THE spectre of elections is once again haunting political leaders in Uttar Pradesh. A flurry of partisan polemics, ideological conflicts, claims and counter-claims, reassessment and reexamination of the loyalties to the parties is on the anvil. The political flux may help us perceive political trends and the mood of the electorate that will eventually decide the fate of many at the hustings.

Nonetheless, in the ensuing election to the state assembly, perhaps the most hotly-debated issue between parties and citizens will be the policy for the socially excluded dalits and minorities, notably the Muslims, in view of the startling revelations in the Sachar Committee report on the status of Indian Muslims.

Uttar Pradesh with its distinct identity as a political bastion of India’s freedom struggle and as the cradle of her multicultural synthesis represents the most important federal segment of the Indian Union. Unfortunately, in the realm of contemporary politics Uttar Pradesh has remained unstable, with both a highly fractured electorate and a leadership devoid of conviction, vision or direction that has promoted non-governance and administrative chaos. Its one-time pride as a symbol delineating the shape of things to occur at the national level has become a thing of the past, as its secular character and democratic distinctiveness appears corroded with the growth of political outfits based on communal, caste and sectarian loyalties.

 

Even as Mandal polarized a vast segment of backward caste voters around Mulayam Singh Yadav, alienating them from the Congress, the rath yatra provided the Hindu communalists a champion of Hindutva in L.K. Advani. Further, Mulayam Singh Yadav’s well-demonstrated ire against the kar sevaks at Ayodhya at the end of October 1990 endeared him to the Muslims in the state, earning him the tag ‘Maulana Mulayam’. Unsurprisingly, the community, just emerging out of the trauma of the Turkman Gate incidents and returning to the Congress fold, shifted allegiance post the shilanayas of November 1989.

For over 50 years the Congress had tactfully managed to present a pro-minority and particularly pro-Muslim image and thus emotionally exploited the Muslims. Yet none of its leaders, not even the Muslim leaders, ever had the moral courage to at least openly condemn, if not resign, from their lucrative positions when the bizarre act of vandalism was unleashed on the ‘House of Allah’ in Ayodhya right under the mighty Congress empire in New Delhi!

Independent India’s brief history provides ample evidence to show how in the guise of secularism the Indian Muslims have been let down and reduced to third-rate citizens. The Congress effectively played the minority card not only to emerge victorious at the hustings but also to garner international support as a champion and custodian of minority interests.

Nehru, the architect of modern India, had always advocated a moderate approach in his quest to build a strong India. The combination of secularism, mixed economy and nonalignment paid rich dividends in both the domestic and international arena to help a new India evolve as a global entity. Secularism was meant to uphold India’s finest traditions of religious assimilation, tolerance and synthesis that gave a unique world-view to her people and a distinct identity to her culture, in which every group and individual had the freedom to function according to his/her own ways, either culturally or in matters of religion.

 

Exemplifying the spirit of secularism, Nehru pointed out, ‘India is a common home to all those who live here, whatever religion they may belong… they have equal rights and obligations.’ He emphasized that the freedom for which India had laboured through generations of suffering was for all the people of India, and not for one group or class or followers of one religion. ‘Hindus must always remember that the interest and well-being of the minorities are their sacred trust. If they fail in their trust then they injure not only the country but themselves.’

Those who succeeded Nehru had neither his vision nor qualities or perspective to insulate India’s edifice of secularism and democracy from the fissiparous forces. Ironically, it was his daughter, Indira Gandhi, who presided over the process of erosion and decay of the values of renaissance that the Congress had once professed and provided space for the rise of fanatic and communal groups in the form of sanghs, shakhas, parishads, leagues, dals and jamaats which gradually overshadowed the secular state apparatus. Politicians and party leaders felt free to indulge in open appeals to religious and primordial loyalties in their quest for power. Consolidation of religious and caste-based identities became crucial in order to organize vote banks.

 

The very basis of the Nehruvian secular paradigm came to be challenged both on theoretical and practical grounds as secularism became the monopoly of the powerful to practice and interpret in the political calculations. Subsequently, as a counter strategy, in its bid to retain power, the Congress under Indira Gandhi was compelled to toe the line of its competitors and gradually foregrounded the hitherto quiescent RSS minded hawks within the Congress, often elevating them to higher positions of responsibility, and thereby pushing the party into the wilds of political opportunism, defying all norms of secularism and democracy.

