CRITICS and beneficiaries both,
often associate the complex system of preferential regime that modern
India came to spawn with B.R. Ambedkar, and rightly so. Unfortunately
there has been insufficient reflection on the principles and concerns
that persuaded him to propose such a regime and the approaches towards
preferential treatment under different political conditions. In contrast,
when policies of affirmative action were initiated on a large scale in
the United States in the 1960s, a distinct body of ideas on social justice
were formulated and their relationship to the larger liberal concerns
was drawn out.
Ambedkar did not agree with the colonial policy of
divide and rule that saw India as made of a number of distinct interests
which had to be given separate representation. His plea for special
consideration and safeguards to certain communities and social groups was
based on a wholly different set of reasons. He also disagreed with
mainstream nationalist opinion that with the consolidation of India’s
nationhood social divisions would make way for a densely shared common
identity.
From early on, starting with his statement to the
Southborough Committee in 1919, he consistently argued that the Indian
polity cannot be solely based on the foundation of equal rights and
liberties. In the system of liberal dispensation being formulated in
India, he felt, there need to be certain special provisions for the
disadvantaged groups as well as for those who are different on grounds of
religion, language and nationality. He argued that the inability to attend
to social disadvantages and differences cannot be defended on grounds of
justice and fairness and is likely to compromise political stability. He
felt that a major drawbacks of liberal democracy was its insensitivity to
reach out proactively towards those subject to disadvantages of one kind
or the other.
In turn, Ambedkar proposed a set of principles
justifying preferential treatment, and along with it, suggested an entire
complex of public institutions and policy measures to combat disadvantage
and reach out to differential considerations. In his early formulations
Ambedkar argued for special provisions for the untouchables on grounds of
representation, social presence and selfhood. In later years, he reworked
these principles and placed greater stress on equality and democracy.
Although both sets of arguments complement each other, they were revisited
whenever occasion arose .
O ne
of the early arguments of Ambedkar for special provisions to the disadvantaged
groups concerns representation.1
With appropriate modifications this argument can be applied to other groups
as well whose interests and concerns are not adequately taken into account
while formulating public policy. He argued that the first purpose of representation
is ‘to transmit the force of individual opinion and preference into public
action.’2 When a group or
community is denied representation, or denied it in fair measure, then
its beliefs and preferences have little bearing in shaping public policy.
In India between the touchables and untouchables there
is almost an impassable barrier and ‘no shared bonds of aims, beliefs,
aspirations, knowledge and common understanding.’ 3
Therefore, virtual representation cannot meet the need. Besides the
disadvantaged, and particularly the untouchables, have much to gain or
loose depending on the kind and extent of representation available to
them. The untouchables, for instance, may not have ‘large property to
protect from confiscation. But they have their very person confiscated.’4
Representation can help them to seek rights and resources to pursue their
aims and objectives otherwise impossible to pursue.
R epresentation
needs to take the concrete context in view to identify appropriate modes
open to it and the extent to which they have to be pursued. There are
no ideal-typical models holding good everywhere. The progress of franchise
in any society does not lay down a model for other societies to follow.
In this regard, he felt that Britain could be a model for India. There
is no guarantee that a limited franchise produces a better government
either. A narrow franchise aimed at elite representation may bolster the
importance of some communities to the detriment of others.5
Unlike generally understood, communal representation
need not necessarily harden social divisions: It could be a way of
dissolving them by bringing together ‘men from diverse castes who would
not otherwise mix together in the legislative council.’ 6
and by begetting new forms of associated life such associations could
threaten ‘fossilised’7
ways of life and help dissolve ‘set attitudes’.
H e
argued that a minority should find not numerical but adequate representation.
But it should not be so preponderant as to dictate terms to the majority.
In the context of the Simon Commission and his plea for joint electorates
with reservation for Scheduled Castes, he argued that minority representation
should be of such a magnitude ‘as would make it worth the while of many
a party from the majority to seek an alliance with the minority. If the
party is compelled to seek an alliance with a minority, the minority is
undoubtedly in a position to dictate. If it is drawn for the alliance
then it is adequately represented.’8
While giving due consideration to the educational and
economic status of minorities, he felt that the actual figure ‘be the
ratio of its population to the total seats multiplied by some factor which
is greater than one and less than two.’ 9
The lower the standing of the community the greater should be its
electoral advantage over the rest. If a minority is not protected with
weightage and adequacy, it will be entirely submerged. Weightage, he felt,
could be determined by employing a four-fold criteria: numbers, social
standing, education and economic strength. While keeping the demographic
composition in view, those who are economically and socially backward with
low educational accomplishments deserve additional consideration.
