THE Iranian Revolution of 1979, with its original demands of national independence, democracy, political freedom and social justice in one of the most powerful and largest countries of the Middle East, was without doubt an outstandingly important event of the twentieth century. Paradoxically, however, it gave rise to a religious obscurantist regime.

Even thirty years after those memorable days, it is difficult to comprehend how a reactionary cleric, whose historical counterpart in the first Iranian Revolution of 1906 was executed by revolutionaries for demanding an Islamic state, could take advantage of the economic and political crisis, ride the tide of discontent and, through manipulating the religious beliefs of the masses and creating illusions of an ‘anti-imperialist’ stance, establish a Sharia-based state. It is harder to come to terms with the fact that over a century of untiring effort and struggle by generations of Iranian intellectuals and politicians to modernize their country would be lost to the forces of regression.

The nature of the last Shah’s dictatorial regime, foreign intervention, weakness of the political opposition, and the influence of Shi’i Islamists are forces that were involved in this tragedy. In the absence of any effective secular leadership, most of whom were eliminated or maimed by the Shah’s regime, Khomeini and his followers came to lead the revolution and turn it into a mass movement.

Despite his assertions to the contrary while in exile in Paris, Khomeini did not want to share any aspect of the revolution with others; in fact, he called it an Islamic Revolution and the country an Islamic Republic. From the outset, the new regime’s totalitarian and monopolizing tendencies alienated and excluded the left and secular forces, who had been at the forefront of the revolution, from decision-making processes.

 

For decades before the revolution and in the period leading to the fall of the Shah’s regime, the secular left and liberal forces, though a minority, were the dominant voices in oppositional politics, as well as in the arts, literature and other cultural domains of Iran. But prolonged suppression, not to mention the elimination of its prominent leaders by the Shah’s regime, had rendered the left politically weak and in disarray.

The release of political prisoners at the dawn of the revolution, and the return of exiles, led to the formation of a wide range of left political organizations. These included the Tudeh Party, a long-established traditional pro-Soviet party; the Fedaian, which had emerged from the earlier guerrilla movement, turning into the most popular left organization; the Workers Path, which consisted mostly of former political prisoners; several Maoist organizations, notably the ultra-radical Paykar; and several other organizations originating in the Confederation of Iranian Students abroad, including Left Unity, Communist Unity, and the Communist Union; and finally the Kurdish organizations, such as the long-established and moderate Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), and the then newly established radical Komala.

The multitude of voices on the left, with their conflicting slogans, resulted in confusion and created an ideological/political mess. The fact was that the left was confused, generally, about the nature of the new regime and how to deal with it. For the first time it was confronted with a political system that had come to power with the support of the ‘masses’ and, in many ways, seemed to be different from the imperial dictatorships of the previous periods. Confusion and disagreement over the nature of the regime, as well as the nature of the ‘socialist camp’, led to many splits, break-ups and internal fighting, particularly within the left’s largest and most influential group, the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedaian (OIPF).

 

All these splits among the Fedaian, and in other left organizations, culminating in the creation of some several dozen groups and organizations could, in effect, be narrowed down to two distinct approaches: those who confronted the new regime, and those who supported it. Both tendencies, ironically, were based on populist perspectives. The Tudeh Party, following the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and impressed with the overthrow of the pro-American Shah, wholeheartedly supported the new regime from its inception. Not having much credibi-lity among intellectuals and the public because of its known close links with the Soviets, it attracted little attention in the beginning. The Tudeh Party’s policy of supporting the Islamic regime, however, was greatly strengthened when the OIPF Majority joined its ranks. Other left organizations fared no better. The 16th Azar organization, which split from the OIPF Majority on the issue of the position of the Tudeh Party, for a while followed a social democratic policy, but soon dissipated as an organization and many of its cadres, along with other left leaders, were executed.

 

The more radical groups, including the OIPF Minority, were brutally routed out by the regime, as was Paykar, the Union of Communists/Sarbedaran, and many others. Other organizations, such as Left Unity and Communist Union, followed more mature policies, but their voices were lost in the overall confusion of the period. The Left Unity had joined the National Democratic Front of Iran (NDFI), and advocated a reformist democratic socialist project. Initially it attracted much attention, but growing repression by the new regime and lack of support and even denigration by larger left organizations weakened the Front, which for the first time had brought both liberal democrats and left activists together.

