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THE repercussions of the Dantewada tragedy/fiasco, claiming as many as 76 CRPF jawans, are likely to be felt for a long time. Both the scale of the massacre as also the sheer brazenness and audacity of the incident may finally force a serious rethink of the state strategy of combating armed insurgents. Hopefully, it may also push elements in civil society who have some sneaking sympathy for the Maoist cause, not necessarily their tactics, into realizing that the Maoist challenge can no longer be simplistically read as an inevitable response to consistent misrule and state brutality – a case of the proverbial underdog fighting for survival.
Nothing captures this better than the signed article by Digvijay Singh, former chief minister of Madhya Pradesh and general secretary of the AICC (Economic Times, 14 April 2010). Singh not just frontally challenges the thinking of the Union home ministry, more specifically the home minister, for ‘treating it purely as a law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals,’ he goes on to characterize Chidambaram as ‘extremely intelligent, articulate, committed and a sincere politician – but extremely rigid once he makes up his mind,’ as also ‘intellectually arrogant’.
Even those familiar with the ways of the Congress party, the factional sniping that undercuts the possibility of evolving a coherent response to a political challenge, have been surprised by the forthright and public nature of the criticism. Since few believe that a senior party functionary could have so castigated a leading member of the executive without some ‘signalling’ from the High Command, it is possible that we might, despite assertions to the contrary, finally see changes in our counter-insurgency strategy.
Pulling up the Union home minister is, however, a side story. Digvijay Singh also bluntly admits to major failures in meeting ‘the hopes and aspirations of the people living in these areas.’ ‘Are these people getting the benefits of the public distribution system, MNNREGA, NRHM and other pro-poor policies? Are our forest policies, mining policies, land and water policies people-centric? What has happened to the historic, revolutionary pro-tribal legislation of Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (Pesa)?’
None of this criticism is new. Numerous individuals, organizations and researches have pointed to the dangerously high levels of alienation in our scheduled areas, reflective not just of the lack of development or governance but a systematic subversion of justice. Together this creates an ideal ground for rebellion. Where Singh departs from other civil society interlocutors is in stripping away the sheen of ‘revolutionary ideology’ from the Maoists. More than misguided revolutionaries, he equally sees them as an armed group ‘collecting protection fees from traders, forest contractors, industrialists and mining companies’ operating in the Naxalite dominated areas. He also hints at the connivance of political parties in extending protection to the Maoists.
What began four decades ago as a revolutionary struggle to overthrow a feudal, comprador state has over time transformed into something quite different. After numerous reversals, countless splits and internecine killing, ideological rethinking and so on, the Naxalites, in particular the CPI(Maoists), have emerged as a formidable fighting force, well-equipped with modern arms (both looted from state forces and purchased from the underground arms market) and reasonably flush with money collected from extortion, euphemistically termed ‘revolutionary taxes’. Unlike other ‘political forces’, they live and work amongst the affected populace, delivering their own version of development and justice. And much as we might be loath to admit, if a choice is to be made today between an insensitive and callous state apparatus and the Maoists, it is likely that the Maoists will edge the others out.
Clearly, as most counter-insurgency experts have pointed out, treating their challenge as a ‘law and order’ problem and rushing in armed personnel to ‘win back territory’ is unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile, it will imply huge collateral damage, particularly to those wanting to be left alone to live their life as best they can. Similarly, pushing ahead with grandiose plans for new mining and industry contracts can only add to the unrest in a region and peoples who have consistently been short-changed by the political system.
So more than sniping within the ruling party/coalition or between the government and opposition, it is time that the political class initiate a fresh process of consensus building for inclusive development and justice for all those hitherto marginalized by our chosen mode of governance and politics. For all its limitations (and self-serving posturing), Digvijay Singh’s article hints at a new opening. Hopefully, we will build on it.
Harsh Sethi