DEMOCRACY has been good for India, helping provide stability and continuity over the past six decades. A quick glance shows the country standing out as a stable entity surrounded by countries that have had less success with democracy. A classic definition of a democracy is one that has seen at least two parties win and lose office through the electoral process. India’s achievement of that milestone was not 1977, when the Janata Party swept the Congress Party out of power after three decades of incumbency, but 1980 when the reverse happened. Similarly, there are innumerable instances of regional parties in the states being voted out in one election and then regaining power after winning the next election five years later.

Indian democracy has not always been hailed; indeed for its first few decades, the international media would routinely raise doubts about its survival. Its flaws would be exaggerated and its strengths downplayed. Nevertheless, over the years it has gradually gained credence, even hurrahs, for being a democratic icon for the developing world. Democracy in India has undoubtedly got buy-in across the nation and empowered categories of people that had been disenfranchised for centuries. While it is still a work in progress, the scaffolding, tinkering, and evolution of nearly 65 years has led to democracy permeating the fabric of Indian society, right down to the panchayat level and municipal bodies.

 

What is less often conceded is that democracy has been good for the economy. It was only after India achieved independence that it gradually reversed the decline in India’s economic fortunes under colonialism, albeit at a slower pace than some non-democratic countries. In 2008, India became a trillion dollar economy. While it took 61 years to get that far, India’s GDP is already at $1.73 trillion,¹ thus nearly doubling itself in four years. Many financial experts soon see the world’s largest democracy as the third largest economy in the world, with others even predicting this may have already happened.²

Our democracy has been instrumental in creating a robust growth engine that, barring a few hiccups, has served us well. A move towards transparency and universal applicability of rules inherent in a democratic set-up has helped give a fillip to enterprise, encouraged internal restructuring and, in general, opened doors in several areas.

There is a saying in South East Asia: an empty rice bowl gives democracy a hollow sound.³ Some have drawn comparisons with a slow-growing Indian economy and the rapid economic progress some Far Eastern countries have made by putting aside democratic pretensions and using strong-armed political measures to put their economies on a high growth trajectory. The question whether India would have had faster economic growth under a non-democratic set-up misses the point altogether; the more fundamental questions are, first, whether such a large, diverse country could have been held together for long without participatory democracy; and second, whether, with the building blocks in place, it might have any long-term advantages over other systems.

Amartya Sen has found that famines do not occur in democracies while they are endemic in many countries that are dictatorships. As stated in his book Democracy as Freedom (Anchor, 1999), ‘No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy.’ This, he explained, is because democratic governments ‘have to win elections and face public criticism, and have strong incentive to undertake measures to avert famines and other catastrophes.’ This line of argument is reiterated by Madhusree Mukerjee, whose book Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II brings to light devastating evidence of the administrative callousness that led to the Bengal famine of 1943, killing millions.

 

Democracy allows for public dissent and vocalizing disapproval of its policies. Indeed ‘dissent is essential to democratic legitimacy – the need of democratic institutions to enjoy the consent of the governed. Policies and practices would lack legitimacy if the governed do not contribute or their contribution is restricted.’⁴ However there are many challenges to this process.

The above is an ongoing process with many issues still unsettled, requiring a laborious consensus building process. One needn’t look further than the current logjam on foreign direct investment (FDI) in retail, even after twenty years of reform. A recent article by Meghnad Desai⁵ reminds us how some arguments have remained unchanged through the vicissitudes of successive regimes. Arguments that the nation is following World Bank orders unquestioned, even wilfully furthering the resurgence of an ‘East India Company’ are bandied about now, just as they were when Indira Gandhi accepted an IMF loan and when Manmohan Singh presented his 1991 budget.

 

A quick look at business conducted in the last few sittings of Parliament reveals that only about a third of the bills listed for introduction were actually introduced.⁶ As the number of bills waiting in the wings starts piling up and the days Parliament functions dwindles, one worries if this means less time for pre-legislative scrutiny. The threat of bills being passed with little deliberation is as serious as having them altogether vanish in a landslide of paperwork.

