IN 1991 Edward Said travelled to South Africa to deliver the prestigious T.B. Davie Memorial Lecture at the University of Cape Town, which he devoted to the topic of academic freedom.¹ During his visit he also lectured at other local universities but still found time to immerse himself in the politics of the country. This visit coincided with a transformative period in South Africa’s history. Nelson Mandela (whom Said briefly met) had recently been freed, the African National Congress (ANC) legalized (after a 30-year ban) and the stage set for what in retrospect was to become one of the great democratic transitions and emancipatory moments of the 20th century.

Several years later Said had a chance to publicly reflect upon his South African experience. In the last decade of his life he became a regular contributor to the Arabic press, primarily Al Hayat and Al Ahram Weekly, where he wrote a regular bimonthly column for a largely Arab and Muslim audience. In September 1997, he penned a short essay based on his South Africa trip titled ‘Strategies of Hope’, which sought to apply the lessons from the struggle against apartheid to the struggle for Palestinian self-determination.² This important, yet generally unknown, essay is pregnant with insights. Like much of Said’s work, it possesses an enduring quality, and is especially relevant to those interested in struggles for democracy and human rights in the developing world, where a militarily and politically weaker group confronts a more powerful adversary.

In this essay I seek to illustrate the main arguments Said advanced in his South Africa-Palestine comparison, and then apply them to the case of the Green Movement in Iran and the struggle for democracy inside the Islamic Republic today, while taking into consideration the relevant similarities and differences among the three cases.

According to John Donne, while some ‘comparisons are odious’, relevant similarities do nonetheless exist and merit careful consideration. In his perceptive essay, Said articulated a broad strategy for democratic mobilization that continues to have a transnational and timeless appeal. Leaders and supporters of Iran’s Green Movement can benefit from considering this strategy in the aftermath of the 2009 electoral coup, as they begin a protracted, arduous and momentous struggle for the future of Iran.

 

Said’s essay opens with a discussion on the plight of the Palestinians four years after the 1993 Oslo peace process. At that time (as today), Benjamin Netanyahu was in power and the collective plight of the Palestinians was steadily moving from bad to worse. Said lamented that while ‘enough has been said about the economic, social and political deprivations’ facing the Palestinians, which have only increased since Oslo, insufficient attention has been paid to ‘the human factor’ in politics, which ‘surely [is] the most important.’ What Said meant by the ‘human factor’ is the paramount importance of individual will and human agency in shaping political struggles. Specifically, the ability during moments of crisis and paralysis to think outside the proverbial box to advance alternative, creative and original ideas in support of emancipatory causes.

He reminded readers that ‘political struggles are always contests of will, in which one side attempts to persuade the other side to give up, to lose the will to resist and fight on. This is not a military but a political and moral matter.’ His prescription to his fellow Palestinians was ‘the reactivation of [human] will and, just as important, the revival of belief in the possibility that what human beings do can make a difference.’

A specific problem Said identified is the ‘tendency to think only in literal terms… [and] not sufficiently in symbolic and moral ones.’ He reminded his readers how the Zionist project in the West was rooted in a moral claim to be the best response to the Nazi Holocaust and historical anti-Semitism. This is eventually what broadened its appeal after the horrors of World War II. Surveying the plight of the Palestinians on the eve of the 50th anniversary of their dispossession, Said similarly called for a new collective ‘human effort …to demonstrate to the world the immorality of what was done to us.’ This, he affirmed, is the ‘essential task facing us as a people now’ and unless it is pursued, ‘we can never expect any change in our status as an inferior and dominated people.’ In the end he noted that, ‘Our struggle with Zionism must be won first on the moral level, and then can be fought in negotiations from a position of moral strength, given that militarily and economically we will always be weaker than Israel and its supporters.’

 

The importance of this general theme was first brought to Said’s realization after visiting South Africa in 1991. The centrepiece of his essay is a conversation he recalled at the ANC headquarters in downtown Johannesburg with Walter Sisulu, arguably the pre-eminent figure in the struggle against apartheid after Mandela.

Said was flummoxed by the changing political landscape in South Africa, when only a few weeks earlier the ANC was viewed by the regime as a banned terrorist organization. What made such a political transformation possible? Said’s recollection of his conversation with Sisulu is worth quoting in full.

