NEPAL assumed three new fundamental identities – secular, federal and republic, one after another – once King Gyanendra, under the pressure of a powerful mass movement, handed over power that he had exercised absolutely for 15 months since 1 February 2005. In fact, he handed over power in April 2006. The event also marked a clear gesture from the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) that it was willing to join the democratic mainstream and give up the decade long armed insurgency that they had initiated in February 1996 with the avowed objective of turning Nepal into a republic.

Within hours of the constituent assembly adopting the pro-republic resolution on 8 May 2008, Gyanendra said he would honour the decision and vacate the throne that he occupied as the 12th king of the Shah dynasty that Prithvi Naryan, architect of modern Nepal (won through a military victory in 1768) had founded. Gyanendra not only kept his word and vacated the Narayanhiti Palace within the deadline the government had set, but also declared he would not leave Nepal and stay on as a commoner.

The monarchy is now history, but none the three fundamental identities are as yet firmly institutionalized. Though the country is currently guided by an interim constitution and has an elected constituent assembly (CA) with 601 members, there is considerable doubt and even skepticism that a new constitution would actually be promulgated by the deadline of May 2010. No wonder, pessimism and disappointment have replaced the euphoria that ruled the country in the aftermath of the successful mass movement. The question that is asked at home and by representatives of the international community is: Will the new constitution be ready within the agreed time frame? And, what will be the likely consequences if the deadline is not met? According to the interim constitution, the deadline can at best be extended by six months, and that too only if a state of emergency is declared in the country.

The earlier agreement among political parties that they would take all major decisions through consensus has already collapsed. The first government that took over immediately after the successful mass movement had all the major political parties – Nepali Congress, CPN-M and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) – as members. But since the Maoists emerged as the largest party, though without an absolute majority in the constituent assembly elected in April 2008, the Nepali Congress, the second largest party, chose to sit in the opposition. The Maoist led government resigned after ten months in office within hours of President Rambaran Yadav vetoing the dismissal of the army chief by Prime Minister Prachanda. The CPN-M, in turn, saw this move of the president as an affront to the principle of civilian supremacy, and now wants the present government led by Madhav Nepal, which they call an ‘illegitimate’ one, dismissed. What has created a political deadlock for the past five months is the Maoist’s rigid demands and a spate of agitations for correcting the ‘president’s mistake’ alongside the government’s refusal to yield.

 

These developments have not only obstructed the politics of consensus, but ensured that even the minimal understanding required for a workable arrangement has become a casualty. The functioning of the CA, mainly in regard to the constitution drafting process, remains stalled, forcing the time schedule announced earlier to be amended for the seventh time. Consequently, the political parties have been unable to finalize both the modality of federalism as well as the political system that the future constitution is to adopt.

The Maoists want Nepal split into 15 provinces, drawn up mostly on the basis of ethnicity and with the right to self-determination. The Congress Party, the second largest in the CA, is still confused about the basis of federalism, while there are many others, members of political parties and representatives of civil society organizations, who are convinced that a model of federalism on caste or ethnic lines can only lead to the disintegration of the country that has about 103 ethnic groups. Similarly, the major political parties remain divided on the modality of the political system. The Maoists, for instance, insist that they will not accept the parliamentary form of government, something that the Nepali Congress does not want to compromise on. So far there has been no substantive debate on the sharing of powers between the Centre and the provinces.

 

The Maoists also want a captive judiciary accountable to the legislature, a proposal that goes totally against the principle of separation of powers. In fact, the CA’s thematic committee on judiciary, in which both the chairperson as well as a majority of the members are from the CPN-M, has recommended that the legislature – and not the Supreme Court – should be the final interpreter of the constitution in case of any dispute. It has also proposed that the judges should be appointed from outside the bar and by the legislature, instead of being drawn from the judicial establishment.

Federalism, the model of the political system, or the independence of judiciary are not the only issues that divide the different parties. In fact, the collapse of the politics of consensus – that was the common pledge and spirit of the interim constitution – has pushed Nepal’s politics towards uncertainty. The United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) that was assigned to manage ‘arms and army personnel of both sides’ (state and Maoist combatants), is now trying to secure another six months extension beyond 23 January 2010 as Maoist combatants – around 19,000 as verified by UNMIN – are yet to be rehabilitated and integrated into the armed forces.¹ The plight of 4000 plus child soldiers too remains uncertain as there are no concrete plans for their integration in society. All this indicates that the future of peace is far from secure.

 

The situation may have been different had the signatories to the peace process honoured the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between Prime Minister G.P. Koirala on behalf of the then government and Prachanda on behalf of the CPN-M or the rebels on 21 November 2006. Though through the CPA, the Maoists had declared an ‘end to the war that has been going on since 1996’,² three years later, not only do key provisions of the CPA remain unfulfilled, even the code of conduct is not adhered to by either side.

