AFTER a traumatic summer of 2010, which saw massive unrest throughout the Valley of Kashmir, the state is currently experiencing a period of lull. However, the ‘peace’ that prevails at the moment is tinged with an element of anticipation and anxiety about the approaching summer. The last three consecutive summers have been difficult in Kashmir. In 2008 the mammoth agitation around the Amarnath land row lasted almost the entire summer, igniting memories of the early period of militancy when mass protests had resulted in a breakdown of political order and a crumbling of mainstream politics.

The summer of 2009 was similarly consumed by frequent and prolonged protests around the murder and rape of two women in Shopian, making it difficult for the newly formed government of Omar Abdullah to operate in a normal manner. The 2010 ‘stone-pelting’ upsurge that continued for five months, claiming 112 lives, mostly of youth in police action, was even more severe resulting in a virtual collapse of political authority and turning national and international spotlight once again on ‘Kashmir’.

Why has the situation in Kashmir become so precarious? The question needs to be probed, especially in the context of ‘normalcy’ that had apparently come to characterize the politics of the state during the last decade or so. The decline of militancy and an expansion of democratic space since 2002 created an impression of a retreat of separatism. This feeling was boosted after the 2008 assembly elections which saw a massive participation of people despite the directions of the separatist leaders.

 

The reinvigorated demand for ‘self-determination’ in the background of the slogans of ‘azadi’ (‘Go India Go’ became the more popular slogan and ‘Quit Kashmir’ was the label given by Syed Ali Shah Geelani to the ‘protest politics’), has clearly punctured the theory of a retreat of separatism and brought out the fact of persisting political alienation in Kashmir. Clearly, the conflict situation that marked political responses during the last couple of decades continues to impact the internal politics of the state.

Nevertheless, the persistence of separatist sentiments does not undermine the fact of a simultaneous extension of the democratic space. This democratic space, however, operates within the larger context of the conflict situation and thus should not be seen as a substitute for separatist politics. Both separatist and democratic politics exist side by side, impinging upon each other at many points and overlapping at others.

It is in the context of an extension of democratic space in the valley, within the overall context of separatism, that this paper seeks to analyze the volatility of Kashmir’s politics during the recent period. The intensity of the separatist response during the summer of 2010, it argues, was as much a reflection of the separatist sentiment per se as of the failure of democratic politics.

Democratic politics, which had been totally de-legitimized in the early period of militancy, started gaining some credibility after the 2002 assembly election, seen as not only ‘fair’ and ‘transparent’ but also genuinely competetive. The competition had been intensified by the presence of the newly formed People’s Democratic Party (PDP) which, like the National Conference, identified with Kashmiri identity politics and had its base mainly in the valley. With two Kashmir-based parties competing for the same political constituency, electoral politics was quite animated. This had the effect of changing the very logic of power politics – from being dependent upon the Centre to its being located in the popular response at the local level. In its earlier hegemonic avatar, the National Conference was under no pressure to respond to local sensitivities. If at all, its major concern was to sustain power by remaining on the right side of the ruling party at the Centre, even at the cost of its popularity within the state.

 

The PDP’s entry into politics changed the character of power politics in many other ways. Seeking to make space for itself in the context of the dominance of the National Conference on the one hand, and the overwhelming influence of separatist politics on the other, the PDP located its politics in the context of the conflict situation, specifically responding to the common people’s sensitivities. Its discourse of a ‘healing touch’, aimed at providing succour to a people troubled by prolonged aggression and violence, not only helped it to gain popularity but also facilitated the process of making power politics relevant in the given situation. What assisted this process was the party’s approach towards the conflict situation, specifically separatist sentiment at the ground level.

Rather than denying its role and relevance, the PDP acknowledged the popular basis of separatist politics and defined it as a sphere distinct from the ‘politics of governance’, dealing with larger issues of an ‘ultimate resolution of the conflict.’ With the NC too following suit and accepting the self-imposed limitations of mainstream politics in the overall context of conflict, a distinction came to be clearly drawn between the ‘mainstream politics of governance’ and the ‘separatist politics of ultimate resolution of conflict.’ This distinction helped the people associate with mainstream politics without any fear of separatist politics. They could participate in mainstream politics without feeling that they were betraying the movement or abandoning the cause for which thousands of people had ‘sacrificed’ their lives.

