THIS essay is organized in two sections. The first briefly discusses the nature of secular (urfi) and religious systems and the second touches upon the nature of religious life in the modern secular world.

At the very outset, I wish to use the term ‘urfigarai’¹ instead of ‘secularism’, because the terms ‘secular’ and ‘secularism’ and their derivatives have been overly controversial and disputed in the Iranian context. Even among the secularists there is little consensus over this terminology and concept. The same goes for the notions and nomenclature related to ‘laïcité’ and their derivatives.

Recently, differing and contradictory interpretations of these concepts as well as classifications such as ‘philosophical secularism’, ‘social secularism’, ‘political secularism’, ‘subjective secularism’ and ‘objective secularism’ have been proposed that only add to the controversies and ambiguities. Furthermore, finding exact equivalents for these western concepts and terms in Persian and Arabic – because of their peculiar historical, social and religious contexts and the lack of complete correspondence to the religious and social developments in Islamic societies – faces serious difficulties.

As such, I think the terms ‘urf’ and ‘urfigarai’ are more appropriate and accurate to articulate those parts of the arguments of secularists that are in reference to political power, the state and governance. The current interest in these conceptualizations of secularism and its relation to religion, particularly to Islam and Shi’ism, is with regard to the nature of the state and government. Therefore, it is important to dwell upon this aspect of secularism.

 

On this particular issue, it can be said succinctly that from a purely Islamic perspective ‘governance’ and consequently ‘political power’ are urfi and demotic (mardomi) and not subject to the Shari’a and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqhi). Here urf stands in contrast to Shari’a and does not refer to its common meaning, that is, the prevalent customs and habits of the society and of the populace. It refers to the prevalent collective reasoning which in the fiqhi parlance is recognized as ‘rational tradition’ that is valid (by religious criteria such as), ‘fundamental dogmas’ (ilm usul), as well as by ijtihad in the absence of clear (Qur’anic) Text and Hadith. In the Qur’an also, the term urf and its derivatives (e.g., ma’ruf) have the same meaning. The Qur’an refers many of the problems and questions raised by people to the prevalent collective reasoning prevalent in its time.

If we use the two criteria, ‘the Divine legitimation of power’ and ‘complete implementation of the Shari’a’ (as state policy as well as the Shari’a as Law revealed to the Prophet) to define a Shari’a-based state, then such an state has never been discussed in the Qur’an, nor did these criteria undergird the ten years of rule by Prophet in Medina. The reasoning adduced by the faqihs and the Muslims claiming a divinely sanctioned rule by the Prophet, as far as they are grounded in the Qur’an and Hadith, are not rigorous and leave much space for disputation.

The Qur’anic verses that speak to the keywords ‘sovereignty’ (hukm) and ‘authority’ (willaya) as well as other cognate terms, were never meant to establish a divinely sanctioned rule by the Prophet. The Muslims of the early Islamic period never made such a claim regarding the government of the Prophet either. History attests that the establishment of the state by the Prophet was a natural and inevitable process that occurred only after the second treaty with the representatives of the great tribes of Aws and Khazraj. Furthermore, the Arabs at that early time had not yet entered the phase of state building and even the Prophet did not create a state, since it can be shown that establishing a state among the Muslims only began after the conquest of Iran and by utilizing the Sassanid’s bureaucracy.

 

In the first fifty years of Islamic history there is nothing indicative of divine rule. Based on historical evidence, it was only with the Caliphate of Abd al Malik Marwan (d. 705) that the ground was prepared for grafting governance and state to the heavens and the Caliphate to be construed divine. In the meantime, in his twenty years of rule in Iraq and the eastern part of the Islamic world, Hajjaj (Ibn Yousef, d.714), the bloodthirsty and ferocious governor of the Umayyads, played the most effective role in the establishment and promulgation of this anti-Islamic and anti-Arab idea.²

Based on historical evidence, however, at least from the Abbasid period when the jurisconsults (faqihs) and judgeship (Qadha) were institutionalized, all the way to the disestablishment of the Caliphate in 1924, the institutions of governance (Caliphate and Sultanat) have always been separated from religion and there has been a division of labour and separation of office between the government and the ulema. It should be also mentioned that the ulema and jurisconsults who carried out the very significant offices of pronouncing ‘legal opinion’ (ifta) and judgeship, were always subsumed under the state and subject to its supervision.

 

In Shi’ism and in Iran, after the Greater Occultation (beginning in 941 CE) until the advent of the Islamic Republic, the same separation has existed – while in the Christian West until recently the government was under the supervision or even total tutelage of the Catholic Church. As such, if we define secularism in terms of the separation of religion and the state, at least since the death of the Prophet, these two institutions have always been separate in Islamdom.

With regard to notion of implementing the Shari’a law, it must be mentioned that first, because a part of the Shari’a is comprised of social precepts (in fiqhi terminology, mu’amilat), the Shari’a is subject to the state. When the state and governance do not possess a divine mandate, naturally the law cannot be divine. Second, if we consider the law and legal rights as the configuration of current social facts and social needs for attaining justice and security, then law cannot be fixed and eternal and, as such, a change in the law is ineluctable and abiding. Be that as it may, there are many rational and ‘traditional’ (naqli) reasons to demonstrate that the religious precepts of the Prophetic era and the ten year of governance by the Prophet in Medina were not eternal and that the rules implemented during that period were for that specific time, or similar conditions, without being permanent and timeless.

