IN his famous work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx had said: ‘Hegel observes somewhere that all great incidents and individuals of world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.' This was while drawing a parallel between the coup of 1851 by Napoleon's nephew Louis Bonaparte, who had crowned himself as Napoleon III, and the original Napoleonic coup of 1799, of course, as satire.

A similar law of Hegelian dialectics seems to be in operation in the history of Nepal too. Earlier the father, King Mahendra, had staged a military coup on 16 December 1960 against the first parliamentary democracy established after 1950 to centralise all power in himself. Now the son, King Gyanendra, has staged another military coup on 1 February 2005 against the second parliamentary democracy restored after 1990 and centralised all state power in himself. However, for the politically enlightened, it is not difficult to see that the events of February 1 are merely a continuation or culmination of the episode of 1 June 2001, when the relatively weaker and liberal King Birendra, along with his entire family was butchered and a new dynasty ushered in by Gyanendra. The ‘First February' of Nepalese history seems to be a carbon copy of the ‘Eighteenth Brumaire' of French history; it is yet to be seen whether it will represent a ‘tragedy' or a ‘farce'.

In all public utterances after the coup, including the ‘royal proclamation' of February 1, Gyanendra has laboured hard to sell the theory that his move was designed to restore ‘peace' and consolidate ‘multiparty democracy' by exorcising the ghost of ‘terrorism', (i.e. the ongoing revolutionary People's War led by the CPN-Maoist), and is only for a definite time-frame of three years. While talking to a group of selected media persons on February 24, he took pains to project himself as the real messiah of ‘democracy' and the exorcist of ‘terrorism', demanding that the parliamentary political parties and the international community cooperate in this grand venture against ‘terrorism'. Thus, he has sought to project himself as a true follower of US President George W. Bush in the international crusade against ‘terrorism' and begged everybody to grant legitimacy to his autocratic military regime at least on that count. Possibly, he seems to have learnt a few lessons from General Musharraf of Pakistan.

However, Gyanendra's political gimmicks have not cut much ice among the masses. He has a tainted image as a hardline autocrat even within the palace since his father's and brother's days and is particularly hated among the public as the real fratricidal and regicidal culprit in the palace massacre of 1 June 2001. Particularly after the induction of old palace stooges like Tulsi Giri and Kirti Nidhi Bista as his principal political associates and the abrogation of all fundamental and democratic rights of the people with the countrywide declaration of emergency, the true nature of his despotic military rule has been thoroughly unmasked. Despite incessantly parroting his commitment to ‘multiparty democracy' and ‘constitutional monarchy', his practice – the crackdown on political parties and their leaders, free media and human rights activists and blatant trampling upon the limited democratic provisions of the old constitution – leaves no doubt that the supine parliamentary democratic system has been snuffed out and autocratic monarchy restored in the country.

Hence the questions arise: How could the limited bourgeois democratic system established after 1990 be abolished and an autocratic monarchy restored so smoothly? Should not the wheel of history move forward rather than backward? For the correct answers to these questions, one has to grasp the laws of social development in a scientific and objective manner and correctly evaluate the weaknesses and limitations of the chronically infirm post 1990 parliamentary system.

First, it should be acknowledged that struggle between social classes provides the basic motive force of societal development. The present semi-feudal and semi-colonial Nepalese society is a multi-class society, and the principal struggle is among the feudal, the bourgeois and the proletarian classes and their allies. The traditionally dominant feudal class has the support of the comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the small and weak bourgeois class are supported by a section of the rural and urban petty-bourgeois class, and the proletariat enjoys the backing of the vast number of poor peasants and semi-proletariat.

This basically triangular class contention is increasingly turning into a bipolar contention after the initiation and development of revolutionary People's War under the leadership of the proletariat in 1996. In other words, the parasitic reactionary classes are polarised on one side under the leadership of the most capable and strong class among themselves, and on the other are the working and the progressive classes under the leadership of the most advanced class, the proletariat. As the monarchy representing the feudal and comprador and bureaucratic bourgeois classes is historically the strongest representative of the reactionary classes in Nepal, the parasitic classes most adversely affected by the revolutionary People's War have increasingly rallied under its leadership. This is the rationale and essence of the current royal regression or the restoration of autocratic monarchy in social class terms. The regressive march of the reactionary classes in opposition to the progressive march of the working classes is perfectly in keeping with the dialectical law of social development.

