IN Bangladesh, political power can be held only by three parties: the Awami League, the BNP, and the army.¹

Civil-military relations in Bangladesh are not a matter for abstract and academic contemplation with relevance only for discrete ministries and constituencies. The ever-evolving negotiations and complex division of power between military and civilian authorities lie at the heart of Bangladesh’s political reality.

To fully appreciate the Bangladeshi polity, it is important to grasp the subtleties and nuances of the relations between the army and the democratically elected civilian governments and understand how the imperatives of the armed forces influence and restrain elected governments, even when the military remains in its barracks and away from the seat of power.

The question of civil-military relations appears even more crucial in light of the fact that a military-backed caretaker government was in power as recently as from 2007 to 2008. Though prior to this interregnum Bangladesh had enjoyed 16 years of more or less stable democratic rule from 1991 to 2006, the caretaker government’s two-year rule suggests that the democratic dispensation in Bangladesh remains fragile and that civil-military relations constitute a crucial point of negotiation for any elected government.

Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the caretaker government that took over power on 11 January 2007 was very different from the martial law regimes that had ruled Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s, and that a unique set of circumstances, both internal and external, combined to bring it to power.

Thus, before we point to the two years of interregnum rule by the military backed caretaker government after 1/11 as evidence of the armed forces’ atavistic impulse to exercise political power, we need to examine the fundamental nature of the 1/11 regime and the differences between it and the army regimes that ruled Bangladesh in the past.

Even though 1/11 has been described as a ‘soft coup’ or ‘the coup that dare not speak its name’,² appreciating the fundamental differences between the 1/11 regime and earlier martial law regimes and understanding how and why the army limited its engagement in the political process is critical to making sense of the time period and the attendant implications for Bangladesh’s political future and the dimensions of civil-military relations.

 

The most noteworthy element of the 1/11 regime was the extent to which it went to maintain arguable constitutional legitimacy and to rule through a constitutionally legitimate caretaker government, rather than to simply declare martial law. The reason for this was twofold, and both reasons are critical to our analysis of the fundamental nature of the regime. The first is that the regime understood the importance of international legitimacy and acceptability, and at all times was acutely conscious of international public opinion and international law.

The external context is crucial to appreciating the difference between the 1/11 regime and the martial law regimes that came before it. In 2007, the world was not only a very different place than in the 1970s and 1980s, the international community’s tolerance for military dictatorships too was far lower than what it once was. The significance of this change in international public opinion becomes apparent when we look at the imperatives of the 1/11 regime and indeed of the Bangladesh armed forces today. In a world in which the Bangladesh economy depends on annual garment exports of $12 billion and where the principal source of financial security for its military personnel is UN peace keeping missions, no Bangladesh army chief will break the consensus of the international community and risk isolating his regime.

 

To act in contravention of international public opinion or international law would not only run the risk of incurring crippling economic sanctions, but of the Bangladesh army losing its lucrative UN peace keeping missions.³ It was these considerations that were behind the 1/11 regime’s decision to govern using the constitutional legitimacy of a caretaker government, rather than suspend the constitution and declare martial law.

In other words, since the international community is no longer willing to countenance the overthrow of a democratically elected government, the Bangladesh army is so beholden to UN peace keeping, and the Bangladesh economy is so reliant on global market access, the army cannot afford the consequences of overthrowing an elected government. Indeed, I see no evidence that the army has either the inclination or the incentive to act in the absence of a green light from the international community.⁴ 

But precisely what was green lighted was also significant. The international community gave the green light for a limited period of interregnum army backed rule that had arguable constitutional legitimacy, specific goals in furtherance of good governance and credible elections, and a set time frame for relinquishing power and holding elections.

 

At no point in time did the international community evince any appetite for a more expansive martial law regime in Bangladesh and at no point in time did the army seek to act in contravention of international public opinion. One analyst has argued persuasively that UN peace keeping has put the Bangladesh army out of the coup business,⁵ and I believe that this analysis still holds true. Earning money through running UN peace keeping missions is a far steadier and safer route to financial security than trying to run the country. Additionally, the spoils of UN peace keeping per colate down to enlisted men as well as junior officers, whereas the spoils of martial law only tend to be concentrated in the hands of senior officers.

No less important to understanding 1/11 is the recognition that the 1/11 regime was at all times also conscious of internal public opinion and worked hard to act in accordance with it. The army only mobilized when the situation around the country had deteriorated to a near civil-war situation due to the BNP government’s determination to rig the elections slated for 22 January 2007 and the AL-led opposition’s violent resistance to these efforts.

