Report

Electoral politics in Indian states

THE somewhat unexpected victory of the Congress-led UPA in the 2009 Parliamentary elections once again fuelled speculation, particularly within Congress circles, about its revival as an all-India party. This broad hypothesis was subjected to a rigorous scrutiny in a recent workshop on ‘Electoral Politics in the Indian States 2004-2010’, organized by the Lokniti network on 24 to 26 January 2011. Drawing upon the National Election Studies (NES) data, the different presentations, each focusing on a specific state, also sought answers to a set of related questions. Were the electoral gains for the Congress more ‘a by-product of the disarray within its opponents’ than a reflection of the ‘party’s initiatives’? Does the ‘electoral recovery’ of the Congress indicate an ‘organizational revival’ of the party in recent years? Should the ‘recovery’ be attributed to new-found support from ‘newly politicized social groups’ or does it signal a return to the fold of ‘traditional voters’ such as the Muslims? And finally, how does one explain the differential success/failure of the Congress across different states?

The South: G. Koteswara Prasad’s paper on Tamil Nadu seemed to agree with the ‘resurgence thesis’, though with the Congress still playing second fiddle in a coalitional arrangement, as has been the case since the 1967 elections. The DMK-Congress alliance that came into existence after a 24 year long interval in 2004, managed to win not only the last two successive Lok Sabha elections, but also the 2006 assembly and local elections, besides all the by-elections, despite the rival AIADMK weaning away some erstwhile DMK allies like the MDMK, PMK, CPI and CPM.

According to NES survey data, the DMK-Congress alliance got an upper hand due to the electorate’s satisfaction with the central government, positive assessment of the performance of the state government, and because of comparatively better support among the upper castes, dalits and Muslims. In terms of governance, the alliance also gained by balancing out the pitfalls of the processes of globalization with its emphasis on human development.

K.C. Suri, P. Narasimha Rao and V. Anji Reddy in their paper on Andhra Pradesh seemed less assured of the continuation of the process of resurgence of the Congress indicated by the fact that despite its success in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the party received fewer seats than in 2004. Moreover, the Congress will miss the leadership of the late YSR which drew on the support of the numerically strong, land owning dominant Reddy caste, and also his popular welfare schemes that caught the imagination of the masses (not forgetting his padyatras). Ever since his departure, dissidence has cropped up within the party, as rival claimants vie with each other for party leadership. The TRS-led agitation for Telangana, and the coming together of TDP and the left parties, is a cause for worry, though the merger of PRP with the Congress is a good omen. The paper tends to substantiate the NES 2009 finding that compared to national leaders, it is the state level leaders who now play a more decisive role in determining the electoral outcomes at the state level.

Sandeep Shastri and Veena Devi too find no evidence of the resurgence of the Congress in Karnataka and despite serious internal dissensions and charges of major corruption involving the top state leadership, it was the ruling BJP that managed to increase its seats in the 2009 Lok Sabha. The BJP win replicated the party’s electoral success in the previous assembly elections. The subsequent BJP victory in the local body elections has further exposed the Congress inability to make a comeback in the near future. Ironically, it is the JD(S) which, despite its limited social and regional support base, has been in the forefront of challenging the BJP government.

According to NES data, the respondents who assessed the performance of the state government positively, overwhelmingly voted for the BJP. The NES surveys held during the last two Lok Sabha elections have shown an overwhelming support for the BJP among the numerically dominant property owning Lingayat community. The party’s ability to wean away the votes of the other numerically dominant landed peasant community, namely the Vokkaligas, as well as the non-dominant backward castes who have traditionally been Congress voters, has further consolidated its position. Among the traditional voters, only the dalits and the Muslims have continued to vote for the Congress, though the BJP has made a dent in the tribal vote.

Kerala comes across as yet another state where the performance of the state government and state specific issues matter much more in determining the electorates choice than matters related to the Union government or national issues. The usual narrow difference in terms of votes polled by the two fronts, namely the LDF and UDF, in the state has long been attributed to the presence of an ideologically committed vote for the two fronts. Though the recent elections show an increased difference in terms of votes polled in the elections, K.M. Sajad Ibrahim points out that the bipolar nature of electoral politics remains stable. So far the political loyalties of the regional allies too have not wavered for either of the coalition making parties, namely the Congress and CPM.

What augurs well for the UDF in the state, where assembly elections are shortly due, is the likely strategic shift of BJP voters to the UDF, as shown by the 2009 NES data. Moreover, the Congress has also strengthened its support base among the minorities, i.e. Muslims and Christians, constituting half of the state’s population, due to the LDF government’s education policy that was seen as aimed at eroding the autonomy of the Church as well as the Muslim organizations running minority educational institutions. Among the other two numerically strong Hindu communities, the Nairs and Ezhava, the latter remains firmly with the LDF, a legacy of the lower caste based radical movement politics going back to colonial days, whereas the land owning Nairs continue to back the UDF.