The left and secular forces were influential at the workplace, in universities and other educational institutions, and in the regions and territories of national and ethnic minorities. Soon all these sites became scenes of bloody confrontation between these oppositional forces and the new regime. The suppressive and monopolizing policies of the regime were the main reason for such confrontations, but the uncalculated and at times unrealistic demands of many left groups were also responsible for the early clashes with the new regime.

In a multinational and multi-ethnic country such as Iran, with centuries of regional deprivations and suppression of national and ethnic minorities by the central government, demands and expectations were at their highest after the revolution. Calls for autonomy and independence were soon used by different left organizations that had established offices and bases in the Kurdish, Azeri, Turkmen, Baluch, and Arab areas and supported the creation of different peoples’ councils, or showras. Many of them clashed with each other in these areas over tactics and strategy.

In the Kurdish areas, as a result of the strength of the local organizations such as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Komala, the new regime was weaker than in other areas, and the resulting political freedoms had attracted many different organizations. The new central government was afraid of the growing strength of the secular progressive forces in this region and, under the direct order of Khomeini, the Kurdish regions were invaded and brutally suppressed.

 

In relation to labour, the left’s politics was as problematic. During the revolutionary period, in the absence of trade union organizations, a new genre of labour organization emerged in the form of showras (councils) which, in the absence of the managers or owners of factories and other social units, came to control these institutions. Most of the showras in the large and medium-sized factories were originally organized by left-leaning individuals or sympathizers of left organizations and the mojahedin. This was true of powerful councils such as the workers and employees showras of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Steel Company (NISC), the Union of Councils of Gilan Region, and particularly the Union of the Workers and Employees Councils of the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO), the largest industrial conglomerate in the country, consisting then of 110 large corporations and projects.

 

The large showras had played a crucial role in toppling the Shah’s regime, and in the beginning were very influential in decision-making in their institutions. Confrontation between showras and management, however, was inevitable. This was partly because of the tendency of the new government, and many new managers, to maintain the status quo or to change it cautiously and slowly. But it was also the result of radical and unrealistic demands on the part of showras looking for drastic change overnight.

The workers had endured decades of exploitation, harsh working conditions and low pay under the Shah’s regime, and rightly expected dramatic improvements in industrial relations and in their working and living conditions. Many of these expectations could have been achieved with the right policies and good management, but the new government was slow and reluctant to make such changes, and at the same time did not have the immediate resources to fulfil all the legitimate demands with which it was faced.

The left organizations, each claiming to represent the working class, were all excited about the concept of the showras. The lack of experience of the left and of the mojahed activists, and their erroneous understanding of democratic organizations, led them to try to make the councils into appendages of their political organizations. Councils thus became sites of competition rather than cooperation amongst these activists. Most left organizations celebrated the showras as organs of ‘workers control’, but were in theory and in practice confused about them. Were the showras supposed to act as Soviet-type organs aimed at a socialist project? Or were they intended to implement some sort of industrial democracy in a corporatist fashion? Some viewed the showras as distinct from trade unions, while others emphasized the duality of their functions.

The Islamic regime had no faith in the showras and no influence on them either; in the beginning it had no other choice but to tolerate them. The new government tried to bring them under its own control, and when that did not succeed, moved to destroy them and establish its own yellow ‘Islamic councils’ with the help of the ‘Islamic associations’ that had sprung up in most workplaces, acting like fascist type organizations.

Even without brutal suppression by the regime, which was the main reason for the quick demise of the showras, they were doomed to failure. Their breakdown was the result of a combination of factors, such as the nature of the industrial working class in Iran, the nature of Iranian industry, and the characteristics of the showras themselves.