The fact that the army considered itself constrained by domestic public opinion is very relevant to both understanding 1/11 and assessing the army’s current posture and the future of civil-military relations. The public welcomed 1/11 as the country was then teetering on the brink of a civil war between the two main political parties. Even as the public was willing to give the caretaker government the two years it said it needed to clean up politics and hold free and fair elections, available evidence also suggests that the public would not have countenanced a longer period of non-democratic interregnum.⁶

 

There can be no doubt that the 1/11 regime did want to bring fundamental change to the Bangladeshi polity, pursuant to which hundreds of political leaders, including the two ex-prime ministers were charged with corruption and incarcerated. However, while the army juggled through various exit strategy scenarios, all contemplated an election within two years. Equally, while the army certainly aimed to weaken the hold of the two ex-prime ministers over their parties as well as to dismantle the parties and to promote new political parties, it did not at any moment seriously contemplate either direct martial law or forming its own party.

In the final analysis, the army did what it said it would do. It held effective power for a limited time period, worked hard to operate constitutionally under a civilian government, tried to reform the political system, and set in place institutional reforms so that democracy would function better. When its attempts to remake the polity ran afoul of public opinion, it not only abandoned them, it voluntarily relinquished power when it said it would and administered the most credible elections in the history of the country.⁷ 

There is one final point to be made about the circumstances that gave rise to 1/11. It was not just that the preceding democratically elected BNP-led government had set new standards for corruption and abuse of power, another crucial consideration was that the BNP had manipulated the electoral system for the upcoming elections under the aegis of a hand-picked partisan election commission. No matter how bad the government may have been, had there been a mechanism in place allowing for its peaceful removal, there would have been no public support for the army to step in and oversee elections, and the army would not have acted.

 

It was the BNP’s attempted subversion of the electoral system that both precipitated the need for the army to step in to (paradoxically) preserve the democratic system and also ensured that there would be strong public support for limited military involvement in furtherance of this goal. Thus, we can see the fundamental difference between the 1/11 regime and a martial law regime and also appreciate precisely what stars need to be in alignment, both internally and externally, for there to remain a credible threat of future army interventions in Bangladesh politics.

Not only is there no support for full martial law within the country, even a more limited engagement such as 1/11 is only possible if it is in accordance with both domestic and international public opinion, domestic and international law, and if an unpopular ruling party attempts to subvert the democratic process by rigging the elections to stay in power. In the absence of these three crucial factors coming together, there is no need to fear a recurrence of 1/11.

 

The 1/11 regime and its aftermath have, however, altered civil-military relations in ways which are still unfolding and have yet to be fully appreciated. Prior to 1/11, the army had always been more pro-BNP than AL. This is understandable given the AL’s historic struggle for supremacy with the army during and after the war of liberation and the fact that the BNP was a party born in the cantonment and founded by a military ruler.⁸

This pro-BNP sentiment within the army has always been a massive advantage for the party, both in terms of popular perception, which held that a party backed by the army has a more stable and secure power base, and in terms of limiting the AL’s scope for action that might run counter to army interests.⁹ Initially, one of the most significant outcomes of 1/11 was that it up-ended the conventional wisdom and drove a wedge between the army and the BNP. Had the army not stepped in when it did, the BNP would have been able to hold its fraudulent elections and remain in power.

Thus, for an ostensibly pro-BNP army, and led by officers hand-picked by the party, to thwart the BNP’s machinations, was an unexpected break from the past and signalled that the BNP could no longer count on unstinting army support. The army’s anti-corruption drive not only principally targeted BNP politicians, the alleged mistreatment of senior BNP leaders, including the son of the ex-prime minister, in custody, may have permanently strained relations between the army and the party.

In the final analysis, when the army realized that it could not remake Bangladesh’s polity and that it would have to come to an arrangement with one of the two ex-prime ministers in order to facilitate a smooth exit strategy and ensure its own security after return to civilian rule, it ended up plumping for the AL.¹⁰ Perhaps it had little choice. The AL was the party that would likely win a free and fair election and the BNP was the party which was more compromised in terms of corruption, the crackdown on which the army had made the centrepiece of its mission.¹¹ 

Finally, the army had much more to fear from a BNP government than an AL government due to the fact that it was the BNP’s machinations to stay in power that had been thwarted by its intervention.¹² 1/11 thus had the effect of realigning the army in terms of its partner of choice among the political parties.¹³ 

 

However, whatever goodwill had been created within the army for the AL as a result of 1/11 and its aftermath, quickly dissipated when the AL presided over a massacre of 54 army officers in a border guard mutiny in February 2009. Significantly, the PM resisted the pressure to order an all-out military offensive against the mutinous border guards, and the army chief of staff, Gen. Moeen, the key man behind the 1/11 regime, resisted pressure from his officers and abided by the PM’s decision.

The anger within the army that resulted from the massacre and the belief that the atrocities could have been contained had the army been given the green light to act, destroyed whatever goodwill there was between the army and the AL, leaving the relations between the current government and the army in tatters.¹⁴ 

The end result is an armed forces with strained relations with both the major political parties. The benefit of this is that the army is unlikely to take sides between the two parties and is also likely to remain more isolated from the political process. The obvious downside is that such isolation means that the army’s stake in the political process is diminished and the chances of extra-constitutional involvement in the future may increase.

