DEMOCRACY was first introduced to Nepal in 1951 following a popular uprising which ended the century-old family oligarchy of the Ranas. Nepali society, until then, kept in isolation lacked even the minimum political and civil infrastructure to practice democracy and democratic governance. The level of literacy was less than 5% with access to education mainly restricted to the ruling class and its allies. Caste-based hierarchical discrimination, exploitation and superstition had been the fate of the average Nepali. With neither institutions nor legal provisions there was little basis for civil administration.

Barring a few newly established political parties, there were no civil and political organizations. The Nepali Congress (NC), which was instrumental in bringing democracy to the country, had functioned from neighbouring India and had little organizational network within the country. Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was in a similar situation . Unlike the British in India, the Ranas in Nepal never permitted any civil and political organizations or activities within the country.

King Tribhuvan, who was restored to the throne in 1951, promised a democratic constitution to be framed by an elected constituent assembly based on adult franchise. Until then an interim constitutional arrangement was instituted which provided for the ‘king-in-council' system to run the government and administration. In other words, the king had the authority to issue executive and legislative orders only upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers (Interim Act 1951). But the transition could not be smooth. The interim government, a Rana-Congress coalition, was short-lived. The king assumed power to appoint and dismiss the government at his discretion and exercise full state authority. Elections for the constituent assembly, as promised by the Delhi settlement between King Tribhuvan, the Rana prime minister and the Nepali Congress, were never held.

In 1959 King Mahendra, who assumed the throne in 1955 after the death of Tribhuvan, approved a constitution which provided for a parliamentary system of government based on the Westminster model following which elections were held for the parliament. However, the king could not reconcile with the parliamentary system of democracy. In less than 18 months of parliamentary constitutional experiment, he exercised his royal prerogative and used military power to overthrow the system in December 1960. The duly elected government was dismissed, parliament dissolved, political parties banned and political leaders detained.

Following a popular mass movement within the country and a strong international wave of democracy around the world, after 30 years of absolute monarchical rule in the garb of the ‘partyless panchayat regime', democracy was restored for a second time in 1990. King Birendra, who succeeded King Mahendra in 1972, agreed to abide by the principles and norms of democracy and limit his role to that of a ‘constitutional monarch'. Accordingly a new constitution was framed on the basis of multiparty democracy, constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system of government.

The second democratic experiment in the 1990s faced a better national environment than in the 1950s. People were more aware and conscious of democratic rights. Their level of education had risen. A certain level of civil and political infrastructure had been developed. Nevertheless, the country failed to evolve coherent institutional behaviour, compatible practices, able leadership and a political culture.

Besides in February 1996, the country faced an armed rebellion of the extreme left, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), with the declared goal of overthrowing the constitutional system to establish its own regime, a ‘people's republic'. The state remained divided in dealing with the Maoists who took full advantage of incoherence and inconsistencies in the body politic to develop into a full-fledged nationwide insurgency and push the constitutional state out of the interior parts of the country. By 2000, the Maoists were on parity with the state, with their parallel rule in many districts. Simultaneously, the country faced acute problems of governance with growing corruption at the political level, governmental instability and leadership failure – leading to an internal breakdown of the system.

The post-1990 constitutional democratic experiment came to a dead-end following the premature dissolution of the House of Representatives (HOR) in May 2002. King Gyanendra (who succeeded to the throne in June 2001 when King Birendra along with his entire family members was killed in a shoot-out within the royal palace) assumed executive powers on 4 October 2002 dismissing the duly elected government. Elected governments and political parties were blamed for all the miseries – incapacity to govern and visible corruption. From then on, contrary to the principles and provisions of the constitution, the country has been administered at the king's discretion.

This time, unlike in 1960, though the king was not directly involved in breaking down the system, he allowed a situation to develop in which the constitutional process could not proceed. Unfortunately, political parties and leaders remain divided and seem unable to devise a common strategy. The experiment of democracy in Nepal thus faces an uncertain future in the crossfire of two extremities –Maoist insurgency and an assertive monarchy.

Democracy has never enjoyed smooth-sailing in Nepal. It has been repeatedly interrupted, often ending in favour of absolute monarchical rule. Since 1951, Nepal has experienced four monarchs and none found it easy to reconcile with the norms of democracy. Democracy can accommodate the institution of monarchy provided the latter is satisfied with a limited role related to some procedures and ceremonies. At best the monarchy is an institution of reverence and a symbol of continuity with the past and all active roles must be held by either elected bodies or other institutions which are accountable to the people. But in Nepal, the monarchs have continued to claim an overarching role and space to act if the need so arose, as well as to be above the law in their own personal conduct. As a result, institutional incoherence frequently occurred in the political process despite the acceptance of democracy.

Broadly speaking, a democratic political system may be defined as ‘the presence of a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free and fair elections and universal suffrage, organizational and institutional pluralism, extensive civil liberties, effective power for elected officials, and functional autonomy for legislative, executive and judicial organs of the government' (Diamond 1997, 311). The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA) advances two ‘basic principles or values – popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control' for the governing arrangements to be called ‘democratic'. Accordingly, IIDEA advanced several mediating values as indicators of democracy – participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity. Based on these values it has developed a framework of democracy assessment covering four broad areas: ( a ) citizenship, law and rights; ( b ) representative and accountable government; ( c ) civil society and popular participation; and ( d ) democracy beyond the state (IIDEA 2002; 2001).