Elections can degenerate quickly into mudslinging and lose sight of the main issues. While Americans may bemoan the lack of bipartisanship in their polity, their legislatures cannot be faulted on civility and rule-based functioning. The same can be said for the UK that has recently seen two brothers contest for the Labour leadership in an election fought on the strength of policy and ideology, especially one free of rancour and mudslinging. Many have asked when this would be possible in India.

Due to the gradual misalignment of national, state and local elections, we are in a constant election mode and this detracts from sound policy making. Politicians are forever worried about and distracted by electoral consequences and are thus rarely able to move away from populist positions. Elections at fixed intervals would allow for breathing space and ensure that attention is rightly invested in creation of policy and better deliberation.

 

The legitimacy of the political system has been enhanced by the credibility of certain key institutions such as the Election Commission, although that took several decades before being universally accepted. Fortunately for us in India, the office of the Election Commission is protected from interference by virtue of its statutory nature, but even more importantly has acquired an independent ethos and culture of its own.

Despite our achievements, there is today a credibility issue running across the political system. Politicians have gained a venal reputation with hardly any example of role models that the general population can look up to (quite unlike a generation or two ago). Much public anger stems from the opinion that MPs are awarded perks disproportionate to their contribution which, as the recent Privileges Committee report has shown, is something several MPs differ with. What MPs certainly get is cushy accommodation at nominal rates, but have nothing of office infrastructure, staff, research support that their counterparts are eligible for in other democracies. It is no surprise that the level of preparation and engagement suffers as a result.

 

One root cause for this is the ‘original sin’, i.e., the hypocrisy of pretending politics runs on love and fresh air. This attitude turns a blind eye towards the need to have a transparent funding system. Thus, as democracy got entrenched and politics became competitive, it developed a complex, subterranean ecosystem for funding, which was co-dependent with a patronage system linked to the licence permit raj. With election budgets having risen over the years, rent seeking by a certain category of elected officials needed to keep pace, the only difference being that it seems all the more egregious only in comparison to the public’s lowered tolerance for it.

Every democracy has similar problems if political funding is related to the doling out of favours, but nowhere more so than India, where only a very tiny portion of political fund-raising is unconnected to governmental favours. The vast majority of political funds in India are raised through backroom deals involving quid pro quo by way of governmental favours for crony capitalists.

In contrast, almost a quarter of Barack Obama’s record-breaking $750 million raised in the 2008 campaign came from small donations of $200 and less.⁷ Interestingly, this pattern seems to have repeated itself in the first twenty-four hours of his 2012 campaign, where nearly all the 23,000 donations came in for the same amount.⁸ Six months later, as the number of donors touched one million, 98% donations stayed under $250 with an average donation of $56.⁹ Donors were urged to give as little as $3 for a chance to have dinner with the Obamas.

Ironically, the case I have made for public funding comes from a country whose House has recently decided to eschew public funding for its presidential elections.¹⁰ While it has been observed that public contributions pale in comparison to funds raised through private donations, this does not have to be an either-or scenario. France allows for a combination of public subsidies and private donations, while Turkey provides indirect subsidies for parties that have garnered 7% of the vote share in the previous election. Other means of public support include free postage, expenses for personnel and transport and even television airtime (which India provides).¹¹

 

Corruption, particularly the petty corruption faced by hundreds of millions of citizens in their daily interactions with governmental authority is rampant and one of the principal grouses. The poor – the voiceless, the time-constrained, and those who cannot afford other options or have none – suffer the most. The massive and momentous response that the Anna Hazare movement against corruption has received all over the country is a solid testimony to the cancerous spread of the problem and the seething resentment that so many feel against it.

Corruption at higher levels of the government – including politicians as well as the bureaucracy – is assuming gargantuan proportions, especially now that massive funds are being released for improving infrastructure, welfare programmes, food distribution, etc. and as the economy grows and more funds are available at the disposal of the government, the problems are only likely to grow without important changes in the way India is governed.

