AFTER a people’s movement overthrew fifteen years of military rule in December 1990, Bangladesh appeared to be set on the path of institutionalizing democracy. The country organized three successive national parliamentary elections in 1991, 1996 and 2001, all certified as free and fair by national and international observers. As a result of the elections, state power rotated more or less peacefully (based on constitutional guidelines) between the two major political parties – the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – with the incumbents being defeated both in the 1996 (BNP) and 2001 (AL) parliamentary elections. During this time the media and civil society became free from overt government control. The military remained under civilian control showing little interest in getting involved in domestic politics. Instead it increasingly became drawn to international peacekeeping operations.

However, despite these achievements and fulfilling the criteria of a ‘minimalist democracy’¹ – regular free and contested elections, peaceful transfer of governmental power as a result of elections, fundamental freedoms, and civilian control over policy and institutions – Bangladesh could not make significant progress in consolidating its democratic institutions. Over the years, democratically elected political leaders started behaving in an autocratic manner using state power to reward political supporters and punish and repress the political opposition. The country gradually turned into what Fareed Zakaria has termed an ‘illiberal democracy’.² The rule of law started breaking down as successive elected governments began to misuse state power for partisan and personal gain. Increasingly the judiciary, particularly the lower judiciary, civil bureaucracy, police and other institutions of government began to lose their autonomy as they were also brought under partisan political pressure by successive governments.³

Though parliamentary elections were hotly contested, parliament never functioned as an effective accountability mechanism. Regardless of which party was in power, the main opposition party boycotted most of the parliamentary sessions, alleging government repression and impediments to voicing its views. In the absence of scrutiny and oversight by the legislative branch, the executive started to function like the viceregal system of the British and Pakistan colonial days, with few checks on its actions.⁴ Power was concentrated in the hands of the chief executive, the prime minister, who did not behave as primus inter pares, as is the custom in a parliamentary democracy. The two prime ministers who alternated in state power for the last fifteen years – Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina – were dynastic inheritors of their respective party’s leadership position where they held undisputed authority for nearly a quarter of a century.

 

The undemocratic practices of democratically elected political leaders gradually became a popular topic of debate in the media and civil society. Demands for reforms were voiced at two levels. First, there were demands for governance reforms such as eradicating corruption, reversing the politicizing of government machinery, restoring the rule of law, and establishing transparency and accountability. Second, there arose demands for political reforms such as democratizing the decision-making process within political parties, establishing transparency of party funding, removing the influence of black money and mastaans in party and election politics and so on. Many of these demands for reform found their place in the Report of the Nagorik Committee 2006, a citizen’s forum established to mobilize public opinion in support of a vision and policy agenda to move the country forward.⁵

While the media and civil society were highlighting these democracy deficits, the mainstream political parties, particularly the two major parties, the AL and the BNP, largely remained immune to these criticisms. Instead they initiated a deadly game of confrontational politics, rejecting the path of democratic dialogue and tolerance of dissent, embracing instead the politics of street agitation and violence. The politics of exclusion and violence practiced by the two major political parties created increasing pressure on the fragile democracy. In recent years fulfilling even the minimalist criterion of organizing free and fair elections became problematic.

 

Though Bangladesh organized three successive national elections, the neutrality and fairness of the electoral process, particularly the election machinery, was never accepted by the contesting parties. The result of each election was initially rejected by the losing party. Bangladesh initiated an innovative system of Caretaker Government (CTG) to ensure the organization of free and fair elections. The first CTG in 1991 was an ad hoc arrangement when, after the overthrow of the Ershad autocracy by a mass movement, a civilian non-party government headed by the chief justice was installed to organize a free and fair election.⁶

The CTG system was later institutionalized in the wake of another mass mobilization, led by the AL, after widespread allegations of vote rigging by the incumbent BNP government in a parliamentary by-election. After a fraudulent national election in February 1996 was boycotted by the major opposition parties inspiring widespread civic resistance, the BNP had no option but to agree to a constitutional amendment which stipulated that national parliamentary elections would be organized by a non-partisan caretaker government (CTG) to be headed by the most recently retired chief justice. Organization of the election was to be the main responsibility of the CTG and elections were to be held within 90 days. Two successive elections were held under the CTG, but this system itself became compromised when, after the 2001 election, the ruling BNP-led four party coalition government sought to manipulate the composition of the CTG and the Election Commission (EC) to ensure an electoral outcome favourable to them.

 

The crisis deepened as the opposition parties rejected the BNP-led coalition government’s unilaterally selected candidates for appointment in the EC and the leadership of the CTG, but the government refused to enter into any dialogue with the opposition. The voters list was found to be flawed even by an independent study commissioned by the US National Democratic Institute (NDI).⁷ The opposition threatened to boycott the upcoming election but the BNP-led coalition government pushed ahead with its plans, which the opposition called election engineering. Civil society initiatives as well as moves by the international community failed to broker a peaceful negotiated settlement between the two contending political forces to resolve the impasse over the elections.