The Turkman Gate incidents were the beginnings of an open appropriation of sectarian fanaticism in the Congress. The Congress penchant to woo Hindu votes in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star consolidated its image as a champion of Hindu interests; its exploitation of the Punjab issue to tarnish all dissent as anti-national and the 1984 onslaught on Sikhs completely altered the electoral calculus and enthused Hindu fundamentalist support in favour of the Congress. All this led to the beginning of a Hindutva politics appropriating the Indian state.

The Muslims, haunted by the trauma of communal partition and its after-effects, had found Nehru’s Congress with its commitment to the ideal of secularism as a safe haven and formed its strong electoral support base. Even after the exit of Nehru from the political scene they continued to nurture a false sense of optimism that Congress alone could be their messiah. The Congress, in turn, fully exploited that sentiment, using the Muslims as a solid vote bank, occasionally exhibiting a few courtier Muslims as ministers to demonstrate its secularism. The real setback to Muslim confidence in the Congress occurred on 6 December 1992 when the Congress at the Centre gave a free hand to the bigotry of fundamentalist and criminal elements patronized by the BJP, RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal to fix the last nail in the coffin of India’s secularism. The Times of India (8 December 1992) commented: ‘In the event of a contest (between the Hindutva varieties of Congress and the BJP) why on earth would anybody buy a spurious product from the Congress when the BJP peddled the genuine one?’

 

Many believed that India had succeeded in initiating the process of secularization within its frame of composite culture, but with Nehru’s death the communal gulf he had bridged gradually widened. The impact of Hindutva is manifested both in the organization of the BJP and in the articulation of the Congress party. The increasing cry of Hinduism in danger, the atrocities on Christian missionaries, burning down of churches, brutal killing of Sikhs, the holocaust in Gujarat, and unending violence and murder of dalits have all created a situation of turbulence.

In this climate of a de-secularizing state machinery, ascending communalism and partisan police force, a new generation of Indian Muslims – unlike their elders who were timid and timorous therefore inert – are active, demanding and as conscious of their rights as other Indian citizens, have realized that their community is a victim of empty promises. Unfortunately, even issues like the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and restoring Urdu to its due place that preoccupied the community after independence, rarely receive satisfactory attention. After 30 years of struggle the AMU gained minority status in 1981, only to become a prey to a welter of legal interpretations in 2005. Urdu, on the other hand, never emerged from the wilderness, despite Zakir Hussain entering Rashtrapati Bhawan and I.K. Gujral, the biggest votary of the language, becoming prime minister!

 

The Muslim youth is conscious that even as reservations and affirmative action empowered other weaker sections, Muslims despite being part of the so-called mainstream continued their inexorable march towards backwardness. The community is today convinced that it is trapped in the BJP phobia syndrome, ultimately stigmatizing them as reactionaries and fundamentalists. Muslim youth in particular believe that the Congress is hesitant to identify with the community, unlike leaders like Mulayam Singh. As such, it is time for the political parties to understand that traditional gimmicks devoid of constructive action are unlikely to sway the new generation of Muslim youth. The Sachar Report and sudden concern for the upliftment of Muslims in all corners today, needs to be seen in the backdrop of the new dynamics and emergent political psychology and behavioural patterns in the community.

For historical reasons communal frenzy and religious hatred is more pronounced among the North Indians as compared to their southern counterparts, in part because the leadership of the BJP has always been with the upper caste North Indian RSS zealots. For a time it appeared that the BJP was changing when a South Indian lower caste leader, Bangaru Laxman came to head the organization. Some even believed that having come to power the BJP would realize that to retain power in a pluralistic society like India, sectarianism and caste superiority are not the right tools of the trade. But events following the Tehelka exposure proved that the BJP had missed the bus and failed to seize the opportunity and reverted to its original hate agenda.

A return to issues of the Ram temple, Uniform Civil Code, Article 370 and repeal of so-called ‘minority appeasement politics’ by the party in its National Council session recently at Lucknow demonstrate that the party vision is stuck in the Hindutva idiom. Paradoxically, even as the party is convinced that its road to Lucknow and Delhi is only via the Ram temple, Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the same time has the gall to appeal to the Muslims to support the BJP to usher in change in UP!

