IN much of scholarly discourse
the institution of caste is commonly taken to be the embodiment of fundamental
socio-economic inequalities. In particular, during the last decade a consensus
has emerged across the entire gamut of political, legal and intellectual
opinion regarding the use of caste as an appropriate criterion in public
policy oriented towards positive discrimination. Every now and then, particularly
before elections, caste groups demand their inclusion in the lists of
the ‘backwards’. At the same time, political parties dangle the carrot
of the benefits of reservation to more groups and promise to extend the
policy to the private sector.
Caste remains a major force in Indian politics. More
caste organizations are coming into existence. Overt and covert appeals
are being made to caste sentiments in all spheres of public life. The
increasing mobilisation of castes is being approvingly described as the
emergence of caste ‘identity’. The politics of caste identity has been
unanimously hailed in the media, among intellectuals and politicians of
all varieties, as a move towards true equality. It is argued that the
politics of caste is secular and serves a bulwark against the politics of
religion. It is suggested that the recent rise of political leaders
belonging to lower castes in northern India and the implementation of
reservations for backward castes actually amounts to a silent revolution.
Does the ritual rank of a caste indicate the degree of
deprivation actually suffered by its members? Neither the Kalelkar Report,
nor the Mandal Report, nor the reports of the backward classes commissions
at the state level have so far demonstrated that deprivation was related
to the ritual status of a caste. These reports generally emphasized that
the higher castes have cornered a disproportionately large share in the
bureaucracy and that the presence of low castes in class one and class two
jobs was nominal before the implementation of reservations schemes. Not
only is caste virtually used as the sole criterion in public policy
oriented towards positive discrimination, but categories like OBCs (Other
Backward Castes) and SCs (Scheduled Castes) are treated as essentially
homogeneous. It is simply assumed that the great bulk of the population of
each of the categories suffers from a uniformly high degree of deprivation
without answering the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph.
The relation between caste and deprivation is an issue
that should be addressed at the macro-level; village studies will not
suffice. The results of village surveys typically contradict each other,
as is to be expected in a large country characterised by great diversity.
The only information available at the macro-level, where castes are treated
separately, was collected through the census operations during British
rule. 1
While scholars are fond of discussing the colonial power’s motives and
methods of collection, classification and inadequacies of caste data,
the data remains largely unused. Despite all its inadequacies, this data
set can be used to throw light on the issue raised here.
I f
caste is a good indicator of deprivation now, it should have been a better
index in the past. Let us consider Uttar Pradesh. It contains some of
the most backward regions of India. Here the link between caste and deprivation
should be stronger than the more advanced regions of the country. Information
on the social, material and educational conditions of castes in U.P. is
available only at the beginning of the last century. We get the ritual
rank, the literacy rate in Hindi and the work participation rate for 42
castes from the census tables of 1901 and 1911. There are eight high or
‘twice born’ castes, 27 middle ranking or intermediate and ‘shudra’ castes,
all of which are now considered OBCs, and seven ‘untouchables’, later
designated SCs.2 In 1911 the
average literacy rate was about 11% for the high castes. It was only 1%
for the OBCs and 0.13% for the SCs. Thus, literacy rate seems to be strongly
inversely associated with ritual rank.
Since there is no direct evidence on income or wealth
of members of a caste, we have to devise an appropriate index which may
enable us to use the available data and compare the average economic
status of castes. The work participation rate, defined as the proportion
of workers in the population, can be used as an inverse indicator of the
economic status of a caste. The commonsense reasoning underlying this is
simple: In a traditional economy, with low rates of literacy and
industrialisation, the poorer families have to send a greater proportion
of their members (namely, women and children) to seek work than the
better-off, well-to-do and rich families which send their children to
school and confine their women to the home.
