a durable realignment of social groups with political parties, reflecting both ethnic polarization as well as the beginnings of ethnic accommodation in Assam. Unlike most other Indian states where regionalism is usually articulated in terms of a single dominant cultural community, in Assam a number of smaller ethnic communities had begun to carve out areas of influence through their respective parties. The Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), which won a decisive victory in the December 1985 election to the state assembly, was the first government by a regional party in Assam. The AGP owes its political existence to the regional issues of the state. Many even thought that the election signalled an end to the one-party dominance by the Congress, making way for a bi-polar competition between the Congress and the AGP.

A close look at the verdict, however, reveals that far from instituting a two-party system, the two parties put together did not garner even 60 per cent of the popular vote. The earlier Congress rainbow coalition had begun to come apart and each slice was headed in a different direction. The election marked a significant decline in strength, not just for the Congress but all national political parties. What this election instituted was a system of high mobilization and intense competition among diverse social groups, a competition that was bound to introduce and sustain party fragmentation. All subsequent elections continue to reflect this pattern.

 

In both the assembly and parliamentary elections held in 1991, the Congress party staged a remarkable comeback, remarkable not for the size of its majority, but the recovery staged in the aftermath of the Assam movement. The verdict, however, did not actually reflect a resurgence of support for the Congress. The main reasons for its victory, despite a poor vote share, were the division of the pro-Assamese nationalist votes between the AGP and Natun Asom Gana Parishad (NAGP), a breakaway faction of the AGP, and the unprecedented performance of the BJP. It could be argued that these three formations put together polled more votes than the Congress, but this fact was no more than a statistical consolation.

The debacle of the AGP in this election was predictable. Unseemly wrangling among top leaders and rampant factionalism had culminated in a split in the party. Another factor that contributed to eroding the regional image of the AGP was the sudden upsurge in the activities of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Indeed, the emergence of the ULFA can be causally related to a failure of the AGP leaders to pull together and respond to regional aspirations. Moreover, taking advantage of the AGP being in power, the ULFA got an opportunity to act on a parallel course of attaining independence for Assam with the connivance of the state government. In the process, the ULFA entered into a rather complex relationship with the state authority. The AGP leaders’ ambivalence regarding ULFA, which they could neither suppress nor make a deal with, left them no escape route when the Centre finally cracked down. The deteriorating law and order situation in the state finally led to an imposition of President’s Rule prematurely in November 1990, and ULFA was declared an unlawful organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.

 

In 1996, the Congress party found itself in a difficult situation, facing charges of unprecedented corruption and an indiscriminate use of the repressive machinery of the state. Meanwhile, the AGP and NAGP united. The other opposition parties, including the left parties and even the United Minority Front (UMF) – a party claiming to represent the interests of the religious and linguistic minorities – joined hands with other regional forces. The situation was further complicated by the extremist politics of organizations like ULFA and BDSF (Bodo Security Force). The AGP managed to elicit the militant’s support by promising to support the cause of self-determination, which incidentally amounted to accepting the demand for secession of Assam in accordance with ULFA’s political parlance. (The AGP, in its 1996 election manifesto, had placed more emphasis on the question of ‘greater autonomy’ and the ‘right to self-determination’ for the state.)

Surprisingly, major regional issues were not included in the AGP manifesto, in part because of the alliances it had to form to keep the non-Congress votes together. The new inclusive strategy of the AGP had three components: the AGP under Mahanta’s leadership accepted the dissident faction, entered into a political coalition with the left, and underscored the need for a social coalition. The AGP succeeded in regaining a majority in the state assembly. Though this performance appeared less impressive than its historic victory in 1985, it needs to be remembered that the AGP contested only 99 seats in this election. A similar pattern was repeated in the Lok Sabha elections held at the same time. The alliance ensured a strong presence for the AGP in all the regions of the state since it had forged a rainbow coalition cutting across ethnic lines.

 

The Congress recovery in the state began in the late 1990s. This is evident from the performance of the Congress since the 1998 Lok Sabha elections (Table 1) and the 2001 Assembly elections (Table 2). Although the party is back in power, the Congress is no longer an umbrella organization that accommodates the various ethnicities and communities of the state. The decline of Congress dominance was caused by the emergence of multipolar party competition and the assertion and realignment of ethnic identities.

The situation that prevailed in Assam before the 1998/1999 Lok Sabha elections was not conducive to the ruling AGP. Contrary to popular expectations of a party opposed to state terrorism (because of its own experiences that led to its formation and commitments made in the election manifesto), the AGP government imposed repressive measures in the shape of a unified command, similar in form and content to those followed by the Congress. This contributed to the alienation of the Assamese middle class from the AGP.

