Comment

Truth as politics

Narayan Desai in his recent biography of Gandhiji Maru Jivan Ej Mari Vani (My Life Is My Message) repeatedly reminds us of the quality of ‘servant co-workers’ that gathered around Gandhiji. Henry Polak, Herman Kallenbach, Maganlal Gandhi, Imam Saheb Abdul Kadar Bavazir, Mahadev Desai, Pyarelal, Swami Anand, Kakasaheb Kalelkar, Narhari Parikh, Kishorlal Mashruwala, Miraben and many others like them were men and women of exceptional qualities and virtues. They were thinkers and servants of people. My personal journey to Gandhiji was also mediated by Swami Anand, Kakasaheb, Mahadevbhai, Kishorlal and Prabhudas Gandhi. It was through their Gujarati writings that I found my way to Gandhiji.

It was much later that I discovered Professor K. Swaminathan, Professor C.N. Patel and Chandulal Bhagubhai Dalal. They were the finest archivists and chroniclers of the life and letters of Gandhiji. As I went deeper into the CWMG (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi) and the archives of the Sabarmati Ashram, a sense of deep gratitude defined my relationship with these ‘ancestors’. They and others like them were moved by a conviction that so long as human beings aspire to be guided by truth, compassion and love, Gandhiji, like other great teachers of humankind before him, would remain relevant as an exemplar.

During the last one year I have been engaged in the English translation of Narayan Desai’s biography of Gandhiji. It was only then that I came to understand the true worth of the CWMG. The CWMG project was commenced in 1956. The Government of India decided to create an advisory board and vested all control and direction of the project in the board. Morarji Desai was the chairman of the board and at various points the following individuals worked as members: Kakasaheb Kalelkar, Devdas Gandhi, Pyarelal, Maganbhai Desai, G. Ramachandran, Shriman Narayan, Jivanji P. Desai, P.M. Lad, R.R. Diwakar, Ramdhari Sinha ‘Dinkar’ and Shantilal Shah.

The task before the editors of the CWMG was immense. Gandhiji’s papers were scattered over mainly three countries – South Africa, India and England, in government files, newspaper offices and individual collections as also in diaries of his associates like Mahadev Desai. He wrote primarily in three languages: Gujarati, English and Hindi. From 1956 to 1959, Dr. Bhartan Kumarappa and Jairamdas Doulatram worked as the chief editors of the project. In February 1960 a man who was equally comfortable with the European literary and philosophical traditions, Sanskrit poetics and Tamil literature as well as the ashram of Shri Raman Maharshi, Professor K. Swaminathan was appointed the chief editor. He continued to work on the project till his eyesight failed him in his early ’90s.

A project that was conceived in 1956 was closed in 1994 with the publication of the 100th volume. Men such as U.R. Rao, R.K. Prabhu and C.N. Patel assisted Swaminathan. It was decided that the CWMG would be published in three languages – Gujarati, English and Hindi. The Gujarati version was prepared by the Navajivan Trust while the Publications Division of the Ministry of I&B, GOI, was responsible for the publication of the Hindi and English versions.

The editors and the advisory board decided on three guiding principles: (a) the aim of the series would be to reproduce Gandhiji’s actual words, (b) reports of his speeches, interviews and conversation in indirect speech would be included when they were proved to be authentic beyond doubt, and (c) since later research was likely to lead to discovery of more material – like the Gandhi-Kallenbach correspondence – it would be published as supplementary volumes. Of the 100, volumes 1-90 reproduced Gandhiji’s writings, speeches, letters, interviews and notes in a chronological order; volumes 91-97 were the so-called supplementary volumes which dealt with material that had become available later; and volumes 98-100 contained index of subjects, index of persons and a volume containing prefaces to the set. The CWMG has come to be recognised as one of the finest examples of editorial and translation work world over. At least two generations of Gandhi scholars have expressed their indebtedness to those who gave their lives to the CWMG project.

