‘My leader is a 13 year old young man who strapped grenades to his body and blew himself up,’ under an Iraqi tank in November 1980.¹ This is what Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, remarked in appreciation of the courage, passion and commitment of the Iranian youth who played a pivotal role during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), one of the bloodiest wars since World War II.

Many of the war commanders who risked their lives were under 30 years old. Iranian city walls are covered with huge propaganda posters depicting these young leaders. If there is one abiding legacy of the revolution and the war era for the Iranian youth, it is self-confidence and belief in their ability to bring about change despite all the burdens and obstacles.

The confidence and aspirations of the Iranian youth played a major role in Iran’s reconstruction era (1989-1997), helping rebuild the country after a war that cost Iran more than $1 trillion in damages, and by some estimates, hundreds of thousands of lives.² Such consciousness was also a driving force for millions of Iranian youth who voted for the reformist candidate, Mohammad Khatami, in the 1997 presidential election, even though the odds were against him. With an unprecedented participation of the youth in elections, Khatami garnered 20 million votes, drubbing his conservative competitor, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, who represented the clerical establishment in power and received only seven million votes.

Ironically, even though the reconstruction era was associated with economic austerity, it was Khatami’s political agenda, his emphasis on promoting Iran’s civil society, freedom of speech and assembly, and political and social freedom that won him the presidency. In fact, the Iranian youth, along with other groups in the society, manifested their major demands and expectations in the votes they cast.

Fours years later, Iran’s National Youth Organization carried out a nationwide survey addressing the major crises facing Iranian youth and presented the results to major political figures and entities within the establishment to be considered in future planning. The survey identified four major crises facing Iranian youth, at the time almost 69 per cent of the population: unemployment crisis, sexual crisis, drug crisis, and the crisis to promote Islamic thoughts.

Encapsulated in the term ‘sexual crisis’ was a clear indication that a majority of Iranian youth did not necessarily believe in the norms and values that were constantly advocated by a variety of religious, cultural and political institutions on a number of issues such as relationships between men and women, public covering (hijab), sex before marriage, and so on. This meant that despite severe restrictions on male-female relationships and systematic sexual repression which has become an integral part of the Islamic Republics’ identity, the youth preferred a different path.

More importantly, while the Islamic Republic of Iran has since the revolution established numerous religious institutions, coupled with organized attempts imposed by the official educational system and state-run TV and radio to promote Islamic ideology and thought, results indicated that the massive planning and policies had not penetrated a sizeable portion of the youth population.

 

In an interview, Davood Mirbagheri, head of the NYO, told me that the ranking Iranian authorities were deeply concerned about the situation of youth, carelessness about Islamic dress codes, or hijab, and interaction between men and women.

In response to the overwhelming demands of Iranian youth, the relatively open space during Khatami’s era was accompanied with an unprecedented and massive presence of youth in university activities, newspapers and magazines, and the launching of thousands of youth NGOs. In 1998, hundreds of Tehran university students protested against the ban on the reformist newspaper Salam inside their dormitory, braving police intimidation, indicating their will for change in the social and political sphere.

However, Ahmadinejad’s first term in office, based on his populist and economy-oriented agenda, was attractive to many young people in small and big cities facing severe unemployment. During his campaign, he showed a tolerant image regarding social policies. Moreover, he was the first non-cleric president. There were many who found his nationalism and anti-westernism inspiring. However, within months of assuming office, he started leaning towards the most radical factions in Iran’s politics – radical Ayatollahs like Mesbah Yazdi on religious matters and the Revolutionary Guards on economic and political questions.

 

In 2006, in an unprecedented explosion of public opposition, students set fire to Ahmadinejad’s picture and chanted ‘Death to the Dictator’ during his speech at Amirkabir University in Tehran. The Amirkabir incident was a turning point in converting Ahmadinejad’s image among the youth who felt overwhelmingly frustrated, both economically and politically.

All this is indicative of the deep transformations marking Iranian society. The first generation of young men who participated in the revolution was deeply ideological, committed to a charismatic leader, anti-imperialist and idealistic. The new generation is realistic, favourably inclined towards the modern world’s cultural accomplishments (thanks to the internet) and, though still religious, has clearly distanced itself from the official ideology.