TABLE 1

Position of the Congress Party in Lok Sabha Elections (1998-2009)

Political Party

1998

1999

2004

2009

 

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Congress

10

39.00

10

38.42

9

35.07

7

34.89

AGP

12.70

0

11.09

2

20.00

1

14.60

BJP

1

24.50

2

29.84

3*

30.80

4

16.21

CPI

1.00

0.60

1.66

0.92

CPM

3.30

 

0.66

0.70

ASDC

1

2.20

1

0.98

UMF

1

4.30

 

0

0.62

JD

 

1.21

AIUDF

 

1

16.10

BPPF

 

1

5.41

Ind

1

9.50

1

9.40

       

Others

1

5.60

5.80

1

13.41

0

12.79

Note: * BJP+ includes one seat contested and won by an independent candidate supported by the BJP and one seat contested by the BJP’s ally JD (U). In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, one seat was won by the same independent candidate, who was not supported by the BJP, and one by the CPI(ML).

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

 

TABLE 2

Position of the Congress Party in Assembly Elections (2001-2011)

Political Party

2001

2006

2011

 

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Seat Secured

Votes Polled

Congress

70

39.75

53

31.00

78

39.38

AGP

20

20.10

24

20.39

10

16.30

AGP(P)

1

3.39

BJP

8

9.30

10

11.98

5

11.50

AIUDF

10

16.12

18

12.60

BPPF

11

3.72

12

6.10

IND

19

19.50

22

9.71

Others

2

3.70

3

14.20

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

The verdict of the electorate was thus clearly a reflection of its disillusionment with the AGP, the torchbearer of regional politics. Even as the Congress party appeared to have consolidated its position, the more significant development was the emergence of the BJP as an important electoral force. Its success could be attributed mainly to the Kargil issue and also its promise to repeal the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act, thereby allaying fears of the indigenous Assamese of being wiped out. Smaller parties like the Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC), in alliance with CPML and independent candidates supported by the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU), could retain one seat each. On the whole, the mandate was against the AGP-led alliance, clearly indicative of its declining support base among the Muslim, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities.

The strong anti-incumbency wave that swept across the country did not have a distinct impact on the electorate in Assam during the 2004 Lok-Sabha elections. In the absence of a wave in favour of any political party, most parties played a familiar tune to woo voters. The BJP focused on the problem of the perennial influx from across the border and repeal of the IMDT Act.3 Immigration has long been a serious issue in Assam politics and is seen as critical to fuelling the vote bank politics of the ruling cliques. Overall, the political competition among the parties in this election was intense and the margins of victory/ defeat very narrow.

 

The BJP failed to make any significant breakthrough in terms of seats as its organizational base was relatively weak and the party devoid of capable leaders. The regional party, AGP, managed to regain its recognition at the national level by winning two seats after its debacle in the 1998 and 1999 elections, when it won no seats. The Left Democratic Alliance, however, failed to win any seat, although its vote share showed a marked increase. An independent candidate backed by the ABSU and supported by the BJP retained the Bodo dominant Kokrajhar constituency with the highest margin of votes in the state. On the whole, the mandate was a mixed one, signalling diverse electoral choices.

 

The 2006 Assembly verdict in Assam was probably the most fragmented one, ushering in an era of coalition politics in the state. The Congress party showed resilience and an ability to form useful alliances. The repeal of the IMDT Act by a Supreme Court verdict became an important issue in this election. It came as a blow to the minorities, who blamed the Congress for not defending the act strongly enough. Though the Congress tried to allay their fears by proclaiming the Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order of 2006, it failed to satisfy the leaders of the minority communities. The formation of the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF) on the eve of the elections demonstrated its political clout by successfully weaning away a substantial section of Muslim supporters of Congress. The Congress party was considerably weakened and forced into a coalition to hold on to power.

In more ways than one, this was a verdict against the ruling Congress. Perhaps what saved it was that the previous AGP government had received an even more negative rating in most opinion polls. Despite several opportunities offered by the party in power, it seems that the AGP failed to take advantage of the situation. In considerable disarray and wracked by splits (Prafulla Mahanta, the former chief minister, left the party with his breakaway faction – the AGP-Progressive) the party was unable to capitalize on the poor record of the Congress government.

The split in the AGP led to a major break-up in its traditional vote bank, which undoubtedly benefited both the Congress and the BJP. Note that even the exit poll and post poll survey data (CSDS 2006), found that only 41 per cent of the respondents were in favour of giving the incumbent government another chance, while 55 per cent were opposed to its continuation. The survey did indicate a moderate level of satisfaction with the government and the incumbent CM, but also strong anxiety about the high levels of corruption and on the crucial question of immigration.