I, like many others, had until recently taken the enduring authenticity of the CWMG for granted. The GOI in 1998 decided to re-edit the English and Hindi versions of the CWMG. The exercise was aimed at bringing in uniformity, strict chronology and authenticity. Uniformity meant that all volumes ought to be of the same size – 500 pages each! Chronology required that all the material of the supplementary volumes be incorporated in its appropriate chronological order. The publisher’s note in the revised edition of 2001 has this to say about authenticity: ‘The objective of the series is to reproduce Gandhiji’s actual words as far as possible; reports of his speeches, interviews, conversations which did not seem to be authentic have been avoided, as also reports of his statements in indirect form.’ (Emphasis added.) The exercise thus involved a process of re-authentication and therefore subsequent deletion of material ‘which did not seem authentic.’ It also involved a process of realigning the material from supplementary volumes. The exercise, which began in 1998, resulted in publication of a revised edition of 100 volumes of CWMG both in English and Hindi. A CD-ROM version was also prepared.

It was in April this year that a colleague – who wishes to remain anonymous – brought to our notice the discrepancies between the original and the revised version of 2001. Thus began the slow process of comparing the two versions. We soon realised that there were not two but three versions – the original CWMG, the revised print edition and the CD-ROM, which was based on the revised edition. There are about 500 entries deleted from the CD-ROM version, all of which may not be inauthentic as about 215 are included in the print edition.

The entire exercise is deeply flawed. One of the aims of the revised version was to incorporate the material from the supplementary volumes in their strictly chronological place. We have found that from Vols. 91-97 of the original CWMG, 97 entries are missing, most of which form part of Gandhi-Kallenbach and Gandhi-Polak correspondence. Their authenticity is beyond doubt, and they are now part of the National Archives.

We are not told who the new editors were or who was part of the advisory board, not if any measures were adopted to re-ascertain the authenticity of the deleted material. There is no listing of entries that have been thus removed. In the re-editing process the prefaces to each volumes became redundant, which have been removed. In lieu of the prefaces the new editors have incorporated a publishers’ note, which too is unsigned. The list of contents between the original and the revised entries do not match in a large number of cases. That is, the same entry is listed in both under different titles.

As we gained a certain measure of control over our disbelief, anger and pain, we began to slowly find our way through the chaos. Many questions came to us and were posed to us. What was the politics of the exercise? What were the reasons for the secrecy surrounding the exercise? What would a process of recovery and reinstatement involve?

Clearly the decision to re-edit the CWMG could not have been taken at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. But was it a ‘political’ decision, motivated by malice and a desire to rewrite Gandhiana? It would have been easy and in some ways expedient to attribute this to a deep political conspiracy. We constantly reminded ourselves that our quest was to restore the dignity and sanctity of the original CWMG; it was an exercise in truth. We were also convinced of the inviolable relationship between means and ends and the purity of both.

As weeks passed, conviction grew that what we could prove beyond any doubt was that the re-editing process was pedestrian, unthinking, mindlessly bureaucratic and smacked of illiteracy. This is borne out by the nature of entries omitted and the manner in which the content headings have been altered. What continues to baffle us is the desire of the new editors and the advisory board to remain anonymous. Self-effacement can be a virtue, but it also must be accompanied by the ability and the willingness to accept responsibility.

We also realised that the process of recovery and reinstatement was not a worthwhile exercise. A process of recovery would require at least three stages. One, to ascertain the entries that have been omitted from both the print and the electronic version; two, checking the entries in all the three versions against their subject headings; and three, to verify the contents of all 46,000 entries. It is possible that the new editors might have been inclined to ‘improve’ Gandhiji’s prose or even render the translations with greater accuracy. This exercise, however rewarding, is completely unnecessary at this juncture.

The only way to reinstate the CWMG to its former self is to declare the revised edition and the CD-ROM as null and void and reinstate the original edition. We must also ensure that no future dispensation shall open up the question of re-editing the CWMG.