For Ambedkar, joint electorate or separate electorate 10
as modes of representation are not a matter of principle but mechanisms to
achieve certain ends. A separate electorate guarantees that a
representative enjoys the confidence of the electorate who are his special
concern. It is justified in the context of hardened social identities when
each group holds on to its particular interests with little possibility of
generalizing them in the foreseeable future. If, however, there is
homogeneity of interests then joint electorates with reservation for
affected groups is, in his opinion, a better option.11
A gainst
the argument that separate electorate for untouchables, whom he clearly
recognized as the bearers of a set of particular interests, would lead
to fissures within Hinduism, Ambedkar felt, ‘Social considerations and
not religious affiliation is the basis of the acceptance of the electorate.’12
The argument that separate electorates would reinforce an anti-national
spirit, he felt, was baseless as not every group demanding separate electorate
was anti-national. The demand need not necessarily have a religious or
communal nexus. A majority, however, according to him, cannot have a separate
electorate as it would result in a permanent domination of the majority
over the minorities. When political units are primarily communal, majority-rule
based on a community is unjustifiable as it could perpetuate its rule
keeping other communities under its tutelage.
Ambedkar’s second argument for preferential treatment
was based on social inclusion and the significance of public presence.
Preferential treatment provides an opportunity to persons and groups who
have hitherto been denied social presence and are excluded in public life.
Presence in public life affords an opportunity to actively participate ‘in
the process of government.’ 13
Besides, participation in associated life begets social bonds and stakes.
T his
makes a big difference to certain societies such as India where, he felt,
there were no shared aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge and common
understanding and therefore little ‘endosmosis’ across social groups.
In India, ‘given two candidates belonging to different groups but purporting
to represent the same interest, the voters will mark their votes on the
person belonging to the same community,’14
leaving out an entire group from being counted. Untouchable communities
suffer the baneful effects of such exclusion the most.
Representation of opinions and preferences alone is not
an adequate measure for democracy. It requires personal representation as
well. The latter involves ‘representation of opinions as well as
representation of persons.’ A government for the people, but not by the
people, is sure to educate some into masters and others into subjects;
because it is by reflex effects of association that one can feel and
measure the growth of personality.’ 15
It requires that adequate representatives are drawn from the concerned
groups. Territorial representation fails to provide adequate and effective
representation to minority groups. Such a situation gets further
exasperated if the majority and minorities in that area are relatively
stable, made of specific social, religious and ethnic cleavages and looked
down upon by the majority.
Ambedkar felt that there are some constituencies, such
as untouchables, who can be represented only by the untouchables
themselves. 16 Others cannot
understand their situation of dehumanisation, subjugation, denial of
respect which one man owes to another as a human being and the denial of
rights of citizenship that ensues therefrom. The representative should not
merely hail from such a constituency but should be able to effectively
highlight its concerns, monitor them across contending interests and
pursue their implementation. Further, representation should be ‘in such
numbers as will constitute a force sufficient to claim redress.’
O pportunity
for social interaction afforded through presence is particularly important
for the constitution of a healthy and confident self. In interaction with
others a person constitutes himself or herself. Valued or degraded understanding
of oneself has to a great extent to do with one’s location in such interactions.
‘What one is as a person is what one is as associated with others.’17
Social exclusion can greatly impair the growth of the human person and
communities as has been the case with untouchables in India.
Untouchables have been denied their very personhood and
consequently the basis of their treatment as equals. They ‘have their
very persona confiscated. The socio-religious disabilities have
dehumanised the untouchables and their interests at stake are therefore
the interests of humanity.’ What they have been deprived of is something
basic that is ‘incomparably of greater interest than interests of
property.’ 18 Social
interactions treat untouchables as nobodies and others try to construct
superior selves of themselves on that basis.
The former, he says, are like ‘Plato’s slaves’
who ‘accept from another the purposes which control their conduct.’
They are denied their ability to make their choices and consequently their
agency. They are socialised ‘never to complain’ or expect ‘improvement
in their lot’ or to expect ‘common respect which one man owes to
another.’ 19 The consequence
of social dispositions as expressed in untouchability is to deprive its
victims from claiming the right of citizenship embodying such claims as
personal liberty, equality before the law, liberty of conscience, freedom
of opinion and speech, right of assembly, right of representation in the
country’s government and right to hold office.