 

It is indeed difficult to predict the likely electoral outcome since of late, it is clear that voting patterns, by and large, are contextual and largely depend on immediate events and developments, and even on the political gimmicks of contestants from constituency to constituency. A cursory look at the following table indicates that till the early 1990s the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party shared a large chunk of votes. However, major changes in the voting pattern occurred during 1993, 1996 and 2002 elections when the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) made substantial gains and their share of vote exceeded that of major national parties such as the Congress and the BJP. (Table 1)

To this overall change in the voting pattern, Muslims as a formidable electoral group have a contribution, for out of the 403 assembly segments, the Muslims constitute 25% of the electorate at least in 170 segments. A comparison of 1996 and 2002 assembly elections in the state vindicate the argument that the Congress witnessed a sharp decline in terms of percentage of Muslim votes polled by the party, though the number of Muslim legislators elected on the party ticket remained virtually unchanged. In contrast, the SP improved its share of Muslim votes from 48% in 1996 to 53% in 2002 while the BSP maintained a status quo in terms of votes, even though the number of Muslims elected on the BSP platform rose from eight in 1996 to 14 in 2002. As a matter of fact the Congress witnessed a steep drop in Muslim vote from 54% of the total votes it polled in 1980 (Lok Sabha) to 14% in 2004 (Lok Sabha) whereas the SP share of Muslim votes shot up from 49% in 1991 (Lok Sabha) to 61% in 2004 (Lok Sabha); the BSP improved its share from 4% in 1991 (Lok Sabha) to 10% in 2004 (Lok Sabha). (Table 2)

Further, as against 17% Muslim population in the state, their representation in the assembly from 1952 to 2002 remained only 8.5%. During the first assembly polls in 1952, the Indian National Congress (INC) nominated 41 Muslims, of whom 40 were elected; this figure came down to four in 2002. The post-Ayodhya scenario brought Muslims much closer to other socially excluded communities such as the yadavs and the dalits to strengthen the base of political parties like the SP and the BSP. The 1996 poll witnessed the emergence of many Muslim leaders from the SP platform. Of the total of 33 Muslim members elected, 19 were from SP, followed by eight from the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). The BSP worked on the strategy of dalit-Muslim combination, particularly appealing to the lower sects (caste) amongst the Muslims. On its part, the Congress, sensing the disenchantment of the community, gradually reduced the number of Muslim contestants from 11% in 1980 to just 3% in 1996, though it made a U-turn in 2002 sharply increasing the number. In 1989, the party fielded 49 Muslim candidates out of which 10 won; in the 1993 election, immediately after the demolition of Babri Mosque, it fielded 45 Muslims out of which only one was elected; in 1996 out of 13 candidates fielded three won; in 2002 the party nominated 61 Muslims of whom four were elected. (Table 3)

Curiously, even in constituencies where Muslims account for between 40-50% of the total constituency population, Muslim candidates often fail to get elected, the outcome of a polarised and strategic voting pattern in a situation of uncertainty. The lack of direction in the voting behaviour of the community, if properly channelized, could radically alter political fortunes and it is on this calculation that major political actors are attempting to mobilize and enthuse Muslim support.

 

The four-cornered contest in Uttar Pradesh may help bail out the BJP with its ‘minorityism’ and Muslim minority appeasement plank, diffusing the upper caste irritation on the issue of temple construction. So should the division of Muslim votes among her rival camps. However, factional infighting continues to haunt the BJP as caste and community loyalties are vital factors in determining voting patterns. No wonder, the party has fallen back on RSS pracharaks to ensure better coordination among its different wings. The projection of Kalyan Singh, Rajnath Singh and Kesarinath Tripathi is the party’s grand strategy to target and enthuse backward castes, thakur and brahmin votes. Possibly placing the issue of cow slaughter on the BJP election agenda may have a positive impact on the demoralized brahmins.

P.V. Narasimha Rao’s decision to enter into a political alliance with an ideologically volatile and politically ambitious Mayawati in the 1996 assembly elections is reflective of the ideological decay in the Congress. Once Mandal and kamandal had altered the political landscape in the 1990s, the Congress inaction and taken-for-granted attitude towards the two numerically vital social segments of the state – dalits and Muslims – strengthened both the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party. It is a sad commentary that issues other than caste and community like family planning, primary education, nutrition, food security, women’s welfare and public health occupy hardly any space in the agenda of either the BSP or SP, who otherwise keep advocating social justice and empowerment of dalits and minorities in UP.

 

Mayawati, who had defied all political conventions and thrice formed government in connivance with the BJP, is aspiring to yet another honeymoon with the BJP while at the same time keeping her options open vis-a-vis the Congress. In her bid towards this adventure she claims that the BSP transferred its vote bank towards both the BJP and Congress to ensure the defeat of SP during the local bodies’ election in November 2006.