Democracy in Nepal cannot be said to have consolidated or completed a certain level of transition with many principal values and core issues yet to be settled. The promulgation of the 1990 Constitution and subsequent experiment with some democratic procedure may create an impression that, though fragile and ambiguous, Nepal is a practicing democracy. If it is primarily a ‘matter of degree', there is a certain degree of democracy. But if it is matter of principle and substance, whatever democracy was achieved in 1990 and practiced for more than a decade since, has been a casualty of an assertive monarchy and Maoist insurgency. Nevertheless, the experiment with democracy this time round brought forth many issues relating to the state and nation. The revival of absolute monarchy, irrespective of form, cannot be sustained. Nor can the one-party authoritarianism advocated by the Maoists.

This paper examines the future of democracy in Nepal against the current debate on political reforms, referred to in popular discourse as ‘restructuring the state'. Various issues and proposals are being debated across the country today. They include a federal versus unitary state, monarchy versus the republic, Westminster parliamentary model of government versus some form of accommodative or consociational arrangement, proportional representation, multilingual policy, secularism, ethnic autonomy with the right to self-determination, framing a new constitution through an elected constituent assembly and the like. Until recently such voices were not only considered irrelevant but ‘primordial' and ‘parochial' by a hidebound political mainstream of both the establishment and opposition. But now these issues are expressed in the policy and programmes of all major political parties, including the government.

Nepal, though over 80% Hindu by religion, is a highly diversified multiethnic, multilingual and multi-cultural society. The 2001 Census recorded 100 ethnic and caste categories and 92 languages (CBS 2002). The largest groups are Chhetri and Brahman, which comprise 15.80 and 12.74% respectively. There are 59 officially identified ethnic groups, of whom only 42 are covered by the census report (Gurung, Malla, Bhattachan and Gurung 2004). The rest are either unidentified or included in their nearest groupings. Out of 92 languages recorded by the 2001 Census, up to 12 have less than 1% speakers each. Nepali, which is recognized as the ‘language of the nation' as well as the official language, is the language of about half the population, i.e., 48.61% and has assumed the place of lingua franca .

Nepali society is divided both vertically and horizontally. The Hindu population, which is treated as different from ethnic groups, has a vertical division. The Hindu caste groups in the hills have a four-layer hierarchy, consisting of Brahman, Chhetri, Sanyasi and Dalit. Although the hill caste groups, commonly known as khas or parbatiya , constitute a more homogeneous cultural and linguistic group, the hierarchy of relationships discriminates against and deprives the lower strata, particularly dalits from having equal and equitable treatment and in the sharing of resources. Although they collectively make above 7% of the total population, dalits too are internally divided. The largest sub-category, Kami, alone makes up more than half the hill dalit population and is also comparatively better off in socioeconomic terms than the other dalits. However, despite variations, all dalits prefer to identify themselves as a collectivity distinct from the other caste categories, which also enhances their bargaining capacity vis-à-vis other groups.

The officially defined ethnic groups, popularly called adibasi/janjati (i.e. the original settlers) comprise 59 groups: 18 in mountains, 24 in hills, 6 in inner terai and 11 in terai. The total ethnic population as per the ‘official' categories is estimated at 36.4%. The largest of them are Magar (7.14%) in the hill and Tharu (6.75%) in terai. The hill ethnic groups (32), including those of inner-terai, constitute about 28.5% of the total population. Despite variations and heterogeneity within and among them, they too would like to have a collective janjati identity vis-à-vis the dominant caste groups – Brahman and Chhetri. The people of terai, except those who migrated from the hills, are known as madhesi and consist of both caste and ethnic groups. Madhesi is an ethno-regional identity of the terai people (Yadav 2003). The madhesi people (including Muslim and others) make over 31% of the total. Like in the hills, the madhesi caste groups, which constitute about 19.5% of the total population, also have dalits.

The various ethnic and language groups that make up Nepal's population, have many commonalities. The Nepali-speaking hill caste groups, including dalits, comprise over 38% of the population, both closely linked in terms of language and culture. Each of the Mongoloid hill ethnic groups have their own language, but belonging to the Tibeto-Burmese language family they have many commonalities. They are considered as having a common origin as kirat descendants (Bista 1991). Madhesi, which comprises 54 groups, both caste and ethnic, also speak different languages. Their languages are influenced by both race and region. Unlike in the hills, the caste groups in terai speak different languages; even those belonging to the same caste group speak different languages depending on their region. Various caste and ethnic groups of Nepal may thus be divided into three broad ethno-regional categories – parbatiya/khas, mongol/ kirat and madhesi. However, as is evident, none of these groups makes a majority.

Although Nepal is constitutionally declared a ‘Hindu Kingdom' (HMG 1992) the people belong to various religions and it is indeed a multireligious country. The 2001 Census shows that the religious composition of Nepali people include Hindu (80.6%), Boudha (10.7%), Islam (4.2%), Kirant (3.6%), Christian (0.5%), Sikh (0.0%), Jain (0.0%) and others (0.4%) (Gurung 2003a, 20). Likewise, ethnic groups identify Buddhism as their religion, though many of them continue their own traditional religious practices. Some ethnic groups, such as Magar, Rai, Limbu, previously treated as Hindu, have now dissociated themselves from Hinduism as their religion. As a result, the Hindu population declined in both the 1991 and 2001 Census. In 1981 Hindus constituted 89.5% and Buddhist 5.3%. In 1991 the Hindus declined by 3%, while the Buddhists increased by 2.5%. Kirant, first time enumerated as a separate religion, constituted 1.7%. In 2001, the Hindus further declined by 6% whereas the Buddhist increased by 3% and Kirant by almost 2%. Likewise, the followers of Islam and Christianity have also increased (CBS 2002).