A mbedkar’s
second set of arguments for preferential consideration are grounded on
equality as an attribute of every person and admitting to this worth the
kind of engagement each person should have in a polity. Preferential considerations
remove obstacles and enable people to act as equals.
For Ambedkar, equality is not merely a juridical notion
as equality before the law, or a political notion as equality of
treatment. It is a value that denotes what kind of consideration we need
to extend to others and in turn demand from others for ourselves. It sets
standards for our ways of life and thereby sustains a regime of rights.
Democracy can become a way of life only by extending equal consideration
to others.
Ambedkar problematizes regard for equal consideration.
Empirically men and women are quite unequal. Our experience highlights
numerous facets of human inequality rather than equality. ‘A man’s
power is dependent upon (i) physical heredity, (ii) social
inheritance or endowment in the form of parental care, education,
accumulation of scientific knowledge, everything which enables him to be
more efficient than the savage, and finally, (iii) on his own
efforts. In all these three respects men are undoubtedly unequal.’ 20
The fact of inequality stares us in our face.
H e,
therefore, called belief in human equality as a construct or a fiction
which should nonetheless be considered a governing principle. Only when
we uphold equality of men we will not run counter to some of our other
deeply held beliefs. Those beliefs become tenable only on the presupposition
of equality.
If heredity and upbringing which make men unequal
constitute the measure of their estimation, then their efforts, i.e., what
they do with their lives, will not be the basis of social relations. Human
agency expressed in their efforts will not find recognition. It would ‘not
be the selection of the able. It would be the selection of the privileged.’ 21
Human endeavour and agency will find due acknowledgement only if we treat
people equally with respect to heredity and inheritance.22
Therefore, birth and natural assets, education that is not funded out of
one’s own earnings, family name, business connections and inherited
wealth cannot be the basis for allotment of resources.23
A mbedkar
placed another argument for equality in Buddha’s mouth. ‘In the struggle
for existence if inequality is recognised as the rule of the game the
weakest will always go to the wall.’24
Is it right? Some people are positively disposed to it. They reason: ‘It
will help the fittest to survive.’ It does not, however, tell us, ‘Who
is the fittest? And are the fittest the best from view of the society?’
‘Equality may help the best to survive even though the best may not be
the fittest.’25
This view is supplemented by the argument that a social
body can bring out the best in men and women only when initial
equality is extended to them. Utility and progress demand that we treat
people on an equal basis. In this case Ambedkar specifies equality as
accorded ‘initially’. It does not demand that equality of opportunity
remains the condition throughout, disregarding the effort put in by
people.
He formulated a fourth argument by appealing to
pragmatism. It demands that people be treated equally as it helps us to
avoid the traps of unfair treatment. Statesmen have to handle vast
numbers. It is well nigh impossible to go on the basis of need or capacity
particularly as they are susceptible to continuous changes. Therefore,
with fairness in view, the rough and ready rule is, ‘To treat all men
alike not because they are alike but because classification and assortment
is impossible.’ 26
The argument of initial equality and equality of
treatment work cumulatively. If there is no initial equality there cannot
be equality of treatment subsequently. If in the initial run, resources
and opportunities are unequal then they would beget unequal individuals,
obviously for no fault of theirs. Extending equality of treatment to them,
subsequently, will reproduce the unequal condition rather than make amends
for it. Preferential treatment makes amends to initial inequality and the
distortions it throws up in equality of treatment. It reinforces equality
and does not undermine it.
A mbedkar
advanced primarily two approaches for preferential treatment that a polity
could pursue: the community centred/consociational and the liberal-nationalist,
although they are not wholly watertight and often there is a good deal
of mix of the two in a concrete setting.
The first approach holds good when society is
made up of identities, closed on themselves, that have become independent
players on the political scene. These identities are of a relatively
durable nature such as based on religion, ethnicity and so on. Here the
primary actors are communities and identities, and the political order has
to invariably rest on them. Special arrangements for representation of the
weaker communities need to made in this context by according additional
weightage to them.