However, the SCs, who constitute a mere 10 per cent of the population as per the 2001 Census, remain firmly with the LDF. Finally, along with the erosion in the social support base, dissidence within the CPM over leadership issues combined with a lack of effective governance (‘befitting the Kerala model’!) have also hurt the fortunes of the left alliance.

The East: The joint paper on West Bengal by Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Suprio Basu examines the impressive success of the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) in terms of seats won and votes received and a concurrent decline of seats and votes by the CPI(M) in both the 2009 Lok Sabha as well as the recent local body elections and assembly by-elections. What explains the apparent breakdown in the seemingly impregnable hold of the CPM that has remained in power since 1977? Citing survey data, the paper observed that the left parties lost 26 per cent of votes in 2009 compared to 2004 among the farmers, so far traditional supporters of the Left Front due to the ruling left government’s successful implementation of land reforms as well as its success in turning PRIs into an empowered grassroots bodies.

In recent years, however, with the stagnation of the agrarian economy and the PRIs turning into the apparatus of ‘the party’, alienation has set in. The Singur and the Nandigram episodes further accentuated the feeling of alienation among the farming community, especially the Muslims, as they found themselves at the receiving end of the forced land acquisition given the newly acquired penchant for market-led industrialization of the LF government. Interestingly, the LF has over the years gained in terms of votes among the salaried middle classes in the urban areas who, along with the party workers, have been the major beneficiaries of a well-oiled system of patronage reflecting a ‘fusion of the ruling party with the government.’

The NES data showed that a combination of the dismal performance of the state government as well as the alliance of the AITC and Congress best explains the steady electoral decline of the LF. Is the shift symptomatic of an anti-left wave or is it a wave in favour of the AITC-Congress alliance? The paper suggests that it is more the leadership factor of Mamata Banerjee that has resulted in a significant turnaround in the state. Though clearly a beneficiary of the alliance, there is no evidence of a ‘Congress wave’; in the recently held municipal elections, it was AITC and not the Congress which made impressive gains when the two parties fought independently. It is thus difficult to claim a resurgence of the Congress, unless one considers the AITC as an offshoot of the former.

In Assam, the Congress, despite winning a majority of seats in the last four Lok Sabha elections, and successfully forming governments at the state level since the 2001 assembly elections, has not been able to re-establish the dominance that it lost in the 1986 assembly elections held under the shadow of ethnic violence. The recent successes of the party have mainly been due to its social coalitional base, as well as an erosion in the popular appeal for its main rival, the AGP, for malgovernance and an inability to fulfil its promises.

Sandhya Goswami’s paper on Assam also attributed the decline of Congress dominance to the emergence of a genuine multipolar party competition triggered by the assertion and realignment of ethnic identities. As a result, the state has witnessed the emergence of outfits like the Autonomous State Demand Committee, United Minority Front, Bodoland People’s Progressive Front, and the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), among others. With the rise of the AUDF, the Congress can no longer take the sizable Muslim vote for granted. Given the greater likelihood of a fresh round of ethnic tensions, the Congress needs to ‘return to its role of as the party of grand coalition’ if it is to retain its dominance.

In their paper on Jharkhand, Harishwar Dayal and B.K. Sinha blamed the ‘half-baked’ Congress-JMM pre-poll alliance as also the Congress inability to ally with the RJD, that allowed the BJP to win an impressive number of seats in the 2009 elections, despite reduction in the percentage of votes polled as compared to the 2004 elections. Significantly, the BJP ally, the JD(U), could not win even a single seat. Underlining the importance of local factors, the decline in BJP votes is best explained in terms of an impressive performance of its splinter party, the Jan Vikas Morcha which, mainly due to the popularity of its founder leader Babu Lal Marandi, weaned away the traditional Santhal tribe support in the North Chotanagpur region. The Jan Vikas Morcha even managed to win a seat in the Santhal Pargana region, considered a bastion of the Shibu Soren-led JMM. Despite a decline in terms of votes, the BJP nevertheless managed to lead in all three regions of the state, winning not only all three urban seats, but also half of the rural seats. The verdict, viewed in the context of NES data, suggests that the Congress must win back the substantial support of both Muslims and Christians if it is to make a comeback. As of now, RJD retains its support base among the Muslims, whereas the BJP has been able to take away a section of Christian votes.