Said: What exactly did the ANC do to turn defeat into victory?

Sisulu: You must remember that during the eighties we were beaten in South Africa; the organization was wrecked by the police, our bases in neighbouring countries were routinely attacked by the South African Army; our leaders were in jail or in exile or killed. We then realized that our only hope was to concentrate on the international arena, and there to delegitimize apartheid. We organized in every major western city; we initiated committees; we prodded the media, we held meetings and demonstrations, not once or twice, but thousands of times. We organized university campuses, and churches, and labour unions, and business people, and professional groups.

Said: [Sisulu] paused for a moment and then said something that I shall never forget as long as I live.

Sisulu: Every victory that we registered in London, or Glasgow, or Iowa City, or Toulouse, or Berlin, or Stockholm gave the people at home a sense of hope, and renewed their determination not to give up the struggle. In time we morally isolated the South African regime and its policy of apartheid so that even though militarily we could not do much to hurt them, in the end they came to us, asking for negotiations. We never changed or retreated from our basic programme, our central demand: one person, one vote.

 

Building on his reflections on South Africa, Said called on his fellow Palestinians to ‘take our moral presence directly into the Israeli and Western, and even Arab consciousness’ and to ‘show Israel and its supporters that only a full acknowledgement by them of what was done to us can bring peace and reconciliation.’ The success of this project will gain ‘moral stature by its human dimensions, its sincere willingness for coexistence, its firm belief in respecting the rights of others.’ It will also require ‘a policy of concrete detail, not one of broad, abstract statements that are not fully engaged in the struggle for opinion.’

This was a strategy that Said, over the course of decades, repeatedly encouraged Yasser Arafat and the PLO to pursue. Yet, despite his close connection to the senior leadership of the Palestinian national movement, there was little interest in engaging with these ideas.³ His advice fell on deaf ears, and Said resigned from the Palestine National Council in 1991 over the process leading up to the signing of the Oslo accords, of which he remained a persistent and principled critic.

 

 

While the struggles for democracy in Iran today and in pre-1990 South Africa are not identical, relevant parallels do exist. First, a few of the key differences. Iran’s political system, notwithstanding its theocratic underpinnings, is not as discriminatory as under apartheid South Africa. Until the 2009 presidential election, despite widespread voter dissatisfaction, state repression and elite corruption, the Islamic Republic could nonetheless claim a degree of political legitimacy, as evidenced by the over 80 per cent voter turnout (arguably, this was due to the absence of viable alternatives, among other things).

Prior to the rise of the reform movement in Iran, elections in the Islamic Republic were never ‘free’, insofar as candidates were screened for regime loyalty – but they were based on universal suffrage and were basically ‘fair’, in that the announced results closely reflected the number of ballots cast. The case of South Africa was qualitatively different on this score.

 

Second, on a regional level, broad public sympathy and support exists for Iran in its conflict with the United States and the West. The reference here is to the Arab and Muslim populations at large, not the authoritarian regimes (often allied with the West) who rule over them.⁴ This can be extended to significant parts of the Third World as well, which similarly resents US pressure and the bullying of Iran and who generally sympathize with its anti-imperialist posture. In the case of South Africa, the opposite conditions prevailed. The apartheid regime had little regional support at the elite or the popular level.

Third, in contrast to South Africa, Iran over the last decade has been subject to threats of ‘regime change’ by a global superpower that surrounds its borders with a sizeable military presence. Threats of possible military strikes on Iran by Israel and/or the US are a constant concern and are frequently debated and sometimes advocated in the West by powerful and influential political leaders and constituencies, most recently by Tony Blair and Senator Lindsey Graham.⁵ 

All of this undermines Iran’s internal struggle for democracy and sustains Iran’s authoritarian rulers by providing them with an opportunity to shift public attention and debate toward external threats and national security issues and away from pressing internal socio-economic and political problems. While South Africa was internationally isolated and quarantined, it never faced a comparable threat of an imminent attack by a global superpower seeking regime change, nor was it surrounded by a hostile and more powerful military force as Iran is today.⁶

 

Nonetheless, the similarities remain striking, especially in terms of the internal struggle for democracy. A decidedly authoritarian system struggles to survive and perpetuate itself with increasing brutality and unscrupulousness, replete with state censorship, human rights abuses and political chicanery. It draws support from a minority of the population that was/is deeply loyal and ideologically committed to maintaining the status quo. Both political systems had international pariah status and were subject to broad UN economic sanctions, moral censure and ostracization. This contributed to a siege mentality within both South Africa and Iran that reinforced a sense of moral self-righteousness among ruling elites, which they regularly exploited to solidify their ranks, repel calls for change and pacify their opposition.

