CONTEMPORARY writings on India’s Northeast seem to have oscillated from ‘the sociology of doom’ to an otherwise robust ‘utopian impulse’. The early prediction of the region being cut into smithereens, evident perhaps in its sharpest possible form in Selig Harrison’s India: The Most Dangerous Decades,1 has undoubtedly lost much of its steam now. As we march into the new millennium, the region is believed to have somehow outlived this grim prediction. In more recent times, however, this has given way to a strong neo-liberal conviction that its future lies in India’s much-vaunted ‘Look East’ policy. The Northeast, in short, happens to be the key strategic point through which India can really look farther east towards Southeast Asia. While a mood swing is only too apparent in the recent surge of neo-liberal writings, there is of course need for caution and critical introspection.
In the battle between these two extremes in our understanding of the region, it is the middle ground that always stands to lose. This rejoinder seeks to offer some observations that primarily aim at restoring the middle ground at a time when in our – albeit overzealous – search for policy alternatives, we often tend to lose sight of the liabilities and risks that are involved in such endeavours. This, however, gives us no scope for moving to the other extreme of holding on to the prevalent border control regime at great social and economic cost.
True to the ‘utopian impulse’, a plea is made for ‘connecting the region with its transnational neighbours’ and appreciating the ‘opportunities’ that such connection offers to us in ‘our era of globalism’.2 The plea is based mainly, though not exclusively, on two rather complementary arguments: (a) Nation states of South and Southeast Asia with their more or less firmly drawn territorial borders have already become dysfunctional to economic development of the Northeast. Thus to cite an example, a transit route through Bangladesh, according to one estimate, would have ‘halved’ the transportation cost of commodities shipped to the Northeast from the rest of India. It is further argued that this would enable Bangladesh to set off her current adverse balance of trade with India.3 (b) Corresponding to a reconfiguration of economic space, thanks to the whole set of reforms initiated in the wake of globalization, there occurs or should occur a certain ‘softening of national borders enabling the formation of transnational regions.’ De and Ghosh make a plea for ushering in ‘a new era of economic development whereby the borders will be rendered redundant’.4
In this oft-repeated plea for connecting the Northeast with its transnational neighbours, there is very little or hardly any reference to the possible impact of such connection on the ethnic scenario of the region. The unplugging of ethnicity from the realm of political economy since the late 1980s seems to have proven costly for social science analyses in general and more particularly for the projections on ethnic scenario or as Arjun Appadurai would have put it, ‘ethnoscape’5 of the region. It is true that the case for connecting India with the larger transnational region in the East also springs from a desire to be part of a larger anti-terror coalition in a bid to isolate Pakistan.6 It is interesting to note that India’s threat perception has not changed and the same grand security design continues to inform her Look East policy.
In this projection, there is hardly any mention of the possible impact of the policy on the security scenario of the region except in very grandiose and general terms. The ethnic scenario of the region is thus held captive to India’s grand security design. Moreover, it is feared that this policy of befriending countries of the neighbouring region seeking an Indic Sanskritic connection might ethnicize India’s ‘war on terror’ and endanger the pluralist fabric of her society. If ethnicity in the region figures at all in the discussions on India’s Look East policy, it is in the general context of global terrorism and India’s abiding concern for depriving Pakistan of becoming the spearhead in the global anti-terror war. This brief rejoinder is a modest exercise in visualizing the possible impact of the formation of a ‘transnational region’ on the ethnic scenario of the Northeast. We propose to develop our argument with the help of the following largely overlapping premises.
While it is too tempting to describe the Northeast as region that is mired in violence and insurgency, according to Sanjib Baruah, ‘…only small minorities of people are committed to an agenda of political independence from India.’7 The plea often trivializes ethnicity and ethnic insurgency as a ‘minority phenomenon’. It is true that empirical studies in this regard are inadequate and, in most cases, nonexistent, one critical distinction will have to be made between peoples’ apparent non-commitment to insurgencies and their antipathy towards them. The recent events of Manipur do not in any way indicate any trace of antipathy. Of course the point is not that insurgency is a majority phenomenon. It is simply that in a region like the Northeast, the commonly made line of distinction between insurgent and institutional politics hangs on thin air. We will have occasion to come back to this point later.
It is true that economies of the Northeast are losing enormously. The economic costs of insurgency have been incalculably high. Independentist militancy and insurgencies seem to have led to a transformation in the character of economy and a switchover from jhum economy (Das Gupta 2002).8 Thus to cite an example, while early Lushai raids in the state could not lead to the abandonment of jhumming as probably the only mode of livelihood in the hills due to the abundance of land and absence of any alternative mode, today’s insurgent raids are responsible for not only massive migration from the hills but desertion of their traditional mode. The loss aspect of the economy is highlighted. But that insurgency is a sub-optimality endemic in the economies of the Northeast9 is hardly being highlighted.