Taking the above points into consideration, it is my contention that governance and state are human and terrestrial affairs and thus outside categories such as religion and Shari’a. Though this claim has been advanced, more or less continuously, by Islamic reformists and modernists for the last 150 years, it nevertheless still appears very alien, and the traditionalists, especially the dogmatic fundamentalists, equate it with the denial of faith and negation of divine law. Interestingly, the dogmatic and doctrinaire anti-religious forces, on the other hand, consider the proposal by religious intellectuals regarding governance and state being terrestrial an invention of religious reformists made out of necessity and in order to save Islam.

 

As to the second part of this essay, that is religious life in a secular world, it is first necessary to pay attention to the fact that in contrast to popular belief among the faithful, living a religious lifestyle is in reality possible and desirable in a free world and in an urfi and non-religious state. The simple reason for such a claim is that ‘faith’, which is the essence of being religious, is grounded in ‘freedom’ (free will, freedom of conscience, and free choice). It stands to reason, and historical experience supports the claim, that only in a free political, social and cultural environment is it possible to have the free faith that the Qur’an calls ‘uncoerced religion’ – in contrast to despotic and authoritarian regimes.

It is highly significant to note that in ostensibly religious and Shari’a-based states, because of ideological and religious monopolization, free faith is more difficult to attain than, for example, in non-religious authoritarian regimes. The reason is that a religious state in practice gives rise to a state religion, since usually a single religious interpretation and school of thought inevitably morphs into the official state ideology and any other type of religious faith and approach comes to be viewed as disruptive, dangerous, and ultimately subject to rejection and suppression.

 

Even if the adherents of a particular religion or a sect are afforded full freedom, what happens to the scores of heterodox and non-believers that, according to the Qur’anic recommendation and the principles of free choice in faith (as manifested in the necessity to investigate religion and not blindly follow principles of religion), should be free to choose and not face any coercion and imposition on their beliefs? Thus, in regimes grounded in religious ideology, of whatever variation, there is freedom neither for the believers, nor for the non-believers qua free citizens (or in religious parlance as ‘God’s free servants’ – bandegan-e azad-e khoda).

This ‘religious despotism’ shows itself in our history as the great Mujtahid of the Constitutional Revolution era; Mirza Mohammad Hossein Naini (d.1927) considered it the most dangerous and incurable form of despotism. Mehdi Bazargan also invoked Naini in 1965 to say that ‘in despotic regimes, God is not worshipped.’ If we consider Muhammad Iqbal’s (d.1938) proposition that ‘Islam requires being faithful to God, and not being faithful to a despotic state’ as the foundation and criterion for a free faith and free religiosity, then we could convincingly maintain that living according to religious standards is not possible in any authoritarian and despotic regime; but in a religious despotic regime it is quintessentially impossible to live by religious standards. Hence, living by religious and ethical standards is possible and welcomed only in secular democratic states. The experiences of people living under theocratic regimes frequently support this view.

In a civil society (where there is a public sphere), however, the believers can both have their voice and play a positive and valuable role to benefit themselves and others, as has always been the case in history. Even though ethics is prior to religion, yet sublime religious values can contribute to the strengthening of ethical principles as well as good acts. Negation of war and establishment of peace, denial of discrimination and building of equality, rejection of insecurity and realization of security, renouncing oppression and implementation of justice, have constituted great human aspirations throughout history and religion can contribute to the realization of these aspirations on the national or global levels.

 

In the same vein, in a civil society, religion and followers of established religions can contribute to the expansion of public services and provide succour to the downtrodden, as well as national minorities. They can also contribute to the expansion of tolerance and spread of justice and promotion of social solidarity. In fact, religion is the most effective instrument in these fields and in a secular, democratic, free and law-abiding society the role of religion is more efficient and positive than in purportedly religious and ostensibly theocratic societies. There is no need for sophisticated philosophical and theological arguments to demonstrate this point as repeated historical and contemporary experience is the best evidence to support this thesis.

Yet, it cannot be claimed that religion, in its societal capacity and role, is separate from politics, or that in practice the two can be detached. While it is possible to institutionally separate religion and politics, both in theory and practice, in reality, religion does play a role in politics, which arises from the citizenship rights of individuals. We should realize, however, that what we have in mind here is the role of the adherents of religions and not religion itself, which is an abstraction that is being constantly interpreted and reinterpreted by the believers.

Nonetheless, if some groups of believers wish to engage in politics in the public sphere, it is within their rights of citizenship to do so. They can even create institutions, associations and political parties to implement their particular religious standpoints in legislation or in the executive. But they should do so without any ‘privileges’ and by observing democratic principles and without any harm to others’ rights and without attributing their ideas and programmes to God, religion or the Shari’a.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that in theory and on an analytical plane, speaking of the separation between religion and the state and establishing a secular system based on contemporary common values and collective reasoning is not a difficult task. But the reality is that the practical realization of this task in diehard religious and Shari’a-based societies is not an easy undertaking. Western experience and the 150 years of reform in Iran and the Islamic world clearly point to the challenges in this difficult road.

 

Footnotes:

1. Urf, a Perso-Arabic term means that which is ‘known’. In Persian it has the connotation of recognized institutions of social behaviour stemming from sources that could be non-religious. It is also often used in contradistinction to norms that are derived from Shari’a and for this reason is used to refer to norms and institutions that have non-religious roots. Urfigarai, is the approach to society, culture and politics that is based on urf (Translator).

2. (The idea of divine foundation of rule) was anti-Arab because in Arabia and Hijaz, Divine Governance was never known before.