W hen
communities have become primary players on the political scene, to offer
joint electorate to a minority even with reservation will not affect the
dominance of the majority. In unreserved constituencies the majority can
simply ignore the minority and in reserved constituencies a minority candidate
cannot win an election without the blessings of the majority. It will
be granting ‘office without power.’
Under such a political configuration the legislature
and executive cannot be merely based on majority support, given the fact
that the majority is not merely a political majority but a communal one.
It should enjoy the confidence of the minorities as well. Under such
circumstances, ‘majority rule is not a sacrosanct principle.’ In
general, majority rule is tolerated for two reasons: (i) ‘It is a
political majority’ and therefore, (ii) ‘It accepts and absorbs
so much of the point of view of the minority that the minority does not
care to rebel against the decision’ 27
of the majority. This is not the case when communities closed in on
themselves become primary units on the political scene.
Under such a dispensation, he felt, all communities
should be represented in the prescribed proportion in public services
subject to minimum qualification, education and age, with no single
community having a monopoly. The disadvantaged groups should enjoy special
safeguards in services and in the allocation of resources with built-in
mechanisms of accountability.
As the constitution is susceptible to amendment, these
arrangements even though agreed upon may not last long. In States and
Minorities, Ambedkar proposed a complex scheme wherein such
constitutional changes do not have an adverse bearing on minorities and if
they are effected, the majority needs to elicit popular approval for such
measures. If communities are closed in on themselves, then the
disadvantaged communities, particularly the untouchables, will scarcely
find openings in the employment market. Therefore, the state may have to
exercise a decisive say on a large part of the economy by bringing it
under public control and accord constitutional status for the concerned
provisions.
S uch
a community-centred scheme of arrangements and preferences should be further
buttressed by a charter of fundamental/civil rights available to one and
all which legislative majorities cannot override. These rights should
include the specific claims of minorities including the removal of civic
disabilities of certain communities such as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. Such a charter, he felt, should include the right to religious
liberty; the right to establish and run religious and charitable institutions;
adequate safeguards for the protection of religion, culture and personal
law; provisions for the promotion of their education and languages and
self-government; protection to the charitable institutions of minority
communities and assurances to their due share in grants-in-aid by the
state.
Ambedkar proposed a radically different approach
towards preferential considerations, which I have termed
liberal-nationalist, in situations when group identities are more open. In
this case members of the groups participate across the board in shared
values and interests irrespective of their group affiliations. There is
greater trust and sense of belonging to a shared order among communities
beyond their immediate identity concerns. Economic, political and cultural
policies pursued in common further reinforce such bonds. Shared
institutions and regulations are in place. Communities and identities may
still come in but as secondary to a shared system of rules and
regulations. There is an expressed or assumed conception of a unified
nationalism upheld by such a dispensation.
Under such conditions Ambedkar favours individual
rights, universal franchise and joint electorate with reservation for the
disadvantaged. He is not inimical to a strong emphasis on a unitary state 28
and an unqualified emphasis on joint responsibility of the cabinet29
under such conditions. He is prepared to go the whole hog with a unified
conception of nationalism under such circumstances, envisaging the
possibility of transcending communal cleavages.30
U nder
such circumstances he unequivocally stood for joint electorate with reservation
for untouchables if the polity is based on universal franchise. In case
of limited franchise, he demanded separate electorate for untouchables
for obvious reasons. Detailed arrangements to constitute multi-member
electoral constituencies to foster common identity, mechanisms to promote
equal citizenship and a democratic temper were for him be important considerations
under such circumstances.
Such a system is sustained on the basis of a guarantee
of civil rights to all, alongside certain special considerations towards
the disadvantaged. Besides fundamental rights, abolition of untouchability,
legislation against social persecution, liability of officials for
instances of persecution and right to appeal become important provisions
under these conditions. The distinctive emphasis is on equal rights and
deference to the disadvantaged. Emphasis remains on education, open
recruitment to the army, special police protection, and so on, as sources
and conditions of enablement.
U nder
such circumstances the particularisms of civil society are not allowed
to intrude into the universal agency of the state. Under these conditions
Ambedkar favoured a strong welfarist conception of the state. The target
of criticism is not so much the communal majority but the existing state
which falls short of its universalist mission.31
In this context Ambedkar underscored the difference
between minorities and such disadvantaged groups as untouchables in India.
