WITH its victory in the 2007 state assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP) in which it gained an absolute majority, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is today at the crossroads. The party has since its inception in 1984 been through a number of phases. Its success has lain in an ability to reinvent itself and shift tactics constantly, moving from being an almost puritanical, narrow and hostile movement to becoming a more moderate, electorally oriented party while retaining both its Dalit identity and the ideology of Ambedkarism. During the 1990s, the BSP successfully transformed itself from a social movement into a political party and managed to capture state power on its own.

Since the early 2000s – with the decline of identity politics in UP, the marginalization of the BJP, the inability of the SP to homogenize the backwards, and the failure of the Congress to rebuild itself – the BSP has taken advantage of the political space thus made available. It is now attempting to shift from being a bahujan to a sarvajan party enjoying the support of all sections of the population but with a strong Dalit core, similar to the Congress of the past.

The BSP, when it first acquired power during the 1990s with the support of the BJP, was criticized as lacking an economic vision of development and of pursuing exclusively Dalit-oriented policies together with the politics of symbolism. Having now formed a government on its own and adopted the strategy of sarvajan, the party has formulated a broad-based inclusive agenda of development. This shift is in keeping with Kanshi Ram’s dictum of a two-stage revolution: first capture power through mobilization and snatch electoral victory from the Brahmins; and in the second phase, consolidate the revolution through use of state power to penetrate deeper into society, thereby transforming it.¹

Given the high levels of political competition among parties and the prevailing economic underdevelopment in UP, this goal will be fairly difficult to achieve. The party faces two formidable challenges if it is to continue as a dominant player in UP: maintain the alliance between the upper and lower castes through a politics of inclusion and consensus; and pursue an agenda of socioeconomic development for all sections of the population and regions of the state, rather than concentrate on its erstwhile Dalit-oriented policies. Achieving these goals in UP is essential before the party can acquire a pan-Indian identity and become a national level player.

 

Success in the UP experiment will to a great extent depend on how far the party is able to balance the political and economic expectations of the upper castes and minorities that helped vote it to power and the demands of its core constituency, the Dalits. It is, moreover, questionable whether there is a new social consensus between the Dalits and Brahmins; what we have is at best a mobilizational strategy, a fragile partnership for political power that has succeeded in the prevailing political situation.

Traditionally, Brahmins who constitute 8% of the population and account for 10 to 20% of the votes in 40 of the 80 Lok Sabha constituencies, have preferred the Congress and the BJP, and rarely voted for lower caste parties. By the early 2000s, however, they realized that the BJP-BSP coalition did not provide stability. Even though the Brahmin-Dalit combination had previously supported the Congress for many years and thus met the challenge posed by the Yadav-Muslim bloc, they were also impressed by Mayawati’s promise of cabinet positions. Providing support to her also became possible because the direct oppressors of the Dalits today are the OBCs who constitute the landowners in the countryside and there is no direct antagonism with Brahmins.

Nevertheless, there are stark differences in the socio-economic situation of the upper castes, particularly the Brahmins, and the Dalits which can lead to intense rivalry and conflict. The UP Human Development Report (2003) shows that Dalits own hardly 8-10% of land while the upper castes hold as much as between 55-65%; large sections of the Dalits are landless agricultural labourers or employed as workers in the unorganized sector at low wages; Dalit literacy and educational attainment is poor, keeping them within low paying sectors. With rising political awareness, Dalits are no longer satisfied with just self-respect and dignity and expect a BSP-headed government to bridge the socio-economic and political gap between the two communities.

 

Even though during the campaign, Mayawati was able to convince her Dalit followers that the BSP remained ‘their’ party despite mobilizing the upper castes, it is finding it increasingly difficult to sustain such claims while in power. The upper castes have long formed the elite section, both in terms of caste and class, reflected in their presence in politics, higher reaches of the bureaucracy, academia and business. Hence, the Brahmins in particular, will not hesitate to return to the Congress or BJP if their expectations of a share in political power and economic gains are not fulfilled, or if these parties are able to revive themselves in Uttar Pradesh.

