INDIA'S Nepal policy has always confronted a dilemma of choosing between security and democracy. King Gyanendra's coup on 1 February 2005, assuming direct power and unleashing oppression against the political parties, has presented this dilemma in a far sharper and acute form than at any time in the past. In the context of Nepal's decade long Maoist insurgency, the king's action amounts to forcing India, and the rest of the international community, to choose between him and the Maoists as, according to him, the democratic system and the political parties cannot cope with the security challenge posed by the Maoists.

India reacted promptly, sharply standing for democracy in Nepal. The statements issued from New Delhi since 1 February, officially and by the External Affairs Ministry and the prime minister, have been clear and categorical. Going beyond the formal statement, India refused to participate in the Dhaka SAARC summit scheduled for 4 and 5 February, as that could have been exploited by King Gyanendra to seek international and regional legitimacy for his anti-democratic action. India's defence supplies to Nepal have been put on hold and two of the king's messengers, his aide Sharad Shah and his Foreign Minister Ramesh Pande, have been sent back empty handed. India has also rallied the international community behind its firm position that the king must roll back his action and ensure a meaningful role for the political parties and the democratic system.

While India shares Nepal's concern regarding the security challenge posed by the Maoists, the rationale advanced by the king to deal with it is untenable. The Royal Nepal Army as the only available instrument of dealing with the Maoist violence, has always remained loyal and under the control of the king. Since 2001, when it was first pushed into anti-Maoist operations, the RNA has not enhanced its reputation for efficiency and effectiveness. Even after the February coup, the RNA failed to break the Maoists blockade of Kathmandu. Despite the heavy security cover all it could manage was to let a fraction of the usual vehicular traffic move between the capital and rest of the country. Therefore, to blame the political parties for their inefficiency in dealing with the Maoists is not credible.

While the charges of inefficiency, corruption and power struggle against the political leadership cannot be denied, observers of Nepali affairs are also aware of the palace-centred machinations to divide and corrupt political parties and their leaders. Since October 2002, the king has hand-picked pliable political leaders as prime ministers. His coup was really driven by his own political ambitions and the RNA's lure for unfettered authority without any accountability. The democratic system and the political parties were made a scapegoat to secure legitimacy for these ambitions.

There is no reason why India, or any other country, should oblige the king by endorsing his power grab. More so, as by his actions, the king has further complicated the security situation in Nepal. Under pressure to show results against the Maoists, the RNA has indulged in ruthless violence in the countryside, often killing innocent people and showing them as Maoists. No independent and authenticated accounts of RNA's operations are available due to strict press regulations. The National Human Rights Commission and the international rights groups have no access to the conflict zone. In addition to the uniformed army, armed vigilante groups have been let loose on villagers in the Maoist-dominated areas where they have mercilessly burnt houses and killed people.

In Kapilvastu, reportedly some 3000 houses have been burnt and 2500 families rendered destitute. The Asian Human Rights Commission has voiced deep concern regarding such developments, and asked the international community to step in. The long term implications of this unabashed violence could be serious, resulting in the sharpening of social cleavages in the affected areas and pushing the prospects of a political resolution of the Maoist problem further away. The spillover of this violence in terms of the migration of affected Nepalese and increased cross-border movement of the Maoists has to be faced by India. The economic cost of enhanced instability in Nepal will be colossal.

To force the king to abandon this path of destruction, India will have to remain firm in its preference for democracy. The king will do his best to break India's resolve through a variety of means, mobilizing his pro-Hindu and old princely constituencies within the Indian polity to soften New Delhi. Simultaneously, he will also encourage and mobilize expression of Nepali nationalism along anti-Indian lines, an old tactic that the monarchy invariably resorts to when pressed for survival. He is also trying hard to break his isolation from the international community by cultivating China and Pakistan. The Chinese foreign minister is expected to arrive in Kathmandu in March and soon thereafter the king is expected to take his first post-coup official visit abroad to China. Pakistan has already extended its support to the king and has shown willingness to offer military training and hardware to the RNA.

India need not panic with this crude display of the China and Pakistan cards by the king and ensure that his bluff is called. These two countries cannot in any way provide a viable alternative to the support hitherto available from India and the international community in Nepal. While China should be diplomatically persuaded against supporting an autocrat at the cost of fast growing constructive Sino-Indian engagement, Pakistan too needs to be cautioned that its access to Nepal, even by air, is only through India.

In relation to the important and powerful segment of international community, the king is seeking a better rapport with the US, UK and Japan. Japan has already been persuaded to keep its developmental assistance flowing to Nepal, while the UK has been approached to reconsider its hold on military assistance. A greater part of the royal regime's efforts are directed towards distancing the US from the Indian position. It is important to note that the US priority in Nepal is the fight against terrorism, over and above the restoration of democracy. This is closer to the king's stated rationale for his coup. That is why the king decided to meet the American ambassador while keeping the Indian envoy waiting to deliver New Delhi's message to him.