 

Between 2002 and 2008, therefore, one witnessed intense political activity in mainstream politics. Not only were the political parties able to restore the political space that had eroded in the wake of militancy, but also enhance the legitimacy of their politics. The scope of mainstream politics, meanwhile, was extended as the issues raised so far exclusively by the separatists, were now incorporated in the agendas of these parties. The violation of human rights by the security forces was one such crucial issue routinely raised by the political parties, not only in party forums but also on the floor of the legislative assembly. Other issues raised revolved around the core context of the conflict and the need for its resolution. While the PDP came out with a document detailing its vision of conflict resolution on the principles of ‘self-rule’, the National Conference highlighted its demand for autonomy, signalling its readiness to agree to any other formula of conflict resolution acceptable to the people of the state.

The galvanizing of mainstream politics during this period generated a sense of crisis among the separatist leaders and organizations. The ‘mainstreaming’ of the separatist issues not only challenged the exclusivity of separatist politics, it positioned mainstream politicians as legitimate stakeholders in the politics of the state. So much so that this was recognized even by Pakistan (as became clear from the reception that leaders like Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti received in Pakistan).

By 2007, one could clearly see how the political scenario of Kashmir had changed. The year saw massive political rallies in various parts of the valley, in anticipation of the election scheduled a year later. Elsewhere this would not mean much, but in Kashmir where for years there was little campaigning in the public space, it indicated a huge transformation in the political responses of the people.

 

An extension of the democratic space not only invigorated electoral politics but also generated a space in which people could articulate demands and express their discontent. This space, it needs reiteration, was not available during the entire decade of the nineties when militancy had overtaken the valley and multiple sources of violence had muted society. Apart from the militants and security forces, violence was also perpetuated by the counter-insurgents. In the overarching ‘culture of the gun’ (a term invented by Kashmiris to define their situation) there was no space for people’s voices.

Protest politics, therefore, became a logical corollary of the extended democratic space. As the local political space started getting animated by party politics, popular protests too started becoming more common. Though there were incidents of demonstrations and protests earlier as well, their frequency and intensity markedly increased by 2007.

Throughout that year, there were spontaneous protests in different parts of the valley. While few of the protests were over resources being distributed by the state – for instance, on the location of a newly opened college, or the formation of a new tehsil – a much larger number involved issues of violation of human rights. The fake killing of five innocent citizens by the security forces, ostensibly for awards and honours, aroused a major response. Similar protests took place in other parts of the valley around different cases of human rights violation. As the intensity of the electoral mobilization increased in the year 2008, protest politics too saw a fillip. It was in the wake of fervent electoral mobilization that the massive protest around the Amarnath land issue took place.

 

To understand the location of protest politics in the democratic space, it is important to highlight the way protests have been linked with separatist politics. Most of the protests erupted spontaneously around isolated issues without any direction from above. In fact, none of the major protests since 2007 have been initiated at the behest of the separatists. It is a different matter that they were subsequently appropriated by the separatists and thereafter guided by them. During the massive agitations of 2008 and 2010, though the separatist leadership, particularly of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, appeared in command, directing and coordinating the protests, it is important to stress that both these protests, to begin with, were spontaneous. If anything, the separatists found fresh relevance for themselves through protest politics.

This is not to deny that the protests did not have separatist implications. Separatist sentiment is a reality of Kashmir and therefore, situations of prolonged and intensified protests inevitably take a separatist turn as also provide the base for further mobilization and reproduction of separatist sentiment. This is what happened during the 2008 agitation. It became the ground for not only consolidating the separatist response, but also for initiating the youth in separatist politics. It was also during this agitation that new tactics of separatist mobilization and assertion were devised. The stone-pelting youth who spearheaded the 2010 upsurge were trained during the 2008 agitation.

 

Nevertheless, despite its linkages with the separatist leaders and organizations, protest politics remains located in the popular response, autonomous in many ways of separatist leaders or organizations. Their failure to control the popular response became clear in 2008 when defying the separatist direction people participated in the 2008 assembly elections. Fully in control of the Amarnath agitation, the separatist leaders, though successful in mobilizing people through their numerous ‘bandh’ and ‘chalo’ calls (ranging from ‘Lal Chowk chalo’ to ‘Muzaffarabad chalo’), suddenly found themselves irrelevant as their call for an election boycott went unheeded. The same people who had participated in the agitation barely a month back, decided to participate in the elections.