Neither side, for instance, has publicized details of the disappeared persons or those killed during the conflict with their real name, surname and residential address within the stipulated 60 days, or even notified their families. Even the high level Truth and Reconciliation Commission ‘to conduct investigation about those who were involved in gross violation of human rights at the time of conflict and those who committed crimes against humanity and to create a situation of reconciliation in the society,’³ is yet to be formed. Similarly, the Maoists are still to return the property of individuals and the state that they had confiscated during the years of conflict. As a result, relations between the two sides are strained by an absence of mutual confidence. Proper confidence building exercises and implementation of the key provisions of the CPA might have kept the politics of consensus intact.

 

The international players have advised the Nepali actors that it is perhaps time to form a national unity government so that the new constitution could be promulgated on time,⁴ a proposal that most political parties in Nepal, except the Maoists, have criticized as constituting undue interference in the country’s internal affairs. The Maoists, in turn, insist that a national unity government under their leadership (since they are the single largest party) is an essential condition for smooth journey of the peace and constitution writing process. Clearly, Nepal’s current politics is driven more by the equation of numbers commanded by different parties than any principles and the spirit of consensus that was born soon after the 2006 movement. Unfortunately, a revival of that spirit does not seem to be anywhere in the offing.

India, with ultra-left violence posing a threat to its internal peace, had at that stage taken the initiative to steer the Nepali Maoists into mainstream politics – perhaps as an experiment in its backyard that is so strategically important for it. The unity between pro-democracy forces and armed Maoists would never have been possible without India taking the lead. That is why it is seen as much of a player as most Nepali actors. Now, with the prospects of failure dogging the peace process, there is no dearth of people and forces – Nepalis and outsiders – labelling it India’s failure in equal measure. After all, India was both guarantor as well as facilitator of the peace process.⁵

The International Crisis Group, like some other European groups, seems to believe that India has of late moved away from its initial project of taking the peace process to its logical conclusion. Instead, it now seems more concerned about the fulfillment of its short-term goals. Not only does India continue to interfere in Nepal’s domestic affairs, but it also opposes any reform in the Nepal Army. This comment of the ICG emanates from India’s visible support to the Nepal Army when President Yadav reinstated army chief Katawal soon after his dismissal by Prachanda in May 2009.

 

It was, however, not only India but many Nepali actors too who did not feel comfortable with Prachanda sacking the army chief. The move was seen as a clear ploy to divide and demolish the Nepal Army that was seen as a psychological barrier or force which had stopped the Maoists from capturing state power during the years of insurgency. Even after joining the peace process, the Maoists chose to denigrate the Nepal Army as an institution loyal to the king. Even though the Nepal Army did not oppose the country becoming a republic, it did not change the Maoist attitude. For one, the Nepal Army continues to be suspicious of the Maoists as its combatants – although confined to the UNMIN monitored cantonments – have often come out bearing arms in the public arena, thus violating the CPA. Second, the Maoist chief, Prachanda, going by his in-camera address to party cadres, had clearly admitted that joining the peace process was more of a tactical move than a real ‘change of heart’.⁶ The rift and distrust between the Maoists and the army, alongside the accompanying political polarization, is once again pushing parties to the CPA apart.

The Nepal Army, for instance, has all along resisted the CPN-M demand that all its combatants as a group should be inducted into the army. Instead, it insists that the entry can only be symbolic, to be decided on a case-to-case basis depending on individual qualifications and eligibility. It argues that the entry of politically indoctrinated individuals as a group will destroy the ‘apolitical character’ of the Nepal Army. The issue remains unsettled and volatile.

 

Similarly, the Maoists, backed by the UNMIN, have successfully stalled any fresh import of arms and ammunition for the Nepal Army, even for its regular training. As a result, most of its training institutes have suffered. Moreover, about 8,500 vacancies have not been filled in for the same reason. India, United Kingdom and the United States have refused to resume supply of arms to the Nepal Army, suspended when the king took over on 1 February 2005, even after the restoration of democracy. The issue may turn into a flashpoint of conflict as Defence Minister Bidhya Bhandari has already asked India to resume the supply and there is speculation that India is considering the request.

India’s direct and perhaps more visible role in the peace process, as well as its abandoning the long pursued twin pillar theory – backing the monarchy and democratic forces in Nepal – has had a direct bearing on China’s Nepal policy. Despite being a communist country, China had developed a relation of trust and partnership with the monarchy from the late 1950s. Its concerns about Tibet were appreciated by the palace, giving no ground for China to complain. But with the monarchy now gone, China is not only looking for fresh partners and allies in Nepal, it has also moved away from its earlier policy of implicitly going along with India’s primacy of interest in Nepal vis-a-vis China.

 

In the past three years of political change, China has sent at least 30 high level political and military delegations to Nepal. The Maoists, in a slight alteration of Nepal’s policy of ‘equidistance between the two neighbours, have said that they will pursue a policy of ‘equiproximity’. China has not only increased its interest and presence in Nepal in the aftermath of the 2006 political change and downfall of the monarchy, it has aggressively taken up developmental projects in areas along the border. And of late, it has begun to investment in Nepal’s hydro-projects, an area that India had always sought to monopolize. Nepal’s journey to federalism – a much weaker Centre alongside powerful and perhaps autonomous provinces – is also pushing China into establishing new relationships with regional parties, including the ones with their base in the Terai, an area in the plain congruous to Indian border.