Second, it should be acknowledged that the inherent defects and weaknesses of the bourgeois parliamentary democracy established after 1990 and the general infirmity and incapacity of the middle strata and forces also provided an objective basis for the ultimate feudal autocratic regression. Historically, the major parliamentary political forces, viz. the Nepali Congress and later the revisionist UML, enjoy no independent class base of their own, and tend to represent a hodge-podge of class forces ranging from the feudals and comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie to the petty-bourgeoisie and constantly take vacillating and conciliatory political positions. In contrast, the monarchy traditionally draws its strength from the prevailing feudal property and cultural relations, and its monopoly hold over the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).

The political change and the Constitution of 1990 failed to properly settle the question of ‘state sovereignty' traditionally claimed by the monarchy leaving the final ‘state authority' and strategic control over the RNA in the hands of the monarchy. This ‘historical blunder' (to paraphrase Jyoti Basu from India!) paved the way for the monarchy to gradually gobble up parliament and the constitution and consummate the current royal regression. Moreover, the parliamentary forces during their 12 year long rule in between, did nothing to bring about a progressive transformation in the traditionally feudal and increasingly comprador and bureaucratic capitalist socioeconomic and cultural base of society. More recently, particularly after the rapid development of the revolutionary People's War, their class and political base suffered further erosion.

As a result, the upper strata of society, which had backed the parliamentary forces after the political change of 1990, gradually returned to the fold of the monarchy while the lower along with a section of the middle strata naturally got polarized around the revolutionary People's War. This dilemma of the reformist parliamentary forces has been summed up in Chairman Com. Prachanda's recent People's War anniversary statement thus: ‘Ultimately, the so-called royal proclamation of February 1 has not only exposed the irrelevance of reformism in the Nepalese politics, but also shattered the collective lethargy of the parliamentary political forces.'

Third, from a military point of view, this total centralization of state authority in an absolute monarchy can be seen as an attempt of the moribund reactionary classes to wage a final battle with the revolutionary forces. In view of the recent declaration of the CPN (Maoist) to lead the nine-year old revolutionary People's War into the final and decisive stage of strategic offensive, it is not unnatural, though foolish, of the frightened reactionary classes to attempt to wage a final battle of life and death under the direct leadership of the monarchy, which had assumed supreme commandership of the RNA since its inception.

In the recent past, the pathetic showing of the RNA in almost every battle with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been explained away by certain quarters as the contradictions of de jure political leadership of the parliamentary forces and de facto leadership of the monarchy over the RNA. Also, it is not difficult to understand the military ambitions of Gyanendra, who grabbed the throne by butchering the entire family of his brother, Birendra, to project himself as the great saviour of his tottering feudal and comprador-bureaucratic bourgeois class. Nevertheless, as any common student of military science knows, the victory or defeat of a particular army ultimately depends more on its social class base and the political goal rather than on the leadership prowess of its commander. In that sense the ultimate defeat of the reactionary RNA is a foregone conclusion and Gyanendra's dream a mere chimera.

In the present day world of imperialist globalization all internal political events have international ramifications. No wonder, the 1 February royal regression has generated worldwide reaction, and all major world and regional powers and organizations, including the UN, the USA, the UK, the EU, India, China and others have issued public statements. Surprisingly none of the major international players have so far supported Gyanendra's regressive steps. Major powers like the USA, the UK, the EU and India, the principal props of the reactionary regimes in Nepal in the past, have publicly opposed the current developments. Others like China, Russia, Pakistan and Bangladesh have commented upon the events as being the ‘internal affair of Nepal'.

The most significant international development is the suspension of military aid by India and the UK (the USA also appears to be toeing the same line) alongside suspension of ‘development aid' by a number of EU countries. International human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have publicly denounced the royal regime for its violation of human and democratic rights of the people. Thus the autocratic royal regime has been totally isolated from the international community, a good omen for the democratic movement.