Nepali society, which until recently saw itself as an ideal blending of diverse cultures and traditions with centuries of peaceful coexistence, is now undergoing an unprecedented assertion of ethnic, lingual, religious and cultural identities and rights. The current state, in effect an ‘instrument of dominance' by the hill high-caste Hindus, is now being seriously challenged. The crux of recent ethnic, dalit and madhesi activism and demand for state restructuring is aimed at ending the ‘established pattern of dominance' (Gurung 2003b, 17). A new area of tension and conflict is simmering and failure to respond will certainly invite conflict, instability and violence.

The 1990 Constitution recognized three basic elements –the sovereignty of the people, constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system of government based on the Westminster model. For the first time the constitution accepted the people as the source of ‘sovereign power' of the state. The political structures and processes of state are designed accordingly. The parliament, the council of ministers and the judiciary constitute the principal organs of government, and accordingly are vested with the authority to govern. The king is the constitutional head of the state and the government is termed ‘His Majesty's Government'. But he is barred from holding the authority to govern. Except for succession to the throne by his descendants and a few other areas, any function carried out in his name must be on the recommendation and consent of the concerned organs of the government [Article 35 (2)].

However, this constitutional experiment with democracy suffered from various contradictions and weaknesses, both systemic and extra systemic. First, it had problems adjusting with monarchy. Second, there were problems of governance. Third, it failed to accommodate various groups and develop an inclusiveness characteristic to the diversity of Nepali nation and society. Fourth, it faced an ultra-left armed rebellion determined to overthrow the system, which grew into a full-scale nationwide insurgency within a short span of time.

The fallacy of constitutional monarchy: The edifice of the 1990 constitutional system was built on an understanding that the monarchy and democracy could coexist. The monarchy was given a respectable position as the ‘symbol of Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people' and assigned the role ‘to preserve and protect the Constitution keeping in view the best interests and welfare of the people' (HMG 1992, 20). Unlike in many other constitutional monarchies, the king of Nepal was solely empowered to amend or repeal the law relating to succession that nothing in the constitution would ‘affect the custom, usage and tradition relating to the order of succession to the throne by the descendants of His Majesty' (HMG 1992, 20). Likewise, the palace secretariat can, at the king's discretion, frame rules relating to the recruitment of personnel, their service conditions and responsibilities.

Although there is separate ministerial portfolio for palace affairs, the palace secretariat, which is responsible to the king alone, functions independently of the government administration. Similarly, the property of His Majesty is inviolable and exempt from taxation and any other charges. After the ‘palace massacre' of June 2001, the private assets of the king have come under scrutiny. It has been demanded that the private property of King Gyanendra be made public and those of the late king, Birendra, nationalized.

From the very beginning of the second experiment with democracy, the king found it difficult to adjust to the norms of constitutional monarchy. All through the constitution-making process, he repeatedly tried to assert an independent role. Though his attempts were foiled, the government had to negotiate and address many of his concerns before the final enactment of the constitution (Hachhethu, 1994). As a result, some of the crucial recommendations of the original draft, such as the provision for referendum for changing the basic structures of the constitution were dropped and many ambiguous provisions retained which later created problems.

Further, there were attempts to dilute the provision of article 32(2) of the constitution relating to some appointments and nominations made by the king. Against the provision and spirit of the constitution, the king started exercising his discretion to nominate members to the National Assembly from 1993. The rumblings of party leaders to further their petty political interests also helped him to undermine the constitutional principles. Using the excuse of dissenting party views and positions, he began to consult the Supreme Court even on such issues like the dissolution of the House of Representatives, assent to bills passed by the parliament and, in later years, sacking and appointing the prime minister at his own discretion (Khanal 2004c).

The search for political space and role by the monarchy did not facilitate a healthy tradition of constitutional monarchy and the ongoing constitutional experiment created confusion and mistrust between the king and political leaders. King Birendra was largely restrained and did not disrupt the constitutional process by asserting his direct role. But King Gyanendra has preferred to play a different role. The constitutional vacuum created after the dissolution of HOR in May 2002, and takeover of executive power after sacking the prime minister on grounds of ‘incompetence' on 4 October the same year, suited his political ambitions. He toured different parts of the country and met people, claiming it was his duty to redress their grievances, which he alleged had been ignored by the political parties and governments.

Although the king took recourse to Article 127 of the constitution as justification, his action is difficult to reconcile with the provisions and spirit of the constitutional system. The present king seems determined to claim a role above normal practices of a constitutional state, barely concealing his contempt for party politics and desire to prevail politically. This has not only exposed the vulnerability of the 1990 constitutional setup but also destroyed its very foundation. It would thus be naive to believe that the reinstatement or fresh election to the HOR will limit the role of the king in the true sense of the norms of a constitutional monarchy.

Problems of governance: With the inception of democracy for the second time in 1990 the Nepali people expected a new era of governance with a greater sense of accountability and transparency. Despite some initial promise, Nepal soon began to witness many structural as well as related behavioural problems. Under a non-functioning public administration, politics became corrupt and stagnant. With political leaders seen as weak and compromising, their popularity and image has eroded among the people.

The majority government of the NC in 1991 failed to survive a full tenure, unable to manage the relationship between the government and party executive and to resolve conflicts. The issue of stability became more acute in the second parliament following the midterm polls in November 1994. This time the House of Representatives lacked a majority of either party. The UML, which had emerged as the largest party in the house, instead of trying to make a coalition with other parties and ensure stability, opted for forming a minority government of its own. When challenged by a vote of no confidence, it recommended the dissolution of the HOR and a midterm poll within a period of six months. However, this move was foiled by the Supreme Court and the UML government was voted out. The equation between political parties in the house was such that no two political parties, other than the NC, UML and RPP, could form a majority in the house.