This argument is actually built on our empirical observations
on U.P. During the early decades of the 20th century the work participation
rate was a good index to capture the differences in the economic conditions
over regions of U.P. as well as between groups within each region. In
1911 the average work participation rate was 42% for the high castes,
54% for the OBCs and 57.5% for the SCs. Thus, it would again appear that
caste is a very good indicator of deprivation. In fact, such aggregate
statistics are usually provided in support of caste-based public policy. 3
T hese
averages actually conceal the enormous heterogeneity within the OBCs and
the SCs. There is a great deal of variation in the literacy as well as
work participation rates within each category of castes. The literacy
rates for the OBCs vary between 8% and 0.14%. In fact, in the literacy
rankings three of the OBCs are placed among the top seven castes while
two are placed among the bottom seven. The literacy rates for the SCs
vary within a much smaller range, between 0.48 and 0.11%.
T he
situation with respect to the economic condition of castes is more acute.
The work participation rates for the OBCs lie in the range of 40 and 67.
On one hand, four of the OBCs figure in the top eight places on the scale
of economic status. On the other hand, five of this figure among the bottom-most
seven places. Actually the three poorest castes (namely, Bhar, Koeri and
Kewat) belong to the OBCs. Likewise, the economic status of the SCs varies
a great deal; the work participation rates lie within a range of 44 (for
Khatik) and 64 (for Dusadh). Thus, even in a backward region like U.P.
at the beginning of the 20th century, there were large variations in the
literacy rates and economic conditions of castes that were later pooled
together and treated as homogeneous categories.
With respect to literacy rate, three OBCs, namely,
Sonar, Halwai and Kalwar, were ahead of four high castes, namely, Rajput,
Taga, Bhat and Kandu. Similarly, with respect to economic status, five
OBCs, namely, Sonar, Jat, Gujar, Kisan and Mali, were better off than
Brahman and Rajput, the two most numerous high castes, which accounted for
one-fifth of the Hindu population. Two SCs, namely, Khatik and Dusadh, had
higher literacy rates than many OBCs.
In the economic hierarchy two SCs, namely, Khatik and
Dhanuk, were placed in the top half. Conversely, five OBCs, namely, Luniya,
Barai, Bhar, Koeri and Kewat, figured among the seven lowest placed castes
in the economic scale, along with two SCs. None of the large SCs, namely,
Chamar, Pasi and Dhobi, figured in the lowest rungs of the economic
hierarchy. In fact, the average economic status of Chamar, the most
numerous of all castes in U.P., was not lower than that of Ahir, the most
numerous among the OBCs. Thus, the high castes, the OBCs, and the SCs were
highly heterogeneous in terms of economic status and access to literacy.
I t
is unambiguous that even in a backward and traditional agrarian society
such as U.P. during the early decades of the 20th century, ritual rank
of a caste was not a good indicator of its literacy or economic status.
The formation of three administrative categories of castes, based on past
ritual status only succeeds in hiding the glaring intragroup disparities.
High ritual rank could not secure some of the upper castes against low
economic status. Similarly, low ritual status did not prevent large sections
of Jat, Gujar, Sonar, Kisan and Mali from attaining prosperity. Caste
did not preclude the upward economic mobility of a section of the untouchables.
Even with ‘5000 years old tradition of learning’, the Brahman population
of U.P. could not reach an average of 12% literacy by 1911; they were
not the most literate of castes.
Advocates of caste politics argue that the problem will
be solved if the OBCs or SCs are arranged according to the degree of
backwardness and split into subgroups such as ‘more-backward’ and ‘most-backward’
and sub-quotas created within the total quota. However, the economic
status of households varies a great deal within each caste. In a caste,
several economic classes exist. Marginal and small peasants, and landless
labourers constitute the bulk of the population in each caste. At the same
time, every caste contains a section, varying in size, of well-to-do
families.