The democratic opposition – the ANC and the Green Movement – were no match for the power and prowess of the regimes that ruled over them. The repressive state apparatus in both South African and Iran had far greater resources to draw upon and were far superior to their rivals, in both military and economic terms. Internally, these opposition movements, despite being widely popular, were violently crushed due to state repression and surveillance and its key leaders were either in jail, under house arrest, in exile, or dead. As a result, appeals for international support and solidarity by the ANC/Green Movement emerged to form a core part of their democratization platforms and strategy (far more so in the case of the ANC, though it should be pointed out that the Green Movement is still in its infancy).

 

While other significant differences and similarities exist, these are some of the more salient ones.⁷ The lessons here for Iran’s Green Movement are several. In many ways the Green leadership has already adopted Said’s central point about moral clarity and consistency. At a recent gathering of Iranian journalists, Mir Hossein Mousavi stated that the Green Movement’s strength lies in its morality; in calling what is white, white and what is black, black.’⁸ Since the 2009 electoral coup, Mousavi, Karoubi and, to a lesser extent, Muhammad Khatami, have consistently and courageously spoken out against the injustices of Iran’s ruling elite. After a meeting in late August 2010, they issued a statement that condemned ‘the institutionalization of telling lies’ in Iran, noting that ‘they have been so caught up in telling lies that obtaining a true word from this government is like finding a precious gemstone.’⁹ 

The plight of political prisoners, the abuse of power, the constitutional and human rights of the people of Iran and a broad and persistent critique of the policies of Ahmadinejad’s ‘coup d’état government’ (as it is called within Iran), have been core features of the Green opposition’s strategy. While these criticisms are important and provide the movement with necessary leadership, looking ahead there is much more that can be done. Here are some key recommendations.

 

The task of ‘morally isolating’ your adversary must be sensitive to the context. Generally, advice for democratic movements from those living outside the country in question often suffers from the trap of ‘one-size-fits-all’ thinking. This is the fallacy of providing prescriptions while ignoring context, background and unique political sensitivities that could be exploited to crush democratic struggles. Thus, for example, what worked in Eastern Europe in the 1980s will not necessarily work in the Middle East in 2010.

In the context of contemporary Iran, morally isolating the Ahmadinejad government at the international level is an easy task, in large part because it is already so morally isolated by virtue of its own actions. While sympathy for Iran’s Green opposition is widespread, it is based more on revulsion for the current Iranian regime than on a clear-cut understanding of internal Iranian politics. At the popular level – especially in the West – there remains widespread ignorance of the Green Movement’s basic policies with respect to both internal political developments and especially those issues of global importance such as Iran’s nuclear programme, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

 

The Green Movement must do more to publicize its views internationally, especially throughout global civil society, by focusing on how the threat of a US/Israeli military strike undermines the internal struggle for democracy in Iran and generally how western policy toward Iran, both in the past and in the present, has more often strengthened political authoritarianism than Iranian democrats.¹⁰ A set of clear positions as to how those outside Iran can assist the Green Movement would be most helpful. Mehdi Karoubi’s advice to Iranian expatriates on the first anniversary of the Green Movement is most instructive in this regard, as are his views on UN sanctions.¹¹ 

The more important task, however, with respect to ‘morally isolating’ the Iranian regime, lies in the internal dimensions of this endeavour. A small but loyal percentage of the population, for a variety of reasons, still buys into the regime’s propaganda, particularly the claim that only Iran’s current rulers embody Islamic authenticity and Iranian nationalism.

