ANYONE who left Karnataka at the turn of the millennium and returned a decade later would be bewildered by the political transformations that the state has gone through. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is securely enthroned as the ruling party. The Janata movement has turned into former Prime Minister Deve Gowda’s family-owned party (JDS). The Congress, while still commanding a third of the state’s vote share, is struggling to revive itself as a potent political force. To top it all, Karnataka is now heralded in the media as India’s most corrupt state.

To make sense of these transformations, we need to start with the 1999 assembly election which saw the incumbent Janata government – afflicted, as usual, by factional strife – replaced by the Congress. Chief Minister S.M. Krishna succeeded in completing a full term which was marked by the emergence of Bangalore and its Information Technology industry on the world economic stage. Krishna’s perceived favouritism toward Bangalore was allegedly the key reason for the Congress’s subsequent defeat in 2004, though a succession of droughts may have been the real cause. This election saw the JDS revive itself across the state. The BJP, until then a third force confined to the coast, the hills and Bangalore city, made significant gains in the Lingayat-dominated regions of North Karnataka (and won 18 out of 28 Lok Sabha seats in the simultaneously-held Parliament poll).

Thus 2004 saw Karnataka facing a hung assembly with three equally strong parties. The secular parties, Congress and JDS, formed a coalition. Deve Gowda dictated terms. His Vokkaliga rival, S. M. Krishna, was exiled to Maharashtra as Governor. The Congress chose Dharam Singh as chief minister with Siddaramaiah of JDS as his deputy, both from the backward classes. During the ensuing 20 months, Deve Gowda kept the government off-balance through constant interference. The previous government’s emphasis on Bangalore was publicly reversed. A series of stalled infrastructure projects gave the impression that Karnataka’s growth momentum had slowed markedly. Overall, the coalition gave the impression of being adrift.

Suddenly, the JDS witnessed a rebellion within its ranks. Except for the senior JDS men in the cabinet, who stayed with Deve Gowda, the rest of the JDS legislators rallied behind Deve Gowda’s son, H. D. Kumaraswamy and joined forces with the BJP to oust the Dharam Singh government. Kumaraswamy became chief minister and BJP’s B. S. Yeddyurappa his deputy, on the condition that each would lead the government for 20 months. While Deve Gowda gave the public impression of being in shock, he soon reconciled with his son. An entire set of senior JDS leaders were marginalized. Siddaramaiah attempted to launch an independent political platform uniting backward classes, dalits and minorities, known by its Kannada acronym, Ahinda, but soon joined the Congress, where he is currently leader of the opposition.

Kumaraswamy’s coup was an important moment in Karnataka’s modern political evolution for multiple reasons. Once he took over, the JDS essentially became a family-run party. Senior leaders who had the weight to counterbalance Deve Gowda moved to the Congress or the BJP. Karnataka was no longer the battleground for three national parties. A regional, dynastic party had emerged. The movement of JDS leaders to other parties also marked the end of ideology in Karnataka, with politicians now shifting to whichever party offered them a chance to prosper. The fact that all three parties got a share of power also meant that each of them had a chance to accumulate the economic resources necessary to remain politically viable. The BJP, hitherto confined to the opposition benches, was now able to project itself as a party that could govern as well.

 

Still in his 40s, Kumaraswamy represented a refreshing generational change in leadership. Despite lacking significant experience, he turned out to be politically savvy and quickly built a reputation as a dynamic leader with a common touch. Under Kumaraswamy, the JDS consolidated itself in the Vokkaliga heartland of Old Mysore where it continues to be locked in a direct contest with the Congress. However, at the behest of his father, Kumaraswamy made a fatal misstep when it was time to hand over the chief ministership to the BJP. After allowing Yeddyurappa to take over as agreed, the JDS quickly withdrew support. The ensuing chaos saw the assembly being dissolved. Thereafter, in 2008, Karnataka became the first state to go to the polls under the new delimitation of constituencies.