Independentist movements do not disrupt the economy in the sense of leading them to an immediate and sure disaster, as many economists mentioned above would have us believe. If the economies of the Northeast are in a state of visible disorder, one must remember that the disorder is also enduring in the sense that it does not end up in any chaos and cataclysmic disaster.
According to Sanjib Baruah: ‘We know from the experience of decades of ethnic militancy and counter-insurgency that it is not difficult for the Indian state to control and contain insurgencies.’10 The argument is based on an assumption that the state is sufficiently distinct and distant from the realm of ethnic insurgencies so much so that it is possible for the state to ‘control and contain’ them. The problem with ethnic insurgencies in the Northeast is that it is difficult – if not impossible, on our part to locate the state outside this realm. Ethnic insurgencies are not external to the state that is supposed to handle and deal with them. The state-insurgency nexus in the Northeast has been a subject of frequent discussion in recent years.
The state’s capability of handling insurgency and keeping it under control is not determined by the simple balance of forces that decidedly weigh in its favour. There are two important factors that have to be taken into account in this connection: First, there is no denying the fact that persistent violation of rights has been responsible for large-scale disaffection of the people. Present-day Manipur serves as a burning example. Second, the issue of human rights and civil liberties comes increasingly under the international focus and any state that persistently violates them is likely to face a wide variety of pressures ranging from censorship and aid cuts to diplomatic isolation and even direct military action.
Neo-liberals underline the importance of a ‘free’ market unfettered by international borders in promoting and developing economies of the region. Such a plea obviously goes against the autarkic demands voiced by many an ethnic group. These demands thrive on generation and use on the part of an ethnic group or a group of them, of some norms of exclusion from the larger society and economy. A wide variation in the nature and degree of exclusion is noticeable in the region. The bonfire of Indian goods in Manipur in recent times obviously illustrates an extreme form of separation and exclusion, although it is not known whether this entailed a complete severance of market ties with the Indian mainland. But autarkic groups in most cases are seen to retain their market linkages and transactions – notwithstanding their mutual hostilities, by way of investing them with an ethnic character. Thus when there occurs any conflict between market interests and people’s ethnic preferences, the latter seem to prevail over the former.
Autarkic demands in market transactions and most importantly without severing them may take any of the following three forms or maybe any of their combination: (a) refusal to sell goods and services to people belonging to an alien community (a section of Meiteis for example, refused to sell goods including some essential commodities to the Nagas of Imphal valley in June 2001 and thereby causing severe hardship to them); (b) refusal to buy goods and services from people belonging to an alien ethnic community; and (c) manipulating prices for either buying or selling or both, in cases where members of an alien ethnic community are involved.
What it implies is that I sell commodities to an alien at a price higher – sometimes forbiddingly so, than what I might have charged from the members of my community. Ethnically specific pricing is an instance of how supposedly unfettered market relationships characteristic of globalization are vitiated, violated and turned aside. Inter-ethnic conflicts in the region are also accompanied by ethnically constituted market forces.
There is reason to think that ethnicity in the Northeast is not just a market imperfection that can be taken care of by the state with necessary legal and institutional reforms. I will take the point a step further. Although we have insufficient information in this respect, it seems that left to itself, penetration of markets does not do away with the already existent ethnic preferences in the Northeast. It is rather the other way round: Market exchanges and transactions follow the already existing lines of ethnic preferences. This squares with one of Despres’ concluding arguments that ‘resource competition is more determined by than determinative of, ethnic ascriptions.’11
If one widens the scope of one’s analysis and takes a more nuanced view, one does not fail to notice that while migration of capital from one country to another has been fairly easy and playing a great role in transcending the preexisting ethnic and social barriers, that of labour has proven to be highly difficult and most importantly ethnically skewed. Viewed in this light, forces of globalization have only contributed to a certain reinforcing of the already ethnicized international labour market in South and Southeast Asia. Although India’s Look East policy talks more in terms of trade flow than human flow (which is basically, if not exclusively, a labour flow), any migration of labour, particularly cheap labour, from either side will surely be unwelcome on both sides. That the governments are yet to accept – let alone implement – the proposed Indo-Bangladesh work permit regime is only illustrative of this point.
While these demands being of varying nature have differential implications for the economy and society, not all autarkic demands as Russell Hardin warns us, bear ‘negative consequences’. The problem arises when such demands become detrimental to both the autarkic groups and the larger society. Hardin argues that there could hardly be any real tradeoff between the productivity losses inflicted by the separatist and autarkic practices and moral and social identity of a community advocating and practising it: ‘…the gains are not greater except economically. The losses are moral and social and they are ignored in liberal’s vision.’12 This is one of the key running threads of any militant discourse in the region.