In this flurry of coalition making and breaking, all the parties in parliament faced a serious challenge of ­division and split. The UML, the largest party in parliament, split. So did the RPP. The NC, by default became the largest party in the house. The fluid parliamentary equations expedited both corruption and degeneration of parliamentary norms. The misuse of government funds for appeasing MPs, distributing privileges, amassing of personal property, and other similar instances of corrupt practices shattered people's faith in political leadership (Panday 2001).

Issues of leadership and stability of the government became more acute after the 1999 parliamentary elections, though the NC had a comfortable majority in HOR. Leadership rivalry within the ruling NC produced three prime ministers in less than three years. Against the backdrop of a growing Maoist insurgency and strained relations between the prime minister, the king and army, Nepal faced an all-round failure of governance. It failed to protect the life and property of people in the remote villages and districts. The government soon began to withdraw banks, police posts and other agencies from the villages. Those who differed with the Maoists were forced to abandon the villages and shift to secure places in the district headquarters or other urban centres.

The estimates of internally displaced persons due to the insurgency are above 34,000, while more than 10,000 people have lost their life. Nepal tops the list of countries with people missing. Among 1430 cases of disappearance, the state is directly accountable for more than 1000 ( The Kathmandu Post , 25 September 2004). The people were further isolated from the body politic when the HOR was dissolved and the tenure of the local units of government expired without being able to restore them through elections.

Concomitant with the political class losing its grip, the security regime has expanded its hold over civilian life. The exercise of civil and political liberties has been restrained. Both the state and insurgents have committed human rights excesses (INSEC, 2004). Since November 2001, the country has been under regular security surveillance of the army led ‘unified command'. The cost of military operations has risen and development budgets have been diverted to security (Kumar 2003). People's access to public offices has become more difficult due to tight security provisions. Ordinary people's movements within the country have been regulated and regimented. The supply of essential commodities, even food and medicine, has been regulated in the hill districts so that the Maoists may be denied access to them. Because of these steps, civilian life has only worsened – threat, extortion, torture, displacement, disappearances, rape and killings, have become a regular feature of people's lives in most parts of the country.

Problems of inclusion: Inclusion and participation of various ethnic groups, women and other depressed caste and communities in the politics and administration of the country continue to be major issues. Despite efforts to address these issues on a piecemeal basis, such as a constitutional provision for a minimum of 5% women in the parties' list of candidates for parliamentary elections, some seats for women in local government bodies, radio news broadcast in the major ethnic languages, scholarships for dalit students at the school level, reservation of jobs in government offices, etc., no substantive changes were possible. And voices for reservation in politics, administration, employment, education, based on the proportion of the population, have only increased.

The politics of exclusion has its roots in the very structure of the state. Ever since its territorial unification in the latter half of the 18th century, Nepal has been ruled from the centre, i.e., Kathmandu, and the unitary approach considered essential to reinforce the unity of the nation. Nepali language and the Hindu caste-hierarchical model provided the instruments for extending central authority over the newly founded kingdom. Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the present kingdom, had conceived it as ‘an ideal Hindu homeland' ( Asil Hindusthana ) even as he claimed to be Hindupati . Subsequently, the pluralistic social and cultural composition of the country was comprehended into a ‘single scheme of Hindu caste universe' through a national code of social order. The non-Hindu social and ethnic groups were accorded a ranking within the Hindu hierarchy, with concomitant legal provisions for reward and punishment (Sharma 1977).

Even after the introduction of democracy in 1951 and subsequent politico-constitutional experiments, such dominance did not end and other groups remained peripheral. However, the opening up of the country exposed various ethnic groups and communities to new political ideas and experiments, leading to a growing demand for equitable accommodation and participation in the state structures. But before these aspirations could occupy any political space, the process was abruptly ended leading to an authoritarian regime under the command of the monarchy, which suppressed democratic and ethnic voices as being divisive.

The partyless panchayat regime under the command of the king further reinforced the homogenizing cultural ethos and patterns of politics and state structure. Absolute monarchy, Nepali language, Hindu ethos and centralized politico-administrative structures were considered as the basic ingredients of national integration. Moreover, the institution of the monarchy was projected as a symbol of unity and provider of justice especially to the underprivileged and marginalized communities.

The restoration of democracy in 1990 once again opened up space for people to ensure their legitimate role in the state. The new constitution recognized, for the first time, the country's multiethnic and multilingual composition but no provisions were made in the political structures and processes, continuing the unitary form of the state with a liberal parliamentary democratic model of polity.

Despite the scheme for decentralization of power for local self-governance, the local units of government were ill-equipped to govern and provide leadership. The experiment with this model for the last 14 years, however, did not yield satisfactory results in terms of representation and participation of excluded groups. The majoritarian model of representation continued to perpetuate the dominant caste groups' control over the politics and administration of the country (Neupane 2000).

Hill high caste male people continue to dominate the major political parties too. The presence of women, ethnic groups and dalits in the leadership hierarchy of these parties is negligible. Although most of them have party-affiliated women, ethnic and dalit organizations, they cannot influence party policy and leadership structures. The aspirant women, ethnic and dalit leaders too remain loyalists rather than assert their role. As a result, various ethnic groups and dalit caste groups remain peripheral to both party politics and the national political mainstream.

The political system, patterns of representation, party structures and leadership and overall political orientations have thus helped to reinforce the unitary system of government and administration and the continued exclusion of deprived caste and communities. If we look at the pattern of representation in both the houses of parliament, HOR and NA, (see Table I and II) in each of the elections, it is apparent that the experiment with democracy could not address the problems of exclusion.

The dominant caste groups are thus over-represented in both the houses. The HOR has 205 members elected on the basis of adult franchise. The administrative districts are divided into single-member constituencies as per the ratio of population, with a guarantee of at least one seat to each district. The method of election is the simple plurality system, i.e., the first-past-the post system. The National Assembly (NA), the upper house of the parliament is a 60 member house and the members come from different constituencies: 35, including three women members elected by HOR on the basis of proportional representation; 15, i.e., three each from five development regions elected by the representatives of the local bodies and 10 nominated by the king. One-third of its members retire every two years and vacancies are filled as per the above-stated criteria.