The BSP also requires the support of the Muslims who, together with Dalits, constitute 40% of the state’s population. Hoping to gain from their unhappiness with the SP-Kalyan Singh alliance, the BSP fielded 14 Muslim candidates in the 2007 assembly elections. After victory, it has formed ‘Muslim Bhaichara’ committees in many districts such as Agra, Meerut and Devipatan.² However, both the BSP and SP will have to compete with the growing popularity of the two new Muslim parties, particularly the Peace Party of India, among the poorer Muslims of eastern UP, where the BSP performed well in five constituencies and polled more votes than the SP and Congress.³ 

The implementation of an inclusive development agenda has acquired greater political urgency with the attempt by the Congress party under Rahul Gandhi since the early 2000s – and more particularly after the BSP’s victory in 2007 – to revive the party organization. Rahul Gandhi has put forward a development agenda and is trying to regain the party base among the upper castes, minorities and particularly Dalits by visiting their homes and highlighting their problems of livelihood and dignity; Congressmen observed his birthday as ‘equality day’ in Dalit homes.⁴ 

 

Buoyed by obtaining 21 seats in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, he has sought to emphasize the neglect of backward regions such as Bundelkhand by the BSP government. The region with 21 assembly and four Lok Sabha seats is currently a stronghold of the BSP, and it is here that the Congress hopes to gain a foothold using the politics of development. This explains the beginning of Gandhi’s campaign against the BSP from this region; the demand for the establishment of a Bundelkhand Autonomous Authority, a financial package for large-scale irrigation in the region, and even the establishment of a separate state to upstage this demand by the BSP. Strongly criticizing these demands as central interference, Mayawati has in turn announced numerous welfare programmes, including a revival of the defunct Bundelkhand Vikas Nigam. The massive rallies by both the Congress and the BSP on 14 April 2010 turned Ambedkar’s birth anniversary into a trial of strength between both parties.⁵

 

Some of Mayawati’s early actions and policies announced on assuming office in May 2007 provide room for some cautious optimism as they are markedly different from the retributive social justice agenda of the past. The caste composition of her ministry with eight Dalits, four Brahmins, four OBC and one each from the Muslim, Bania, Thakur and Bhumihar communities allayed the apprehensions of upper caste BSP MLAs that the party may forget them after the elections.

Mayawati identified the ‘priority areas’ of her government as ‘rural development, agriculture, social development and infrastructure, making the state conducive for attracting investment’ and sought massive economic assistance from the Centre: a special economic package of Rs 80,000 crore for the 11th Plan period to ensure 10% growth and reduce poverty – ‘Special Area Incentive Package’ of Rs 9,400 crore and Rs 4,700 crore separately for developing infrastructure in Purvanchal and Bundelkhand; Rs 22,000 crore for the development of agriculture and allied sectors; Rs 6,500 crore for rural development. She also requested the Centre to consider reservations and job quotas for the poor among the upper castes.⁶ 

On completing six months in office in November 2007, Mayawati claimed that her government had successfully implemented her agenda⁷ of improving law and order alongside numerous inclusive developmental and pro-poor policies to help all sections of the population such as improvements in infrastructure and power;⁸ revamping of the Ambedkar village programme for upliftment of the entire village community with 17100 villages to be improved; programmes for minorities; the Kanshi Ram Urban Development Yojana to provide housing, roads, drinking water, sewage and employment; removing encroachments on cultivable and housing land given prior to 13 May 2007 to SC/ST; rise in minimum daily wages for agricultural labour, recruitment of 88,000 school teachers; job reservation of 10% to SC, 10% to other backwards and 10% to upper caste poor in government-supported industrial units.⁹ 

 

A recent study on outlays by the BSP government during its first three years on health, education, housing and social security shows higher expenditure on health and education, but overall progress in primary and secondary education as ‘lagging’ with a decline in quality, fall in attendance, high dropout rates and decrease in toilets and drinking water facilities. In contrast, progress in providing housing security is described as ‘very impressive’ with three new housing schemes in all of which OBCs get 23% and the SC community 27% of total benefits and a housing scheme exclusively for SC/ST communities in rural areas in which a large number have already benefited. The government has spent the largest amount of its budget on social security for welfare of backward classes, physically handicapped persons, minority, women and child development; the average per capita expenditure in the last three years being Rs 805.20.¹⁰ 

 