 

In the 2009 Lok Sabha election, the Congress party, despite apprehensions of a slide, got away with a minor loss of two seats from its tally of nine in the 2004 elections. Moreover, the party managed to more or less retain its vote share. The decline of Congress’ vote share was due to the presence of the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF – earlier AUDF), which contested the Lok Sabha election for the first time and strengthened the process of polarization among Muslims, both domiciled and immigrants. It posed a challenge to the Congress base among religious minorities, especially among immigrant settlers of the char areas.4 Though AIUDF managed to win only one seat, the party emerged as a strong opponent of the Congress in the areas dominated by the minority communities.

The Congress, however, did not face a serious dent in those constituencies where the AIUDF did not contest, for example the Lakhimpur and Dhemaji constituencies. But in a few constituencies like Silchar, the Congress candidate lost to the BJP candidate. The BJP candidate managed to win 35.37 per cent of votes, while the AIUDF candidate came second with 29.35 per cent votes, while the Congress candidate came third, securing 28.65 per cent of votes. If AIUDF were absent, the Congress would have given a tough competition to the BJP. Even in the Karimganj constituency, where the Congress candidate narrowly won by securing 37.89 per cent of votes, the AIUDF came second, securing 36.74 per cent. Thus, in this election, the Congress faced tough competition due to the presence of AIUDF. The electoral understanding between the AGP-BJP combine turned out to be fruitful for the BJP, as the party managed to increase its tally in Assam to four seats from two in 2004, but failed to dispel the apprehensions of religious minorities about the BJP’s political ideology and its agenda. Besides, the AIUDF damaged the alliance’s prospects among Muslims and strengthened the process of polarization.

 

The 2011 Assembly elections marked the beginning of a new phase in state politics. The Congress party secured an absolute majority, winning 78 seats and 39.38 per cent of votes. The main opposition party, the AGP, suffering from organizational weaknesses and internal factionalism, managed to retain only 10 seats with 16.38 per cent of votes. The BJP managed to secure only five seats garnering 11.46 per cent of votes. The AIUDF won 18 seats and12.58 per cent of votes. The BPPF and Trinamool Congress also managed to increase their tallies, the latter garnering one seat.

 

Instead of playing into the hands of sectional interests, the emphasis on peace talks with the insurgent groups and development of the state paid rich dividends to the Congress. Assam has been reeling from violence and insecurity for nearly a quarter of a century. The initiation of a peace dialogue with the ULFA proved to be the Congress’ trump card. The possibility of a political solution to the vexed problem of militancy in the state by engaging the dominant militant groups across the negotiation table and initiating the much-awaited peace process without any preconditions on the issue of sovereignty after a long period of 30 years worked well for the Congress party. Moreover, while the pro-poor initiatives of the government, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and the farm loan waiver scheme, may not have fully impacted on the people, they did create a positive climate for the incumbent party, even though weak delivery systems have prevented the benefits from reaching the targeted populations.

TABLE 3

Pattern of Voting by Ethnic Communities

Community

Congress

AIUDF

AGP

BJP

 

2006

2011

2006

2011

2006

2011

2006

2011

Assamese Muslims

39

55

32

16

13

11

4

4

Bengali Muslims

36

28

36

55

8

7

0

1

Assamese Hindus

25

34

3

0

31

34

10

8

Bengali Hindus

29

30

7

6

14

10

30

35

Others

38

41

2

5

23

11

13

8

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

Besides, the Congress party could partially recover its old role of a grand unifier of divergent social and economic forces. Even though the AIUDF cost the Congress a portion of immigrant Muslim votes, the party could regain its lost strength by wooing the Assamese speaking Muslims and part of the Assamese Hindus mainly owing allegiance to the AGP and BJP.

The 2011 NES survey data reveals that the Assamese Muslim vote share for Congress increased from 39 per cent in 2006 to 55 per cent in 2011; for the Bengali Muslims it reduced from 36 per cent to 28 per cent. Simultaneously, its vote share among the Assamese Hindus went up to 34 per cent in 2011 compared to 25 per cent in 2006, and among the Bengali Hindus increased from 29 per cent to 30 per cent during the same period.

 

This clearly reflects that the ethnic Assamese voters are the key to the Congress’ success. The AIUDF did cost the Congress a portion of immigrant Muslim votes, but it regained its lost strength among the Assamese Muslims and Bengali Hindus who had earlier been allied to the AGP and the BJP respectively. Nevertheless, the polarization of Muslim votes has long-term implications for the state. The challenge by the newly formed AIUDF party to the monopoly of the Congress over the Muslim ‘vote bank’ is a new phenomenon in Assam politics. Besides, the success of the AIUDF and BPPF seems to have encouraged the formation of smaller ethnic parties, causing even greater political and ethnic fragmentation.