The search for meaning and truth of a text is a hermeneutic process, involving a deep faith in the fidelity of the text. We have demonstrated in the last decade or so our capacity and enthusiasm for rewriting history and altering structures of memory and memorialising. This process seeks to place all events and memories in the realm of the political. Politics might be our Yugadharma but truth and meaning cannot always be contained by the political. We need to resist those tendencies which seek to render truth as politics.

Tridip Suhrud

 

Veiling the fundamentals

MARCH 2004, the upper house of the French Parliament approved a bill banning conspicuous religious symbols like the Islamic headscarves (Hijabs), Jewish skull caps (Kippas), large Christian crucifixes, Sikh turbans and other overtly visible symbols that ‘lead to an immediate recognition of religious affiliation’ in state schools. The proposal, based on the recommendations of the Stasi Committee, was approved with 276 votes in favour and 20 against. Most of France’s political parties, and around 70% of the population, supported the ban.

The ban has invited diverse reactions from around the globe affecting state diplomacy, international economics and trade, world peace and civilian rights: the Fereshta Ludin case in Germany (as a result of which states in Germany are left with a choice of enacting state specific laws banning head scarves); Belgium permitting women to wear headscarves in identity photographs; Muhammad Sayed Tantawi, the Grand Sheik of Al Azhar University, Egypt, declaring publicly that he saw no problem with the proposed law¹ (an opinion contrary to the majority Islamic reaction of rebellion and anger); the European Human Rights Court’s decision in favour of the ban;² Iraqi kidnappers threatening to kill two French hostages unless France lifted the scarf ban;³ Iraqi Shia clerics calling for a boycott of French products in protest at France’s move⁴ are some of the impacts felt.

‘La loi sur la laïcité’, (literally the law on secularity) has its expressed legislative rationale in the constitutional requirement of laïcité (secularism), the separation of church and state, protecting women’s rights and public neutrality. Despite such expressed reasons, the most oft-reached conclusion on this issue is that the step taken by France and approved of by some other nations is nothing more than a result of over-scepticism, insecurty, cynicism and fear of Islam. It is yet another step by the West on account of ‘Islamophobia’.

In addition to ‘Islamophobia’, I also see French history, ‘religion versus republic’ war and efforts to preserve French identity and culture as a possible rationale for the French step. The ‘religion versus republic’ war began sometime in 1792 with the extremist Jacobins seizing power in France. ‘Jacobinism’ resulted in a concerted attack on religion, leading to a hideous civil war which claimed thousands of victims in the west of France. The coming to power of Napoleon marked the repeal of much Jacobin anti-clericalism and for some time there was peace between politicians and the church. However, in 1880 Jules Ferry (an ancestor of the present education minister, philosopher Luc Ferry) and in 1902 Emile Combes started the war with religion again, expelling all religious staff from public schools, and nuns from hospitals. Additionally, the French protect their secular tradition fiercely because their ancestors suffered through religious conflicts, mainly between Protestants and Catholics. The French have also battled to maintain their cultural uniqueness. The Italians were the first to come to France en masse at the end of the 19th century followed by the eastern European Jews after World War I. Each of these waves were accompanied by a backlash and a fear that French culture would be diluted or the country would lose its identity.

The French connection with the Islamic community developed with the migration of Muslims from Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Senegal in the 1950s. This influx was larger than any other France had hitherto experienced. These new immigrants were young and had a higher birth rate than the French. The Muslim population in France has the potential to grow from 8% – 5 million of France’s 60 million people – to a majority in 25 years, according to demographic experts. Such demographic possibilities thus raise the most obvious concerns. Not surprisingly, French politicians see the Hijab as a ‘political symbol’ and understand it as a rejection of membership in French society. They see Islamist extremists as the next invaders into French society.