Reflecting on the Naga insurgency, Kaka Iralu for example observes: ‘Yes, we are underdeveloped but underdevelopment is not the cause of insurgency in Nagaland. We also want development in an environment of freedom and liberty and not under political and military oppression. This dream can only be possible (sic) when a political solution finally dawns upon the battle scarred lands of Nagaland.’13
The formation of a transnational region, Baruah argues, is likely to compensate for ‘the marginalisation of ethnic communities within nation states’ by way of conferring on them what he calls ‘transnational recognition’.14 Some of the ethnic communities living on the borders for example have reportedly been feeling enthusiastic about the prospect of meeting their ethnic cousins. Such sentiments are frequently expressed in the media and in literary writings of the region. As Anand Oinam observes: ‘…Manipur will be no longer a landlocked state in the 21st century. Our sons and grandsons will find it easier to visit our long lost brothers and sisters in Myanmar in the coming decades.’15
The ‘natural’ connection between South and Southeast Asia in history has already led a section of intellectuals and rights activists to raise the demand for people’s ‘natural’ right to migration across international borders.16 As much of India’s Look East policy concentrates on the flow of goods and services than of human beings, it is not at all clear whether the proposed free trade regime will also be coupled with free flow of people between the countries or at least any substantial liberalization of visa regime within the transnational region.
Our argument is not so much that the ethnic communities in the post- Partition Northeast have reconfigured themselves in a way that looks irreversible or for that matter unchangeable. We have shown elsewhere how ethnic communities of the region have gradually sought to normalize themselves into the changing realities of the post-Partition era.17 Nor is it that the relevant parties have developed stakes in the perpetuation of the existing border control regime in whatever way. Some empirical studies conducted on Indo-Bangladesh borders for example show how a whole chain of people including brokers, smugglers and a section of security personnel, politicians and migrants benefit from such a regime.
The point is: If such cross-border ethnic solidarities are allowed to develop in the near future, they may not necessarily imply what Baruah calls, ‘transnational recognition’. First, if the concerned communities are to be compensated for the ‘harm’ of dismemberment caused to them as a result of Partition, mere ‘visits’ to their ethnic cousins will not be enough. The ‘visits’, instead of addressing the ‘harm’ may contribute to a certain sharing of their agonies and thus hardening of positions. It has to be safeguarded through a ‘double citizenship’ regime that Baruah has been talking about in some of his recent writings.
Second, sections of the same ethnic community severed from each other as a result of the reorganization of borders are not at the same stage of social and economic development. Their present interests and concerns too are bound to vary. The Nagas of Myanmar – known as ‘eastern Nagas’ are economically not as developed. Pan solidarity within the group has been one of the most difficult things to achieve for the ethnic communities. Many of the insurgent groups operating in the region seem to be divided on this issue. Transborder communication will provide opportunities of comparison between them. Even forces of globalization by all accounts do not make the same economic impact on two distinct yet adjacent ethnic spaces. These comparisons will introduce newer and hitherto unknown sources of ethnic schism and conflicts.
In other words, we argue that the proposal for region’s insertion into the larger transnational region may not provide a foolproof answer to the tangled ethnic question of the region. Contrary to the neo-liberal myth, market forces are not of uniform nature throughout the world: they too have their particularities and specificities even in our age of globalism. The emerging ethnoscape in the region is shaped by the fact that the so-called universal market forces are enmeshed in ethnicity and culture and vice versa. This rejoinder tried to draw our attention to only some of the modalities of their mutual impingement. These particularities we must not forget, offer both opportunities and challenges for us. Unless we become sensitive to them, any mechanical application of the European or North American experience to the Northeast will be a sure recipe for disaster.
Is it then the end of the road for the Northeast? At the outset, we have pointed out that a critique of the plea for connecting the Northeast with the neighbouring countries should not lead us to take refuge in the prevailing border control regime. We propose to take a more nuanced view of the situation. First of all, the proposed transnational regime is likely to be more effective if it takes ethnic factors of the region into account.
At least three critical areas that need to be addressed and taken into account may be identified in this connection: One, in our pursuit for quick economic recovery, we must ensure that the communities are not deprived of their right to difference and identity. This is not to say that the communities fanatically hold on to and preserve their old identities even in our age of globalism. This is only to say that globalization has made it imperative on our part to respect a community’s right to rearticulate its identity in keeping with the changing times. While there have been occasions when Assamese identity has been defined in narrow and ‘chauvinist’ terms, particularly in opposition to the outsiders/‘foreigners’, there is no denying the fact that a strong tinge of universalism is also traceable to the Assamese ethos that has its roots in the humanism of Srimanta Sankaradeva and Muslim preachers and saints. Forces of globalization might encourage the Janus-faced Assamese community to show its universal face. Ethnic identity is not something given; it is rearticulated in keeping with the changing times.
