The problem
ARE we witnessing a tectonic change in Indias foreign policy? For decades, India, seen as a prominent spokesperson of the Third World and non-alignment, if not a camp follower of the Soviet Union, and the US, widely regarded as a leader of the capitalist world, were described as two estranged democracies. No longer does this seem to be the case. The recent agreements signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, opening up among others the prospect of civilian nuclear cooperation a major irritant in their relationship are seen by many as moving into a decisive new chapter.
True, the thaw between the two has been in the making for some years now, starting with Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-eighties. Be it the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the eighties, the starting of the economic reforms process in the early nineties, the greater outward orientation of the Indian economy and its steady enmeshing into the global marketplace and, more recently, a shared concern with terrorism have all forced a rethink by the Indian leadership and contributed to a growing proximity with the US. Equally important has been the increasing presence of the Indian-Americans in the US, the growing attraction of the Indian market as also the US need, now that the Soviet Union is no longer seen as a primary threat, to rework its global priorities. Few, for instance, notice the increase in Indo-US military cooperation, a situation unimaginable in the early seventies.
Yet, despite significant sections of the Indian elite with multifarious interests in the US supportive of greater cooperation between the two countries, and the situation being mirrored, though not to the same degree, in the US, the prospects of a new strategic partnership has simultaneously given rise to an unease, if not engendered suspicion about a secret deal. This notwithstanding that, at least in India, the Bush-Singh agreements, particularly in the nuclear arena, are seen with satisfaction by both strategic analysts and the Atomic Energy establishment ending Indias nuclear isolation and easing restrictions on access to nuclear technology and fuel.
For once, it is not only the Left which has raised doubts. Left opposition to the US has in any case a long history, primarily ideological but also a reaction to perceived US hegemony and interventionism in many countries, a tendency more marked since 9/11 Afghanistan, Iraq and, most recently, in its altitude to Irans nuclear programme. Few, for instance, take seriously US claims to be upholding values like democracy and human rights, seen more as a ploy to engineer regime change. A tendency towards unilateralism and pre-emptive action, and scant regard for multi-lateral institutions or international treaties too generates apprehension that the growing proximity may well compromise the countrys non-aligned foreign policy, if not sovereignty.
But forget the political opposition both from the Left and Right. Significant sections in the ruling Congress Party too have been lukewarm in welcoming the recent agreements. In part, their fear arises from domestic electoral calculations whether a closer alliance with the US, seen by many as engaged in battle with Muslims and Islam, would alienate minority voters in forthcoming elections. Unfortunately this focus on and fuelling of minority fears the protests against the Bush visit bringing in issues not only of Palestine, Iraq and Iran but also the cartoons controversy sparked off by a Danish newspaper may have made the foreign policy calculus hostage to communitarian sentiments.
There are other concerns. Are we over-reading the potential of nuclear power in meeting our growing energy demand, possibly sacrificing enhanced development of conventional sources hydel and hydrocarbons? Will these agreements result in India further opening up its markets to US goods and corporations, dilute the negotiating position in the WTO and so on? Will it change our relations with our neighbours, possibly jeopardize the fragile peace process with Pakistan, expectedly miffed at being treated differentially from India? Are we being drawn into a strategic containment policy vis-à-vis China? And what of our traditional allies, in particular Russia?
More troubling are the joint statements on spreading democracy and combating terrorism. Will India, for instance, be now expected to play a more pro-active role in the many conflicts that the US led fight against terrorism may give rise to? Worse, will we become a site, as indeed many US allies have, for escalated action by global terrorist networks. All this may be a high price for what we perceive to be substantive gains in the access to high end technologies, not just nuclear and military equipment, but in space, computers and agriculture.
It is by no means certain that President Bush will be able to push through the agreements, particularly on the nuclear question, in the US Congress. Many politicians across the party divide as also leader writers oppose what they see as a dilution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, both rewarding a country which without being a signatory to the NPT is a declared nuclear weapons state as also making it more difficult to justify disciplining of other perceived rogue states. They also raise fears of an escalating arms race in the subcontinent. But, above all, there is disappointment that in the eagerness to clinch an agreement with India, the president may have failed to extract greater concessions both on nuclear safeguards as also an opening up of the Indian market.
Neither the specifics of the Bush-Singh agreements nor the prospects of a new alliance/strategic partnership have any self-evident answers. Foreign policy discussions have for long been the preserve of self-styled experts, with differences of perception sought to be buried behind the veil of national consensus and national security. Introducing changes in long favoured positions is rarely easy. Fortunately, these issues are today being debated by a wider variety of actors corporations, special interest groups, and articulate sections of the middle classes. And though this makes foreign policy debates more cacophonous, it also ensures a lively engagement.
Even as the future trajectory of events remains uncertain, it is clear that we can neither afford to remain shackled by earlier ideological formulations, nor continue to express distrust about the integrity of our political class. This issue of Seminar attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate on the recent shifts in our relations with the US which, whether we read them positively or not, may well turn out to be historic.
