EXCEPT in 1980 when the percentage of Muslim MPs in the Lok Sabha at 9% was roughly comparable to the percentage of Muslims in the Indian population (11.4% according to the 1981 Census), the community has always been under-represented in Parliament. The gap increased in the late 1980s as the percentage of Muslims MPs fell to about 5% in the 1990s – the decade when the BJP became the dominant party in the Lok Sabha. It increased slightly in 1999 and 2004 because of the good performance of parties which had nominated a large number of Muslim candidates, mostly the BSP and the SP. In the outgoing Parliament, Muslim MPs represented 6.4% of the total MPs as against 13.4% of the Indian population, according to the 2001 Census. In the 15th Lok Sabha, we are back to the situation of the 1990s, with only 30 Muslim MPs,1 less than 6% Muslims in the House of the People. Note that this figure is as low as that in the 1990s, when the low share of Muslim MPs could be linked to the rise of the BJP. This is one of the paradoxes of the Congress victory in the 2009 elections: the Muslims are facing political marginalization in terms of representation in the Lok Sabha, whereas the Congress has won the elections partly because of Muslim citizens who have massively voted for the party after a long period of estrangement.

Understanding the pattern of ‘Muslim candidacy’ is thus a crucial step to understand the under-representation of the Muslims in the Lok Sabha. Indeed this under-representation could be anticipated by merely looking at the list of candidates, even though that might not be immediately striking. This list reveals a very high number of Muslim candidates: more than 800 were in the fray, that is more than 10% of the total numbers of candidates, a figure which is consistent with the community’s share in the Indian population at 13.4%.2 The large number of Muslim candidates reflects the desire of the community to take part in the political process. Note, for instance, the unsually high turnout of the Muslim voters who have not lost faith in the electoral process even after the Ayodhya affair, as some analysts then feared. However, this is a very global figure that needs to be disaggregated, both state-wise and party-wise.

 

One has, in each state, to contrast the percentage of Muslim candidates with the proportion of Muslims in the population. In many states, including Jammu and Kashmir, the only one with a Muslim majority,3 the CDR is just above 5%, which means that the percentage of Muslim candidates is far below the percentage of Muslims in the general population. In Assam, where Muslims represent 30% of the population, they comprise 19% of the candidates; in Uttar Pradesh, where Muslims are 18.5% of the population, they are only 11%; in Bihar where Muslims represent 16.5% of the population, they are 12.5%.

In some states CDR is an even 100%. These are usually states in which the low percentage of Muslims in the population or the number of seats in Lok Sabha makes it difficult to have Muslim MPs, as the election of even a single Muslim would result in a huge over-representation of Muslims. However, even if the share of Muslims in the population makes it difficult for them to always be represented in the Lok Sabha, if there is no discrimination in the political arena, it should in theory sometimes happen that a Muslim gets elected. But in none of these ‘small states’ or ‘few Muslim states’ was a Muslim elected, and very few of them were candidates, which has an important cumulative impact on the all-India deprivation rates.

In several states though, the number of Muslim candidates is proportionate to the percentage of Muslims in the population – or even higher. This, for example, is the case in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, where the CDRs are relatively low. Even more striking, in some states such as Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Maharashtra, where Muslims constitute about 6, 10 and once again 10% of the population, the Muslim candidates make up 7, 15 and 14% respectively of the candidates.

 

One has to underline that ‘Muslim candidacy’ does not always indicate proper participation of Muslims in the political sphere. To do so, it is interesting to compare the CDR and the EDR. In Tamil Nadu, the CDR is average and the EDR quite low (it is the lowest for a state in which Muslims are a minority). The Muslims of Tamil Nadu thus seem adequately integrated in the political process, and manage a fair quantitative representation.4 In contrast, in some states both the deprivation rates are high (but do not reach 100%), as for instance in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal or Assam. In these states, Muslims constitute more than 18% of the population. And though Muslim MPs do get elected, their numbers are not enough to claim ‘fair’ representation.

Two others situations are interesting to compare. In Jammu and Kashmir and Lakshadweep (provinces where Muslims are the majority), the CDR far exceeds the EDR.5 In contrast, there are other states where the CDR is substantially lower than the EDR, which often reaches 100%. Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar, Jharkhand and Gujarat are among these states, which suggests that the North/South factor is not relevant to explain Muslim representation.