 

The betrayal card was central to the BJP’s election campaign. BJP leaders went to the people asking for a chance to demonstrate their ability to govern. The party benefited substantially from projecting Yeddyurappa as its chief ministerial candidate, as he was able to rally the politically powerful Lingayat community behind him and his party. The JDS was in retreat. Instead of capitalizing on the other parties’ conflicts, the Congress made numerous missteps. It failed to project a chief ministerial candidate. In an attempt to appease its numerous faction leaders, it gave tickets to their unelectable cronies. The Congress also failed to capitalize on its earlier popularity in Bangalore which, post-delimitation, now constituted fully one eighth of the seats in the assembly.

The 2008 election saw the BJP emerge as the single largest party, just short of a majority. By offering ministerial berths to a few independents, Yeddyurappa was able to become the first stand alone BJP chief minister in South India. The BJP’s victory cannot be read as a ‘saffronization’ of Karnataka’s voters and their embrace of Hindutva. Rather, it was made possible by a split in the traditional backward class and dalit vote banks of the Congress, and a wholesale consolidation of Lingayats behind the BJP.

Lingayats rallied behind the BJP for multiple reasons. The Congress, over the years, had not been able to groom Lingayat leaders of stature. The JDS was perceived as a Vokkaliga-dominated party. Lingayats, who had historically provided many chief ministers, saw in Yeddyurappa a chance to regain their primacy in Karnataka politics. Most importantly, Lingayat mutts (religious institutions) around the state openly campaigned for the BJP and swung their community’s support to the party.

The BJP’s victory was made possible by a few other factors. In the Bangalore region, the BJP capitalized on the substantial Vokkaliga population by successfully fielding candidates from that community. But across Karnataka, going beyond Lingayat support, the key reason why its candidates were able to run competitive campaigns was because they were able to expend resources in an unprecedented manner. This transformation in the BJP’s financial strength was made possible by a group of leaders from Bellary: the three Reddy brothers – Janardhan, Somashekhar, and Karunakara – and their close companion, Sreeramulu.

 

These four have risen as quickly through the BJP’s ranks as they have into the league of multimillionaires. Their rise in the BJP came courtesy of their campaigning for Lok Sabha leader of the opposition, Sushma Swaraj, when she contested from Bellary against Congress President Sonia Gandhi in 1999. Their rise to riches is due to their involvement in iron ore mining in Karnataka, and in Andhra Pradesh, where they were business associates of the late Congress Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajashekar Reddy. Their business dealings blur political boundaries, literally: the Supreme Court is investigating whether they actually changed Karnataka’s boundary markers on the ground to enable them to extend their Andhra Pradesh mining operations into Karnataka’s territory.

The Reddy brothers’ windfall wealth has come about because of Karnataka’s increased integration with the global economy. The infrastructure boom in China ahead of the Beijing Olympics resulted in the price of iron ore shooting up by many orders of magnitude. The royalty due to the state government on mining licenses amounted to nothing compared to the profits from iron ore export. Mining magnates became extraordinarily wealthy politicians overnight. The Supreme Court is now investigating the charge that substantial portions of mining-related profits come from illegal mining on government or forest lands.

 

Another fallout of globalization has been the spike in real estate prices in Bangalore, triggered by its emergence as the software outsourcing capital of the world. Numerous developers have made windfall profits and have used their war chests to embark on political careers. Political parties, eager to find candidates who have the capacity to fund elections on their own, readily adopted real estate barons and many were elected. While much real estate wealth has accrued to legitimate entrepreneurs, concerns have been raised about how some developers have encroached on public lands and lakes. Elected office can be very useful to real estate developers. As legislators, they can influence land allocation and land use, both still under government control. The savings in bribe outflows alone makes running for office a worthwhile investment.

Because a strong parallel cash economy is prevalent in mining and real estate, some candidates with backgrounds in these industries pioneered an election tactic dangerous to democratic competition. Instead of the time honoured practice of surreptitiously distributing liquor to voters on election eve, they attempted to buy votes outright. While India’s economists debate the merits of direct cash transfers as a technique to alleviate poverty, Karnataka’s nouveau riche politicians have already demonstrated the efficacy of discreetly distributing envelopes to voters.