Although there is the danger of discrimination to minorities, it is
qualitatively minor as compared to what the untouchables have to suffer:
The latter are not entitled to a range of civic rights available to
minorities and are subject to social persecution unlike the former. On the
other hand, in the community-based approach, the situation of minorities
and Scheduled Castes is perceived as much more akin. The danger of
boycott, instigation to boycott and threat of boycott is present for
minorities as they are to Scheduled Castes against which they have to be
insured. 32
T here
are corrective mechanisms suggested against incursions of vested interests
from the social arena or the partisanship of certain apparatuses of the
state, as also effective and appropriate remedy. ‘What is important to
an individual is not that his rights should be declared but he should
have the remedy in order to enforce those rights.’33
Other mechanisms to guard over the deviation of the state are suggested
such as public service commissions with provisions to safeguard the integrity
and security of tenure of its members. Special departmental care is sought
for depressed classes to watch over the interests of the depressed classes
and promote their welfare.
Ambedkar’s considerations on preferential treatment
assume a specific theory of representation drawing upon conceptions of the
human person, value of sociability, equality and democracy. These
considerations are acceptable to the extent one is in agreement with their
theoretical presuppositions. For him a theory of representation needs to
be socially sensitive and should not simply assume that representatives
are committed to an unalloyed pursuit of common good. The disadvantaged
have great stakes in who represents them and how.
A scheme of preference should afford greater public
presence to the disadvantaged. This, in turn, will help checkmate the
monopoly over public space by the dominant sections. A preferential regime
creates conditions for the crafting of a confident self which in the case
of the untouchables is trampled underfoot through exclusion, abuse and
denigration. Preferential consideration is closely tied with the pursuit
of equality and all that it implies in terms of the distribution of rights
and liberties, opportunities and powers. It calls for effective public
measures and interventions for the purpose. Preferential treatment can
enormously strengthen democracy, not merely as a formal device of
constituting public authority but as a way of life.
T he
specific schemes of preferential treatment are contextual and depend largely
upon the nature of the political community, and may greatly vary within
the same polity. While the disadvantaged need differential consideration
in all societies, the specific measures – legislative, executive and developmental
– needed for the purpose depend upon how diverse communities and identities
relate themselves to public life.
Ambedkar formulated his preferential regime in the
context of the rise of the welfare state. 34
How would such a regime engage with a polity in the throes of
liberalization? Though Ambedkar did not confront such a situation, his
preferred response would be that a democratic polity committed to rights
and pursing equality as underscored above would be the best judge in the
context. Such a response may not satisfy many who are caught in the
contested trajectories of such pursuits. Nevertheless Ambedkar’s moral
and political stances are helpful in specifying issues without necessarily
pre-empting the options before the polity.
Ambedkar primarily emphasized the role of the state in
attending to issues of disadvantage and for upholding the concerns of the
disadvantaged as citizens. The state is the voice of the
citizen-collective and it cannot shirk this responsibility. If a polity
opts for liberalization, it cannot be market-driven but needs to uphold
the will of the citizen-collective. A state approaches concerns of
preferential consideration, not merely programmatically, that is, by
adopting a set of policies and programmes, but by striving towards an
ideological consensus across society through a number of apparatuses and
interventions open to it.
W hile
the state plays such a role, Ambedkar felt that it is the disadvantaged
themselves, and in the Indian context they are the dalits, adivasis and
similar social groups, who should decide what is good for them while respecting
the rights of the others. Ambedkar would definitely have suggested representative
fora of these social groups to devise what they consider as reasonable
policies to be pursued in this context. Deliberation of this kind and
the specific proposals flowing from them requires that the polity remains
open and transactional. In its absence, there would not be anything wrong
if the disadvantaged groups were to mount unilateral pressures, including
pressure to retract from liberalization or any of its specific expressions.
For Ambedkar equality is a moral value that foregrounds
pursuit of rights including rights to property. Those who are not
deferential towards equality cannot claim respect towards their rights
including their rights to property, contract and transactions. Promotion
of equal consideration is as much a responsibility of civil society as it
is of the state.
The devices available to a society to pursue equality
may be diverse although all of them cannot be invoked or invoked to an
equal measure and even if we do such measures may not be effective.
Reservation in employment in the private sector or affirmative policy of
the kind in vogue in the United States could be such options but a
reasonable presumption needs to be made in favour of them – whether they
indeed are the best options to promote equality or should they be pursued
alongside other measures. Ambedkar himself would have favoured such
options as they can partially extend palpable benefits and heighten the
presence of disadvantaged groups in civil society, much as the
preferential policies pursued by the state have done in India.