To explain the difference between the two situations one needs to look at the rate of Muslims running as independent candidates. In J&K and Lakshadweep, these rates are relatively low. Conversely, in the states where the CDR is high, it seems that it is the direct result of a large number of independent Muslim candidates: generally above 50%, except in Bihar with ‘only’ about 37% of independent Muslim candidates. Clearly in these states, it is expected that a vast majority of Muslim candidates stand no chance of being elected.

 

Currently the national parties – the Indian National Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party, the Communists (CPM) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) – collectively boast of 17 Muslim MPs, whereas the regional parties together contribute eight MPs and the Muslim parties four. There is also the rare case of an independent Muslim MP from Ladakh. Among the national parties, Congress has the most number (11), whereas with only one CPM MP, the Communists fall way short in terms of representation of Muslims among their MPs and project a deplorably negative picture. The logical assertion that it is still the national parties among the four categories that can really assure greater representation to the minorities appears valid (about 75% of the Muslim MPs in 2009). Equally that they are most responsible for the low overall number of Muslim MPs.

 

Indeed, the national parties – and more especially the Congress – did not give tickets to many Muslim candidates. In terms of nominations, the list of Muslim candidates is marked by a high number of independents, 393, against 293 candidates fielded by regional parties and only 116 candidates fielded by the national parties,6 resulting in a marked deprivation of 23% (deprivation is 59% if it excludes the independents from the total candidates, as those actually offered nomination by political parties). That independents form almost half of the total contestants is a case in point (47%).

While the Communists discredit their credentials as secular national parties by the extremely low representation given to Muslim candidates (CPM-7 and the rest mainly CPI), the BJP however stands true to the expectation in its non-representation to Muslims at a low of four candidates from across India. Party-wise, the BSP stands out as nominating the highest among single national parties, followed by the INC. However, its capacity to convert nominations into seats won is least comparable to INC (6% versus 35%). The national parties’ nomination to Muslims increased from 78 (1999) and 103 (2004) to 116 (2009), but the corresponding representation in MP seats reduced to 17 (2009) from 19 (2004) and 19 (1999), since a party like the BSP was not in a position to ensure the election of many Muslims – in contrast to the Congress. In states with the largest party-nomination of Muslim candidates –namely Uttar Pradesh (102), Bihar (58), Maharashtra (57) and West Bengal (39) – the BSP on its own nominated more numbers in the states of Bihar and Maharashtra.

 

The state of Maharashtra shows the highest number of nominations from multiple Muslim parties (19) like the NLHP, NELU, NBNP and DESEP (interestingly, Maharashtra also shows a major increase in total nominations: 57 (2009) from 6 (1999) and 26 (2004)). Nomination from regional parties is also the highest in these states especially in Uttar Pradesh (73) and Bihar (43). This is also the case with independents, especially in Uttar Pradesh (52) and Maharashtra (59). In contrast, however, only West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh have high MP turnout (7) where the strength of national parties seems relatively high (INC, BSP in UP). But Maharashtra had no Muslim MPs both in 2009 and 1999 except for one (INC) in 2004 and this is not unrelated to the fact that the Congress did not nominate any Muslim candidate there.

 

The notion of a ‘Muslim vote’ has been contested by many analysts who strongly object – and rightly so – that this minority does not vote ‘en bloc’ for any one party. However, Muslims do tend to vote together at the local level when, in a given constituency, they have to defeat a Hindu nationalist candidate – be he nominated by the Shiv Sena or the BJP, a party for which only 3.7% of the Muslims voted in 2009 according to the CSDS post-election survey.7

In 2009, the Muslim voters had a larger choice than before given the relatively greater visibility of parties predominantly representing Muslims, some of them exclusively, such as the Indian Union Muslim League (MUL). These parties, for a simpler understanding, are clustered under ‘Muslim parties’ in the table, have a representation of 4 MPs (a little less than 1%) and 31 candidates (nearly 4%) of the nationally nominated (includes All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen AIMIM, MUL, Assam United Democratic Front AUDF, National Lokhind Party NLHP, Nelopa (United) NELU, Nava Bharat Nirman Party NBNP, and Democratic Secular Party DESEP).