However, the despotic regime is desperately seeking to exploit two issues to gain international support for itself. The first is the ‘anti-terrorism' card, and second, the ‘geopolitical' card. The hackneyed ‘anti-terrorism' card, much exploited after 9/11 by all petty dictators and reactionary regimes around the world, has already lost much of its original sheen; it is yet to be seen how it will fare in Gyanendra's case. But one can be fairly certain that enlightened world public opinion will not be easily hoodwinked by the ‘anti-terrorism' claims of a person of Gyanendra's ilk, whose hands are bloodstained in the infamous palace massacre and who has now launched a countryside reign of military terror against the people by suspending all political and fundamental rights. Nevertheless, as all the values and norms in a class-divided society are governed by class interests, it will not be surprising if some of the reactionary rulers of the world ultimately back the regressive royal regime, overtly or covertly.

As far as the ‘geopolitical' card of the country's strategic positioning between the two super-states of China and India is concerned, Gyanendra's attempts to repeat the skilful diplomatic manoeuvring of playing one neighbour against the other as practised by his father, Mahendra, in the specific Cold War context of the last century, cannot be expected to bear much fruit in the changed situation of international balance of forces in general and India-China relations in particular. The recent coming together of the USA and India and their coordinated policy against royal regression may tempt Gyanendra to play the China card. He has given enough hints of this by appointing the old royalist Kirti Nidhi Bista known for a pro-China tilt as one of his principle associates in the government.

Pakistan and Bangladesh, given their traditional contradictions with India, may provide some breathing space for the royal regime, indications of which have already come from Pakistan's ambassador in Kathmandu. However, given the extremely shaky position and uncertain future of Gyanendra himself, it is unlikely that any of the neighbours will go beyond diplomatic niceties to extend him any substantial material help. Similarly, the proletarian revolutionaries should be prudent enough to practice strategic firmness and tactical flexibility in the matters of diplomatic relations, particularly with the immediate neighbours.

Another noteworthy factor in recent days is the indication of some thawing in the attitude of major international and regional powers towards the revolutionary forces in Nepal. Due to their own distorted class outlook and interests, in the past these major powers used to regard the monarchy and the parliamentary forces as the ‘two pillars of stability', and worked hard to bring about a grand alliance between the two against the revolutionary democratic forces. Now they are increasingly veering around to a ‘three pillar' theory, including the revolutionary forces, which is a step forward. But the historical necessity and the new objective reality of the country is for the new ‘two pillars' of parliamentary and revolutionary democratic forces to join hands to uproot the outdated and rotten third ‘pillar' of monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) has already made a policy decision to this effect, which is reflected in the recent anniversary statement issued by Chairman Com. Prachanda.

After the royal regression of February 1, there have been some important developments in the internal political situation. Whereas national politics was earlier divided into three streams of monarchy, parliamentary democracy and revolutionary people's democracy, it is now gradually getting polarized into two broad streams of monarchy and democracy. The leaders, cadres and supporters of parliamentary democracy have in particular now seen through the anti-democracy manoeuvring and divide-and-rule policy of the monarchy increasing their collective ire against the monarchy.

Despite sponsored public rallies and daily statements in favour of the autocratic monarchy, none of the known political parties or their leaders have so far openly endorsed the royal move. Even as the royal regime has laboured hard to propagate that the harsh autocratic measures are directed only against the ‘terrorists' (i.e. Maoist revolutionaries), the people have increasingly realized that they are against all democratic forces. Similarly, most members of ‘civil society' – media persons, human rights organizations, professional organizations – have openly come out against the royal coup. This is a good sign for the future of democracy.

However, it is a matter of serious concern that more than a month since the coup, democratic forces have failed to come up with an effective and coordinated plan, programme or mechanism of resistance against the autocratic monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) attempted to provide initial tempo to the resistance movement by organizing a three-day ‘Nepal bandh ' (shut-down) and a 15-day transportation blockade in February, and is planning further mass-mobilization and military-action programmes in the coming months. The parliamentary forces did organize some propaganda activities from India and symbolic public rallies within the country, and are planning peaceful mass-arrest programmes for the future.

