Resurrecting the state

SHAIBAL GUPTA

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THE mahagathbandhan government in Bihar – consisting of the RJD, JD(U) and Congress – has successfully completed a few months under the leadership of Nitish Kumar. Disproving the prophets of doom, the cabinet selection and distribution of portfolios was managed without any acrimony and retribution. The social base of the mahagathbandhan is very wide. In a manner, this unlikely alliance of incompatibles came about primarily, if not only, because of the threat posed by the BJP and its communal agenda. The current coalition also implies that upper caste suzerainty, the hallmark of all earlier regimes in Bihar, has been substantially marginalized. The social composition of the cabinet also indicates a ‘bottom up’ subaltern thrust. Following the near eclipse of left parties in the earlier two assemblies (2005 and 2010), the 2015 assembly election has registered, even if a token, the presence of the CP(ML). This may ensure a further plebeian thrust in the assembly debates and policies.

In anticipation of a commensurate ‘bottom-up’ thrust in the posting of civil servants, police officials and legal functionaries, there appears to be a concerted effort by some vested interests to destabilize the ‘law and order’ machinery of the state so that the prediction of a ‘jungle raj-II’ may come true. The spate of high profile murders, extortion, bank dacoities and kidnapping, all within a month of the establishment of the new government, is being presented as an unavoidable consequence of altered social and electoral reality, giving a bad name to the alliance. The democratization of society, some people believe, invariably leads to destabilization, the breakdown of law and order being its first manifestation.

In the context of Bihar, where both the corporate sector and civil society are weak, the ‘state’ remains the most important institution. Many a times, hegemony over the state machinery becomes more important than a majority in the legislative assembly. Even as a legislative majority is a necessary precondition for forming government, it may not be a sufficient condition to run the government smoothly. For instance, though Lalu-Rabri ruled for 15 years between 1990 and 2005, their control over the state machinery was generally marginal, sometimes even non-existent. Over and above, under the Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commission transfers (between 1995 to 2005), a significant period of Lalu-Rabri rule, Bihar received Rs 12, 000 crore less than the total quantum of projected transfers. This proved a major constraint in matters of governance.

In contrast, in the first two tenures of Nitish Kumar, the state machinery extended full support to him. Moreover, the Finance Commission recommended a much higher devolution of funds to the state. Immediately after he took over in 2005, the state government received Rs 12,000 crore more than the sum projected by the Twelfth Finance Commission in the first three years itself. Consequently, he was able to undertake several development projects. Additionally, as a Union minister, first in V.P. Singh’s and later A.B. Vajpayee’s governments, Nitish Kumar’s cognitive world had become pan-Indian; he had also gained considerable experience in matters of governance. It is, therefore, not surprising that Nitish Kumar enjoyed an enviable record of good governance as chief minister of Bihar.

 

There is little doubt that in the last decade, Nitish Kumar’s contribution to Bihar has been seminal. Not only did he resurrect the state and re-establish its authority, he ensured massive construction-centric growth, unsettled the existing centres of power by providing positive discrimination in favour of women, lower backward castes and dalits, and provided a new and positive identity to Bihar. Nevertheless, the social base of the government that he led in his earlier eight year stint was very different from the one that supports this present government.

The resurrection of the state and restoration of its authority, as well as the granting of a strong positive identity to Bihar, found support not only within NDA but also the state functionaries dominated largely by the upper caste oligarchy. Restoring the authority of the state suited the upper caste oligarchy. Earlier, while the Lalu-Rabri regime had democratized the society and ensured subaltern empowerment; this also meant that there was a dialogue of the deaf when it came to an interaction between the political and state functionaries. Even though the state was not a powerful institution, in whatever shape it existed prior to Lalu’s ascendency, it practically collapsed during his regime. Consequently, a process of social transition, unaccompanied by any change in the administrative set-up, led to serious destabilization, characterized crudely as ‘jungle raj’.