 

Historically, Karnataka was a pioneer in land reform, decentralization of power, and the empowerment of non-dominant castes. Today it stands castigated as the most corrupt state in India. A Vajpayee-era BJP slogan proclaimed that what other governments took fifty years to accomplish, the BJP had achieved in five years. In Karnataka, this slogan probably refers to the magnitude of the loot. Even non-political branches of government have been tainted. The Karnataka High Court’s Chief Justice Dinakaran was transferred out of the state after he refused to resign even in the face of corruption probes and the launch of impeachment proceedings against him in the Rajya Sabha.

The prevailing ethos of money power and ideological bankruptcy has manifested itself most dramatically in ‘Operation Kamala.’ This refers to the audacious BJP strategy of depleting the Congress and JDS legislator ranks by taking the Anti-Defection Law head on. Under this law party-hopping legislators stand to lose their seats, unless they are expelled by the party or part of a comprehensive split in the party’s ranks. Under Operation Kamala, the BJP persuaded Congress and JDS legislators to resign their seats and contest the ensuing byelections as BJP candidates. A majority of those who have done so were re-elected, after cash-intensive election campaigns funded generously by their new party. The BJP now has a majority on its own. Early defectors under Operation Kamala were rewarded with ministerial berths or appointed as chairmen of sundry governmental boards.

 

The attention and rewards to newcomers – while justifiable from the perspective of ensuring the government’s survival – generated tremendous dissatisfaction among BJP veterans. Capitalizing on this discontent, the Reddy brothers nearly succeeded in effecting a coup d’etat. To survive, Yeddyurappa had to sacrifice cabinet associate Shobha Karandlaje and key bureaucrats close to him, compromises that caused him to weep in public about the price of power. A year later, when he was stronger politically, his first move was to reinduct Shobha Karandlaje and to drop some of the Reddy brothers’ supporters from the cabinet, including an independent MLA turned minister.

This move caused anxiety among the independent MLAs who had become ministers when the BJP took their support to form the government. They were now redundant and could be axed. Taking advantage of their insecurity as well as of the discontent among BJP veterans, Kumaraswamy persuaded some ministers and BJP MLAs to petition the Governor to change the chief minister – the dissidents had enough numbers to make the government lose its majority.

A chaotic vote of confidence followed where the Speaker proactively invoked the Anti-Defection Law to disqualify the dissidents based on their conduct outside the assembly. The Governor initially recommended dismissal of the government, but backtracked under pressure from a wavering Congress high command. A re-vote saw the government scrape through. The validity of the Speaker’s decision is under challenge in the Supreme Court, but the momentum to oust the government has since dissipated. Operation Kamala is still ongoing and MLAs keep deserting the opposition.

A few ministers have had to resign when charged with corruption or rape. But Yeddyurappa has stayed glued to his chair despite dubious land deals involving his family having come to light. These exposes were the climax in a cascade of Karnataka corruption scams that proved to be an embarrassment for the BJP nationally, where it was trying to corner the UPA government on the issue of corruption. In an attempt to appear clean, the BJP central leadership resolved to replace Yeddyurappa. However, in a manner counter to his disciplined training as part of the Sangh Parivar, Yeddyurappa threatened to dissolve the assembly if forced to resign. So he still survives.

 

In contrast to the BJP and JDS, the Congress has untainted leaders in Siddaramaiah and party president Parameshwara. But it was unable to capitalize on the corruption issue to oust the BJP. In 2010, the Congress led a party-reviving padayatra from Bangalore to Bellary to highlight the Reddy brothers’ alleged illegal mining. But in the local body elections that followed, the BJP continued to be in first position though the combined vote share of the Congress and JDS remained substantially higher.

This has led to speculation that the two opposition parties will work out a seat sharing arrangement in future. Such a move would likely harm the Congress and help the BJP. This is because the JDS support base is in Old Mysore, where the BJP does not have much presence. If the Congress hands over seats to the JDS in this region, Congress workers and leaders, implacably opposed to the JDS on the ground, will simply switch to the BJP, giving the BJP a base it does not have currently!