Although major political parties, particularly the communists, often insist that the National Assembly should be made the house of nationalities in order to compensate for under-representation of various ethnic and other groups, the candidates they field do not comply to that position and the house remains dominated by Chhetri and Brahman, who occupy more than 50% of the total seats. Likewise women, who constitute more than half of the total population, are least represented. Aside from three seats, which are mandatory, political parties are reluctant to increase their presence in the house.

Local government bodies are relatively more representative in terms of participation of women, ethnic groups and dalits. Besides, the act relating to local government also provides for nomination from those groups who are not represented or under-represented through election (Baral, Hachhethu, Khanal, Kumar and Sharma 2004). However, the ethnic groups remain dissatisfied, first because the local bodies have limited powers and are too dependant on the central authority for resources, which is again controlled by the dominant caste groups. And second, the dominant castes prevail in local bodies because they control the party leadership, leaving no scope for the autonomy of ethnic groups. The local government organization in Nepal is not based on the principle of autonomy but on limited decentralization of power. It is expected to be active on development activities rather than administration and government (LSGA 1999). Despite the claim for local-self governance, Nepal continues to be governed under a centralized administration and authority. As a result, demands for restructuring the state as a federal system are popular among various ethnic groups.

Due to a lack of inclusiveness, the constitutional experiment could not evolve a sense of ownership, particularly among ethnic groups and the dalit community. Instead of broadening inclusiveness of the polity through structural reforms as suitable to the multicultural diversity of the nation, the ruling elites under the democratic dispensation too resisted the aspirations for change. Demands for secular identity of the nation state, multilingual policy, proportional representation, cultural and ethnic autonomy were seen as threatening the unity of the nation. As a result, ethnic and dalits groups have lost confidence in mainstream political parties and their movement is growing outside the party fold, giving an opportunity to the Maoists to cash in. The Maoists call for the ‘right to self-determination' and ‘ethnic autonomous rule' has appealed to the sentiments of many ethnic and dalit communities. They were thus able to build alliances with these groups and form joint fronts against the state (Thapa 2003, 5-6).

The Maoist insurgency: In February 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed rebellion in the name of ‘people's war' with the declared objective of overthrowing the 1990 constitutional system to establish a ‘people's republic based on Marxism-Leninism and Maoism' ( Janadesh Weekly , 20 February 1996). The rebellion, beginning with isolated incidents of violence in the remote villages of some mid-western and few other districts, has now grown into a full-scale nationwide insurgency. As a result, the writ of the constitutional state has been drastically reduced to the district headquarters and a few urban centres. The constitutional process has been rendered dysfunctional, bringing into question the very legitimacy of the polity.

The Maoist ‘people's war' has not only survived but grown in both space and influence. The present polity has failed to contain them administratively and politically. Politically there exist differences of opinion among the political parties about the nature of the problem and strategies for its solution. The government too is not consistent. Sometimes it sees the problem as one of terrorism and wants to deal with it administratively and by legal measures, though on occasion, it had shown a willingness to enter into a dialogue for resolving the problem.

The communists in Nepal are divided on the issue of democracy. Although the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) participated in the first parliamentary election in 1959 and the subsequent constitutional process, they continued to retain their extra systemic goal. Particularly post the 1960s, various factions emerged which fundamentally differed on such issues as the nature of class struggle, monarchy, and restoration of parliamentary democracy. Some factions even cooperated with the monarchy on the pretext of ‘nationalism' (K.C. 1999).

However, in 1990 most communist factions participated in the people's movement for the restoration of multiparty democracy. But they continued to differ on the future political settlement (Mishra 2002). Some even advocated an armed movement aimed at establishing their own model of the regime, and one faction, CPN (Mashal), boycotted the 1991 parliamentary elections. Even those who participated in the electoral process and won seats in parliament did not subscribe to the parliamentary system. The objective of their participation in the election was to ‘expose the weaknesses of bourgeoisie democracy' and continue the ‘revolutionary struggle' from the parliamentary front.

Nevertheless, the extra-systemic front of the radical communist factions did not pose a serious challenge to democracy until the 1999 parliamentary elections. Subsequently the situation began to deteriorate fast. The state lost control over many parts of the mid-western and far-western hills. The Maoist insurgents made full use of the contradictions and divisions within the system and major players. In the beginning their main targets were the local cadres of Nepali Congress. Other parties, including the palace, were not threatened. Even within the ruling party, this remained a matter of concern only to those who held government positions.

Initially, the state tried to deal with the problem as a law and order issue, using the police and administration to curb it. Its attempts to legislate through the parliament to this effect did not materialize due to opposition by both the parties and civil society. The police force was poorly equipped to contain the Maoists. Deploying the military against the Maoist insurgency was a delicate and complex affair. The government therefore decided to form a paramilitary force under its command and created an Armed Police Force (APF) to fight the Maoist insurgency. An ordinance was promulgated to this effect.

To contain the insurgency and ensure regular governance, the government sought to engage the army in internal security and development through the Integrated Internal Development and Security Plan ( Kantipur , 12 April 2001). However, the army expressed reservations. The chief of army staff (COAS), demanded the ‘lasting and continuous political commitment of all the political parties and the entire citizenry' if the army were to be involved in the internal security and development plan ( Kantipur, 21 April 2001). There were several other instances of the army chiefs expressing reservations and criticizing the government and political parties for their failure to ensure peace and security pushing the state ‘towards dissolution'. Such an attitude raised suspicion as to whether the army had made an independent assessment or taken its cue from the king.