Despite policies targeting all sections of the population, there are signs that Dalits are feeling restive and marginalized. In fact as early as June 2007 there were negative reports from her supporters after her increasing emphasis on Brahmins both during the elections and her first two months in power. This led to a use of both a politics of symbolism as well as an increase in programmes specifically for Dalits. Mayawati immediately announced the demolition of the Gomti Nagar cricket stadium in Lucknow and its replacement with a memorial to Dalit icons.¹¹

Subsequently the party has tried to woo SCs through various ways such as request for special assistance of Rs 23,000 crore from the Centre for the SC/ST, OBCs and religious minorities; continuous enhancement of the budget allocations for SCs – in 2008-09 it was 44.5% higher than the previous year; demand for extension of reservations for SCs to the private sector with the rule incorporated in the ninth schedule; orders for rigorous implementation of rules to ensure actual possession by Dalits of gram sabha land allotted to them.

Despite these signs of unhappiness, the BSP won all the three assembly and two Lok Sabha seats in the bye-elections held in April 2008; the Congress, SP and BJP were badly defeated. The victory of the BSP demonstrated that in constituencies such as Muradnagar and Azamgarh the Muslims, and in Khalilabad and Bilgram the Brahmins, continued to support it rather than the SP or the Congress.¹² However, by the 2009 Lok Sabha elections there were media reports of Dalits complaining that their villages lacked roads, water, schools and power while Mayawati was spending on building parks and memorials to Dalit icons.

 

Following the party’s less than expected performance in the elections in which it could not improve its earlier tally of 20 seats, a slew of changes were immediately made to reassure its Dalit constituency: marginalization of Brahmin leader S.C. Mishra and renewed importance to old-timers such as OBC leader Babu Singh Kushwaha and minority leader Siddiqui Naseemuddin; replacing 100 chairmen/vice presidents of various local boards; reshuffle of top bureaucrats to induct lower caste officers; gifting of ‘currency garlands’ by Dalit supporters to Mayawati in public rallies; hints of a possible ministerial reshuffle and a Dalit mega rally in Lucknow in March 2010.¹³ 

While continuing with the policy of uplifting the sarva samaj, there is added emphasis on the Dalits, exploited, persecuted, destitute and the poor. A good example is the ‘Mukhya Mantri Mahamaya Garib Arthik Madad Yojna’ launched on 1 November 2010 for the poorest of the poor to enable them to meet their daily needs. Based on a government survey that showed lakhs of the poor had not been covered under the BPL card, Antyoday or old age pension scheme etc. and whose annual income was below Rs 19884 in the rural and Rs 25546 in urban areas, ¹⁴ the beneficiaries, who will be paid Rs 300 per month in two half-yearly installments in their bank account, will be identified in each gram sabha/revenue village in open meetings by district magistrates. While 31 lakh people stand to benefit from the measure, 50% of them will be SC/ST.¹⁵ 

Mayawati has also pursued her agenda of building memorials and parks for Dalit icons using state funds with greater vigour to reassure Dalits that the BSP primarily remains a Dalit party. A good example is the Noida park on the outskirts of New Delhi that will house a museum and numerous statues of Dalit icons, including those of Mayawati, Kanshi Ram and Ambedkar, being built at a cost of around Rs 300 crore.¹⁶ She has tried to refurbish her image as a Dalit leader by pointing out that she was compelled to build so many memorials because no other government had bestowed appropriate honours on these ‘great leaders’. Further, that construction of the Noida park was started at the request of Dalits living in Delhi ‘piqued with the Congress’s partisan attitude towards their leaders and saints.’

 

Her backers have also been quick to support her, arguing that even though BSP governments – both past and present – have done a great deal for the development of the state, critics pointed only to the establishment of memorials and statues. Replying to the accusation that state funds were being squandered, she has alleged that after independence Congress governments had spent several crores of rupees in constructing memorials to members of the Nehru-Gandhi family, though this is not seen as ‘misuse of public exchequer’, ‘what BSP government has spent (in comparison) is negligible.’¹⁷ 

 

Despite these controversies, signals emanating from the grassroots suggest that the BSP still retains a hold over its Dalit constituency. The party virtually swept the panchayat polls held in late October 2010 with BSP-supported candidates winning the maximum seats.¹⁸ In many places, female relatives of BSP ministers and senior bureaucrats won the polls while opposition parties including the SP were badly routed. Aditya Yadav, son of Shivpal Yadav, was defeated in Etawah, a bastion of the SP, making it the second defeat after that of Dimple Yadav, daughter-in-law of Mulayam Singh Yadav. in the Ferozabad bye-elections in less than a year.¹⁹ 