 

Through its massive propaganda apparatus and tight control of the media, Iran’s oligarchs seek to convince the population that the Green Movement is not indigenous and has been manipulated, or is on the payroll of foreign powers that seek to subjugate Iran and compromise its political independence. The categorical rejection of foreign intervention is a unifying theme shared by Iranians across the political spectrum. Refuting these claims, however erroneous they may seem, remains a pressing task for the Green Movement and its supporters.¹² 

Second, Said’s discussion of ‘the reactivation of [human] will’ and the importance of the ‘revival of belief in the possibility that what human beings do can make a difference’ is essentially a call for new ideas of resistance, ideas that are both nonviolent in nature and morally symbolic in terms of their political impact.

For most of its first year, the Green Movement relied on street protests to express opposition and to rally supporters. After those protests were brutally suppressed and legal permission to demonstrate was denied, the only option advocated by the leadership was a general and somewhat vague call to establish ‘social networks’ and spread awareness about the political status quo among Iranians.

More can be done in this regard, and here Iran’s Greens need not reinvent the proverbial wheel. The key is to think in symbolic terms and to follow the lead of other democratic struggles. One concrete initiative is to keep alive the memories of fallen heroes and martyrs and to remember the plight of political prisoners. Neda Agha Sultan and Sohrab Aarabi, two students who were slain in the violent crackdown that followed the electoral coup, immediately come to mind. Their martyrdom, which was a reflection of the hundreds of deaths during this phase of Iran’s quest for democracy, should be annually commemorated.

 

Equally important is to remind the world of the plight of Iran’s political prisoners. Recall the important symbolic role Steven Biko played in the anti-apartheid struggle, both during his imprisonment and after his death. Abdollah Momeni and Majid Tavakoli are similarly heroic figures, both of them student leaders like Biko, worthy of admiration, respect and global name recognition.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of what Said called the ‘human dimension’ of democratic struggle and the demonstration of a ‘sincere willingness for coexistence’ and ‘firm belief in respecting the rights of others.’ In the context of Iran’s democratic struggle, this necessitates breaking the vicious historical cycle of bloodshed, reprisal and revenge which has characterized Iranian politics for far too long.

The Green Movement is best advised to reject this past and chart a new course rooted in nonviolence with the goal of national reconciliation. To its credit, these themes have already been stressed and repeatedly affirmed by the leadership. But to date no statement has been made or strategy suggested as to how the Green Movement seeks to deal with past human rights abuses and injustices such as those that occurred (and are occurring) at the notorious Evin and Kahrizak prisons.

 

An Iranian version of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is best advised. This could easily be justified on both secular and Islamic grounds by recalling the general political amnesty given by Prophet Muhammad when he defeated his rivals and recaptured Mecca in 630 AD.

While some Iranian intellectuals and activists have already made passing reference to such a commission, a clear statement by the leadership of the Green Movement on this issue would serve many purposes. Not only would it immediately change the moral language in Iran from ‘us’ versus ‘them’ to a new emphasis on ‘we’, a united collectivity seeking national reconciliation, forgiveness and justice, it would also send a strong message to regime loyalists, in particular the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia, that a democratic transition in Iran will not lead to political executions and acts of revenge, retaliation and violent retribution.

The Green Movement’s non-violent orientation can best be affirmed by continuing to articulate a clear nonviolent future for Iranian society that marks a historical break with the past and which is rooted in lessons from other political struggles that have universal appeal, such as the anti-colonial movement in India, the African-American struggle for civil rights in America and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.

Edward Said’s advice for the Palestinian leadership as articulated in his ‘Strategies of Hope’ essay was never taken seriously. Rather than investing in their own people and in a global campaign of grassroots mobilization based on an ANC model, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas repeatedly chose to compromise with established power along the lines of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the tribal chieftain and apartheid collaborator. The hope from these Palestinians was always that powerful political forces in Washington DC could pressure Israel and deliver Palestinian independence from above.

As we approach the 20th anniversary of the Oslo Accords, the collective plight of the Palestinians today remains far worse than when the Oslo peace process began. The failure of leadership has been central to this story. South Africa, by contrast, despite many internal problems, has a far brighter future and has effectively consolidated its democracy.

If there are lessons here for Iran’s Green Movement, they are best advised to engage in a careful comparative study of emancipatory struggles for which the ANC and the South African experience serve as a shining example, just as the PLO and the Palestinian leadership remains a case study in how not to lead a successful movement for democratic transition and self-determination.