 

The legitimacy of the earlier Congress regimes was derived not merely from an electoral majority, but hegemony over the state system as well. Congressmen exercised power effortlessly in part because of the political, academic and moral hegemony generally enjoyed by the ‘traditional’ elites. This capital was built up over more than a century. In their operation, state functionaries and civil servants, often belonging to the same class, acted as foot soldiers. With the emergence of governments that actually banked more on ‘social justice’, the traditional elites were weakened. But their place was not yet occupied by the ‘vernacular’ or ‘cockney’ elites, making the task of governance difficult for the new regime. Such a regime, apart from having limited ‘institutional memory’ of governance, also lacked moral and intellectual hegemony, which was the core strength of Congress rule during the initial decades after independence.

When Nitish Kumar was first installed as the chief minister of Bihar in 2005, the upper caste-led civil servants immediately rallied behind him. He appeared an organized person, fully cognizant of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of governance and measured in his utterances. From the ranks of the ‘social justice’ constituency, a leader had suddenly emerged who had taken India by storm. He presented a striking contrast to Lalu Prasad or Mulayam Singh Yadav. He was compared, not with any of the usual ‘social justice’ or ‘socialist’ icons but with Jawaharlal Nehru or Srikrishna Singh. It was expected that he would pursue a class-caste neutral governance strategy and, by and large, he did live up to that expectation.

Not only did he give up on the implementation of land reforms and a common school system, but in fact practiced reverse discrimination for his own caste in the higher positions of the civil services and police administration. For instance, he actually removed a DGP and prevented the senior most IAS officer from becoming the chief secretary – despite both belonging to his own caste. In Bihar, the image of the state government and the chief minister is in the main determined by the civil servants, further reinforced by their counterparts in the media. The axis of media and the civil servants, generally from the same social group, is thus a potent force. Nitish Kumar allowed way too much leverage to this combination. It was contemptuously said by his detractors that Nitish Kumar’s government in the earlier two stints rested on two pillars – ‘Bhumihar and Akhbar’.

 

Instead of initiating substantive institutional reform to reinforce his authority, Nitish Kumar was overly sensitive about ceding space to upper caste officers. For example, in his second term, he did something which is almost unthinkable in administrative postings in Bihar: his choice for both the post of DGP and Chief Secretary belonged to the Bhumihar caste, though neither enjoyed a good reputation. They were appointed in quick succession and sabotaged the agenda of Nitish Kumar from within. Instead of facilitating the break-up of the rural power centre, they implicated 463 police officers in disproportionate assets cases – of these only 13 belonged to the upper caste, and none to the Bhumihar caste. The rest of the implicated officers were all from backward castes, dalits and Muslims. Two tribal and two dalit IPS officers were also suspended as a retaliatory action for tormenting an upper caste mafia.

Ironically, the Economic Offence Wing in the DGP office was entirely manned by Bhumihar officers. Apart from the DGP, the wing consisted of IG, DIG, SP(2) DSP(4) and several inspectors. Even the legal cell was headed by a person belonging to the same caste. In fact, most of the legal functionaries of the Bihar government, who play a significant role in prosecution from the lower to the Supreme Court, were from the same caste. In 2005, immediately after taking oath, Nitish Kumar’s first order was the appointment of an Advocate General, who too was from the same caste. Thus, for the subaltern and poor, the new government of Nitish Kumar appeared to be anti-backward, in part because of machinations of one section of its functionaries. This had a huge electoral fallout in the 2014 parliamentary elections, with the JD(U) coming third, even below RJD. Recently, in the backdrop of a deteriorating ‘law and order’ situation in Bihar, Lalu Prasad has warned the new government that the practice of a Bhumihar dominated police administration, which saw the nadir of governance in Bihar, should not be repeated again.

 

Earlier there was generally an exaggerated notion about the strength of ‘mafias’ operating within the state, creating the impression of ‘jungle raj’. In the ten years since 2005, that larger than life image of the mafias got erased with the heightened functioning of the state. This became possible because of better coordination between the executive and judiciary, which helped ensure speedier trials and higher rates of conviction. Many mafia chiefs and their foot soldiers were put behind bars, practically unsung and unwept. Many politicians, either former or current, too faced the consequences of rule of law that was being implemented by a pro-active state. Once convicted and sentenced – awarded life imprisonment or death penalty – they cried like children and begged for small favours before their impending doom. Never before has the heat and might of the state been felt all round in Bihar as in recent years.