 

Bangladesh is not Pakistan. The relation that its military has with the people and the polity is very different. The Bangladesh army does not have the outsize role or influence on society and in policy-making that the Pakistan army has. Nevertheless, it is not as though the Bangladesh army is powerless or has no impact on affairs of state. Every civilian government has to make accommodations with the army and there is always a very careful negotiation between the army and the civilian government of the day on issues relating to national security.¹⁵ 

The first relevant issue for consideration is: what are the chances of another army takeover? The failure of 1/11 to bring about long-term change and the difficulty the army faced in running the country, together with the public’s limited appetite for even a limited period of non-democratic rule, would suggest that the army’s interest and ability to take power again anytime soon is very constrained.

It is always possible that the internal and external factors that bought about 1/11 may again recrudesce – that the AL government will govern horrendously, further institutionalize corruption and be reluctant to face the people’s verdict in a fair election – such that the country will once again be in the same situation as pertained before 1/11, only with the BNP and AL’s roles reversed.

 

However, the internal political situation would have to deteriorate dramatically and the AL would have to demonstrate its unwillingness to hold credible elections, before the international community as well as the general public would countenance any action by the army. In fact, with the signal failure of 1/11, the appetite for supporting, even tacitly, such intervention remains very limited. And without support, both domestically and internationally, I cannot see the army moving sua sponte.

A more pertinent question, perhaps, is what role the army will continue to play in terms of our electoral politics and day-to-day governance. This is harder to predict. The uncertainty comes from the fact that 1/11 and the BDR mutiny have had the cumulative effect of almost completely isolating the army from both the BNP and the AL. If 1/11 destroyed the relationship between the army and the BNP, then the BDR mutiny and massacre destroyed the relationship between the army and the AL.¹⁶ 

Thus, while support, either inside the country or without, for another military intervention, either direct or indirect, is unlikely to be forthcoming, it would be a mistake to be too complacent. The isolation from both political parties that exists within the army alongside the level of disenchantment with civilian rule, exacerbated by the fact that the current government has not only reversed virtually all the reforms put in place by the 1/11 regime but also that malgovernance and corruption continue as if 1/11 had never happened, fuels strong anti-civilian government/anti-political party resentment within the army and should be a significant cause for concern.

As with every political issue in Bangladesh, much hinges on the government’s ability to deliver during the remaining years of its tenure in office. Thus far the signs are not good, and the country is already reeling from the effects of power and water crises that the government appears unable to resolve.¹⁷ Though the macro-economic outlook remains reasonably healthy, how much longer the country can continue to post the economic growth necessary to create jobs and cut poverty remains in question.¹⁸ 

The one bright sign is that the government seems to be letting the election commission do its job without hindrance, as evidenced by the recent victory of the BNP supported candidate in the Chittagong mayoral election. If the government refrains from interfering in the electoral process and allows free elections at the end of its term, there will be no excuse for the army to step in once again. However, if this government goes down the path of authoritarianism trod by the last elected government and refuses to countenance a free and fair election, and if the only guarantor of the democratic process in the long run is the army, then public opinion, both internal and external, could shift rapidly. Then all bets are off.

In the words of one analyst: ‘The chances of a return to autocratic rule around 2012 are higher than we think. On the back of widespread break-down of law and order amid economic failure, I would not so readily dismiss that scenario.’¹⁹

 

Footnotes:

1. Afsan Chowdhury, ‘Happily Ever After?’ Forum, January 2009.

2. ‘Bangladesh: The Coup That Dare Not Speak Its Name’, The Economist, 20 January 2007.

3. See, e.g. Farid Bakht, ‘Which Way to Mauritania?’ The Daily Star, 5 March 2006.

4. See, e.g., Omar Khasru, ‘Renata Lok Dessallien Departs’, New Age, 19 April 2010.

5. Chowdhury, op cit.

6. See, e.g., The Daily Star-Nielsen Opinion Poll, 21 November 2008 and The Daily Star-Nielsen Opinion Poll, 25 December 2008.

7. See, e.g., Rashida Ahmed, ‘The 1/11 Paradox’, Forum, March 2009.

8. See, e.g., Syeed Ahamed, ‘The Argumentative Oligarchs’, Forum, July 2007.

9. Ahamed, ibid.

10. Rehman Sobhan, ‘Exit Strategies’, Forum, January 2009.

11. Sobhan, ibid.

12. Sobhan, ibid.

13. Chowdhury, op cit.

14. See, e.g. Shamsuddin Chowdhury, ‘Brothers in Arms’, Forum, April 2009; Jyoti Rahman, ‘Picking Through the Wreckage’, Forum, April 2009.

15. See, e.g., Afsan Chowdhury, ‘What Lies Below’, Forum, April 2009.

16. Shahedul Anam Khan, ‘Untangling the Web’, Forum, April 2009.

17. See, e.g., ‘If Bangladesh Doesn’t Act Now, There Will Not Be a Second Chance’. Interview with Dr. Gus Papanek, The Daily Star, 25 April 2010.

18. Papanek, ibid.

19. Farid Bakht, ‘Getting Beyond a Thousand Days’, Forum, January 2009.