Sanjay Kumar and Rakesh Ranjan’s paper on Bihar focuses on the shift in the electoral agenda from caste-based mobilization to issues of development. Bucking the trend, it was issues of governance and political leadership more than caste that held sway in the latest Lok Sabha as well as assembly elections. Once again, it was the positive assessment of the performance of the state government that most influenced the electorate. The success of the JD (U)-BJP alliance can also be attributed to a breakdown in the famed Muslim-Yadav alliance, as the Muslim vote has gradually shifted towards the JD(U).

In a strategic move, the JD(U)-BJP government created a distinct constituency among the minorities and socially marginal groups by gaining the support of the Pasmanda Muslims, the most backward castes, as well as the mahadalits by introducing/promising special schemes for these newly mobilized social/ political categories on the extreme margin of the society. Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered. Does, for instance, the impressive performance of the BJP in the 2010 assembly elections (reminiscent of 2007 elections in Punjab, where it is an ally of the SAD) indicate that the party may no longer be content to play second fiddle to its regional ally? How would that pan out in the future? Equally, the Congress strategy of going alone in the assembly elections (like in UP) failed because of a poor choice of candidates, internal divisions, organizational weakness and, above all, the absence of any political leader with state-wide support.

The West: If it was the ‘one man show’ of Nitish Kumar that was behind the rise of the RJD-BJP combine in Bihar, then Gujarat, as Ghanshayam Shah argues, has been ‘Modi’s victory rather than BJP.’ The ‘Modi factor’ has ensured that, like in the late YSR ruled AP, dissidence within the BJP has been wiped out, making the party ‘monolithic’ in character. Besides the leadership and unity factors, the impressive wins in the recent assembly as well the Lok Sabha elections can be explained by the ‘Modi formula’ of not repeating many of the sitting members as candidates, thereby bucking the anti-incumbency factor. Along with the performance of the sitting representative, the distribution of party tickets, solely decided by Modi, was also influenced by myriad factors like caste, money and loyalty to ‘the leader’.

The well-planned constituency specific election campaigns, veering around both development and a ‘well entrenched Hindutva, further helped the BJP cause. The emotive appeals to preserve Gujarati asmita or to strengthen the hands of Gujaratna Gauravanta also helped the mobilization, particularly in the BJP traditional support base in the numerically strong and economically dominant Patidars/Patels as well as the Banias and the Brahmins.

To make a comeback, the Congress has to win back the support of the OBCs, especially the numerically strong community of the Kolis, who in the recent Lok Sabha elections shifted allegiance to the BJP. The Congress also needs a strong state level leader who can match the popularity of Modi. The party has been constrained to ask for votes in the name of the national leadership in a state where the electorate prefers Narendra Modi as a ‘would be’ prime minister over even L.K. Advani, the party’s official candidate. What, however, gives slender hope to the Congress is that the 2009 Lok Sabha elections saw a narrowing of the gap in terms of both votes polled and seats won between the two contending parties.

Suhas Palshikar, Rajeswari Deshpande and Nitin Birmal’s paper on Maharashtra referred to the fact that the Congress (or the Congress and its splinter party, NCP) has been continuously in power in the state, except during 1995-1999 when the Shiv Sena-BJP combine won. That the Congress has been able to survive in power, albeit without pre-eminence, can be attributed to the following factors: the benefits of market-oriented economic growth have passed on to both the urban as well as rural middle classes, who seem to be voting for the alliance in larger proportion. The support of the ‘entrenched’ Maratha-Kunbi community for the Congress ally, the NCP helped. The absence of any single party to replace the Congress, whether it is the BJP or Shiv Sena, played its part.

The challenge before the Congress is to regain its support base, substantially if not wholly, among the Marathas who constitute 30 per cent of the population. In order to broaden its social coalitional support base, the Congress must wean away the OBCs who have mostly extended their support to the Shiv Sena and BJP. Its traditional support among the SC, ST and Muslims may not be sufficient, as together they constitute only one-third of the population and hardly vote en masse for the Congress. It is also crucial to mediate between the interests of rich farmers and industrialists for long-term electoral gains. But first, the party needs to manage its internal factionalism and ensure effective governance.

The North: In his paper on Madhya Pradesh, Yatindera Singh Sisodia discerns a mild revival of the Congress in the state beginning with the 2008 assembly elections which he attributed to a significant shift in the votes of the STs, Muslims and OBCs in favour of the Congress. What aided the Congress was the state’s proclivity to follow the national trend in the Lok Sabha elections. The recent elections have also seen a shift of traditional votes of the other smaller and regional parties to either the BJP or the Congress, thus making the polity bipolar. The paper argues that the best way forward for the Congress lies in further strengthening its traditional base among the OBCs and retaining its SC-ST-Muslim support base. The inability of the BSP to emerge as a third credible alternative should encourage the Congress.

