NEPAL, once again, is in the news. And once again for the wrong reasons. Trapped for close to a decade in a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence, the royal proclamation of 1 February 2005 declaring an emergency, suspending the constitution and fundamental rights, placing key political party leaders and democratic rights activists in jail, imposing press censorship, even (temporarily) curtailing communication links within and without the country, may well push the Himalayan kingdom over the edge.
It is likely that some close observers of the Nepal scene may have anticipated the latest turn of events. After all, the House of Representatives had been placed in suspension as far back as October 2002 with the country run by a series of nominated cabinets, each short-lived. Not only were the different political parties hopelessly divided, there had been no progress in the negotiations with the Maoists. Above all, King Gyanendra, who assumed the throne following the tragic (and mysterious) assassination of his brother Birendra and his family, had never hidden his ambition for a more assertive monarchy. Yet, to read the February developments as just another step in a steadily worsening situation, and not recognizing the qualitative change, might be a grave error.
This is not the first time in its brief democratic history that Nepal has experienced an assertive monarchy. Gyanendra’s father, Mahendra, too had dismissed the then Koirala government and replaced multiparty democracy by a partyless panchayat in 1960, a system which survived for 30 years. Unfortunately, the resumption of multiparty democracy following a people’s movement in 1990, failed to provide responsible governance and meet the aspirations of the Nepali people.
The three elections – 1990, 1994, 1999 – turned in fractured verdicts. The political parties proved incapable of structuring stable coalitions or even avert splits in their own organizations. Despite as many as 12 governments in this brief period, there was insufficient progress in improving development indicators. The behaviour of political parties, both within and outside the Parliament, contributed to sullying their image as self-seeking and corrupt, more bothered about personal and sectional ends than national good.
It is difficult for outsiders to appreciate the exclusionary, and thus non-representative, character of the Nepali system, with a few hill-based, upper caste Hindu groups hegemonising positions and resources in all domains – legislative, executive, judicial – in the process marginalizing a vast majority of citizens from any effective participation in formal decision-making. Despite a plurality of religions, languages, cultures and ethinicities, Nepal constitutionally remains a Hindu state with Khas Nepali recognized as the official language. Equally, the limited attempts at decentralization have failed to break the centrality of the Kathmandu valley in national affairs. And despite valorizing the people as the ultimate source of power and legitimacy, the constitution permits extraordinary power to the institution of monarchy, a situation made more complex since traditionally the king has been seen as a avatar of Lord Vishnu.
Nevertheless, as a recent survey on the state of democracy in Nepal demonstrates, Nepali citizens retain their trust in democracy as the best form of government, this despite disappointment with the working of democracy and the behaviour of political leaders. Less than a quarter preferred the king’s rule, with the figure slipping even lower vis-ŕ-vis army rule. Few favoured an executive monarch with more powers and rights. And a vast majority of respondents (84%) strongly disapproved of the dismissal of popular government (October 2002) and felt that the situation of the country had worsened after that.
It should thus come as no surprise that King Gyanendra has found few takers for his claim that the takeover was necessary to ensure the safety and security of the state and engender a process of peace and progress. Even more that the monarchy, rather than an elected government, is better equipped to handle the many challenges confronting Nepali state and society. It is worth noting that, though currently muted, Nepali citizens have protested the abrogation of the constitution and fundamental rights and despite censorship, news of anti-emergency protest continues to trickle out.
No country so far has extended support to the king’s actions; many like India, UK, US, the European Union, to name a few, suspending aid, particularly military aid, though China has decided to treat the situation as an ‘internal matter’ and Pakistan has even offered military aid against the Maoist insurgency. While it does appear that the current government in Nepal, run by a nominated cabinet under the direct control of the king stands isolated, and there are attempts to censure the country for its human rights record in the UN General Assembly, this situation may change if the international community decides that the Maoist threat is more troubling than the absence of democracy.
To locate the recent developments in the personality of the current monarch, though there is little doubt that he is widely disliked, is to miss the point. In addition to the socially exclusionary nature of Nepali state and society, and the centrality of the Kathmandu valley, is the fact of social geography. Constructing a just, equitable, modern democratic state and society in a small, land-locked country with a large proportion of its land mass covered by mountains, extreme poverty, low literacy, and a tantalizingly brief experience with democracy, is unlikely to be easy.
Equally troubling is the country’s relations with its larger neighbour India, which surrounds Nepal on three side and plays a preponderant role in the country’s affairs. Not only are all shades of political opinion uneasy with the various Indo-Nepal treaties, the role of Indian capital in Nepal’s economy and India’s continual insistence on a special status has added to a feeling that Nepal enjoys little autonomy in deciding its own affairs. This despite the fact that many Nepalis depend on work in India and that a vast majority of its political class was socialized here.
The role of donor countries and agencies, given the importance of external aid in Nepal’s economy and the vigorous espousal and promotion of civil society organizations, too remains contentious. Many see external assistance as not only propping up unpopular and corrupt regimes but weakening the political impulse for transformation by foregrounding the role of non-political NGOs. Left-wing forces, including the Maoists, have often seen a ‘foreign-funded’ civil society sector as a Trojan horse, weakening the nationalist impulse and struggle.
The growing challenge of the Maoist insurgency over the last decade needs to be understood in this context. The Maoists today control over three-fourths of the country, and while many decry their methods, there is little doubt that they have consolidated their hold in the countryside, in particular amongst marginalized groups and communities and their call for local autonomy and self-determination is extremely popular. To treat them as essentially a terrorist group, to be controlled through force, might be short-sighted. Unfortunately, post 9/11 and the global war on terror, dissenting forces, particularly if armed, are usually classified as terrorist, reducing the likelihood of political settlement.
It is highly unlikely that the current regime in Nepal – an unpopular and autocratic monarch ruling with the help of the Royal Nepal Army – can meet the challenge posed by the armed insurgency or ensure a democratic transition. Equally unclear is how a fragmented and mostly discredited political opposition will act, though civil protest has begun and many leaders who have fled the country are trying hard to galvanise international opinion. Nor can we be sure of the stance of key international players – whether they will or can exercise pressure on the current establishment to revoke the emergency and reinstitute democratic rule. Above all, unless the Maoists and democratic political forces forge an understanding and collaborate to redesign state and society, Nepal may well slip into an endemic civil war, another example of a failed state.
Fortunately, alongside the political parties, civil society in Nepal – NGOs, research institutes, human rights activists, media – too has joined the battle, actively debating institutional designs and working to influence democratic behaviour. There is today a more widespread appreciation for the need to enhance inclusion and ensure active and meaningful participation of all groups. Only this can ensure a peaceful and democratic Nepal.
This issue of Seminar seeks to engage with these contentious questions in the hope of contributing to the struggle for democracy. To quietly accept that poor Third World states are predisposed towards authoritarianism would indeed be a tragedy.
