Bush has come and gone and the nuclear betrothal with India is now history; whether it will reach consummation, time alone will tell. Prior to the agreement being inked, the US had indicated that if India went ahead with the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, it might endanger the offer of peaceful nuclear cooperation. The removal of Mani Shankar Aiyar from the oil ministry came as a strong indicator that India was prepared to toe the US line to obtain the deal on nuclear cooperation. Aiyar was not only a strong supporter of the pipeline and regional cooperation, he was also viewed as not pro-American; his successor, Murli Deora is considered being strongly pro-US. But in face of domestic pressure the Indian prime minister reassured all concerned that the deal remained under active consideration.

Similarly, before the Bush visit the US had warned India that its vote against sanctions on Iran when the matter is taken up at the UN might jeopardize the nuclear deal. In the event, though India did vote against Iran, the opposition as well as the left-wing parties allied with Congress in government forced a debate on why India had capitulated to US pressure on Iran.

Whatever the initial snags, with the visit of George W. Bush, the betrothal has taken place and the initial agreement has been signed by both sides. India has been assured of continued supply of enriched uranium and its concerns regarding the fast breeder programme have been addressed by excluding it from those that must be placed under IAEA inspections. True, this might make it difficult for Bush to push the deal through the US Congress but he may have something up his sleeve. As for the rest, only time will tell.

While there has been little subsequent mention of the IPI pipeline in India, Bush’s comments in Pakistan that ‘the US’ beef with Iran was its nuclear programme and not the pipeline’ leave open the prospects of the pipeline, at least for Pakistan. There is little doubt that the gas pipeline, provided India is reassured regarding its security concerns on the deal with Pakistan, provides an attractive option for India to obtain cheap energy. However, this cheap energy cannot penetrate too far South and, therefore, a deal on cheap nuclear energy which can penetrate to all regions is certainly attractive.

So even if India has agreed to forego the gas deal in favour of a more beneficial nuclear deal, of which there is no proof, I see no reason why it should not take the strategically advantageous decision for its own future. But if the decision is taken under US pressure, it will do little good to its own image domestically and abroad in its search for recognition as an independent world power. And if Bush has accepted the pipeline for Pakistan, India’s non-participation might create that very impression.

 

I view this deal as a benchmark with certain international ramifications, in particular for the many other nuclear actors in the region – China, Pakistan, and Iran to name the most prominent. In the future, Saudi Arabia and, some day perhaps even Iraq, could be added to the list. However, let us start our discussion with this very aspect of proliferation which has been raised by a number of US Congressmen too.

Unfortunately, the NPT could not be renewed last year. Many analysts consider this treaty discriminatory, in that it accepts only the original five countries – the US, Russia, China, UK, and France – as the de jure nuclear weapon powers and is not prepared to allow any of the other de facto nuclear powers recognition to enter the elite club, leaving out countries like Israel, India and Pakistan. I have no doubt that the treaty needed to be modified to deal with this discrimination. Nonetheless, there is a greater, a moral purpose to this treaty, which most people conveniently forget – the fact that the ‘big five’ recognized these weapons of mass destruction to be immoral and undertook to work towards a nuclear weapons free world. That they have, so far, neither made any move in that direction, nor shown any inclination to do so, does not reduce the importance of morality in the agreement.

As one who has been a soldier for long years, I find weapons of mass destruction an anathema to my purpose in life – they contradict the very basis of the profession of arms. Conceptually, the purpose of soldiering is to protect the innocent civilians of ones nation state from aggression by others. However, no soldier can effectively defend his nation’s citizens against these weapons; in fact, they are designed to threaten the innocent, thus forcing the state and the soldier to capitulate. I humbly suggest that the concept of the use of weapons of mass destruction is identical to the concept of ‘international terrorism’, i.e. it targets the unprotected civilians in an effort to force the target state to change its policies. Consequently, non-proliferation or in fact the eradication of weapons of mass destruction lies high on my agenda.

It appears that this deal on nuclear cooperation between the US and the subsequent statement by Linton Brooks, head of National Security Administration, that nuclear disarmament is no longer a goal of the US ‘for the foreseeable future’ as it seeks a new generation of more reliable warheads, has effectively rung the death-knell of the moral issue contained in the concept of the NPT. Though the issue may be trivial for a majority of the people of both our countries, it weighs heavily with me.