The entire gamut of justifications for taking up such a legislative step nevertheless seems ill-founded. At the outset it must be highlighted that most religious symbols constitute a part of the religion and have a specific meaning and importance. For instance the Hijab for Muslim women is prescribed in the Qur’an and Hadith of Sahih Bukhari.⁵ It is seen as a symbol of obedience, modesty (iffah), bashfulness (haya), purity (tahara), faith (eeman), righteousness (taqwah) – a commandment of Allah and not as a mark of oppression, suppression or inequality (as is argued by women’s rights activists). Similarly, the Sikh turban is one of the five essentials of practicing Sikhism as laid out by Guru Gobind Singh in the Guru Granth Sahib. The symbols are therefore seen by most followers as orders of the almighty and a prerequisite of following their faith honestly. Several states of the world recognize these symbols and provide concessions in state laws. An example of such a concession is the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act enacted in 1976 by the British Parliament permitting Sikhs to ride motorcycles without helmets. The governments of Australia and Singapore have also enacted similar laws.⁶ 

However, such concessions have not acted as a model stand for the French. A closer reading of the stated justifications and core principles involved suggests a misunderstanding. First, in the attempt to maintain its strong tradition and mandate of secularism the French have ended up redefining secularism beyond its fundamental essence. Secularism as commonly understood simply implies that religion should not dictate political decisions and there should be free exercise of religion without conferring on it a special status. It is well accepted that most religious symbols form a part of practice of that particular religion and are therefore considered quite mandatory. Therefore, restricting or banning their usage amounts to restricting the freedom to practice a religion of one’s choice. On the other hand the French approach to secualrism is rather negative, scepetic and almost anti-religious in the sense that it equally limits manifestations of all religions under so-called secular law. In this sense, such secularism itself becomes a state-sponsored religion.

Second, the legislative step taken is at the cost of individual freedom and liberty of expression and religion. France is a signatory to major world conventions and is an integral part of the United Nations. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion form part of the international obligations of France.⁷ Further, jurisprudence under the International Covenant has held that the observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headgear and other practices integral to the religion concerned.

Ironically, secular traditions like the 1905 law which the French try to maintain do not at any place prohibit freedom of expression or practice of religion. In fact Napoleon who, though antagonistic to the power and influence of Rome also conceded that, ‘A society without religion is like a ship without a compass; there is no good morality without religion.’ Napoleonic law guaranteed freedom of religion within the dominion. However, the new law attempts to extend compulsory secularity not only to officials and agencies of the government, but also to its ordinary citizens. Targeting school children in their formative years when all religiously conscious people wish to instill certain religious values in their children is not the correct route to adopt.

The roots of French secularism lie in the church-state conflict and efforts towards building primacy and supremacy of the state. At that time France’s schools were the favoured vehicle to turn Catholic peasants into French republican citizens and thus state education focused on how to build an integrated, cohesive nation. The French secularist tradition does have its own coherent logic, but it was conceived in one specific and particular set of historical circumstances. It is now being applied in another, vastly different set of circumstances and the end result of such logic – a generation of angry Muslims – could quite literally be catastrophic.

Third, the supporters of the law seek justification under the garb of women’s rights. Muslim women see the Hijab not as a mark of oppression but more as an order of the almighty which they cherish and abide by. What in effect the ban does is quite contrary to the proclaimed purpose:

* If a girl decided to wear one freely, the ban might force her to choose between schooling and her faith.

* If parents force a girl to wear a headscarf, they may pull her out of the public schools and, for instance, send her to a Koranic school, which may even reduce the openness of education she would receive.

It is ironic that the enactment has been justified largely on account of women’s rights when it actually might deny her multiple opportunities not only of faith but of education, employment and over her being. Moreover, a Hijab is only a public attire and involves the freedom of the woman to choose her own style of dressing and appearance. Banning it is almost like America dicating women to wear skirts with spaghettis. What is more appalling is how a free, democratic, modern and equal society can dictate to women what is to be worn. Ironically, France is actually taking a patriarchal approach to the situation in the guise of secularism.

