THE royal proclamation of 1 February 2005, sacking the incumbent Sher Bahadur Deuba government for incompetence and all-round failure, declaring a state of emergency and suspending all fundamental rights, claims to be ‘in accordance with popular will and aspiration.' It goes on to assert that: the parties failed to handle democracy for the interest of people and nation; the Maoist insurgency posed a serious threat to peace, order, democracy and development; and the objective of taking power by the monarchy was to restore peace first and then democracy.

These assertions are crucial to the justification of the royal action. This paper attempts to examine how far the king's assertions are in conformity with what the people of Nepal actually feel. It uses available evidence to analyze how the Nepali citizen may react to the idea of executive monarchy and what they think is the way out for some of the most difficult issues facing the country today. Since the current circumstances of emergency and press censorship do not permit any accurate assessment of public opinion, this paper uses the findings of a recent social scientific survey of democratic opinions and attitudes of a representative sample of Nepali citizens to answer these questions. Carried out across the country some six months before the royal action, this survey is one of the few sources of reliable information about the opinions and attitudes of a cross-section of Nepali citizens.*

The justifications offered in the royal proclamation are not new. The political and constitutional history of Nepal reveals similar ideas whenever an attempt was made at offering the king a respectable but constitutional role: ‘king in council of ministers' in 1951, a combination of ‘sovereign monarch and elected parliament' in 1959, and recently ‘king in parliament' in 1990. All these offers were rejected on similar grounds by a palace that was most unwilling to accept limitations on power. King Birendra was compelled by circumstances to reluctantly consent to constitutional monarchy under the 1990 constitution.

On ascending the throne, King Gyanendra did not hide his ambition to be an executive monarch. In defending his assertion for ‘constructive monarchy', he publicly stated, ‘The days of monarchy being seen but not heard, watching the people's difficulties but not addressing them and being a silent spectator to their tearstained faces are over.' Note the reference to ‘people's difficulties', reminiscent of late King Mahendra's warning before he dismantled multiparty democracy by a royal coup d'etat in December 1960.

It is interesting to recall that the party leadership in both the 1950s and the post-1990 period, despite being aware that the palace was plotting against democracy, failed to take any preventive measures. Another forewarning came in the form of the royal takeover of power on 4 October 2002, dismissing the elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba and initiating a system of executive monarchy in contravention of the 1990 Constitution. King Gyanendra's latest step is thus a logical culmination of a series of events over the last two and half years, all in the name of the people.

A survey on The State of Democracy in Nepal was carried out between 6 August and 20 September 2004. This survey was part of a larger South Asian exercise coordinated by Lokniti, a research programme of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi in collaboration with International IDEA and South Asia based scholars and institutions. This was one of the few national representative sample surveys of the Nepali citizens and the first social scientifically reliable survey of democracy related opinions and attitudes in Nepal.

The sample for this survey was selected through a careful procedure of three-stage systematic random sampling. First, 41 parliamentary constituencies out of 205 were selected through systematic random sampling. This ensured that the sampled constituencies represented all the five developmental regions and the three ecological zones of Nepal in proportion to their population size. Systematic random sampling was again used to select six polling stations in each of the sampled parliamentary constituencies. Finally, a sample of around 30 respondents was selected by systematic random sampling from the existing electoral rolls in each of the sampled polling booths. The original target of the survey was to have 100 interviews in each of the 41 sampled constituencies and thus have 4,100 face-to-face interviews.

The political and security situation in the country was quite troubled by the time the fieldwork of the survey began in August 2004. Many of the survey teams encountered Maoists and this has taught us many lessons about conducting survey research in conflict zones. The Maoists did not allow the survey in two of the sampled parliamentary constituencies, and many polling stations in the rest. Eventually, the survey took place in 39 parliamentary constituencies (spread over 38 out of the 75 administrative districts) and 163 polling stations (31 urban, 132 rural). This and seasonal migration resulted in a lower completion rate despite over-sampling. A total of 3249 respondents were interviewed. Another 982 interviews were carried out for a ‘booster sample' of the 10 marginal communities that were too small to get sufficient representation in the regular sample.