Ahmadinejad’s economic failure, which for Iranians is mostly reflected in the inflation rate (25% at the time) and unemployment rate (up to 15%), along with intensifying political and social repression, provided yet another opportunity for demanding change. Millions of university students and 33 million internet users (the majority of them youth), once again came to the streets prior to the 2009 presidential campaign to show their desire for change.³

The presence of youth, male and female, during the post-election protests was overwhelming. Iran has 5.3 million university students,⁴ more than three million unemployed youth, many of whom have the means of accessing information from multiple locations. Without claiming that all those who filled the streets, like the three million protesters on 25 June in Tehran, were demanding the overthrow of the government, it would be fair to claim that many Iranian youth believe that any improvement in the quality of their lives is dependent on changing Iran’s political structure. That is why instead of economic demands the slogans were focused on government’s accountability, human rights, and freedom of expression.

Before and after the June 2009 election, the young generation, a few steps ahead of the government in understanding and using communications technologies, challenged the government propaganda machine’s narrative of the election and post-election incidents. The thousands of videos and photos that were captured on cell phones and put online severely damaged the image of the Islamic Republic and presented a new picture of the Iranian youth to the world.

 

The overwhelming presence of youth was not accidental. Even though the NYO’s nationwide survey on youth in 2003 was never acknowledged by the establishment, presenting as it did a different image of the Iranian youth than what the government desired, it seems to indicate the major roadmap for addressing the young Iranians’ major issues within the establishment.

Given that the NYO was led by Davood Mirbagheri, a religious conservative whose deputy once told me that, ‘If I send a message to the Supreme Leader, I will be able to see him within 24 hours,’ it was believed that such a survey might serve as a wake up call for the Iranian authorities, particularly the conservatives. Instead, sharing the result with major decision-makers led to a backlash.

 

Mirbagheri first presented this document to a group of rankings officials, whose main job had been to promote ‘Islamic thoughts’ over the past three decades. These were the head of the Supreme Council of Friday Prayers; head of the Organization of Islamic Propaganda; a ranking member of Basij, probably the deputy incharge of social issues; Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council deputies; a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence; and an official from The University Jihad.

Look at both the composition of the decision-making group as also their reaction. An aide to Mirbagheri mentioned that most of them became infuriated and told the head of the NYO that the result was nonsensical and the surveys they had conducted said the opposite. They refused to accept that in an area such as promoting Islamic thoughts there could exist such a crisis.

But numbers over and over again prove that the above mentioned issues remain important. According to Iranian officials, the unemployment rate was 11.5% in 2005 and 12.5% in 2010. More disturbingly, ten prominent Iranian economists have challenged the official numbers as underestimates, claiming that the numbers were 14.7% in 2005 and are 15.4% in 2010. Currently, almost 70% of Iran’s more than three million unemployed are between the ages of 15 to 29 years. Significantly, 80% of them live in cities and the other 20% in rural areas.⁵

Each year between 700,000 to 1 million young Iranians enter the job market. At the height of its prosperity in the 1990s, Iran was annually able to create 600,000 jobs; the figure is down to 400,000 jobs in the current decade.⁶ An increase in unemployment remains a major source of concern, as it can add to other social issues such as brain drain among the educated population, drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, intensified social unrest and political instability.

Educated Iranians have tried to find a way out. ‘According to the International Monetary fund (IMF),’ which surveyed 91 countries, ‘Iran has the highest rate of brain drain in the world. Every year, 180,000 educated Iranians leave their country to pursue a better life. The economic loss of this departure is estimated at some $50 billion a year or higher.’⁷ This number was 150,000 in 2004.⁸ More disturbingly, it is clear that this tendency to outmigrate has been increasing over the last few years.

 

Moreover, access to the internet has made it easier for university graduates to apply to schools online and learn how people in other parts of the world live their lives. In a country where 42 million people are below the age of 30, Iran has more than 33 million internet users, one of the highest in the Middle East. Many believe that this has contributed to the rise of expectations, leading many of the top students to leave the country to pursue higher education and employment abroad.

At a conference entitled Brain Drain: Challenge or Opportunity, held in the prestigious Amirkabir University in November 2009, it was reported that ‘90 people from among 125 gifted university graduates who participated in the Scientific Olympiads had left the country.’ According to the High Council of Cultural Revolution, Iran has 5.3 million students in universities.