 

In the absence of strong trade union organizations and other democratic institutions, the role of showras in terms of upholding the interests of the working class was limited. Under such difficult conditions, the left should have pushed for the establishment of industrial trade unions at the national and regional levels, and supported showras as their participatory arms. Yet, in the confusing times of the revolution, the growing disunity and infighting among the left and other secular forces, and the speed with which the Islamists and their fascist-like organizations consolidated power, this was not possible. The takeover of the American Embassy by Muslim students and the subsequent hostage crisis only added to the confusion. Finally, the Iraqi invasion of Iran gave the best excuse to the regime to move towards its final assault on the showras, expelling their activists, jailing many of them and executing some.

The left, while truly concerned about the conditions of the working class and striving towards representing its demands, had no clear understanding of what constituted it; its segmentation and heterogeneity were unclear. The fact was that the left had only a limited social base among the blue-collar wage workers. At the same time, it ignored the demands and aspirations of the white-collar salariat who, ironically, constituted its own main social base, and in the process lost their support.

 

Apart from its relations with labour, the left also had problematic relations with the liberal nationalists and Muslim reformers. Since the early twentieth century in Iran, the three ideologies and political forces of socialism, nationalism and Islamism have confronted autocratic rule and competed with each other in periods when party politics was possible. These contending forces have, to varying degrees, followed different strategies, ranging from liberal reformism to radical sectarianism.

Relations between left organizations and nationalists in Iran have always been strained, going back to the time of the nationalist movement during the Mossadeq era. The hostilities, however, were two-sided, and the nationalists too never sought or showed any willingness to collaborate with the left. The hostilities came to the fore again during the 1979 revolution.

The Provisional Government of Bazargan was formed by liberal nationalists in a period in which the Islamists had not yet consolidated their power and the left was strongest in the showras, universities and regions of national minorities. The left in general had a hostile attitude towards the liberal Provisional Government, which also faced all sorts of limitations caused by Khomeini’s associates and the Islamists in the Revolutionary Council. While the Provisional Government suffered from and was responsible for many shortcomings, above all its indecisiveness and desire to maintain the status quo, it was tolerant of the showras and their left-leaning supporters.

It must also be noted that the nationalists in Iran were always closer to the Islamists, and less heedful of their danger. Mossadeq and his National Front maintained a strong link with and sought the support of the clerics led by Ayatollah Kashani who, at the most crucial time during the CIA coup, abandoned Mossadeq and sided with the military and the Shah. Mossadeq, in the early history of the National Front, even had close ties with Navab Safavi, the ultra-radical fundamentalist leader of the terrorist Fedaian-e Islam.

 

The relations between the left and religious forces in Iran have historically been strained and mutually hostile. The Iranian left has traditionally considered Islam to be a monolithic religion, not distinguishing between its rationalist and literalist traditions. Atheism within the left involved anti-religiosity and, for many, a desire for its total elimination. While in theory they all advocated secularism and separation of church and state, but tolerating religion in the ‘private’ domain, none of Iran’s left organizations had a clear vision as what to do about it in the public sphere. With the 1979 revolution and the rise to power of the Islamists, part of the left led by the Tudeh Party and then OIPF Majority, following their populist perspective and under the illusion of Islamist ‘anti-imperialism’, sacrificed their secularism and supported the Islamic state. On the other extreme, radical left populists continued their total and overall rejection of Islam.

 

The presidency of Khatami and the growing prominence of some Muslim activists calling for reform of the regime created much excitement among some groups, including a section of the left. However, the illusions gradually faded as the two terms of his presidency failed to achieve much, partly because of the intrigues of the more conservative and fundamentalist Muslims, and partly because of the inactions of Khatami and his associates.

These religious state reformers never attempted to forge any relations with the non-religious secular intellectuals or political activists, or even to recognize their existence. Outside the regime, however, a growing trend of secularist tendencies amongst religious reformers evolved, both among clerics and lay individuals. They were critical of traditional Islam and boldly called for a separation of religion and state.

In the incredible and lengthy three decades of Islamist rule in Iran, the post-revolutionary clerical oligarchy went through various transformations. After the long and futile Iran-Iraq war, frustrated Islamists, under the direct order of Khomeini, massacred over five thousand political prisoners in 1988. Subsequent to Khomeini’s death came Rafsanjani’s neo-liberal policies, which while expanding and strengthening the new capitalist class of clerics, their families and military/Islamic Guard officers, as well as the new expanding middle classes, severely widened the gap between the rich and poor. The suppression of the left continued, and the regime resorted to ‘chain assassinations’ of liberal and left-leaning intellectuals and political activists.