Despite the limitations noted above, the survey succeeded in its objective of a representative sample of Nepali citizens. A comparison of the profile of the sampled respondents with the profile of the population as measured by the 2001 Census shows how well the survey captured the various sections of society. The sample included 83.4% Hindus (80.6% in the census), 9% Buddhist (10.7% in the census), 3% Muslims (4.2% in the census), 3% Kirat (3.6% in the census) and 1% Christian (0.5% in the census) and thus captured fairly the religious diversity of Nepal. The respondents included a greater proportion of women (54.5%) than there are in the country (50.1% in the census), a result of large scale migration of men.

The lower completion rate in rural areas resulted in a slight under sampling of rural electorate (79.7% in the sample against 86% in the census). Yet this made little difference to the educational and presumably the class profile of the respondents: the sample included 45.1% illiterate respondents, about the same as the national proportion of 45.9% literates. The caste-community break up of the sample also shows that it successfully captured the social diversity of Nepal. All these details are adequate to conclude that the sample was representative of all the geographical and social diversities in Nepal that are politically salient and, therefore, the opinions of the respondents can be seen as representing the opinions of the Nepali citizens.

On the face of it, the survey findings seem to support King Gyanendra's assessment that the people are fed up with the experience of multiparty democracy since 1990. The party system and government that evolved in the new context of the post-1990 political developments largely failed to link democracy with good governance and delivery of service to the masses of society. Rather, parties and leaders concentrated more on power politics and self-aggrandizement, breaching democratic values and norms, which in turn contributed to an intensification of political instability, anarchy and chaos.

A deteriorating political situation was evident in a number of developments between July 1994 and October 2002. The House of Representatives was dissolved six times, special sessions of the parliament were summoned seven times, and the government changed 12 times. Particularly since the second parliamentary elections of November 1994 produced a hung parliament, politics revolved around a game of government making and unmaking. That led to a number of distortions in the party system of Nepal: intensification of power-centric intra-party conflicts, defiance of party whips, disintegration of parties, horse trading of members of parliament, manipulation of constitutional loopholes, political intervention by the palace and the court, and so on.

Respondents in the survey do share a sense of disquiet if not disgust at these developments. As many as 57% respondents (of those who had an opinion on the matter) were dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in Nepal; these included 20% who were ‘completely dissatisfied'. As against this only 4% were ‘fully satisfied'. A series of detailed questions on how the situation has changed over the last few years bring out that there are many good reasons underlying this dissatisfaction. There is a deep concern with a deteriorating national situation on multiple fronts: politics, economy and security.

As many as 61% of the respondents feel that people do not enjoy equal rights; 58% feel that everyone is not free to speak one's mind. Even the minimal achievement of democracy in ensuring that the people have the power to change the government they do not like is doubted by as many as 41%. A significant proportion of the citizens feel that the country's economic conditions have deteriorated since 1990. Three-fourths of the respondents disagree with the suggestion that food, clothing and shelter is available to everyone.

There is a near unanimity in indicting democratic politics on two charges: instability and corruption. No wonder, political parties and parliament are the least trusted of the institutions in the country. The courts scored highest at 30% respondents expressing very high trust in the institution, followed by the election commission (26%), local government (25.5%), army (25.5%), police (21%), civil servant (21%), central government (19.5%), parliament (17%), and political parties (14%). But there is a silver lining in this negative evaluation of the working of democracy in the last decade and half: an overwhelming majority felt that social disparities between the ‘untouchable' communities and the rest of the population have reduced and that the disadvantaged groups now have more rights.

Yet the negative assessment of the conditions following introduction of democracy does not, contrary to what the king may have hoped for, lead people to a rejection of democratic form of government. The survey asked the respondents if they would always prefer democracy to any other form of government or whether they would accept dictatorship in special circumstances. Nearly two-thirds of Nepali citizens stuck to democracy, with only 10% prepared to accept dictatorship in some situations; 28% said democracy or dictatorship did not make a difference to them. The proportion of those who were indifferent to this choice is very high among women and the uneducated. Significantly, the same question has been asked in India and many other countries of the world over the years. The level of support for democracy in Nepal is comparable to that in a long-standing democracy like India and is much higher than many countries of Latin America that have experienced authoritarian regimes.

But what about monarchy? The answer to this crucial question is unlikely to make the king happy. The respondents were presented with democracy and various alternatives to democracy without assigning any of these a label and then asked how much they approved of each. Whereas 64% ‘strongly agreed' that the ‘country should be governed by the people chosen by fair elections', only one-fourth ‘strongly agreed' that the ‘country should be governed by the king.' The figure was even lower, only 11%, for army rule. Not only do the people prefer democracy as a form of government, they also think that it is suitable for Nepal. More than three-fourth of the total respondents (79%), affirmed the suitability of democracy in Nepal, leaving only 21% respondents who thought that this form was not, or not at all suitable for Nepal.