 

The MUL is the only party that shows a geographically expanded base, whereas the others are confined to one state like AIMIM in Andhra Pradesh,8 or a handful of regionally proximate states viz. AUDF in Assam and West Bengal. The NLHP, NELU, NBNP and DESEP are all primarily based in Maharashtra. The latter are also more recent compared to the long established and stable parties like MUL and AIMIM, which have consistently won seats in the Lok Sabha – MUL since 1962 and AIMIM since 1989.

In addition, MUL (also sometimes referred to as the Muslim League Kerala State Committee MLKSC) is the only party that has fielded candidates in multiple states outside its primary political base in North Kerala. In the current elections of 2009, its candidates contested from six other states: West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra (in Maharashtra, by its splinter group under the name IUML). Therefore, in the current national scene, MUL seems to be gradually consolidating its position as the party aiming to represent Indian Muslims.

In addition to ‘Muslim parties’, an increasing number of tickets have been given to Muslim candidates by two types of parties – low caste parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party, and emerging regional parties that are in the process of widening their party membership (such as the Praja Rajyam Party in Andhra Pradesh).

Despite this larger choice between parties which nominated a large number of Muslim candidates, the Muslim voters tended to prefer the Congress. According to the CSDS post-election survey, of all the castes and communities, the Muslims supported Congress the most – just after the tribals. 37.2% of Muslims voted for the ruling party, as against 38.9% of tribals and ‘only’ 27.1% of Dalits.

At first sight, this does not represent a very significant shift compared to 2004, when 35.6% of the Muslims had voted for the Congress. But one needs to look at the regional scene before drawing conclusions. In Andhra Pradesh, 50.7% of the Muslims voted for the Congress; in West Bengal, 58% of them voted for the Congress and the TMC; in Uttar Pradesh, 25% of them voted for the Congress, 11.1% more than in 2004 (whereas 30% of them voted for the SP, that is almost 17% lower than in 2004 and 18% voted for the BSP, 0.7% more than in 2004).

Certainly this was not a wave, but a strong indication that Muslims are in part ‘coming back’ to the Congress. In fact, the only party which succeeded in doing better is the AUDF, receiving 61% of the Muslim votes in Assam.

 

Hence a major paradox: the Muslims started to return to the Congress, the very year the party decided to nominate a smaller number of Muslim candidates. Muslims, therefore, made this move in spite of this decision. Why? This voting pattern was perhaps based on the promise of delivery on progressive measures taken to identify and address the community’s backwardness (e.g. the Sachar Committee in 2006 and the subsequent 15-point programme of the government). On the other hand, perhaps it is also a ‘secular’ vote chosen for greater assurance of security to the community, especially post the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Last, but not least, it may well be a vote by default. Who else could Muslim voters have supported? The SP was not seen as reliable as earlier, particularly after Mulayam Singh Yadav inducted Kalyan Singh – the man who was largely responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid – in the party. The BSP did not seem a safe choice either, given the fact that Mayawati was susceptible to striking a deal with the BJP after the elections, as she had done before.

 

Endnotes:

1. In terms of representation achieved, the Lok Sabhas of 1999 and 2004 were slightly better with 6.62% and 5.89% over that of 2009 at 5.52% (percentage of Muslim MPs in LS). The deprivation rates for 2009: 2004: 1999 are hence 58.33% (30 MPs): 45.45% (36 MPs): 51.52% (32 MPs) respectively [source for the latter two: Iqbal Ansari, 2006].

2. The deprivation rate shows the differential between the number of candidates/seats that Muslims would have if it was proportional to their share in the population and their actual share (basically, if the EDR is said to be of 58.86%, it means that of the total number of Muslim MPs that one could expect, 58.86% are missing). In the article, this rate has been calculated for candidates (CDR), and for elected candidates (EDR).

3. Lakshadweep where Muslims make 94% of population is a Union Territory.

4. See endnote 1.

5. It has to be underlined that if Muslims can be considered as ‘overrepresented’ in Lakshadweep, as there is only one seat for this territory where Muslims make 94% of the population, they get more or less their exact share of seats in J&K, which means that even if they are a minority in this state, non-Muslims are not underrepresented.

6. NCP and RJD included in the ‘Regional and other parties’.

7. ‘How India voted’, The Hindu, 26 May 2009.

8. AIMIM remains exclusively limited to Hyderabad district and has not attempted to expand its constituencies even across the state of Andhra Pradesh, e.g. it nominated only one candidate from Hyderabad to the 2009 Lok Sabha.