Curiously enough, the BSP leader, in her new avatar, surprised many by her novel agenda of a brahmin-dalit alliance, the underlying objective being to win over the brahmins who feel alienated in the race for power in Uttar Pradesh. The brahmins with around 9% of the state’s population, have become the most sought-after vote bank for the Bahujan Samaj Party. Ever since the exit of the Congress from the corridors of power in the state, they have gradually drifted into political oblivion – Narain Dutt Tiwari was the last brahmin chief minister of the state. Even during the heyday of the BJP and BJP-BSP (1995-2004), despite a Vajpayee led NDA at the helm in New Delhi, a larger chunk of BJP MLAs in UP were thakurs. Mayawati’s penchant for the appeasement of brahmins is an outcome of the dormant power tussle between brahmins and the thakurs, and the growing brahmin disenchantment with the BJP. Moreover, brahmins, by and large, were comfortable with BJP’s anti-Muslim traits throughout the Ramjanambhoomi movement. It is this particular section of brahmins affiliated to the core BJP vote bank which felt cheated when it realized that the Ram temple was only a BJP political rhetoric that the BSP supremo is eying.

 

The SP is virtually caught in a vortex of attack from all corners, including the Raj Babbar-V.P. Singh led Jan Morcha, besides facing anti-incumbency, growing corruption, a soaring crime graph, deteriorating law and order situation, and the government’s dismal record on the development front. Mulayam’s failure to effectively manage the Nithari carnage and his inaction in the Gorakhpur riots has added to his difficulties. The recent drift of a large number of Muslims away from the SP has added to Mulayam’s woes, upsetting his calculations. Nevertheless, Mulayam’s hope lies with the 9% yadavs and some Muslim sections whom he has cultivated and promoted. In its effort to mobilize a larger number of Muslim voters, the SP took a lead from the Sachar Committee report and tabled a resolution in the UP state assembly demanding that the Centre include dalit-Muslims and Christians in the Scheduled Caste category by deleting Clause 3 of the Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.

 

A major area of friction between the SP and the Congress is their internecine struggle to capture the secular political space in state politics. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, an overwhelming section of public opinion almost took for granted that Hindutva would politically spread throughout India with Uttar Pradesh as its bastion. However, the humiliating defeat of the BJP in 1996 at the hands of SP-BSP combine led by Mulayam Singh Yadav, proved that Hindutva by itself cannot provide the cutting edge in electoral calculations. Mulayam Singh regained the lost crown by forging a near invincible caste alliance comprising the backwards and the dalits which was further strengthened by the Muslim support. He understood that caste is an answer to communalism of BJP and the real issue in UP elections. Further, Mulayam’s biggest asset in the current election is his control of the government machinery unless, of course, the state is placed under President’s rule.

Congress President Sonia Gandhi’s resignation of her Lok Sabha seat following the office of profit controversy and her re-election from Rae Bareli has added strength to the organization. Added to this is the tabling of the Sachar Committee report in the Parliament and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s observation while addressing the 52nd National Development Council, ‘We will have to devise innovative plans to ensure that minorities, particularly the Muslim minority, are empowered to share equitably in the fruits of development. They must have the first claim on resources.’ This may help the Congress provide a healing touch to a fractured Muslim psyche, and regain their support in the ensuing assembly election in the state.

 

The political relevance and strength of the Muslims as voters in the state just cannot be ignored, though an absence of definite direction has left the community in a demoralized, scattered and confused state. Its withdrawal of support to the Congress could not be properly leveraged, as no alternative organization was available to them. Even V.P. Singh or Mulayam Singh failed to meet their expectations. As such, under the prevailing political dynamics, the Muslim vote is likely to split between the SP, the Congress and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). The BSP, though largely seen as a party of the dalits, has a reasonably large Muslim constituency and a dalit-Muslim engagement in constituencies where the two constitute a sizable number, can swing the poll outcome in its favour.

 

The newly floated UPUDF (Uttar Pradesh United Democratic Front), a conglomeration of over twenty minuscule Muslim political outfits, under the eclectic patronage of volatile leaders like the Shahi Imam of Delhi’s Jama Masjid, former Union Minister C.M. Ibrahim, Mohd. Yusuf Qureshi (brother of UP Minister of State for Minority Welfare, Yaqub Qureshi) and others with the avowed intent to replicate the Assam experiment in UP, too is likely to make some inroads into the Muslim vote bank in select areas and slip into the Congress lap.

While the BJP is pinning its hopes on the upper castes, and the SP is mainly banking upon the combined strength of yadavs and Muslims, the BSP continues to retain its hold over the jatavs, who constitute about 12% of dalit voters in the state. The Congress is yet to develop a solid base; non-jatav dalits and upper castes remain its main hope and following the Sachar report it hopes to win back a large proportion of its former supporters, the Muslims. Given this backdrop of caste arithmetic and rat race for the Muslim vote, no political party is comfortably placed to win the elections in UP, far less to form a government on its own.