A look at what people understand by ‘democracy' shows that it was not just an empty affirmation of a nice sounding word. About half the respondents could respond to an open-ended question asking them to spell out the meaning of this word. Most of those who did, described democracy in terms of freedom, equality of rights and popular rule. When asked to choose what they liked most about a democracy, 68% chose freedom to speak and act, something they have been denied by the imposition of emergency in the country.

The closest anyone can come to assessing public reaction to the royal proclamation of 1 February with the help of existing public opinion data is by analyzing the reactions to the king's intervention of 4 October 2002, an intervention which marked a clear beginning of a derailing of the democratic process and revival of monarchical rule. When asked how they assessed the consequences of this intervention by the king, as many as 84% surveyed Nepali citizens observed that things got ‘bad' or ‘very bad' after this intervention. Only 16% thought the king's intervention resulted in positive changes. There was near unanimity across different social groups – male and female, urban and rural dwellers, and educated and uneducated – in assessing the post-October 2002 situation as ‘bad' and ‘very bad'.

The survey provides a clue to the exact role the people of Nepal would like monarchy to play in the governance of the country. The respondents were presented with three clear choices: an executive monarchy, a constitutional monarchy, and the abolition of monarchy. Understandably, 37% of the respondents could not understand such a complex question. The proportion varied directly with education: as many as 57% of the illiterate people could not respond to it, as also 47% of women respondents. Of those who did understand and respond to this question, 63% chose constitutional monarchy while the remaining were split between the 22% who preferred executive monarchy and the 15% who wanted a republic. In every single social group, including among the illiterate respondents, those who prefered constitutional monarchy outnumbered supporters of an executive monarchy. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there are strong social differences on this question. There is a clear residue of yearning for king's rule among the less privileged sections of society: among women, rural dwellers and the less educated. Since the proportion of the large non-responses also come from the same sections of society, it is possible that the support for an executive monarchy is higher than what this survey records. At the same time, it is also significant to note that the support for abolition of monarchy goes up with education and exposure and reaches 29% among the highly educated. This should clearly worry the king. In terms of ecological zones, support for constitutional monarchy goes up from mountains (57%) to terai (61) to hill (64%). An analysis of responses by different age groups shows that the support for executive monarchy declines sharply with age: 35% of the elders support this idea while only 18% of the young and middle aged respondents are for an executive monarchy.

On the question of handling the Maoists, the king is once again out of sync with public opinion. The survey asked the respondents to give their opinions on the three most debated questions of Nepali politics: should the present constitution be retained, amended or rewritten? What kind of government should be formed given the constitutional impasse? And what should be done to bring the Maoists into negotiation? It should be noted that responses to all these questions need to be treated with some caution, for a majority of the respondents were not able to understand and respond. The percentages reported here are for those who did understand and therefore responded.

A majority of Nepali citizens, 53-60%, were unable to give their opinion on the three sensitive and controversial items. However, the definite responses on these questions give a sense of the direction of public opinion. A majority of respondents, who come up with definite answers, suggested the need for a round table conference, an interim government including the Maoists, and a new constitution.

The survey reveals that opinion in favour of a ‘round table conference' is distinctly high, as 69% opted for it. Some 22.5% respondents suggested new election of the HoR. Only a thin minority of 5.5% respondents favoured a reinstatement of the dissolved HoR.

Support for the proposal of round table conference is high from all quarters. Among the respondents, 68% men and 71% women, and 70% villagers and 66% urban dwellers stamped on ‘a round table conference'. Disaggregate data by development regions also revealed a greater support to the round table conference than a fresh election of the HoR. The ratio of percentage distribution, based on development regions, in these two suggested alternatives was: 66 (for round table conference): 25 (for election of HoR) in east, 74:15 in centre, 64:29 in west, and 74:22 in mid and far-west region. Choice to ‘round table conference' stepped up from 66% in hill to 72% in terai to 80% in mountain. The same pattern can be found in age-wise breakdown of data. Response to this proposal by the elder respondents was 60% that moved forward to 67% (matured age) to 70% (young age) to 73% (middle aged). Support to the round table conference climbed up distinctly with the increase in education, from 60.5% (literate) to 70% (school level education) to 75% (higher level education).