Kushal Pal and Praveen Rai’s paper on Haryana attributed the resurgence of the Congress in the last two Lok Sabha elections to the following factors: a high level of satisfaction with the performance of the state government in terms of both the development agenda as well as relatively efficient delivery of public services. The popularity of Chief Minister Hooda, as compared to the negative image of his rival, the INLD chief Chautala, was a positive factor. A fragmented opposition in the form of an unstable alliance between INLD and the BJP and the rise of the HJC further helped the Congress. However, as the 2009 assembly elections showed, the dominant rural Jat vote has once again started shifting to the INLD, the ‘kisan party’. NES data reveals that the Congress must be wary of the polarization of dalit votes, traditional supporters of the Congress, by the BJP, given the sizable presence of the community in the state (19 per cent).

Ashutosh Kumar and Jagroop Singh Sekhon, in their paper on Punjab do not read the relative success of the Congress as signifying any long-term resurgence of the party. The verdict of the 2009 elections was not just indecisive, it was also more a negative vote by an electorate wary of the non-performance of the ruling SAD-BJP coalition government. A shift in the urban Hindu vote from the BJP to the Congress was in response to the BJP playing second fiddle to SAD, and thus unable to promote the interests of the trading and Hindu business communities. A lack of coordination between the two long-term allies clearly contributed to the dismal performance of the alliance. The deepening economic crisis in the agricultural sector that rarely receives critical attention in the policy domain, regardless of the party in power, as well as the continued salience of factors like caste, religion, region, kinship and leadership in the electoral domain, implies that incumbent governments are likely to be voted out.

Uttar Pradesh is one state where the Congress did unexpectedly well. Mirza Asrem Beg attributed the Congress success essentially to the poor performance of the SP and BJP, despite the latter entering into an alliance with the RLD. The loss of the Muslim vote for the SP, a consequence of the SP deciding to align with Kalyan Singh in the hope of receiving Lodh votes, helped the Congress in recapturing the community’s support, at least for the 2009 elections. Similarly, the decline of the BJP enabled the Congress to get the upper caste vote. However, Muslim voters now have a larger number of political options with the emergence of new Muslim outfits like the Ulema Council and Peace Party of India. NES data also shows that the Congress gained from the performance of the UPA government, especially due to the popular NREGA and affirmative actions in favour of OBCs and dalits.

To sum up, it appears that the impressive performance of the Congress-led UPA in the 2009 elections can hardly be construed as indicating a long-term ‘revival in the electoral fortunes of the Congress’, cutting across the states. Even in the states where the Congress did well in recent years, it was unable to recover its traditional social support base. Its gains were often a result of the ‘self-goal’ scored by the opposition (refer SP in UP) or factors like a divided opposition.

In many states, the NES data shows that the performance of the state government as well as regional issues, mattered much more than the national ones, thus helping out the Congress in states like Haryana. All this confirms the thesis that it is essentially at the level of the states that the ‘future analyses of Indian politics must concentrate.’ The critical role of state level leaderships, like in Andhra, Delhi or Haryana was instrumental in electoral gains for the Congress. The shift of minority voters in states like UP also augurs well for the Congress. The Congress also continues to gain from its image of being a ‘social coalitional party’, even if it has ceased to be one for long, as seen in the context of Assam. The inability of the BSP to consolidate its core dalit constituency in states like Punjab, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh and the absence of a credible party representing the adivasis has also enabled the Congress to retain these traditional voters.

Public policy outcomes especially targeted at poverty alleviation – a result of central government schemes like NREGA, mid-day meal, farmer’s loan waiver, old age pension, national health insurance and so on – helped the Congress, even in states where the programmes did not run well, like in UP. In the Union Territory of Delhi, NES data shows that more than 60 per cent of the respondents were aware about these programmes as well as other policy initiatives like JNNURM and RTI. This helped the Congress to sweep the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and also register a third consecutive victory in the assembly elections.

The issues of governance (satisfaction level/choice of the chief minister) and substantive economic issues related to development have gradually found more space during the electoral campaigns once dominated by identity based issues. Interestingly, in states like Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, the shift of traditional votes of the regional parties to the national parties has helped the Congress.

Notwithstanding the state specific nature of political formations (refer the four states of South India) and an inherent fluidity, electoral politics across most of the states reveals certain common characteristics like the presence of electoral regions, both historically constituted or merely administrative ones; the emergence of electoral bipolarity; and political articulation and mobilization along caste/ethnic/language based social cleavages that, however, remain territorially contained and rarely cross regional lines.

Ashutosh Kumar