Before the Maoists attacked the military barracks in November 2001, the use of military to contain the Maoists was a controversial subject. It was only after the attack on the military base in Dang that the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) was deployed against the Maoist insurgency under a shield of nationwide emergency and anti-terrorist legislation through an ordinance. However, the army chief continued to attack the political parties and party leaders for their non-submission to military supremacy. It was against this background that the HOR was dissolved in May 2002.

Although the insurgency facilitated the breakdown of the constitutional system, a Maoist takeover of the polity or a negotiated settlement seems unlikely in the immediate future. The government and the insurgents had engaged in dialogue in 2001 and 2003. But on both occasions talks failed and after each interlude there was fierce fighting with the state losing further ground. Despite the Maoists dropping the issue of republic from their agenda of negotiation, no headway could be made to transform the armed rebellion into a legitimate constitutional political process.

During the first round of negotiations the government insisted on a constitutional monarchy and reform within the limits of the 1990 Constitution (Wagle 2001). The second time it was prepared to rewrite the constitution, which implied the framing of a new constitution, but insisted on retaining a constitutional monarchy. It also ruled out the election of a constituent assembly because that could threaten the monarchy. The Maoists in turn ruled out any possibility of seeking change through the existing constitution and demanded a new constitution to be framed by the people through a constituent assembly. Although the ‘talk of talks' continues to figure on both sides, the issue of a constituent assembly needs to be agreed upon on or dropped by both the parties for meaningful talks or a negotiated settlement.

Although Maoist insurgency continues to be the major problem facing the country, other political issues including substantial constitutional reforms, engage all political forces seeking ‘forward movement'. This has become necessary not only because of the Maoist insurgency but because the political structures based on the 1990 Constitution have been deficient in meeting the rising expectations of various groups and communities. Besides, the takeover of the executive powers by the king, which the mainstream political parties term as ‘regression', has also compelled them to broaden the areas of constitutional reforms.

The ‘18-point programme' adopted by the agitating parties against the royal regression includes commitments to such reforms as constitutional provision for referendum to decide substantive issues of national importance; drastic change in the royal prerogatives and management of palace affairs; affirmative policy action for women, dalit and other deprived groups, ending discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, language; keeping the army under an elected political authority; secularism and so on. (Forward-going common concept and programme, 2003). In addition, issues such as ethnic autonomy, right to self-determination, federalism, proportional representation, reservation, multilingual policy, constituent assembly, among others, are being debated as part of the agenda of restructuring the Nepali state and governance (Khanal 2004a).

How to restructure the Nepali state constitutes the dominant subject of public discourse in Nepali politics. After the 4 October royal action, the discourse on constitutional changes and restructuring the state have gained momentum. Everybody, including the government, major political parties, the Maoists as well as ethnic groups concedes that the present structure of Nepali state does not reflect the sociocultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity of society and nation and recognises the need for restructuring the state. Ideas ranging from federalism, ethnic autonomy, and multilingual policy to decentralized governance within the existing unitary structure have been floated.

Three kinds of alternate structures are being floated in this context: ethno-regional federalism, ethnic autonomous region and regional politico-administrative divisions. Many of the left-oriented groups are unclear about federalism; they often agree with the notion of autonomous regions like the Chinese model rather than federalism. However, federalism based on ethno-linguistic criteria has become a popular demand, particularly among the ethnic peoples of Nepal. Nepal Sadbhavana Party and janjati parties along with various ethnic groups have opposed the unitary political structure and demanded a federal system since the very beginning of the 1990 Constitution ( Nepal Press Digest, November 1990).

The demand for a federal system remained muted until the Maoists established themselves as a force and entered into a negotiating process for the second time. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has pleaded for the right to self-determination and autonomy for various nationalities. Other major political parties are not even open to debate the idea of federalism in Nepal, ruling it out as divisive. However, federalist lobbies are also growing in these parties and leadership hierarchy. Recognizing the growing demand for federalism and its scope in the context of Nepal's multi-cultural setup, they have advanced regional autonomy as an alternative. But it is not clear how regional autonomy would be politically structured.

Most ethnic groups, both of hills and terai, complain that the founding of the unitary structure of Nepal ever since 1769 has negatively impacted on the autonomy and identity of ethnic groups (Nepal Bauddhik Manch 2000). They allege that it imposed a process of homogenization of Nepali society and nation, favouring hill high caste domination and depriving ethnic communities of their traditional territories, languages and culture, and subjugating them to a Hinduization process. This has not only resulted in the ‘destruction of their ethnic and cultural identity' but also perpetuated their ‘exclusion from the politics and administration' of the country (Kramer 2003). The major thrust of ethnic movements in Nepal is to restructure state to reduce the role of the dominant high caste groups and allow the ethnic groups a rightful place in the national political mainstream.

After the restoration of democracy, Nepal witnessed a resurgence of the ethnic movement, which also became an effective social mobilization process. Issues related to deprivation and discrimination, identity, reinterpretation of history, cultural and language rights and equality, and so on, have been effectively raised. As a result, ethnic awareness and sensitization about these issues has grown among the masses, putting pressure on the state to respond positively (Lama 2002). Several measures such as reservation of proportional quota in the politics and administration, affirmative policy intervention, language and cultural rights, autonomy, including the right to self-determination are being demanded.