 

Iranian youth is still dealing with the drug problem. Iran has a more than a 900 kilometre long border with Afghanistan, a major supplier of drugs, mainly opium and heroin. With more than two million users, Iran has one of the highest rates of drug dependence in the world.⁹ Each year, about 130,000 new people become addicted to drugs.¹⁰ Hamid Reza Sarami, the Director General of the Drug Prevention Administration says that the average drug user in Iran is 23 years old.¹¹ The number includes 1.2 million drug addicts and 800,000 who use drugs casually (two million in total). Of course, these are official figures, probably underestimates.

Continuing resistance to the programmes to ‘promote Islamic thoughts’ and the deepening ‘sexual crisis’ seem to be interrelated. According to the Islamic training, men and women should not have any relations before marriage. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine in charge of promoting Islamic thoughts and ideology includes a number of gigantic national organizations such as The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Islamic Propaganda Organization, The Council of Friday Prayers, Iran’s Education System and the Basij. Islamic training, from kindergarten to university, teaches Iranian women that make-up should be used only inside the house to please their husbands and not ‘the others’. Still, Iranians women ‘spend about two billion dollars a year on cosmetics,’ almost 29% of the Middle East market,’¹² and fill the streets with tight tunics and skimpy hijabs, challenging the Islamic dress codes.¹³

Add to this the underground market for porn films, alcoholic drinks and prostitution – issues which have yet to be properly addressed by state agencies despite their high visibility. All this makes a mockery of the billions of dollars spent on ‘promoting Islamic thoughts’.

 

In an interview in 2003, Davood Mirbagheri told me that more than 50% of Iranian youth have relations with the opposite sex, from normal friendship to sexual relationships. Even though the authorities have not released any new data on this issue, it would be surprising if, considering the increase in internet use, satellite programmes, and increased travel to the neighbouring countries such as Dubai and Turkey, the number hasn’t gone up.

Social issues related to the young population such as ‘runaways’ and ‘divorce’ are also on the rise. Although Iranian authorities never release any data on the number of sex workers, runaway girls and brothels, independent groups claim that the number of runaway girls has increased over the past few years. They also claim that the divorce rate has been constantly increasing over the past decade and that close to 25% of couples divorce in the first five years of their marriage. The average divorce age is 34 years for men and 29 years for women. Divorce rates showed an 8% increase in 2009.¹⁴

 

In fact, the youth’s clothing style, relationship with the opposite sex, use of make-up, the prostitution market, use of alcohol, private night parties, and other related issues, all of which are viewed by the Islamic Republic as indicators of a sexual crisis, are a further indication of the propaganda machine’s failure to influence the youth to adopt Islamic thoughts and values in their daily lives despite more than three decades of attempts at indoctrination by the authorities.

There are 25 million people between the ages of 14 and 29 years and a large number of them are legally and physically able to marry.¹⁵ But authorities admit the gap between the legal age of marriage and the time they do marry is now about 15 years. The Islamic Republic simply does not have any answer on how the youth should cope with their sexual needs during these years.

In her 2009 book, Pardis Mahdavi, the author of Sexual Revolution, writes: ‘In the absence of any option for overt political dissent, young people have become part of a self-proclaimed revolution in which they are using their bodies to make social and political statements. Sex has become both a source of freedom and an act of political rebellion.’¹⁶ 

To address this issue, Iranian officials have proposed some controversial Islamic style solutions. In 2007, Mosatafa Pourmohammadi, Ahmadinejad’s Minister of Interior, suggested ‘temporary marriage’ as a solution; this generated criticism and was called ‘promotion of prostitution’. Pourmohammadi said: ‘The youth cannot marry because of social and economic difficulties and "temporary marriage" is a suitable (or useful) solution.’¹⁷ In the summer of 2010, the government intensified its monitoring of the youth’s public appearances, and began imposing ‘approved’ hairstyles and women’s public clothing in an effort to challenge the overwhelming number of western looking young men and women on the streets.¹⁸ 

 

There are other issues related to the ‘sexual crisis’ or, as some have called it, ‘sexual revolution’, such as HIV/AIDS, depression and suicides.¹⁹ An increase in the number of HIV positive cases might only be a small part of the cost of not acknowledging the ‘sexual crisis’ or ‘sexual revolution’. In November 2009, Iran’s Minister of Health warned about ‘the third wave of HIV via sexual relations.’ Kamran Bagheri Lankarani said that, ‘The young Iranian population and the tendency of some young people to high-risk sexual behaviour has raised the issue of epidemic AIDS, considered to be the result of sexual transmission.’²⁰ In the same report, Minoo Mohrez, the head of AIDS Research Association in Iran, said that ‘the highest prevalence of AIDS is among young people between 25 to 29 years old.’