 

It is unlikely that this deal will impact China in any material manner. China is growing into a strong economic power, backed by a minimal nuclear weapons capability which it considers essential for its security and a growing peaceful nuclear programme. The Indo-US deal poses no threat to any of this. However, the removal of the last vestige of a moral bondage will permit China to provide assistance to Pakistan’s peaceful programme undeterred. There are indications that the support to the Chashma nuclear power plant had already increased substantially and, in the immediate wake of the Indo-US deal, China has announced further assistance to Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear programme without even the precondition that Pakistan subject these to the IAEA, which Pakistan is willing to do. In my view China will willingly balance the equation with Pakistan by providing necessary assistance to its peaceful programme with impunity.

 

Equally, the case for US-led inter-national community attempts to prevent Iran from going nuclear will be considerably weakened. There is little doubt that the US is both strong and hypocritical enough to impose varying standards on different nations. It also expects to get away with it, but whether it will now be able to do so is a moot point. Iran has amply demonstrated its determined defiance; it continues to claim that its programme is peaceful, but is not prepared to expose it to the full measures of inspections desired by the IAEA. However, in defiance of the concept of the NPT, if the US is prepared to assist a de facto nuclear weapons power outside of the original de jure list, Iran might consider its case, even for acquisition of nuclear weapons, to have been considerably strengthened.

For some inexplicable reason the Pakistani establishment desires to obtain a level playing field with India. While this may have been possible in the Cold War era [though I continue to hold the view that the Pakistani government(s)/establishment(s) have failed to capitalize on the opportunities that came up in the past], any expectation of being treated at par with India, particularly on issues regarding nuclear technology, appears foolish in the present scenario. The American establishment and its leadership have made explicit statements which should leave little doubt in the minds of our leadership.

Apart from our dubious record on proliferation, which has been conveniently glossed over and which would have created a furore in the Congress had the American leadership treated us at par with India, the Americans have made it clear that their relationship with the two countries is totally independent of the other – there is no longer even a pretence to balance the equation.

The Pakistani Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, suffered unnecessary embarrassment in asking that we be given similar assistance in our peaceful nuclear programme as India (he even offered to endanger our recently growing ties with Iran for that purpose), and was rebuffed. Equally, he could not even obtain a trite word of apology for the American attack on Damadola which killed innocent civilians. Personally, I don’t think he should have even attempted to ask for nuclear assistance and should instead have cancelled his trip to the US, insisting on an apology for the killing of innocent civilians. Even a failure to obtain it would have demonstrated some pride and a vestige of morality. At the joint statement with Musharraf, when asked a question on the possibility of nuclear assistance to Pakistan, Bush was unequivocal and replied: ‘I have explained (to the President) that Pakistan and India are two different countries, with different needs.’

 

I think Pakistan is comfortably placed in its nuclear weapons programme to claim deterrence with regard to India and should lean more towards China for assistance in its peaceful programme. Chinese technology is admittedly less sophisticated, but it is readily available and should suffice for our more modest energy needs as compared to those of India. In addition, our energy needs can be easily supplemented by cheap gas from Iran and Turkmenistan, and oil from Kazakhstan, subject to improvement in the internal situation of Afghanistan. It is preferable that Pakistan should seek to draw its future strength from a strategic coalition with China, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia in terms of shared energy and other resources, forging an economic interdependence where the gateway to the West is via the Gwadar Port and is fed by the resources of western China, Central Asia via Afghanistan and China, and Iran. I would some day like to see India too join this group, collectively making this alliance a competitive world power, but that might just be a dream!

Even though analysts as well as the establishment in Pakistan will continue to feel and express concern about the Indo-US nuclear deal and the denial of the same to Pakistan, I think it is definitely futile and perhaps, even unnecessary.

 

Finally, let me comment on issues that concern India. Being a Pakistani, my views on India might be suspect, but I offer them as an outsider’s perspective which might turn out to be less biased than the reader might initially expect. First, why has the US made this offer, and at this juncture? American analysts and, for some time now, the American leadership and establishment, have been at pains to indicate that they view India as the major power in South Asia as also an emerging power in South East Asia, one which might in future deserve recognition on the world scene.

It thus makes perfect sense for the US to ally itself with such a power, even help it realize its potential, buying a chip in its future. That in itself is reason enough, but there is also the argument that India is being built up to counterbalance the emerging power of China in the region, just as Pakistan was built up as a counterbalance for a Soviet supported India during the Cold War era.

However, is this the only reason, or is there a hidden purpose to this offer? To answer that question I have to revert to where I started this article from; the only possible condition to this deal going through that the US has suggested so far pertains to Iran; India’s participation in the gas pipeline project and India’s failure to support the imposition of sanctions against Iran for its nuclear programme. In fact, the US has even asked India to reconsider the purchase of a Syrian oilfield jointly with China; this without the threat of endangering the nuclear deal. Why should any of these concern the US to the extent that they could consider jeopardizing their nuclear nuptials with India? After all, sanctions against Iran would probably be imposed even if India opposed them and, while the gas pipeline could provide Iran much needed foreign exchange, is that sufficient reason to forego a chip in India’s future, particularly if India’s future is indeed as bright as both the Indians and Americans portray it to be?