 

The private sector is no exception to this scourge: millions are stashed in overseas banks and the government has stonewalled all attempts to raise this issue of bringing back this black money. India’s downgrade in Transparency International’s list of the most corrupt countries¹² reflects the government’s lack of interest in curbing this menace.

Cleansing the economy of black money will bring immense benefits to the political system, quite apart from the country at large. For example, the recent scams that have been exposed point to how the scarce resources of the nation are exploited for personal and political gain. In fact, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001) had even noted that ‘electoral compulsions for funds become the foundation of the whole super structure of corruption.¹³

 

One of the major hurdles to a more dynamic polity is likely the still high barriers to entry. Despite the fact that many millions have been empowered by the political process, actual participation in politics beyond just exercising the franchise has many limits. Hereditary politics have resulted in the creation of fiefdoms rather than parties with vibrant internal democratic traditions. In his seminal chapter on nepotism in Indian politics, Patrick French in his book India: A Portrait (Penguin, 2011), describes that at the time of oath-taking, every single MP under the age of 30 in the current Lok Sabha had inherited their seat. Equally telling of this trend is the fact that nearly 40% of 66 ministers hold hereditary seats.¹⁴ Situations that allow a parties high command to override democratic decision-making only serve to kill internal democracy and perpetuate this situation.

All this raises entry barriers to politics for the average citizen, which both limits the talent pool as well as makes citizens doubtful about the political process. There is a dire need to attract capable people into politics, but election after election sees many unsavoury elements getting elected instead. A law to bar criminal elements from contesting for offices of power, or recall those who fail to perform is a serious need, but has its own complications in a country where trials can take decades, and thus there is no reliable method to preclude the guilty instead of the merely accused.

To promote transparency, a few experiments like live streaming from offices of ministers in Karnataka and Kerala have been done.¹⁵ The success of live telecasts of parliamentary proceedings have even prompted some to ask if this can be done with Standing Committee meetings, though whether this is desirable or even necessary is debatable.

 

We must count our blessings for a system that has largely served India well for so many decades. It is only fitting that we celebrate democracy that has sprung up in a dangerous part of the world, at a time when many nations are building their own democracies. The Arab Spring has been an aspiration for citizens of nations to liberate themselves from dictatorships and to move towards freedom. Furthermore, the key shortcomings that have been alleged about India – slower economic growth and lately large-scale corruption – are more likely despite, not because of, our democracy.

Nevertheless, while it is worth cherishing our democratic tradition, it is time for us to recognize that our system needs improvement. Many of the policy gridlocks that we face today are a result of laws and conventions rooted in a 19th century paradigm, which have outlived their relevance. Decisions on agenda setting in Parliament (e.g., debates and motions) have been left ambiguous with a vague reliance on consensus rather than clearly defined rules. While this genteel approach may have worked in Victorian England or even in the early days of India’s independence, it today gives a veto power to far too many, inevitably resulting in chaos and gridlock. Another example is the obsolete laws concerning land acquisition, a relic of the 19th century, and today out of sync with the times.

 

What is needed in both these and several other areas is to rejig the system and bring it in line with 21st century realities. Agenda setting in Parliament should be rule-based, with a significant minority being able to introduce certain motions, such as debates with voting. Due to parliamentary rules for these dating from the pre-independence Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 – whose ethos was to provide a platform for the natives to vent their ire but not exert real pressure – the opposition is almost always left with an all or nothing situation. That is, they have no middle ground between a toothless debate and a motion of no confidence to legitimately pressurize the government (short of unseating it). Ambiguous rules need to be replaced with specific ones. For instance, if one-third of MPs give notice for voting motions, there should be one. This will break the logjam of setting the parliamentary agenda, and also force the government to sell its agenda to the nation instead of trying to sneak or bulldoze it through.