 

In the context of Bihar, one can decisively conclude that no mafia is in a position to take on the might of the state independently, unlike in Italy or Columbia. Mafias in Bihar generally function and flourish only with state support. Their larger than life image was essentially thrust on them with the connivance of the state.

There is, however, a striking similarity between the emergence of the mafia in Bihar and Italy. When Sicily was annexed in 1860 by Italy, to buy goodwill and ensure its authority, public and church land was distributed to private citizens. In the process, the number of landowners increased from about two thousand in 1812 to around twenty thousand in 1861. Yet, while land distribution did benefit many, there was no proper authority or state structure to enforce the rules regarding property rights and contracts. In the absence of proper governance, the landowners turned to extra-legal arbitrators and protectors, who eventually organized themselves into mafia clans. In Bihar too, in the absence of a functioning state structure which could assert its authority and mediate between different social segments, the mafia groups captured that space. They were further emboldened financially by capturing the contract works awarded by the central and state governments. Most often contracts were awarded to bidders, not necessarily on the basis of merit, but muscle power and social connections of the awardee. Here too caste played a key role since the social power of a group depended on the number of mafia groups that operated in their rank.

 

In many of the southern and western Indian states, following initial accumulation, even if buccaneering, erstwhile robber barons upgraded and transformed themselves into owners of industry. This not only gave them unprecedented financial clout, but also the ability to influence provincial and national politics. Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are copybook examples of mafia dons enjoying unprecedented power. The Bellary brothers, who operated in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, present a textbook example of a rags to riches story through the use of criminal networks. In contrast, the mafia groups in Bihar, even before they could reach a threshold level, were sucked into the vortex of rural conflict. Some of them, though products of rural conflict, find avenues in other fields as well.

In the absence of meaningful state support for agriculture, the disadvantaged agro-entrepreneurs in Bihar had to face falling rates of return in the sector. Besides, an absence of backward and forward linkages for agriculture more or less ensured stagnation. In this backdrop, the agricultural labourers were a soft target, forced to work at low wages. If the recalcitrant wage labourers ignored the authority of the agro-capitalist, the social connection of the farmer to the mafia would be evoked to tame them. In the process, several massacres took place in rural Bihar which, though essentially class conflict, were often misjudged as caste conflagrations.

Unlike in many other states, the connection of the urban elite with the land has not been severed in Bihar. The Ranvir Sena is not only an expression of the rural lumpen fringe, but enjoys resonance with the urban elite of the same social group. Even though the Ranvir Sena organized 32 massacres in Bihar killing 275 people, it always escaped punishment, the convictions being overturned by the High Court. Even in the Bathani Tola hamlet in Sahar block of Bhojpur district, though as many as 20 women and children were butchered on 11 July 1996, all the accused were acquitted by the court.

Barmeshwar Mukhia, the de facto head of the Ranvir Sena, was eventually killed on 1 June 2012 in Ara, headquarters of Bhojpur district. The incidents that followed the killing of Barmeshwar Mukhiya exposed the tacit nexus between sections of the administration and the mafia syndicate, both belonging to the same social group. Even though the muscle and fire-power of the Ranvir Sena was limited, the state administration practically capitulated for almost two days in Bhojpur and Patna. Mukhia was even given an undeclared state funeral in the capital, with massive police bandobast. There was no earlier precedent when supporters of a gangster were allowed to invade Patna as part of a funeral cortege. The Ranvir Sena activists, however were allowed to run amok.

 

The resurrection of the state in Bihar, however, is not favoured by a section of the traditional elite. The reason is simple: if inclusion is the central agenda of state building, the elite would be even further marginalized. In Bihar, the state was not simply weak, it was cruel and undemocratic as well. The elite used the instruments of the state to stifle any demand for entitlements. In Nitish Kumar’s first term, this syndrome saw considerable change. The implication of a change in the lower power structures (brought about by reservations for the marginalized in the panchayati raj institution’s election) was probably not wholly grasped in the first term, but its full import became visible after the PRI election of 2011 during Nitish Kumar’s second stint. The outrage and violence unleashed by supporters of the Ranvir Sena chief Barmeshwar Mukhiya following his killing was an expression of disgust for the democratization of Bihar society. A section of the elite and its counterparts in the administration publicly displayed their anger by openly collaborating with the lumpens in the streets of Ara and Patna.