Fourth, the French justify their law on ground of maintaining public neutrality and integration. The Stasi Report calls the neutrality of public space a ‘protection for the individual,’ allowing one to choose (or not) one’s own spiritual path, free from outside pressure. It also recommends that the schools must be free from political pressures of the outside world and children allowed to ‘build themselves and reach independent judgment.’ There is quite a paradox in the entire situation. How is it that independent religious thinking and expression will bar public neutrality or deny to the student an opportunity for making their own judgement? In fact, exposing children to diversity instills tolerance and inculcates judgement-making capacity in them.

Additionally, the consistent effort of the French assembly has been to ‘integrate’ the Muslims into the single unit French identity. This seems an erroneous position. The purpose must not be mere integration but an effort towards multiculturalism. Such a position and stand would be in consonance with the newly emerging concept of global citizenship.

It is true that recent activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups have created a wave of fear and insecurity, but the European over-skepticism about Islam goes beyond this and is quite closely connected with the ‘theory of white man’s burden’, English superiority and western philosophy. Considering the issues at hand, it would be pertinent to refer to the approach of British liberalism. The British attempt has been to ‘liberalize’ religion over the past 200 years, trimming it into a ‘system of ethics, propped up by God’, as political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh puts it. Britain wanted its religion to be reasonable; in effect, it turned religion into a pale form of itself. The miracles and extraordinary events of the gospels were reduced to allegory and a very English type of faith remained: tolerant, accommodating ‘Anglicanism’.

Therefore, as Parekh argues, at the heart of British liberalism is a certainty of itself and of its own superiority. Such a certainty can lead to a level of rigidity and closure of the imagination and limited understanding of whatever is profoundly different from it – such as Islam. Considering the multitude of issues and core depravities which still need to be addressed with respect to the French Muslims and other minority groups, public attire and headscarves seem to be a rather insignificant agenda to curb fundamentalism. What must be kept in mind is that in a rights-based culture, more specifically in the so-called ‘Free West’, there is no place for persecution based on beliefs. Legislating what can and cannot be worn within France’s ‘secular’ society and schools is at the polar end of the absurdity of compulsory veiling.

If secularity is to be interpreted as such, then term holidays should also be at random periods of the year and students should go to school on Christmas Day and Eid. The French government’s lack of understanding is clearly evident from the stand maintained. One section of the Stasi Report which received less media attention recommended that the school system stop acknowledging Christian holidays exclusively and also celebrate Yom Kippur and Eid. This recommendation was not taken up by the national assembly, depicting a somewhat selective application of secular principles.

The attempt by the state governments to ‘quick fix’ the problem of Islamic fundamentalism is anti-democratic and needs to be reviewed in light of sound jurisprudential principles.

Priyanka Kher

 

Footnotes:

1. ‘Muslim Leader Says France Has Right to Prohibit Head Scarves’, New York Times, 31 December 2003.

2. European Court Upholds Scarf Ban, 29 June 2004, Reuters UK.

3. The Guardian/AP, 12 September 2004.

4. Al-Jazeera, 27 December 2003.

5. My Lord agreed with me (‘Umar) in three things... (2) And as regards the veiling of women, I said "O Allah’s Apostle! I wish you ordered your wives to cover themselves from the men because good and bad ones talk to them".’ (Bukhari, v1, bk 8, sunnah 395).

A similar teaching in Surah XXXIII, Verse 59 of the Qur’an is most often cited in support of veiling.

6. Also see: Mandla and Anr. v. Dowell Lee and Anr [1983] 1 All ER 1062, Gurdev Kaur Cheema v. Harold Thompson 67 F 3d 883(9th Cir 1995); Khalsa v. Weinberger 779 F. 2d 1393 (9th Cir 1985) LOOC Inc. d/b/a/; Domino’s Pizza Inc. v. Prabhjot S. Kohli 347 Md, 258 (C.A Md. 1997); Indianapolis Yellow Cab Inc. v. Indiana Civil Rights Commission 570 N.E 2D 940 (Ind. 1991).

7. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9 of the European Convention (additionally Article 12 of the US Convention and Article 8 of the African Charter all echo the same sentiment).