The overwhelming confusion about how to deal with the implications of ignoring the young generations’ natural sexual needs and demands has resulted in deep sexual frustration with a number of side effects which could have political implications.

Given these different issues and concerns of the youth, it is likely that not all of those who filled the streets were concerned about democracy and political freedom; probably for many, social freedom and respect for privacy look like a priority. Nevertheless, since many Iranians believe that meaningful change can only come about through a change in the political system, a feeling strengthened by the earlier experience of electing a reformist president, this may have unified various groups with different needs and demands, contributing to protests like the ones that occurred after the elections.

 

For instance, the Khatami government had given a lot of support to NGOs, both financial aid as also by awarding projects earlier done by private sector contractors. Over the eight year term of Khatami in office, more than 3000 youth NGOs were registered by the NYO throughout the country, including about 500 women and 600 environmental NGOs.

Mirbagheri, the NYO head, though a conservative, believes that Iranian youth could work through civil society organizations to meaningfully engage with the first three mentioned crisis.

And he is right. Young people from the age of 19 can legally form such groups in order to work on a variety of social issues – from poverty and environment to women’s concerns, and so on. Incidentally, it is also likely that the regime believed that by supporting NGOs, it could monitor, control and use them to effectively propagate the official viewpoint.

 

But there is also resistance to the policy of promoting and supporting Iran’s civil society, particularly by those who fear that modern Iranian civil society can undermine the influence of traditional institutions – from mosques to state manufactured institutions like the Basij and other religious traditional bodies like charities and religious foundations. After all, civil society organizations are the best platform to organize the public, teach them how to negotiate with, and even challenge the government. They are even capable of forming coalitions to pressure the government to change its policies and behaviour – none of which is palatable to the conservative establishment.

A Member of Parliament once compared what he called ‘the poisonous impact of promoting civil society’ to the impact of chain modern stores like Shahrvand or Refah, coupled with the creation of Farhangsara (cultural centres that were created during the time Hashemi Rafsanjani was in power). For one, these new chain stores challenged the role and influence of the traditional bazaar, which was the backbone of financial support for the religious groups during the revolution and completely transformed the distribution system. Similarly, modern cultural centres challenged the traditional cultural and social institutions like mosques, Basij and the other institutions.

Those who favour a crackdown on civil society organizations and media fundamentally believe that they weaken the project to promote Islamic thoughts. Unlike Khatami, who saw civil society as a tool to mobilize people as partners in solving problems in cooperation with the government, the current regime remains hostile to any such attempts. Clearly, it fears that the issue-oriented nature of such NGOs has contributed to the marginalization of ideology and religion, because unlike Basij or religious charities who believe that the core is ideology and religious causes and that all else is peripheral, these NGOs are most focused on the everyday concerns of their constituents. In a majority of post-Khatami NGOs, Islamic ideology is not even at the periphery.

According to the National Youth Organization, up to March 2008, 3400 Sazman Mardom Nahad, SAMAN, (or people’s based organizations) were registered and 2600 of them have renewed their licences. Also, according to the Supreme Council of Youth under the president’s office, there were 3000 student associations in universities in 2005.

Unlike in the Khatami period, youth NGOs or, as conservatives in Iran call them, ‘People’s Based Organizations’, are largely independent of government institutions – from their budget to their operations and the objectives they follow. In fact, during Ahmadinejad’s first term and up to the present, there has been an extensive effort to take control over civil society organizations and ensure that they function in line with the official policy and action plans. Clearly the government has been attempting to make a counterfeit civil society and network of organized citizens in order to propagate its agenda.

 

The youth played a major role in challenging the gigantic Iranian propaganda machine, particularly its effort to orchestrate its narrative of post-election events and, more importantly, of the systematic violence on the streets throughout the country. In relying on this machine to suppress the genuine movement of the Iranian people, they only shot themselves in the foot. The irony is that the government blames the foreign media as the root of the unrest, not realizing that no foreign involvement could have inflicted so such damage as they themselves have done. They forced foreign print, radio and TV journalists to leave the country and started a brutal, organized and premeditated crackdown. They controlled and censored the domestic media and used their gigantic and influential national TV to frame their own version of reality. They sought to create their own narrative in support of their post-election crackdown, all to guarantee Ahmadinejad’s second term in office. But the official narrative failed to dominate either the reality of Iranians or the outside world’s view of events.