 

The second term of Nitish Kumar was thus far more challenging. He had released forces of history which could not be put back in the bottle. In some senses, his contribution to the process of democratization was more than Lalu Prasad’s, whose contribution to the social justice agenda, though substantial, failed to breach the entrenched centres of power. It was Nitish Kumar who achieved this, and hence, should be given due credit for the social justice cataclysm in Bihar.

The democratization of Bihar society, specially its electoral variant, has a long history, spanning nearly a century. It was the peasant movement of Swami Sahajanand Saraswati which first gave an authentic democratic thrust to Bihar society. Both democracy and class resonated in that peasant movement built around the agenda of dismantling of the Permanent Settlement crafted by Lord Cornwallis way back in 1793. Sahajanand’s initial concern for the Bhumihar tenants, the social group that he belonged to, later transformed into concern for all tenants, which subsequently led to the formation of the Kisan Sabha and the communist and socialist movements.

Given the peculiarity of the land tenure system in Bihar, the ‘class’ question was intertwined with the ‘social’ question. A powerful section of the tenant backward castes – Koeri, Kurmi and Yadav – had to face the onslaught of social injustice as well. To fight social deprivation they started the Triveni Sangh movement for social sustenance way back in the 1930s. It is, therefore, not surprising that the present musical chairs of Bihar chief ministership continues to essentially oscillate around the same social coalition which was crafted almost 90 years ago.

 

The social justice constituency is much stronger now; there is little doubt that in the last 25 years, Bihar has undergone a fundamental change when it comes to giving voice to the people. The feudal structure, even though not dismantled, has been substantially weakened. In some ways, Lalu Prasad and Nitish Kumar complemented each other in promoting social justice. While Lalu Prasad gave voice to the subaltern, Nitish Kumar brought them to the centre stage of governance through positive discrimination in panchayati raj institutions (PRI). If the social justice base failed to expand further and consolidate, despite the efforts of Lalu Prasad first and Nitish Kumar later, it is because the substantive step of land reform could not be initiated in Bihar.

No state in India has leapfrogged economically without experiencing meaningful agrarian reform. Apart from the southern and western states (including Punjab), Uttar Pradesh too underwent comprehensive land reforms under the leadership of Charan Singh. The basic foundation of development in the better-off states is built around the structure of updated land records, consolidation of holdings, recording the rights of sharecropper and surplus land distribution. Without ensuring these basic agrarian reforms, a state cannot be enabled for an authentic growth strategy. The recommendations of the D. Bandyopadhyay Committee on Land Reforms constituted by Nitish Kumar, should have been implemented. Unfortunately, not only were the land reform measures not attempted, even the Amir Das Commission, constituted after the Mianpur massacre to expose the atrocities of the Ranvir Sena on the subalterns, was disbanded. During Nitish Kumar’s tenure, the state failed to penalize the perpetrators of these atrocities. In Nitish Kumar’s ten year tenure which saw the conviction of no less than 90,000 persons, including members of the mafia, it is striking that most of the convicts of the horrific massacres (Bathe, Bathani Tola, and Shanker Bigha, among others) were subsequently acquitted by the higher court. Except for a few from the upper castes, most of the persons killed in social or agrarian violence belonged to the subaltern castes.

The positive discrimination in PRIs was a historic step for the subaltern, especially for the lower backwards and dalits. But it can lead to authentic economic empowerment only when backed by land reforms, ushering in economic development from below. In any case, tokenism of PRI governance or giving seats for parliamentary or assembly elections are unlikely to go far in retaining the confidence of the marginalized sections of the people. PRI empowerment has its limits; it cannot be a substitute for inclusive growth and economic empowerment, which land reform alone can provide.

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