Two, in the Northeast, ‘who initiates’ becomes much more important than ‘what is being initiated’. The value of an economic programme is judged not by its intrinsic worth – its economic pros and cons that the neo-liberal advocates have been constantly examining, but by the nature of the agency that initiates them. The programmes would be acceptable if the agencies are not only friendly but also internal to them.
Three, the viability of globalization in the region critically depends on its distributive performance. Insofar as an ethnic community feels deprived, it also intends to catch up with the more advanced communities both of the region and outside. The outcome of globalization will be decided by the tug and pull between these forces. As an ethnic community seeks to catch up with another, it operates within the same framework of social mobility. But disenchantment with the same framework may soon set in if it feels perpetually deprived of what it considers as its due. In a situation where globalization cannot benefit all the communities at least to an equal extent, the advocates and agencies would do well to take care of its distributive aspects.18
We argue that the plea for connecting the Northeast with the larger transnational region per se will not take care of the ethnic considerations that afflict the region. We also argue that the state perhaps is not the agency to take care of the considerations described above. Civil society in the region may play a crucial role in this regard. For one thing, contrary to the commonly made case for transforming it into a market facilitator and catalytic agent for changing people’s mindset,19 we look upon civil society as the very site where the deleterious impact of globalization and its supposedly universal and ethnically blind market forces are met, staved off, controlled and mitigated.
For another, a civil society viewed in this light is not an anathema to ethnicity. It is also the site where a community retains its right to identity and difference in the era of globalism without necessarily getting into any violent conflict with others. It is in short a site where communities contend and negotiate with each other in order to evolve their common strategies of survival and not obliteration. Over and above its many other tasks, we look upon civil society as the manager par excellence of ethnicity and ethnic communities both within and across the region.
Footnotes:
1. Selig Harrison, India; The Most Dangerous Decades, Oxford University Press, Madras, 1960.
2. Sanjib Baruah, ‘Between South and Southeast Asia: Northeast India and the Look East Policy’, CENESEAS, Guwahati, 2004, p. 3.
3. Nitish Sengupta and Arindam Banik, ‘Regional Trade and Investment in Developing Countries: The Case of SAARC’, 1997, mimeo.
4. Prabir De and Buddhadeb Ghosh, ‘Infrastructure, Income and Regional Economic Development with Special Reference to Northeastern States: An Approach to Understand the Indo-Bangladesh Border Trade’, 2003, mimeo.
5. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, OUP, Delhi, 1997.
6. See, Frederic Grare and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy, Manohar, New Delhi, 2003.
7. Baruah, op. cit., p. 10.
8. Malabika Das Gupta, ‘The Economic Impact of Militancy on the Economy of the Jhumias of the Northeast: A Study of Tripura’, 2002, mimeo.
9. This point was highlighted in a different context by Sugata Marjit in course of his presentation to the panel discussion on ‘Is India An Emerging Power?’ as part of the national seminar on ‘India and the Global Order: Security and Diplomacy in the New 21st Century’ organized by the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 5-6 February 2004.
10. Baruah, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
11. Leo A. Despres, ‘Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomenon’ in Leo A. Despres (ed.), Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1975, p. 199.
12. Russell Hardin, ‘Communities and Development: Autarkic Social Groups and the Economy’, 1996, mimeo.
13. Kaka Iralu, ‘Is Underdevelopment the Cause of Insurgency in Nagaland?’ in C. Joshua Thomas and Gurudas Das (eds.), Dimensions of Development in Nagaland, Regency, New Delhi, 2002, p. 19.
14. Baruah, op. cit., p. 18.
15. Anand Oinam, ‘Look East Policy and Manipur’, The Sangai Express, 27 December 2003.
16. Subhendu Dasgupta, ‘Adhikarer tattwa nirman: Ekti khasra’ (in Bengali) [Constructing a theory of rights: A draft], Aneek, 32 (8 & 9), February-March 1996, pp. 32-5.
17. Samir Kumar Das, ‘Extraordinary Partition and its Impact on Ethnic Militant Politics of Assam’, in Girin Phukon (ed.) Ethnicity and Polity in South Asia, South Asian, New Delhi, 2002.
18. I have discussed this in Samir Kumar Das, ‘On the Politics of Globalization: Managing Ethnicity in Northeastern India’ in G. Das and R. Purkayastha (eds.) Liberalization and India’s Northeast, Commonwealth, New Delhi, 1988.
19. Cf. Anasuya Basu Ray Chaudhury, Energy Crisis and Subregional Cooperation in South Asia, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2000, p. 75.