On the nature of government suggested, close to half the respondents (49%) favoured the formation of an interim government including the Maoists. 29% respondents were in favour of a new elected government. Those who stood for all-party government consisted 20.5%.

The opinion of different groups – male and female, rural and urban dwellers, educated and uneducated, people residing in mountain, hill and terai, and inhabitants of all development regions – was a replica of what they said in favour of ‘round table conference' in responding to the question related to legislature/assembly. Response in favour of an interim government including the Maoists was distinct. There was, however, one exception that respondents of the eastern development region favoured this system only by 41% whereas their choice to the alternatives was higher at 58%, a combined figure of responses to ‘all party government' (29%) and a new elected government (29%).

On the question about constitution, though opinions were divided, a clear majority of Nepali citizens (51%) favoured framing a new constitution. This opinion is higher by 11% than the support coming to the amendment of the constitution. 40% respondents suggested amendment of the constitution. Those who stood for retention of the present constitution without any amendment was very thin, a mere 9%.

Support for a new constitution was higher in hills and terai, and in eastern, central, and mid and far-west development regions. Disaggregated data by several social backgrounds also showed a public opinion in favour of ‘framing a new constitution'. Among the respondents of various groups, a majority of male (49%) and female (55%) respondents and villagers (53%) and urban dwellers (45%) were in favour of ‘framing a new constitution'. Favour to this option went up with the level of education, from 45% (literate) to 50.5% (school level education) to 51% (higher level education). There were, however, some deviations from the general findings that majority respondents of eastern development region (53.5%) and the mountain region (71%) opted for amendment of the constitution. But on the whole, support to ‘framing a new constitution' was more favoured than other alternatives schemes.

Among the surveyed Nepali citizens who subscribed to a new constitution, the overwhelming majority (76%) supported the election of a constituent assembly. This line was supported by the respondents of different groups, men and women, rural and urban dwellers, and educated and uneducated. The respondents of all development regions favoured the proposal of constituent assembly, by 67% (east), 78% (centre), 74% (west) and 87% (mid and far-west). This proposal was accepted in terai by a substantial majority of 76%, followed by 74% in the hill region, and 50% in the mountain.

To overcome the nine-year long armed conflict, Nepali voters (among those who come up with a definite answer) suggested, by a clear majority, to go for a round table conference, interim government including the Maoists, and a constituent assembly.

The king's claim to represent popular will and aspirations in the royal proclamation is not backed by any of the known and reliable instruments of public opinion like free and fair elections or a referendum. In a situation of emergency, suspension of fundamental rights, press censorship and control over all types of public communication, it was not possible to get a genuine measure of public opinion. The findings of the survey analyzed here thus constitute one of the few reliable indicators of the political mind of Nepal today. This survey offers little evidence to support the king's presumption about popular will. King Gyanendra's action of 1 February is not quite in line with, if not directly opposed to, the way the people of Nepal think.

To sum up: Nepali citizens retain their trust in democracy as the best from of government despite disappointment with the working of democracy and the behaviour of politicians. The people clearly reject non-democratic alternatives. They do not want the king to be the executive head. People strongly disapprove of the previous instance of dismissal of popular government and the takeover of executive powers by the king. Nepali citizens would like the current deadlock to be resolved through a round table discussion involving the Maoists and the political parties. These views belie the claims of the palace justifying the recent ‘temporary' measures as essential for democracy, governance, peace and security of the nation.

Since the king's action is divergent from what the citizens want, this might induce a rethinking among the citizens on whether democracy and monarchy can coexist. The recent developments are likely to invite a rethinking on whether monarchy is incompatible with the principle of democracy and popular sovereignty. Despite King Gyanendra's assurance of bringing back democracy and constitutional monarchy, his actions since October 2002 reflect an authoritarian path. He may temporarily take advantage of the inability of the discredited and divided political parties' for involving the masses in a democracy movement. But in the long run, he is likely to encounter a public that has tasted democracy and is no longer willing to surrender its sovereignty. Considering the people's adherence to democracy despite their disappointment with its working, and increasing international pressure for the early restoration of democracy, the coming days will be hard for the king.

* For full details see, K. Hachhethu, State of Democracy in Nepal , Survey Report, 2004.