But the desired sharp and unified attack against the monarchy, first, amongst the parliamentary forces and, second, between the parliamentary and revolutionary democratic forces, has not materialized so far. Whereas the Nepali Congress has come out more sharply against the monarchy, the so-called ‘leftist' UML has made a relatively muted response against the royal coup. This has naturally raised some apprehension among the masses whether a new ‘Rayamajhi' trend (i.e. the capitulation of the then general secretary of the CPN, Keshar Jang Rayamajhi, to the monarchy in the 1960s) is in the offing.

However, after so much bloodshed the situation has undergone a sea change since then. Hence, despite a few Rayamajhis from the left camp and a few Tulsi Giris from the Nepali Congress camp, the overwhelming majority of leaders and cadres of political parties and the general masses of people are likely to fight till the end against the autocratic monarchy. Moreover, the presence of the revolutionary PLA to take on the monarchist RNA, and a more favourable international situation against an absolute monarchy, has prepared a new objective ground for the democratic political forces to mount a unified assault against the monarchy so as to sweep it away for ever.

The question of an anti-monarchy common minimum programme and slogan acceptable to all democratic forces, including the parliamentary and revolutionary democratic forces and the international community, has now become pertinent. It is the considered view of the CPN (Maoist) that the programme of election to a representative Constituent Assembly and institutionalization of the democratic republic is best suited for the purpose. The old slogan of restoration of the parliament or re-activization and amendment of the 1990 Constitution, advanced by parliamentary forces and the international community, is totally outdated and inadequate in the new context.

A brief recapitulation of the incessant struggle between the monarchy and democracy since the 1950s in the country should leave no one in doubt that without the complete abolition of the archaic institution of feudal monarchy and its puppet RNA, no form of democracy can be secure and institutionalised in Nepal. Time and again it has been proved that the so-called ‘constitutional monarchy', seen in operation in some of the highly developed capitalist countries, cannot be replicated in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. Hence any attempt on the part of the parliamentary political parties and the international forces to preserve the thoroughly rotten and discredited institution of monarchy, under this or that pretext, does not correspond with the historical necessity and ground reality of balance of forces in the country. Today, the agenda of ‘democratic republic' has entered Nepalese politics.

As far as the sincere commitment of the revolutionary democratic forces, who aspire to socialism and communism via a new democratic republic, towards a bourgeois democratic republic is concerned, the CPN (Maoist) has time and again clarified its principled position towards the historical necessity of passing through a sub-stage of democratic republic in the specificities of Nepal. Particularly, in ‘An Executive Summary of the Proposal put Forward by CPN (Maoist) for the Negotiations' presented during the negotiations in April 2003 [See, Some Important Documents of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2004], the minimum content and the process of realization of this democratic republic through a Constituent Assembly has been expressed in concrete terms. The fact that the democratic republic is envisaged to be institutionalized through a freely elected Constituent Assembly should cast away any illusions about the democratic credentials of the revolutionary forces. Further, concrete issues like the creation of a new national army after the dissolution of the royal mercenary RNA can be discussed during the process of negotiations.

The need of the hour is a unity of all democratic forces in the country on the common minimum programme of a democratic republic. The only thing lacking so far is the real democratic vision and will power on the part of the leadership of major political parties. Also, it is time to win the confidence of the masses of the people through a correct projection of the democratic credentials of political parties, and for this the correct practice of inner-party democracy would be a significant component.

In the end, it may be useful to recall Engels to understand why a proletarian party needs to uphold the programme of a bourgeois republic in the particular historical specificities of a country like present-day Nepal. Lambasting the Bukuninist anarchists who had opposed the immediate programme of a republic in 19th century Spain, Engels had written:

‘When the Republic was proclaimed in February 1873, the Spanish members of the Alliance [i.e. Bakuninist “International”] found themselves in a quandary. Spain is such a backward country industrially that there can be no question there of immediate complete emancipation of the working class. Spain will first have to pass through various preliminary stages of development and remove quite a number of obstacles from its path. The Republic offered a chance of going through these stages in the shortest possible time and quickly surmounting the obstacles. But this chance could be taken only if the Spanish working class played an active political role.' (From The Bakuninists at Work )