The problem

THE military has always been a Janus-faced institution in the polity. Whilst its principal orientation is external, its overwhelming coercive power makes it an important player in internal affairs too. The question of how to guard ourselves against the guardians has been a recurrent theme in political theory and statecraft. The role of military establishments in South Asia (and more broadly the Third World) was the focus of a considerable body of western research in the three decades following decolonization. Much of this work was undertaken within the analytical and ideological framework of ‘modernization’ theories. They attached considerable importance to the structure of the societies in which the militaries operated. The institutional characteristics of the militaries themselves were considered only insofar as they were often the only ‘modern’ institution in a traditional society undergoing transition from agrarian-feudal structures and modes of political behaviour to industrial-capitalist ones. In consequence, two questions came to dominate the study of civil-military relations in these countries: Under what conditions do military coups occur? And to what extent was the military a force for modernization?

Developments in South Asia over the past decade and a half call into the question the utility of an approach to understanding civil-military relations that focuses excessively, not to say exclusively, on coups. The possibility of seizure of power by the military is certainly a live problem in some countries of the region. But coups are actions that lie at the far edge of a spectrum of military involvement in politics. The mere absence of coups can hardly suffice as an indicator of the military’s subordinate role in the political system. We need to have a more nuanced sense of how military considerations impinge on policy, politics and society – both overtly and subtly. The framework of ‘modernization’, too, seems excessively stylized and restrictive. It gives short shrift to the particular historical contexts in which militaries develop as institutions, and the importance of the international and internal environments in which they function.

The removal of this straitjacket opens up a number of interesting and important questions. Take the case of India, a stable democracy where the military is held to be entirely subordinate to political authority. The military has certainly played no overt role in politics – even the number of former military personnel entering party and electoral politics remains negligible. But on certain key issues and under certain conditions the military does seem to encroach on the civilian domain. The control of strategy – the link between political ends and military means – is one such issue. In theory, questions surrounding the use of force are determined by the political leadership. But, in practice, the military – the professional manager of the application of force – tends to resist excessive civilian involvement. Most western democracies struggle to resolve this tension. To what extent can this be observed in the Indian system and why? Does the military’s operational expertise enable it to constrain the policy options of its civilian masters? After all, the available means will also influence the choice of ends. If the application of force is internal rather than external, does the military exercise significant influence on political choices?

Indeed, civil-military interaction in dealing with insurgencies raises an important set of questions. The army might ostensibly be functioning under the local political authority, but to what extent is it really responsive to the latter? Does the creation of a unified chain of command, incorporating civilian and military decision-makers, enable better control of the military? Does the presence of former military personnel in the civilian hierarchy, especially as governors, lend the military greater weight in matters of politics and policy? Given considerable levels of mistrust between the military and local political leaders, is there adequate civilian control over strategy and operations? Addressing such questions will be essential to get a more fine-grained understanding of how civil-military relations play out in practice.

Another aspect of Indian civil-military relations that needs examination is the constitutional arrangement for maintaining civilian control over the armed forces. To be sure, the military has not posed any threat to the endurance of the constitution. But to what extent has its employment and functioning comported with constitutional principles? How do the special powers granted to the armed forces in certain situations affect the norm of civilian control? Have the courts paid adequate attention to the relationship between military power and the constitution? These issues have so far barely been addressed.

The obverse of these concerns about civilian control of the military is the military’s effectiveness as a professional force. After all, we want the military not only to remain subordinate but also achieve the objectives set out for it. There is real force to the argument that excessive focus on issues of control obscures the need to ensure effectiveness. To what extent has the nature of civil-military relations in India obstructed the process of military modernization? Conversely, will a modernized military possess greater heft as an institutional player? Is there any prospect of the emergence of a military-industrial complex as military modernization proceeds apace? Most importantly, have we ended up with the worst of all worlds, that is, a military that is neither particularly subordinate on strategic questions nor particularly effective?

Further, there is the intriguing question of civilian control of intelligence agencies – a relationship that has interesting parallels and links with civilian control of the military. How does the political system ensure control and supervision of intelligence activities? What does the imperative of secrecy imply for our notions of control? Does India have the requisite constitutional and legislative mechanisms for oversight? These questions acquire greater urgency in countries that have experienced long spells of military rule in the past. For the intelligence agencies would maintain close links with the military and would likely have troubled relations with political leaders. What, then, are the prospects of establishing effective control over the agencies?

The experience of India’s neighbours suggests important questions pertaining to civil-military relations as well. Consider the case of Pakistan. The military has governed the country for fairly long stretches. Has this been solely due to the weaknesses of the political system? To what extent do the military’s institutional norms and narratives shape its behaviour? Has the prolonged rivalry with India had an impact on the civil-military balance?

Another interesting question is why the military in Pakistan and in Bangladesh is now inclined towards a pattern of ‘informal control’, whereby it continues to remain the most powerful actor, but prefers to not to get into the business of governance? The reasons for this shift are evidently not confined to the domain of elite interactions and are related to the military’s penetration of domestic political economy. The military controls and profits from numerous civilian industries and business establishments. Its increasing economic clout has clearly lent confidence to the military establishment in its ability to preserve and advance its corporate interests. This trend was visible in China in the early 1990s (before the party and the government commenced divestiture of the army’s corporate assets) and can be seen in Thailand today. Myanmar is another instance of a state where the military has entrenched itself in the political economy. Recent developments in Myanmar indicate that the military leadership is seeking to create fresh constitutional structures and embed itself in new forms of governance. How do we account for such changes in patterns of military rule?

The experience of Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka also suggests interesting ways in which the persistence of internal conflicts endows the military with certain kinds of legitimacy. It is interesting to speculate whether the termination of these conflicts might result in any shifts in the balance between the civilians and the military. Developments in Sri Lanka and Nepal suggest that notwithstanding the wider militarization of the polity, the issue of formal control over the military tends to acquire considerable importance.

It may be useful to compare their experience with that of another state and army that emerged from a long-standing civil war: China. In the early decades of the People’ Republic, the party and the army were closely intertwined. But over the last thirty years there has been a steady move towards separating the two and imposing formal controls on the army. Why and to what extent have these been successful? How are civil-military relations in China likely to develop? And what might this imply for China’s new role as a great power?

As this brief discussion suggests, there are numerous fresh avenues of inquiry to be pursued about the relationship between soldiers and states in India and its neighbourhood. This issue of Seminar hopes to take some first steps in this direction.