Electoral politics in Assam thus clearly reflects two fundamental tendencies – a fragmentation in the party political space and an explosion of ethnicities in the arena of politics. A realignment of relationships among various kinds of pre-existing social cleavages has also emerged. The simultaneous operation of these alignments has made contemporary Assam a virtual laboratory of the politics of ethnicities. The entry of new social groups and parties has the potential of giving greater meaning to competitive democracy in the state, even though this competition has rarely led to better choices and new policies, programmes or institutional devices.

The electoral domination by the ruling Congress party in the last Assembly election points to another aspect. Does the electoral victory of the Congress party mark an end to the troubles of the state and an inauguration of the politics of good governance and development? Unfortunately, such a reading appears premature, a triumph of hope over reality. The Congress won due to a combination of factors, among which was a promise of peace. That promise will have to be fulfiled in the times to come for the troubles of the state to recede.

 

The other promise that seems to have attracted voters to the Congress is development. This is not only an ideological promise; its real test will come in the form of good governance. If the Congress does not show evidence of real progress, the election victory, in retrospect, will only be seen as a victory due to contingent political circumstances like a national opposition lacking confidence, a state level opposition lacking promise, and new social forces lacking unity and direction. State level political forces in Assam arise mainly because of an inability of the political spectrum to accommodate hitherto unrepresented sections and ensure a politics that not only represents the deprived sections in a symbolic manner, but also substantively. Therefore, it is not correct to conclude that a fragmented opposition signals decimation of regional parties in the state.

The fate of the main opposition party, AGP, appears bleak. It took voters for granted and thought that merely highlighting corruption as an issue could substitute for governance and other matters in its campaign. But an increase in the vote share of ‘others’ (BPPF and AIUDF) does not allow generalizations on the basis of AGP’s decline alone. It should not be forgotten that the structural reasons that led to the formation of regional parties in Assam have not totally disappeared; rather these may be present in some areas even more intensely though in a dormant state.

 

Thus, underneath the apparent political supremacy of the Congress party, the state can still witness an unrest caused by more serious issues like, among others, corruption, immigration of foreign nationals, rising prices, and grievances of ethnic minorities. Overall, the future of both the Congress and regional forces will depend less on short-term political exigencies like electoral alliances and more on how well they respond to and meet the dormant political desires of the hitherto unrepresented social forces under a larger federal political umbrella that can effectively strike a balance between the ruling segments and the minorities.

 

Footnotes:

1. What is known as the ‘tea community’ or ‘tea tribe community’ in Assam today is a composite group that consists of those whose ancestors migrated as tea garden workers from central and eastern India during the period of British rule. For a long time these migrant workers did not have much interaction with the world outside the plantations, as they were deliberately kept insulated by the plantation management. Due to an absence of communication facilities in the early years, the workers gradually lost contact with their native places, and thus became permanent residents of the state.

2. The Assam Movement of 1979-85 was primarily aimed at ensuring the distinct socio-cultural, economic and political identity of the Assamese people in the face of a massive influx of immigrants. Besides, the movement opposed the participation of foreign nationals in the electoral process of the state.

3. The Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunals Act which was passed in October 1983, deals with the procedures to detect illegal immigrants. It was made applicable only in Assam, whereas in other states detection of foreigners is done under the Foreigners Act 1946. Under the act, the onus of proving one’s nationality or otherwise, lies on the complainant whereas under the Foreigner’s Act, the onus is on the accused. The act was challenged in the courts. In 2005, the act was quashed by the three-member bench of the Supreme Court of India, responding to a petition filed by Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Member of Parliament, Sarbananda Sonowal. After this judgment, all tribunals set up under IMDT Act were transferred to the Foreigner’s Act, 1945 which is applicable throughout the country.

4. ‘Char’ is a local term used for sand bars/river islands formed by depositions of river borne sediments. In Assam, the Brahmaputra River has formed a large number of such islands. These islands are predominantly inhabited by an immigrant Muslim population.

 

References:

The Assam Tribune (Editorial), 15 May 2004.

S. Goswami, ‘Peace and Development’, Economic and Political Weekly, 4 June 2011.

S. Goswami, ‘Assam: Multiple Realignments and Fragmentation’, Journal of Indian School of Political Economy 15(1-2), January and June 2003.

Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, ‘Ten Theses on State Politics in India’, Seminar 591, November 2008.

Yogendra Yadav, ‘On Predictable Lines’, Frontline, 8 June 2001.

S. Goswami. ‘Assam: Mixed Verdict’, Economic and Political Weekly 39(51), 18 Dec 2004.

Sanjib Baruah, ‘Assam, Don’t Hold Your Breath’, Forbes India, 3 May 2011.

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