India has to make sure that the US does not, in due course of time, waver in its support for democracy and try to soften India's stand for restoration of democracy, not even when the Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice pleads on these lines in New Delhi. It may be useful to recall that on the eve of her visit to the subcontinent, Rice, with reference to Pakistan, said that the US will ‘balance its push for spread to democracy with its need to support anti-terrorism allies.' The king naturally sees a window of opportunity in such an approach, notwithstanding the fact that US officials on earlier occasions have clearly stated that they would be guided by India's lead in relation to Nepal. The US has also not put its military assistance to Nepal on hold, largely under the pretext of complicated relevant legal provisions. If the king succeeds in making any dent in India's lead of the international community, diplomatic constraints will impinge on India's position. India's Nepal policy has in the past shown a notorious tendency to compromise with the king under domestic political pressures and external strategic concerns. New Delhi has to demonstrate in deeds that the phase is now passé.

As the situation evolves, India will have to be clearer in its stand on democracy. India's favourite two pillar theory, of its Nepal policy being based on constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, stands shattered in the wake of the February coup. It is unfortunate that Indian statements continue to refer to the ‘unity of constitutional forces', i.e. the collaboration between political parties and the king. There has been a drastic change in the popular mood in Nepal, particularly among the major political parties and people outside Kathmandu. Nearly 80 per cent of Nepal's youth have ideologically shifted closer to the Maoists' position of a ‘multiparty republic' in Nepal.

The trust in constitutional monarchy under the present king and his son stands further eroded in the aftermath of the royal coup. India has to firm up its position in tune with the rising popular aspirations. For the past 50 years it has opted for policy alternatives tilted towards stability around the monarchy. Persisting in this will cast doubt on India's sincerity of commitment in favour of democracy. New Delhi must make clear that if the people of Nepal want a republic or only a ceremonial monarchy, India is fully willing and prepared to go along with them.

If India has to stand firm on rolling back the king's coup, New Delhi should be prepared to go beyond the current freeze on defence supplies and exercise a number of economic and political options available to it. During 1988-89, even in the face of international opposition, India withdrew special trade and transit facilities accorded to Nepal. While India has decided to continue with all such assistance to Nepal that directly benefits the Nepali people, it has to make sure that the assistance is not abused by the royal regime, either in boosting its oppressive apparatus or harnessing moral support for its continuance.

India can also facilitate the evolution of a broader political consensus within Nepal in favour of open and constructive democratic politics. The king is likely to play around with the groups of pliable political leaders and pseudo democrats to diffuse the international pressure. India should insist on real and genuine political freedom for every legitimate political actor. Though some adventurist columnists in India have recommended that New Delhi be prepared for military intervention, such an option, even if considered against the Maoists, is likely to be counter-productive.

India's support for political forces should include Maoists (sans violence) as well. In India's policy-making and security establishments, there is an exaggerated and irrational demonizing of and paranoia about the Nepali Maoists. Their extended links with the Indian extremist and separatist groups, their anti-Indian ideological jargon, and the prospects of their military victory are abhorred by the Indian ruling elites. A dispassionate and realistic assessment would suggest that while the Maoists are in no position to militarily overrun the Nepali state and capture power on their own, they politically represent the legitimate aspirations of Nepal's long neglected and suppressed rural poor. That is why they are willing to work with the political parties within a multiparty political structure if there is a complete and genuine transfer of power from the king to the people of Nepal.

Their links with the Indian Maoists and ethnic separatists are considerable, but mostly of operational and logistic nature under the cover of ideological rhetoric. Their anti-India rhetoric is neither new nor their own, in the sense that all their demands vis-à-vis India have earlier been voiced by the monarchy as well as the political parties. In fact, some Maoists leaders like Baburam Bhattarai have openly declared that if and when they come to share power, their approach towards India would be based on practical considerations deserving of a neighbour of India's position. Therefore, there is urgent need on India's part to engage the Maoists politically and facilitate the soft-landing of their movement into mainstream democratic politics.

India has repeatedly asserted that there is no military solution to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It is time that concrete and relevant initiative is taken by India in the direction of a viable political solution. Indian policy-makers owe it to the long term and genuine interests of their own people to match their policies with the emerging aspirations of the broad mass of the Nepalese. If India fails to do so for the sake of monarchy under a misplaced notion of political stability it will not only harm the cause of democracy in Nepal but also damage its own credibility as a regional power.