The challenges that India’s democracy is now facing is far from unique; in fact it has several parallels with the experience of that other large democracy, the US. Till the middle of the 19th century, its elected houses of Congress were rambunctious institutions that saw scuffles, brawls and other symptoms of indiscipline. By the second half of the 19th century, dubbed by Mark Twain as the Gilded Age, it too was plagued by huge corruption while, simultaneously, experiencing rapid economic growth due to industrialization. Yet, by the early 20th century, the efforts of many reformers created the so-called Progressive Era, which saw backroom politics give way to transparent processes. The resultant change in the ethos of governance had long lasting effects. It even had effects outside the confines of government, turning former ‘robber barons’ into some of the greatest philanthropists the world has ever seen. India is in the midst of similar growth pangs, both economic and democratic; while success is not guaranteed, it must be comforting to know that others have tread this path before, with positive results.

 

When India embarked on a democratic system of government at independence, it plunged into the deep with universal adult franchise from day one, something that had taken established democracies centuries to achieve. In a desperately poor, mostly illiterate country, this undoubtedly put far more populist pressures on successive governments than any other country. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy took root, the nation bought into its promise, and that holds the key to its evolution, for evolve it must.

The challenges of governing India in today’s combative climate may sound daunting, but in fact they signal the need for new skills for those in public life. In an era of ubiquitous communications, and when the burgeoning middle class has finally started asserting itself politically, the old ways of politicking must give way to the new. Those in government have to get used to selling their agenda to the nation, not just during elections but also in the interregnum. They will need to get out of closed rooms and hit the road, selling that agenda in the states, on the airwaves, to both the public and Parliament.

 

* With research support from Shruti Jagirdar, legislative assistant.

Footnotes:

1. GDP Growth: Actual and Projected, Page 5, Economic Outlook 2011-12, Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council http://eac.gov.in/reports/eco_out1112.pdf

2. Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, India Moved Ahead of Japan Terms of Purchasing Power Parity in the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.0). Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011. Also see: ‘India to Topple Japan as World’s Third Largest Economy’, The Economic Times, 20 September 2011.

3. Anirudha Gupta, ‘India: Democracy and Dissent’, Parliamentary Affairs 53(1), 2000, p. 1, pa.oxford journals.org/content/53/1/181.full.pdf

4. Robert L. Ivie, ‘Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique’, The Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions, Indiana University, Sept 2005, p. 2, http://poynter.indiana.edu/publications/m-ivie.pdf

5. Meghnad Desai, ‘Repeat Performance’, Indian Express, 4 December 2011, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/repeat-performance/883702/

6. All data culled from the ‘Resume of Work’ available on the Parliament website. For example, in the Monsoon session 2011, out of 34 bills listed for introduction, 13 were introduced. In Budget 2011, 9 bills of 34 were introduced and in Winter 2010, of 36 bills listed, 13 were introduced.

7. Federal Election Commission, ‘Contributions to Obama, Barack through 31/12/2008’, 2008 Presidential Campaign Finance, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do

8. Paul Steinhauser, ‘Obama Re-election Campaign Touts Small Dollar Donations’, CNN Politics, 6 April 2011.

9. In an email to supporters, Obama campaign manager Jim Messina claimed that 606,027 people donated to the campaign from June to September, and 98 per cent of the donations were $250 or less. ‘Obama Re-election Campaign Ahead of 2007-08 Fundraising Totals’, Bloomberg, 13 October 2011.

10. H.R. 3463: ‘An Act to Reduce Federal Spending and the Deficit by Terminating Taxpayer Financing of Presidential Election Campaigns and Party Conventions and by Terminating the Election Assistance Commission’. Passed by the House of Representatives, 112th Congress, United States of America on 1 December 2011.

11. PRS Legislative Research, Financing of Election Campaigns: Background Note for the Conference on Effective Legislatures, 18 November 2008, http://www.prsindia.org/pages/prs-conference-on-effective-legislatures-2008-135/

12. Transparency International India, Corruption Perception Index 2011, press release, 1 December 2011.

13. Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Electoral Processes and Political Parties, Chapter 4, Vol I, 2001, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch4.htm

14. The India Site, Family Politics, http://www.theindiasite.com/family-politics/

15. Karnataka CM live webcast: http://119.226.79.204/karnatakacm/index.html, Kerala CM live webcast: http://www. keralacm.gov.in/webstreaming/