The proposal submitted by the Maoists during the second round of negotiations contained many such provisions. They advocated popular sovereignty, proportional representation of all people belonging to various class, caste, ethnicity, dalit, women, language, religion and region. More specifically, they stressed the right to self-determination and extension of ethnic and regional autonomous rule to janjati, madhesi and depressed communities ( Kantipur , 28 April 2003). Though the Maoists stand for a republic, they are silent about the role and status of the monarchy. This seems to be deliberate and strategic because they want a new constitution to be framed by an elected constituent assembly, which would mean that the people would decide the fate of monarchy through elections. While responding to the Maoists during negotiations, the government came up with the proposal for constitutional changes, which also admitted several of the above points ( Kantipur , 18 August 2003). However, the government too was silent on such issues as autonomy, monarchy, army, secularism and referendum.

As an alternative to the federal structures, mainstream political parties stress the need to end discrimination based on religion, language and culture and advocate equal access to government through alternative regional structures with decentralization without explaining its principle and modus operandi . Nepali Congress proposes a reorganization of local government based on regional development structures. It stresses that for socioeconomic transformation of the country there is a need of ‘additional representative and participatory state structures' and proposes the creation of ‘regional structures that would reflect the ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity of the country and guarantee the participation' of various groups (Nepali Congress 2003). Similarly, the CPN (UML) also suggests a ‘reorganization of the existing politico-administrative structure with due consideration of sociocultural diversity as well as geographic reality and economic condition of the country' (CPN UML 2003). But what these structures would be and how they would address issues relating to the participation and representation of various groups remains unexplained. The major political parties are thus vague about ethnic issues and avoid any specific commitment to autonomy.

The major parliamentary political parties had jointly agreed on common points for constitutional/political reforms. The 18-point programme, agreed to by agitating parties, which is called an ‘agenda of agragaman ' (forward-going), although not subscribing to the concept of a federal system, calls for restructuring the state while providing greater regional autonomy and representation of various ethnic groups and dalit equitable to the ratio of their population (Five-Party Joint Task Force 2003). The RPP too had accepted the need for restructuring the state during talks with the Maoists. But it seems to be opposed to changes relating to the status of monarchy, army and Hindu kingdom.

The experiment of democracy under the 1990 Constitution remained highly deficient in terms of representation of Nepali society and nation in the polity. One reason for such unbalanced representation is the electoral first-past-the-post system. Under this system a candidate who scores relatively large number of valid votes is elected irrespective of the percentage of total popular vote. This method is simple and helpful to major parties to have a majority in parliament. It is also believed that it provides stability to the government. However, in the context of Nepal's experience this does not hold. In the 1991 and 1999 parliamentary elections, Nepali Congress had scored a comfortable majority in the house but on both occasions failed to complete its tenure. After the 1999 elections, the prime minister was changed three times. Besides, this system has also failed to reflect the majority vote in government as well as parliament. In multicornered contests between the major political parties, even a candidate securing about 20% of votes could be elected.

Given the above, proportional representation is the most frequently discussed proposal among various groups and political parties. However, there are many variations of proportional representation from simple list systems to complex transferable preferential voting. A national list system, which allows the parties representation in proportion to the ratio of their popular vote, inhibits the electorate from choosing their representatives in person. The preferential voting system, though considered, is also impractical because of the large number of illiterate voters. Therefore, two alternative PR models are being floated.

One is to convert the present single-member constituencies into large-sized multi-member constituencies with allocations of seats according to the ethno-cultural composition of the population (Khanal 2004a). Another is the mixed member model as practiced in Germany, in which half the members of the lower house of parliament are elected on the basis of first-past-the post method from single member constituencies and the other half from the parties' national list of candidates on the basis of the ratio of votes polled in the election (Lawoti 2004). It has also been suggested that the upper house be made the house of nationalities in order to balance the ethnic/linguistic representation. Likewise, there are also demands for seat reservations for women, dalit and ethnic groups as per the ratio of their population within the existing electoral system.

A shift to the PR model is expected to ensure better representation of various social groups, including dalit and women in the national parliament. Under this method, no political party is likely to have a majority in parliament. It will ensure a coalition government and encourage forming broad alliances among the like-minded political parties, both in elections and parliament. A change to this system of election also demands change in the Westminster model of government. A fixed parliamentary tenure, direct election of prime minister and proportional sharing of executive power with a consociational model representing the broad alliance of parliamentary groups may be other alternative measures for future governmental arrangements.

After the palace massacre of 1 June 2001 and particularly after the 4 October takeover by King Gyanendra, the relevance of monarchy in Nepal is being widely debated. Few people are convinced that it was simply an accident. Besides, the behaviour of the royal family has further damaged the reputation of the monarchy. As a result, the institution has suffered a massive erosion of respect among the people. And the republican agenda, so far confined to doctrinaire Maoists, has now found wide favour, particularly among the young and the mainstream political parties.

However, the king has not been willing to reconcile with the political parties and allow constitutional reforms. His strategy is to buy time and ensure that the monarchy is retained. But political developments in Nepal are moving fast. The state has been driven to a more rightist and militarized direction, limiting the space for moderate and democratic forces. As a result the king has been pushed to directly face the republican option.

The idea of a constituent assembly in Nepal goes back to the early 1950s when the country was preparing for democracy. However, none of the three constitutions, including the 1990 one, were the product of a constituent assembly. Although the issue continued to survive in Nepali politics, it was revived only when the CPN (Maoist) put it forward as part of a three-point agenda for dialogue with the government in 2001. On the first occasion it received little attention either from the people or the intelligentsia. The issue began to capture public attention after the royal takeover of 4 October 2002. After the palace massacre of June 2001, there were strong voices for amendments to the constitution, for bringing the palace affairs, including the succession to the throne, within the scope of parliamentary scrutiny. However, the parliament failed to initiate the amendment process and address the problems through the due constitutional course.