Last year, a high level delegation of the Chinese Communist Party attended the party conference of the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), a Terai-based party. As China is aware that uncertainty and chaos are likely to prevail in Nepal for some years to come, it wants to sign new treaties with Nepal to define and legitimize its role in the South. Though efforts following Prachanda’s visit to China as Prime Minister in May 2009 have got derailed after his resignation, China is clear that it needs to build and expand relations with Nepal at par with India. As the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 and related official exchange, many argue, brings Nepal closer to India’s security umbrella, the Maoists want the treaty scrapped altogether while other parties want it amended.

 

The CPA envisages a democratization of the Nepal Army, including determining the right size against the existing strength of 85,000, ‘preparing the democratic structure reflecting the national and inclusive character, and training them on democratic principles and human rights values.’⁷ Most European countries, but mainly DFID (UK), have come forward in a big way to guide and assist the government in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) through partner NGOs in the country. However, the instability of the government, fragility of the coalition and the compromises it has to make for survival, has only forced political parties to push major policies on the back burner. Army leaders, in turn, say that ‘the issue of structural change and rightsizing the army should be taken up only by the government elected under the new constitution taking into account the security situation of the country.’⁸

At one level, the silencing of guns over the past four years has somehow given a sense of security to the people of Nepal. But that has also given legitimacy to the politics of violence in Nepal. Close to a hundred armed outfits – mostly in the Terai area – have emerged in the post 2006 period, and most of them claim to have a political motive and orientation.

At least three such outfits – two of them breakaway groups from the CPN-M – have their own private armies. With Maoist combatants yet to be rehabilitated, and with different ethnic and ‘political outfits’ raising their own armies, Nepal’s journey to peace and democracy looks much blurred. A properly managed transition and implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement alone will ensure peace and constitutional order. There are unlikely to be any short-cut to that.

 

The Maoists’ plan to unilaterally declare provinces without waiting for political consensus has the potential to derail the entire peace process. ‘This will amount to calling off peace process unilaterally and may be called a rebellion against the state.’⁹ If perchance this happens, it has the potential of turning Nepal into a zone of civil unrest, if war is too strong a word at the moment. Caste and ethnicity as the main basis of state formation may begin a never-ending process as the less dominant castes will seek to established their own provinces and languages.

The absence of a mechanism to resolve disputes over interpretation, implementation or non-implementation of the provisions of the CPA, seems to have given immunity to the signatories of the peace process against any deliberate or otherwise violation of the agreement. Their unity – in action and spirit – was premised on the continuation of the monarchy, for fear that their failure might once again make the monarchy popular. But with that fear receding, not only has their behaviour changed, their commitment too appears diluted.

Both the peace process and the making of the constitution are inextricably interlinked. One cannot survive or succeed without the other. For the peace process to succeed, the key provisions of the CPA, including the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the agreement on the disappeared, need to be acted upon. The Maoists too need to return the property that they confiscated from individuals. Transitions are a fragile phase in the life of a nation; a mismanaged transition can easily lead the country to disaster. But in Nepal’s case that disaster might characterize disintegration if the parties, mainly the Maoists, insist on the formation of ethnicity based provinces.

More than a year after he had stepped down, Ian Martin, Special Representative to the UN Secretary General and the first head of the UNMIN, revealed on 6 November 2009 in New York that the Maoists were luring the youth with promises of jobs in the Nepal Army and other security agencies. Finally, this was an admission of the allegation that Martin had all along remained silent about. The revelation will further raise doubts about the sincerity of the Maoist’s regarding the peace process on one hand, and on the other, discredit the dwindling image of the UN system and its possible role in Nepal’s peace process. This only means an enlarged role for the internal actors, but for that they will need to be more sincere and honest – a tall order indeed.

Nevertheless, a failure of the peace process and renewed conflict could well lead to the disintegration of the country along caste and ethnic lines. All this will also have a spillover effect in the South and East. The cost of failure will, therefore, not be confined to Nepal, but to a large extent India as well as China. Perhaps, more than the UN or UNMIN, China and India have a much bigger stake to save the peace process in Nepal, if only for their own sake.

 

Footnotes:

1. See Prachanda’s letter to UNSG Kofi Annan, 9 August 2006, for details.

2. CPA (6.1).

3. CPA (5.2.5).

4. UNSG Ban Ki Moon’s speech in the Securty Council on 30 October 2009.

5. Nepal’s new alliance (ICG report, pp. 15-16, 13 August 2009).

6. Yubaraj Ghimire, ‘The camera has not lied’, Indian Express, 7 May 2009).

7. CPA (4.7).

8. Gen. R. Katawal’s farewell speech, 11 September 2009.

9. Pradeep Gyawali, senior UML member’s statement in Rajdhani Daily, 30 November 2009.