The 1888 Dufferin Enquiry Reports on the condition of
the lower classes of the population in India showed that in eastern U.P.,
the castes of Brahman, Bhuinhar and Rajput contained sections, which
though not landless, were worse off than day labourers, were in debt and
suffered from insufficiency of food and clothing in normal times. This
report also showed that in western U.P., many Chamar families cultivated
landholdings of 10 acres or more in size while others of this caste were
landless labourers. 4 In
several non-twice-born castes, for example, Jat, Kurmi and Kalwar, the
size of the upper class elite was considerable. The existence of
relatively prosperous traders, contractors, and manufacturers belonging to
the caste of Chamar in the Agra-Aligarh area of western U.P. during the
early decades of the 20th century is well known. Improvement in material
condition and educational status of sections of Chamar and other
untouchables, because of employment in the government sector, in army
cantonments, municipalities and so on, in the cities of Agra, Kanpur and
Allahabad is also well documented.5
T he
census tables on ‘occupational distribution of castes’6
in early 20th century demonstrate that each caste contained landless labourers,
cultivators as well as landlords. Some castes were sharply split over
occupations, for example, Chamar, the largest caste of U.P., which is
believed to be traditionally landless. The workers of this caste were
about equally reported as labourers and cultivators, between 35 to 40%
in each. In contrast, more than 75% of workers belonging to the caste
of Bhangi, later known as Balmiki, were scavengers.
T he
cultivators, the single largest occupational group in most castes, were
highly differentiated in terms of size and economic status. A sample of
17,135 agricultural holdings covering 82,176 acres, distributed over size
of holding and caste in Bahraich district in 1939 shows that about one-third
of the holdings belonging to the upper castes were of 2.5 acres or less
in size. The same was the case with the caste of Kurmi, a backward caste.
Such holdings accounted for half of the total number of holdings in case
of Kachi, Murao and all other agriculturist castes. The holdings of size
2.5 to five acres comprised one-fourth of all holdings in case of upper
castes as well as Kurmi, but about 30% in case of the rest of the castes.
In fact, the size distributions were very similar for
the upper castes and Kurmi. In each of these castes, six to eight per cent
of holdings were more than 20 acres in size. 1.7% of upper caste holdings
and 0.6% of Kurmi holdings were more than 50 acres in size. On one hand
the small and marginal peasants formed a majority of households in each
caste. On the other hand, the lower castes, like the higher ones,
contained many rich peasants. Thus there was enormous intra-caste
variation in economic condition. Accordingly, the material interests of
different classes belonging to the same caste would differ.
S ince
the visible heterogeneity within a caste cannot be easily brushed aside,
the proponents of caste politics argue that it is not economic but social
backwardness from which these castes have historically suffered that warrants
reservations. Did all the lower castes suffer from an equal degree of
ritual handicap? Actually, there was an elaborate gradation and hierarchy
among the intermediate or shudra and even the untouchable castes, which
governed interaction between them and kept inter-caste socialisation to
a minimum. The rich households belonging to a low caste tried to imitate
the customs and rituals of the upper castes such as child marriage, prevention
of widow remarriage and payment of dowry for marriage.
Occasionally, prosperous sections of castes broke away
to form new castes and claimed higher ritual rank. By and large an
affluent caste succeeded in raising its position in the ritual hierarchy,
for instance, Kayastha and Jat, both of which rose from the ranks of
shudras to be near Rajputs. Members of the Jat caste claimed their caste
to be of twice-born rank and they wanted to be classified at par with
Rajputs in the census of 1901. In some districts the others accepted their
claims. But the provincial committee, which was drawing up the ritual
hierarchy, accorded them a rank higher than the shudra castes, while not
accepting their claim to be twice born.
Similarly, Kalwars claimed Vaishya status.
Surreptitiously, many of them got enumerated in the censuses as Vaishya/Bania
or even Rajput. Consequently, the share of the Kalwar caste in the
population of U.P. declined significantly over the censuses. The Kurmi
elite followed a variety of paths. Their caste association demanded high
ritual rank, at par with the Rajputs. Some of them got themselves
enumerated as Rajputs. As a result, the share of the caste in the total
population declined over the censuses. In Gorakhpur district, the
landowners and large cultivators broke away from the parent caste (Kurmi)
during the second and third decades of the 20th century. They formed a new
caste called Sainthwar, which was the name of a sub-caste of the Kurmis.