B ut
the benefits that can accrue from employment in the private sector or
even from affirmative action policies would be confined to a few and leave
out the vast majority from the ambit of their reach. Ambedkar would, therefore,
in addition, favour a massive intervention by the state to institute empowering
and enabling measures of a positive kind in the social, economic and cultural
arenas among which education, health, food security, housing and a minimum
threshold of guaranteed employment would be basic.
This is definitely not the case today and the kind of
benefits that are made available are despicable in quality. Instead of
empowerment they reproduce hierarchical relations by distinguishing their
beneficiaries from those who pay for these benefits in the marketplace.
Besides, steps need to be taken to ensure security of possessions of the
disadvantaged such as land, resources, traditional knowledges, respect and
honour. Further, there are other interventions of a negative kind needed
to prevent atrocities and violations of those respects which Ambedkar said
‘a man owes to another man.’
1. B.R. Ambedkar,
‘Evidence Before the Southborough Committee’, Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings
and Speeches (BAWS), Vol. I, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, pp.
243-278.
2. Ibid., p.
247.
3. Ibid., p.
255.
4. Ibid.
5. BAWS,
Vol. 2, p. 262.
6. BAWS,
Vol. 1, p .2 66.
7. Ibid.
8. BAWS,
Vol.2, p. 362.
9. BAWS,
Vol. 2, p. 363.
10. This distinction
evoked huge controversy in the Indian national struggle particularly around
the conjuncture of the Poona Pact. For the Poona Pact, see, Pyarelal,
The Epic Fast, Navjivan, Ahmedabad, 1958 and Ravindra Kumar, ‘Gandhi,
Ambekdar and the Poona Pact, 1932’, in Jim Masselos (ed.), Struggling
and Ruling, Sterling, New Delhi, 1987.
11. BAWS,
Vol. 1, p. 374. Ambedkar, however, favoured joint electorate only during
certain phases – in his deputation before the Simon Commission, during
the Poona Pact and in its immediate aftermath, and during the phase of
constitution-making of free India. During other periods he demanded separate
electorate in an emphatic way. In the former instances he saw greater
openness between communities to come out of their ghettoes and to reach
out to others.
12. For Ambedkar
a policy measure is justified by its social bearing and not religious
implications.
13. Ibid., p.
247.
14. Ibid., p.
251.
15. Ibid.
16. BAWS,
Vol. 1, p. 256.
17. BAWS,
Vol. 2, p.
18. BAWS,
Vol. 2, p. 55.
19. Ibid.
20. B.R. Ambedkar,
‘Annhilation of Caste’, in Valerian Rodrigues (ed.), The Essential
Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002,
p. 276. These arguments are repeated by Ambedkar later on, almost verbatim,
See, B.R. Ambedkar, The Buddha and His Dhamma, Siddharth, Bombay,
1974 (second ed., first pub., 1957), p. 221.
21. B.R. Ambekdar,
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches (BAWS), Vol.
1-16, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, Vol.1, p. 58.
22. B.R. Ambedkar,
‘Annhilation of Caste’, op. cit., p. 277.
23. Ibid. For
similar arguments discounting natural assets and talents from desert,
See, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1973, p. 12 & 507-511, and Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2002, pp. 85-92.
24. B.R. Ambedkar,
The Budha and His Dhamma, op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. BAWS,
Vol. 1, p. 58.
27. BAWS,
Vol. 1, p. 379.
28. BAWS,
Vol.2, p. 507.
29. BAWS, Vol.
2, pp. 514-515.
30. See, BAWS,
Vol. 2, p. 517.
31. Interestingly,
Gandhi challenges Ambedkar and refuses to concede special representation
to untouchables on the overt plea of bringing about a fissure in Hinduism
when Ambedkar is making demands for equal liberties and special consideration
to the diadvantaged. At this stage Ambedkar was far from making any overtures
to create fissures within Hinduism from the point of view of the analysis
that he put across.
32. BAWS,
Vol. 1, pp. 398-400.
33. BAWS,
Vol. 2, p. 539.
34. It is to be
noted that Ambedkar studied at the London School of Economics securing
an M.A. and D.Sc. in Economics. He attended several lectures of Sydney
Webb at the School and was close to many intellectuals and politicians
inclined towards labour politics and Fabian persuasions. |