 

All that India would stand to gain in either of these Iran related issues is Iranian goodwill, which it has built upon in recent years and, in the case of the gas pipeline, an additional source of cheap energy. Similarly, a joint purchase of an oil field with China in Syria would help improve India’s relations with China and obtain another foothold in Syria. This does give rise to another consideration. In addition to Iran, India has made considerable inroads into the Middle East; for the first time in its history, the Saudi monarch has visited India. It is by now an established fact that the US invasion was intended to access Iraqi oil, but with the additional intention of reducing Saudi influence in the region and the OPEC. Is perhaps, the growing Indian influence westwards of some concern to the US? I am not certain, but does this imply that while the US would willingly support an increasingly powerful India so long as it looked eastwards, even encourage a domination of the Indian Ocean, it would be uneasy about any extension of Indian influence in the Middle East or further westwards? Is this perhaps the beginning of a policy of containment while assisting growth? After all, the US has now more than one location for a virtually permanent presence in the Middle East.

 

While the Indian government and the establishment will decide whatever is in their best interests, it is not necessary that their perceptions of what is best be identical to the views of independent analysts. I am aware that there are many skeptics in India, wary of growing relations with the US for a variety of reasons – be it outright suspicion of US intent or an unease with growing dependance on the US.

Although I have argued against seeking US assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, it is not for the reason most Pakistani analysts cite, i.e. that the US will become intrusive and in the process seek to deprive us of our nuclear arsenal. While I have no doubt that it would like to, but despite its phenomenal technology, I do not think it can. I really oppose Pakistan seeking assistance from the US because our governments are more susceptible to US pressure than the Indian governments and, since assistance by definition must be intrusive, the US might some day be in an even stronger position to pressurize us. True that the present Congress-led government as well as the previous BJP-led government have demonstrated a greater susceptibility to US pressure than previous Indian governments did. But the strength of public opinion is far stronger in India than in Pakistan, preventing either one of these governments from succumbing altogether.

Moreover, I do not believe that the US has any desire to control, or even limit, India’s nuclear weapons capability. After all, if counterbalancing China is one minor objective of the US, it can hardly seek to further that end if it does not permit India to develop a credible nuclear deterrence towards China, which I believe they will not possess until they develop missiles capable of targeting China’s East coast. However, any worthwhile US assistance will have to be intrusive to provide meaningful assistance. In fact, the extent of the meaningful assistance will be directly proportional to the extent of the intrusiveness; the more intrusive, the more meaningfully useful and vice versa.

 

Were I an Indian, this would be a matter of considerable concern. Not only would this increase dependence on the US in future, it would also necessarily mean sharing progress in the nuclear field. This could be useful to the Americans if further containment of India were ever to become a consideration again, i.e. if pressurizing India on issues relating to the Middle East is really a policy of containment. While this information sharing and the assistance provided will be for peaceful use of nuclear technology, nuclear technology cannot be entirely separated into peaceful and weapons technology. Though the application of this technology in the fields of energy, medicine, or agriculture is a separate subject, the technology to produce nuclear power is the same as for producing fissionable (or fusionable) material for making weapons.

It is not my intention to make a case for India to reconsider US assistance in the peaceful nuclear field; only to point out some aspects that would concern me were I an Indian in the corridors of decision-making. If Pakistan has received any assistance in the development of nuclear technology, it has been minor; only to refine the design features misappropriated by A.Q. Khan or those obtained through the ‘black market’. Even though this minor assistance has provided considerable useful information to the US , it is still nothing compared to an active permanent collaboration.

 

The ratification of an agreement on cooperation in India’s peaceful nuclear programme with the US is still some distance. There remain areas of concern for the Americans which India will need to satisfy them on if the Congress is to provide consent – issues like how assistance to the peaceful programme will not be used to support the weapons programme. To some, this might be considered a minor glitch, but many in the US Congress will need to be satisfied in this regard before allowing the bill to pass.

There are other strategic considerations, some of which I have raised in the form of questions. There is also an apprehension among some Americans: Are we making haste too quickly? Is it not possible that, having bought a chip in India’s future, India will repudiate the chip if we ever seek to cash it? Will it then have grown too strong for us to control? Are we letting another bottle out of the genie? However, those raising such questions are in a minority. It is my view that provided India is prepared to go along with the US on issues that the US considers crucial for the present and the future (perhaps Iran is a pertinent example), the agreement will go through on the American side, albeit with considerable difficulty.