Before the census of 1931, well-off Chamars in west U.P.
broke away to form a new caste named Jatav, which was the name of a
sub-caste. They claimed to be Rajputs and demanded to be enumerated in the
census as Jatav-Rajputs. In fact, by 1931, barring a few most downtrodden
castes, viz. Bhangi, all other non-twice-born castes had formed
associations which claimed high ritual rank, at par with twice-born
castes. This has given rise to a peculiar situation. The old ritual
hierarchy has disintegrated because the elite of no caste concedes a
higher ritual rank to any other caste. But there is no sense of equality
in the caste system since none accepts the lower as equal on the
social-ritual scale. Even now, inter-caste marriages between OBCs or SCs
are almost absent in the rural areas. The rare instances in urban areas
usually occur within the same economic class.
E vidently,
within a caste, the kinds and degrees of deprivation varied. Within a
low caste, the upper income groups felt deprived of a high ritual status
that would be commensurate with their economic status. They also felt
deprived of education and jobs in the government apparatus. The caste
associations formed by them articulated the demands of the upper class.
At the same time, the caste also contained a large section of marginal
and small peasants, who were oppressed by rent and debt obligations, as
well as landless labourers lying at the bottom of the economic scale.
In the history of the low or backward caste associations, demands for
redistribution of land, or demands for minimum wages, or special measures
for the benefit of the poor were virtually never put forward.
I t
is amazing that in the 21st century not only does caste continue to be
the sole criterion in public policy oriented towards positive discrimination,
but categories like OBCs and SCs continue to be treated as essentially
homogeneous, despite the mass of evidence relating to early 20th century
pointing to the contrary! The claim that the use of an income limit for
identifying the ‘creamy layer’ among the OBCs would bring the benefits
of reservation to the deserving is actually a hoax. The lower income limit
of Rs 250,000 recently fixed by the central government would not even
exclude the entire top ten per cent of the population.
Furthermore, when it is well known that incomes can be
easily under-reported, there is no effort to use any other criterion which
can be actually used to exclude the privileged. Obviously, the use of
caste and caste-based reservations are designed for the absorption of the
elite of the lower castes in the ruling classes. 7
At the same time the use of caste in the public sphere effectively keeps
the deprived masses politically divided and weak.
1. The censuses
of 1911, 1921 and 1931 provide data on the occupational distribution of
selected castes at the level of province or state.
2. Actually
the castes were classified in 12 groups, depending upon their ritual or
social practices, the rules and restrictions observed by them and their
traditional occupations. The high castes were divided into six groups,
the shudras into four and the untouchables into two groups. Castes within
each group were ranked in order of precedence. See Census of India,
1901, v XVI, pt I, p 218-34, 248-53.
3. For example,
see, S.K. Thorat and R.S. Deshpande, ‘Caste System and Economic Inequality:
Economic Theory and Evidence’ in Ghanshyam Shah, ed., Dalit Identity
and Politics (New Delhi and London, 2001), particularly p. 57-70.
4. 1888 Dufferin
Enquiry Reports on the condition of the lower classes of the population
in India, (available in the National Archives of India), Enclosures, letter
from Collector, Ghazipur to Commissioner, Benaras Division, 10 April 1888,
p. 134-136, letter from Collector, Mathura to Commissioner, Agra Division,
1 May 1888, p. 4-20 and note on Etah district by N. Crooke, Collector,
12 Jan. 1888, p. 31-100.
5. Owen M. Lynch,
The Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility and Social Change in a
City of India (New York, 1969), and Nandini Gooptu, ‘Caste and Labour:
Untouchable Social Movements in Urban Uttar Pradesh’, in Peter Robb, ed.,
Dalit Movements and the Meanings of Labor in India (Delhi, 1993),
ch. 10.
6. See Census
of India, 1911, v XV, pt II, Table XVI and Census of India, 1921, v XVI,
pt II, Table XXI.
7. See Pradipta
Chaudhury, ‘The "Creamy Layer": Political Economy of Reservations’,
Economic and Political Weekly 39(20), 15 May 2004, p. 1989-1991. |