 

* Nader Hashemi is the author of Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (Oxford University Press, 2009) and co-editor of The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future (Melville House, 2011).

 

Footnotes:

1. Edward W. Said, Identity, Authority and Freedom: The Potentate and the Traveller. University of Cape Town 31st T.B. Davie Memorial Lecture, 22 May 1991.

2. The essay first appeared in Arabic in Al Hayat, 25 September 1997 and in English in Al Ahram Weekly, 25 September-1October 1997. It was republished in Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After. Pantheon, New York, 2000, pp. 193-199. All quotations are from this version.

3. For details see, ‘The Incalculable Loss: Conversations with Noam Chomsky’, in Adel Iskandar and Hakem Rustom (eds.), Edward Said: A Legacy of Emancipation and Representation. University of California Press, Berkeley, 2010, pp. 381-383.

4. Shibley Telhami, ‘A Shift in Arab Views on Iran’, Los Angeles Times, 14 August 2010. Also see the 2010 Arab Public Opinion Survey by Shibley Telhami at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx

5. Mark Tran, ‘Tony Blair: West Should Use Force if Iran "Continues to Develop Nuclear Weapons",’ The Guardian, 1 September 2010; ‘ "Neuter" Iran, U.S. Senator Tells Conference’, CBC News, 8 November 2010. Also see Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Point of no Return’, The Atlantic, September 2010 and Newt Gingrich’s speech, ‘America at Risk’, at the American Enterprise Institute, 29 July 2010.

6. The claim that South was internationally isolated is not entirely correct. During the 1980s under the Reagan Administration US trade actually increased, despite Congressional sanctions. There was also US support for South Africa policy in the region and as late as 1988 the ANC was officially viewed as a terrorist organization. Nelson Mandela was only recently taken off the US terrorism list.

7. A critical difference is that in the Iranian case the opposition leadership was formerly part of the ruling regime and still supports the ideals of the 1979 Revolution and the political theology of Ayatullah Khomeini (properly understood). As a result, they adopt a policy of reform, not a comprehensive overhaul of the Islamic Republic’s system leading to a revolution. On this point the South African case is qualitatively different. Also, the ANC supported sanctions against South Africa while the Green Movement leadership opposes existing UN sanctions against Iran. However, carefully targeted sanctions that focus on Islamic Revolutionary Guards and key figures in the regime affiliated with human rights abuses has the support of leading intellectuals from the Green Movement.

8. Mir Hossein Mousavi, ‘The Multiplicity of Imprisoned Journalists Speaks to the Legitimacy of the Green Movement’, 4 August 2010, http://www.kaleme.com/1389/05/13/klm-27824

9. ‘Meeting Between Karoubi and Mousavi on the Eve of Quds Day’, 2 September 2010. From Karoubi’s personal website available at: http://www.sahamnews.org/?p=7153

10. Muhammad Sahimi, ‘Toward a Green Foreign Policy for Iran’, 4 September 2010, Tehranbureau.com. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/09/toward-a-green-foreign-policy-for-iran.html

11. Masih Alinejad, ‘The Green Movement at Year One: An Interview with Mehdi Karoubi’, Jaras, 26 May 2010. Available at: http://sahamnews.org/?p=2969. An English translation can be found at: http://khordaad88.com/?p=1619. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Iran Sanctions Strengthen Ahmadinejad Regime – Karroubi’, The Guardian, 11 August 2010.

12. The leadership of the Green Movement is acutely aware of the propaganda tactic. See Mousavi’s Iranian new year message in March 2010 on ‘patience and endurance’ where he specifically speaks to and repudiates these accusations while recognizing that respecting the religious sentiments of society and reaching out to the pious are important goals that will push the movement forward. In Mousavi’s own words: ‘Another point is to take into account people’s religious inclinations. The government has embarked on negative propaganda against us in order to make the society believe that we have changed our religious views. We have to convince people these are merely lies and accusations. We have to strengthen our bonds with the grand ayatollahs and the clergy in a bid to thwart their legend.’ Excerpts available from the Los Angeles Times Middle East blog, ‘Babylon and Beyond’, 16 March 2010.