 

The sandalwood fragrance that occasionally overpowers Karnataka’s stench emanates mainly from the institution of the Lok Ayukta. The incumbent, Santosh Hegde (a former Supreme Court judge) has fought a vocal, visible but vain war against corruption. For instance, a large consignment of iron ore that he had seized magically disappeared. At one stage he resigned stating that the government was thwarting his anti-corruption drive. It took the intervention of the BJP’s national leader, L. K. Advani, to get him to retract. In other encouraging news from the legal front, two courageous lawyers have secured the Governor’s permission to prosecute Chief Minister Yeddyurappa on corruption charges.

Governance splutters on despite the politics and plunder. Occasionally, innovative programmes emerge: The Bhagyalakshmi scheme changes the microeconomics of having girl children. It provides girls from poor families with bank accounts of Rs 100,000 at birth that can be withdrawn for educational expenses or at maturity at 18. Some public projects, e.g., the Bangalore Metro, are close to completion and some public-private partnerships have succeeded, e.g., the Bangalore international airport. Others, such as the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor have been stalled by extortionary politics.

Yeddyurappa has perfected the role of a modern Mysore Maharaja by regally handing out grants to any caste group that demands one. His creative reinterpretation of ‘community development’ is a savvy response to the ‘muttization’ of Karnataka. All castes now have saffron-robed swamis who unite their castemates politically and establish educational institutions for their benefit. Such grants buy these castes’ political loyalty.

At the turn of the millennium, the Bangalore Agenda Task Force showcased how private sector leaders could engage with government to improve public sector performance. Similarly, numerous non-governmental organizations emerged to fill gaps in service delivery or to highlight ways to get Bangalore out of urban chaos. Partly due to some criticism of unelected elites influencing policy, such engagement was terminated after the 2004 regime change. Some of these policy activists then shifted base to New Delhi and persuaded the new UPA government to establish the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.

 

Beyond the above, Karnataka has witnessed numerous other changes. Multiple television channels have sprung up and at least four are owned by influential politicians. Organizations espousing the cause of Kannada and locals have witnessed rapid economic growth. Occasional instances of Naxalism are sometimes encountered. And once in a long while, the educated middle classes stand up to be counted politically.

One instance of urban educated class mobilization was triggered by the Sri Rama Sene’s attack on a group of young women in a Mangalore pub. The Sene’s founder had been expelled from the BJP for being too extreme, even by its standards. After Mangalore, he threatened to bring his ‘moral policing’ crusade to Bangalore. Already, the advent of the BJP government had seen a series of unpunished attacks on churches and Bangalore’s citizens were concerned that no action would be taken against the Sene too. But different civil society groups publicly and innovatively protested against the Sene and it was forced to scrap its plans to medievalize Bangalore.

On the economic front, Karnataka’s growth continues to keep pace with the national average. Bangalore’s knowledge economy continues to flourish, moving beyond its strengths in information technology and biotechnology to a new frontier – aero-space. Bangalore’s entrepreneurial energy continues to be clearly discernible. Investor interest is strong, even if focused currently on extractive industries like iron and steel. The government has signed numerous memoranda of understanding that will see Karnataka’s industrial landscape transformed if they actually get implemented.

In terms of development, Karnataka has benefited from central government schemes that provide rural employment and invest in its infrastructure. Urbanization is proceeding at a rapid pace with negative consequences for traffic and the environment. Growth remains lopsided. Vast tracts of Karnataka remain abysmally backward while Bangalore alone generates half of the state’s gross domestic product. Wealth and job creation happen mainly in the private sector. Karnataka was once known as a progressive state and before that as a model kingdom. It is appalling to see how rapidly it has decayed in a decade. All parties deserve a share of the blame for Karnataka’s decline.

But there is another multipartisan effort more worthy of mention. All parties have come together to treat Belgaum like a second capital and to hold assembly sessions there annually. This has helped Belgaum move beyond Marathi-Kannada conflicts and get better integrated with Karnataka practically and symbolically. That is a ray of sunshine over Karnataka’s bleak political landscape.