The making of a new constitution through an elected constituent assembly (CA) seems imminent in Nepal for several reasons. First, in order to develop a feeling of ownership of state among the people there is a need for a new constitution with direct participation of the people. Second, the need for a thorough restructuring in terms of recognizing the sociocultural diversity of the people for autonomy, identity and self-government of the present Nepali state, including the Westminster model of government. Third, the question mark over the monarchy, particularly after the royal massacre of June 2001. Although King Gyanendra had a smooth succession to the throne, both the legitimacy of and respect for the new monarchy has been significantly eroded. The election of CA, if the people support it, may provide an opportunity for the monarchy to regain its lost image and relevancy.

Fourth, various ethnic and cultural groups have demanded the right to self-determination. They consider the present state an imposition. Since their demand for self-determination has no separatist or secessionist content, the CA could work as a forum wherein all the Nepali people can collectively exercise the right to self-determination in terms of choosing the form of the state, the type of government, their powers and freedoms through the adoption of a constitution. Last, the Maoists have also demanded elections to a CA to frame a new constitution. If they were to give up violence and lay down arms, the opportunity to draft a new constitution would increase (Khanal 2003b).

Many questions have been raised in different political corners regarding the modus operandi of the constituent assembly in Nepal. The mainstream political parties feel that it should be based on the 1990 Constitution. The Nepali Congress feels that the decision should be taken by parliament through a revival of the House of Representatives. The current ruling coalition parties, including the UML, stress the election of HOR so that parliament initiate the new constitution-making process. The Maoists want a round table conference of all parties, including the representation of the king and civil society. Given the triangular conflict situation, Nepal needs to institute time-bound steps for resolving the current conflict through a constituent assembly.

The future trajectory of democracy in Nepal, therefore, depends on how the state responds to these various issues – the Maoist insurgency, inclusion and identities of various sociocultural groups and the role of the monarchy through legitimate and popular means like the constituent assembly. The revival of procedural or electoral democracy by itself has limited meaning in the context of Nepal's current crisis. Ensuring a breakthrough needs both clarity about issues being currently debated as well as confidence in the popular process. This alone can inculcate a sense of belonging to the polity among the common people.

First, it may be premature to write off the institution of constitutional monarchy since Nepal never experienced it in the true sense of the term. Political parties have always compromised democracy with monarchy for expeditious reasons with some normative aspects. And monarchs have never been fully committed to democracy. Monarchy has never been linked to the substance of democracy and democracy needs to be redefined independent of monarchy. Too much contextualization of monarchy has led to distortion and deviation of democratic experiments in Nepal.

Second, the unitary structure of Nepali state and representation system needs an unbiased review given the developments that the country has witnessed since 1950. Kathmandu-centric political structures can never be democratic and accountable in a true sense, and provide space for those groups who are at the periphery. As is evident, despite democratic experiments since 1990, the power structure that prevailed for centuries has not been transformed in any real sense.

Federalism and proportional representation must form the core agenda of the present discourse of restructuring the state if we really want better representation of the people as cultural groups as well as efficient and accountable administration of the country. Administration of growing millions of people under a unitary and centralized polity can never be democratic and efficient.

Third, whether Nepal opts for a federal system or a more autonomous decentralized local government system and proportional representation, the present constitution needs major revision. Amendments alone may not fulfil these objectives. The new constitution is therefore a necessity simply because the people should participate in the process of restructuring the state and the new structure of state and power-sharing mechanism should be the product of negotiation between and among the people themselves. This would instill a sense of ownership of the state among various communities of the people, which is distinctly lacking at present. Elections to a constituent assembly should not be ruled out simply because it has been demanded by the Maoists. It has now become a political necessity.

Fourth, constitution-making in Nepal will be a complex and delicate task. Since the country is rapidly ‘drifting towards republicanism', it is likely that the future constituent assembly will have a republican majority. Indeed, this seems to be a major fear of the monarchy which, with its command of the army, is least likely to accept a CA unless its continuity is assured. To accept such a condition would not only be unfair to the people but contradict the very principle of popular sovereignty.

It would be too idealist to expect a ruling monarch to allow a peaceful transition to a republic. Therefore, there remain only two options: either to retain the constitutional monarchy for some time in a thoroughly democratic framework subject to referendum after a certain interval, or an honourable exit by the monarchy if the majority verdict of the people in the CA is for a republic.

Fifth, the mainstream political parties are suspicious of both the king and the Maoists. Although the monarchy is not in a position to assert more power through an election of the constituent assembly, parties fear that it could be a good conduit for the Maoists to finish even the limited democracy achieved under the 1990 Constitution and impose one-party authoritarianism. Reports from the Maoist-controlled areas also suggest that they show little tolerance for dissent. Unless the Maoists allow free political activities and normal civilian life in the areas of their control, such suspicion would remain and the negotiations become more difficult. Moreover, the Maoists often insist on direct negotiations with the king, which the political parties suspect is an attempt to marginalize them and create a new power equation with the monarchy. Therefore, any solution that weakens political parties is not likely to enhance the future of democracy in the country.

Last, it should be clear that any structural arrangement can offer only certain principles, institutions or processes as a framework for the management of national affairs, including tolerance. It cannot ensure good behaviour of the principal actors. Therefore, much depends on how political forces exercise the constitutional provisions and evolve coherent practices and political culture commensurate with a democratic system. In Nepal, the extra-constitutional tendencies are high both in the extreme left and right political camps. Since the Maoists are no exception to this tendency, there exists every possibility of extra-constitutional adventurism in the name of ‘revolutionary struggle', even though we may adopt a new constitution through the constituent assembly. Therefore, if political actors are sincere to a constitutional settlement through dialogue and popular participation of the people, faith in the constitutional system and popular mandate must be respected.

* Extracted from a background paper prepared for the project on The State of Democracy in South Asia/Nepal.

References:

Nepali Text:

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