Despite the challenges it faces, the BSP has established itself as a strong party in UP. Nor has the ‘Dalit Revolution’ in the state exhausted its democratic potential; it is moving downwards to the poorer Dalits. Though electoral results over the last few years show contradictory signals and are not the best method of assessment, as a party the BSP has the political space required to try out its strategy of Sarvajan. Despite opposition from a section of Dalits, Mayawati has not abandoned her sarva samaj agenda; rather there is, side by side, a greater emphasis on the needs of the Dalits and the poor, needy and destitute from all castes. There has also been a re-incorporation of some aspects of symbolic politics to reiterate that the BSP remains a party of the Dalits.

However, given the prevailing condition of underdevelopment in UP, satisfying the needs of all sections and in particular narrowing the gap between the Dalits and upper castes, will be a herculean task. Following the decline of identity politics and a rise in political consciousness, UP is entering a phase of modernization. There is an urgent desire among the general population for faster development, to catch up with other states which have moved ahead in a period of globalization. In this situation, if the upper castes find that their interests are being ignored, they could gravitate to the Congress, which has shown signs of revival.

Aspirational changes have also taken place among the Dalits, particularly the younger generation, who are no longer satisfied with self-respect and political empowerment and seek material benefits such as quality education and better employment opportunities that market-based growth offers. A major hurdle in this daunting venture is the effort by the Congress, the traditional party of the Dalits, to rebuild its organization and social base, undertake massive mobilization and regain lost ground, if not capture power in the next assembly election. The future of the BSP depends on its ability to meet these myriad challenges. If successful, it will transform both UP and national politics.

 

Footnotes:

1. Kanshi Ram, The Chamcha Age: An Era of Stooges, Privately Printed, 1982.

2. Subodh Ghildiyal ‘After Brahmins, BSP Set to Woo Muslims’, The Times of India, 30 July 2007.

3. Sanjay Singh, ‘Peace Party Stirs the Waters in Eastern UP’, The Indian Express, 22 June 2010.

4. Sudha Pai, ‘Heartland Attack’, The Indian Express, 19 April 2010.

5. Ibid.

6. For details see, Sudha Pai, ‘New Social Engineering Agenda of the Bahujan Samaj Party: Implications for State and National Politics’, Journal of South Asian Studies 32(3), 2009, pp. 338-353.

7. ‘Mayawati ki Sarkar ke che mah ki Uplabhdiya is Bat ki Sacshihe’. Information and Publicity Department, Government of UP, Lucknow. Advt in The Times of India, 13 November 2007.

8. 1000 km 8-lane expressways from Varanasi and Ballia to Noida, a new international airport at Jevar, a new SEZ policy, investment in flood control, investment of Rs 9209 crore and 7000 megawatts of additional electricity generated with more power houses to be built by the NTPC in the state.

9. Ibid.

10. Shyam Singh, ‘Three Years of BSP Governement in UP’, Economic and Political Weekly XLV(38), 18 September 2010, pp. 77-81.

11. OutlookIndia.com, 19 June 2007.

12. ‘Maya has Opposition on Mat as BSP Sweeps UP Bypolls’, The Times of India, Subodh Ghildiyal, 17 April 2008.

13. Sanjay Singh, ‘Operation Damage Control’, The Indian Express, 27 May 2010.

14. ‘Mayawati Launches Welfare Scheme for the Poor’, The Hindu, 2 November 2010.

15. ‘Uttar Pradesh Mukhyamantri Mahamaya Garib Arthik Madad Yojna’, Information and Public Relations Department, Uttar Pradesh, The Times of India, 2 November 2010.

16. The Indian Express, 10 July 2010.

17. ‘Maya Warns of "Consequences if Dalit Leaders" Statues are Demolished’, Express-india.com, 17 Septemer 2009.

18. The BSP government had announced that political parties in keeping with constitutional provisions could not participate in the elections. Hence all parties put up their candidates as ‘independents’ and supported them.

19. Amita Verma ‘UP BSP wins the panchayat polls’, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/ national, 1 November 2010.