 

This is because once the authorities forced out and silenced journalists, the Iranian media was left without any professional coverage of the post-election incidents, forcing them to rely on coverage via the many videos and photographs taken by thousands of protesters which ended up, almost instantaneously, on YouTube and shortly thereafter on dozens of TV channels. These were no longer foreign journalists whom the authorities could control or threaten. Moreover, because there were no news corporations or biased reporting involved, the ‘informal’ coverage was brutally believable.

Imagine spending millions of dollars to orchestrate a message and then having that story destroyed by a 20 year old protester who shoots a one minute video and uploads it onto YouTube. This would certainly guarantee extreme frustration for officialdom. Those videos, like the one that captured the moments after Neda was shot, severely damaged the image of the Islamic Republic – damage that is very hard, if not impossible to control or reverse.

 

The post-election events are an indication that more than having or controlling such devices, the challenge is to develop a new way of thinking. It’s more about a paradigm shift, a new way of sending a message, processing it and giving feedback. The regime’s attempt to monopolize the communication process remains feudal and outdated.

With the continuous increase in the number of internet users and satellite channels broadcasting from outside Iran, where there are 5.3 million students all over the country, it is becoming challenging for the Islamic Republic of Iran to maintain its media monopoly and its ability to dominate the narratives about events.

In order to deal with the crisis facing the youth, major shifts in social policies and Iran’s politics seem inevitable so as to avoid social and political instability. In Iran, economic frustration and lack of hope can easily turn into political turmoil.

The number of young journalists, activists, students and critics that have been arrested over the year since the 2009 election is an alarming sign and indicates the disconnect from the middle class. For a majority of the Iranian youth, the economy, equal opportunities, and security (social and private) have the highest priority; and in a worsening economy, many find changing the political structure the only way to alter their futures.

Regardless of the bloody crackdown on students, young activists, journalists and bloggers, the Iranian youth continues to challenge the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ideology, politics, and media monopoly. And the struggle is still ongoing.

 

Footnotes:

1. ‘The Making of a Suicide Bomber’, The Sunday Times, 3 September 2006 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article626388.ece

2. Iranian Recovery From Industrial Devastation During War With Iraq, United Nations University, 1996 http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0e.htm

3. ‘Internet Usage in the Middle East’, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm

4. The website of Iran’s High Council of Cultural Revolution, 27 August 2009, http://www. iran-farhang.ir/news/view.php?gid=1&id =12541081

5. Khabar Online new website, 25 July 2010, http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-78528.aspx

6. Donyaye Eghtesad newspaper, http://www.donya-e-eqtesad.com/Default_view. asp?@=69588

7. Khabar Online, 10 November 2009, http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-23995.aspx

8. ‘Iran: Coping With the World’s Highest Rate of Brain Drain’, Radio Free Europe, Golnaz Esfandiari, March 2004, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051803.html

9. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/ releases/2009-19.05.html

10. Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AE0Z020091115

11. Tabnak News, 16 June 2010, http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=104713

12. ‘Iranian women splash money on makeup’, the Middle East Online, June 2010 http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=39304

13. ‘Iran’s Hijab Crackdown Intensifies as Election Anniversary Nears’, Omid Memarian, IPS News Agency, 27 May 2010, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51609

14. ‘Every Hour 14 Divorce’, Iranian University Students News, June 2010, http://iusnews.ir/home.html?pageid=111932

15. 28 November 2008, http://www.bbc. co.uk/persian/iran/2008/11/081126_ m_divorce.shtml

16. Stanford University Press, 2009, http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?id=15943

17. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2007/06/070605_ka-short-marriage.shtml

18. ‘Iran’s Hijab Crackdown Intensifies as Election Anniversary Nears’, Omid Memarian, IPS News Agency, 27 May 2010, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51609

19. ‘Sex and Shopping Brings HIV Crisis in Iran’, The Guardian, 3 January 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/03/iran.topstories3

20. Radio Farda, November 2009, http://www.radiofarda.com/content/f3_aids/475116.html