Then came eight years of Khatami with his slogan of reform. With the failure of Khatami’s reformists, the marginalized masses rallied around the crude populism of Ahmadinejad. A military-clerical alliance pushed back the ‘traditional right’ clerics, and established the most obscurantist version of Islamic fundamentalism in post-revolutionary Iran.

 

Despite a reign of terror and the jailing and silencing of dissent, however, a vibrant civil society continued to challenge the establishment, leading to the mass revolt after the botched election that secured the second presidency of Ahmadinejad. The regime has remained in power by relying on outright suppression of dissent. The women’s movement, student unrest and workers’ strikes are on the rise. Although left organizations inside the county were brutally crushed, left tendencies are growing among youth and students. Many left organizations survived in exile, some changing politics and some continuing along the same lines. In a sense, the two extreme tendencies of the revolutionary period, those seeking alliance with elements in the Islamic regime, and those seeking the regime’s complete eradication, continue.

Overall, after over thirty years, it is unfortunate but evident that both sections of the organized left – liberal and radical – have failed to provide the sound theoretical and organizational basis necessary for the creation of an effective left alternative ready to play a significant role in Iranian politics. The accommodating liberal left, by just adding its voice to those of the liberal nationalists or pragmatic Islamists, has made itself redundant as a secular left alternative. The radical left, by ignoring the actual social realities of today’s Iran and repeating old dogma, has also made itself irrelevant. Outside the organized left, both in exile and in Iran, however, there are a growing number of left-leaning individuals who are critical of both these tendencies and seek other alternatives.

 

For the left to play a serious role in Iranian politics, it needs first and foremost to develop theoretical and analytical frameworks reflecting the present realities of Iranian society and economy, and a willingness and ability to forge meaningful links with diverse classes and strata of the working population. For the liberal left, which has compromised its secularism and sought to ally with the Islamic reformers, the main question is whether it is any different from the liberal, non-left nationalists and religious reformers.

As for the radical left organizations, they should sincerely reflect on a set of compelling questions. The first is with whose support and how they can, in reality and not dreams, bring about an immediate socialist revolution. They should also clarify who constitutes the working class. Does it include salaried white-collar workers and employees? If so, what are the political implications and impact of the platform the left puts forward to attract their support?

Other questions include the following:

* Can socialism be achieved without strong mass support and participation of the working class?

* Can the working classes be mobilized and gain class consciousness without genuine, autonomous trade unions?

* Can genuine trade unions be established without the existence of a democratic system?

* Can a democratic system exist without the support and involvement of different parties representing a variety of perspectives and social classes?

 

These questions might appear as bourgeois and academic to individuals and groups who believe that the working class is ready for a socialist revolution and is only waiting for its ‘vanguards’. But for those who base their analysis on the actual objective and subjective conditions of a specific, temporal-spatial situation, these and similar questions should make sense.

Iran is at present under a fascistic, clerical-military oligarchy with a unique, interwoven network of repressive, ideological and economic apparatuses of control. While a majority of Iranians are unhappy with three decades of repression, corruption and social and cultural degradation, the regime, through its impressive apparatuses, still maintains the backing of millions of people whose survival is linked to the country’s massive network of bureaucracy, military, militia, religious foundations (bonyads) and multi-functional mosques.

The left, much weaker now than it was during the time of the revolution, cannot challenge this regime by itself; it needs allies from among the non-left, both liberal nationalists and independent secular Muslim reformers. The workers’ movement, despite its heroic resistance and periodic strikes and confrontations with the regime, cannot grow in the absence of genuine autonomous trade unions.

The women’s movement, equally heroic and even more widespread than the workers’ movement, despite its incredible achievements in challenging the regime, cannot succeed without the establishment of democracy. Nor will the youth and student movements, and movements of national minorities.

 

* This is a shortened version of ‘Lessons (not) Learned: Reflections on a Failed Revolution’, in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 29(1), 2009.