Though there are other issues around which protests have erupted in Kashmir (the Amarnath agitation, for instance, was initially around the issue of perceived threat of demographic change and subsequently the fear of an economic blockade of the valley), the core of protest politics is defined by the issues of human rights violations. Fake encounters, for instance, triggered protests not only in 2007 but also in 2010. The killing of the people in the process of mob control accelerated the protests in 2008 as well in 2010.

 

Well before ‘self-determination’ became the central symbol of the 2010 agitation, the issue which incensed the youth in Kashmir most was the disregard of human rights by the security forces and the continued killing of Kashmiri civilians. A glance at the protests prior to the upsurge in 2010 would make this point clear. These included the protests over killing of two youth in army firing in Bomai in February 2009; killing of a carpenter by the CRPF in Khaigam in South Kashmir’s Pulwama district in March 2009; rape and murder of two women in Shopian in May 2009; killing of two civilians in the custody of a special operation group of the police in Alochi Bag in May 2009; killing of a man near the security picket in Dangiwachi Camp in North Kashmir in October 2009; killing of a teenager by a tear gas shell in Baramulla in October 2009; killing of a civilian from Pulwama allegedly used as a human shield by security forces in an encounter with militants in January 2010; killing of a teenaged boy playing cricket, hit by a smoke shell fired by the police in February 2010, among others.

It was in the background of these incidents that the case of the killing of three civilians in fake encounters in Machail sector in the month of March resulted in massive protests all over Kashmir. These civilians were killed after being lured with the offer of employment (as porters) in the army. The killing of seventeen year old Tufail Mattoo sparked off further protests. In brief, it was the unending cycle of killings that led to the summer uprising. As each killing led to fresh protests and each day of protest led to fresh killings, the anger on the ground intensified and the political discourse became increasingly radicalized. By the time the summer ended, azadi and self-determination had once again become the core of protest politics.

 

Clearly, there has been a major mismatch between the expectations of the people and the response of the state. The urge for normalcy that made the people back the ‘politics of governance’ even while retaining their sympathies with the separatist ‘cause’, presumably led them to expect change in the ground realities. One important expectation was that the pressure of the securitized and militarized structures and processes imposed during the period of militancy would be eased, at least in the civilian areas. All political parties based in Kashmir, across the ideological divide, have therefore demanded ‘demilitarization’, withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), and repeal of Disturbed Area Act (DAA) and the Public Security Act (PSA). Demands have also been made for minimizing of human rights violations and enforcing accountability of the security forces.

However, despite the decline of armed militancy and the commitment by the prime minister during his visit to Srinagar, way back in 2007, that there would be ‘zero tolerance to human rights violations’, the abuse continues unabated.

Despite an extension of democratic space, the state continues to operate in a conflict mode adopted during the peak of armed militancy and retains its militarized structures. Governance thus, rather than delivering a ‘healing touch’ needed by a society facing prolonged violence and oppression, remains constricted in its response. It remains a sore point that many security personnel held guilty by the local police or even the CBI have managed to evade justice. Equally, they are disturbed by the brutalization of the police force and its incapacity to handle protests other than by using violence and killing people in the process. The summer upsurge was triggered by a failure of state forces to recognize that resistance politics had undergone a major transformation. What we see today is a post-militancy situation in which instead of externally trained armed militants striking at will, security forces have now to deal with the stone-pelting youth, many of them teenagers protesting some earlier action of the state, most probably the killing of a non-combatant fellow Kashmiri.

 

The gains made by an extension of the democratic space are thus being frittered away due to the inappropriate response of the state. Though it is no one’s argument that democratic space, on its own, can substitute separatist politics in Kashmir (without addressing the core issues of conflict), yet it is pertinent to note that much of the separatism in Kashmir has been sustained due to a denial of democratic space. It is, therefore, important that governments, both at the Centre as well as the state, develop sensitivities towards the democratic urges of people in Kashmir. The minimum required is that the basic democratic rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution for the citizens of India should also flow to the people of Kashmir; that their dignity and life be protected, and that there be no violation of their basic human rights. Before censuring the Kashmiris for disowning the Indian nation, it is important that they be reassured that they have not been disowned by the nation.