 

On 27 October 2006 the BNP-led coalition government stepped down but its nominee to head the CTG, retired Chief Justice K.M. Hasan, refused to take the reins of the CTG in the face of mounting street violence unleashed by political opposition to challenge his assumption of office.⁸ Instead of choosing another retired chief justice, as provided for under the constitution, the BNP-led government chose to install President Iajuddin Ahmed as the CTG head. Since Iajuddin was a known BNP supporter and as such was rewarded with the office of presidency, this choice blatantly compromised the neutrality of the CTG. The legality of his eligibility to be the CTG head was also questionable, since the constitution mandates that the CTG must be headed by a non-partisan person, and was inevitably challenged in a court of law.⁹

However, this legal challenge was frustrated when some BNP stalwarts pressured the chief justice to order the High Court to suspend the hearing of the challenge to the right of President Iajuddin to head the CTG. Iajuddin Ahmed further compromised the credibility of the CTG by refusing to take the advice of his own CTG colleagues who attempted to find a compromise package formula to resolve the conflicting positions of the two contending political forces. On 11 December 2006, four of Iajuddin’s advisors resigned, pointedly referring to his unilateral actions which were taken contrary to the advice of the advisory council.¹⁰

It soon became apparent to all of Bangladesh and even the international community that the head of the CTG was not his own person and was discharging his mandate on the instructions of the BNP leadership. Under such circumstances the scope for holding a free and fair election under Iajuddin became untenable.¹¹ Exposed to persistent evidence of the partisan character of the CTG, the political opposition eventually took the fateful decision to boycott the election and threatened to thwart its holding. President and Chief Advisor Iajuddin, again, acting under pressure from the BNP and its allies, appeared determined to hold elections and had called out the armed forces to aid the civilian authorities in frustrating the challenge to the election by the opposition. The BNP itself threatened to confront the opposition on the streets. The country seemed to be on the verge of a bloody civil war as Iajuddin and the EC persisted with their agenda of holding a one-sided election scheduled for 22 January 2007.

 

Whilst the military was already on the streets, it had managed to avoid any confrontation with the opposition during this period of mounting tension. As the confrontation between the two opposing political groups brought the country to the precipice of a civil war, the possibility of the military’s involvement as an arbiter of the unending political feud loomed large. The BNP-led four party alliance did not pay heed to the warnings of the diplomatic community that the military may step in as the alliance thought such an involvement would go in its favour. Nor did it appear that the AL-led opposition was inimical to such military intervention if that was the only way to stop the BNP-led coalition from getting a walkover in a one-sided and potentially fraudulent election.

 

The military had, since the ouster of the Ershad regime, kept aloof from political involvements. It attached considerable importance to its role as the largest contributor of forces to UN peacekeeping operations and feared that any such political involvement would compromise this role which was also financially rewarding for the peacekeepers. Faced with the prospect of having to take sides and use force to protect the BNP backed CTG, on 11 January 2007, the military finally stepped in. Under pressure from the military, President and Chief Advisor Iajuddin Ahmed was compelled to dissolve his own caretaker government and declare an emergency.

The next day a second ‘caretaker’ government, under the leadership of Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former World Bank official and former head of the Bangladesh Bank, was chosen by the military leadership and inducted into the office of chief advisor. The military remained in the background but emerged as the main power behind the new civilian government. Though calling itself a caretaker government, it increasingly started behaving like an ‘interim government’ which intended to extend its stay in office beyond the 90-day term of office of the CTG mandated by the constitution.

In the last four months, the Fakhruddin government pushed ahead with a two-pronged agenda. It promised to organize a free and fair election which is the primary role of a caretaker government. But unlike previous caretaker governments, it has undertaken a major reform agenda beginning with a massive anti-corruption drive against the top political figures of the two main parties as well as elements of the business community involved in various financial improprieties. More than 100,000 people have been arrested so far including prominent political leaders such as Tareque Rahman, the eldest son of Khaleda Zia and Joint Secretary General of the BNP, Abdul Jalil, the Secretary General of the AL, former cabinet ministers, as well as the incumbent mayors of four major cities drawn from both parties. The government has started talking about implementing governance and political reforms before the upcoming election, arguing that it is not interested in ‘holding an election for election’s sake’. Rather it wants to hold an ‘election for restoring democracy’.¹²

 

Bangladesh appears to be at the crossroads. The military backed government has moved well beyond its initial goal of holding free and fair elections and committed itself to a far-reaching political agenda of cleaning up politics. A major focus of the government now appears to be on ousting the two dynastic leaders, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, from their respective party leaderships and initiating a reforms process which could be carried out by an alternative leadership emerging from within the mainstream parties. There are also discussions about the formation of new parties committed to reforms. So far it is not clear how the mission to clean politics will be accomplished without the active cooperation and commitment of credible political leaders of the existing major parties. The prospects of a third political force emerging as a champion of reforms seems uncertain after the announcement of Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus that he would no longer proceed with his earlier plan to form a new political party.

The military has given conflicting signals about its intentions. The Army Chief of Staff, General Moeen U. Ahmed, had talked about Bangladesh constructing ‘its own brand of democracy’¹³ but faced with criticisms expressed in the media, quickly assured the public that the armed forces had no interest in ruling the country. However, he and his colleagues have reaffirmed that the military has consistently stood by the agenda of governance and political reforms.¹⁴

The government’s anti-corruption drive appears to have popular support though both civil society and the international community have repeatedly asked that due process must be followed in the prosecutions. Concerns have also been expressed about the restrictions on fundamental freedoms under the emergency rule. Political parties as well as the international community have demanded an early withdrawal of such restrictions. When and how Bangladesh will get back on the track of organizing regular free and fair elections, as well as ensuring other features of liberal democracy such as the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, is not clear. Much depends on how actively new and old political constituencies are engaged to embrace the reform agenda and move forward with it.

 

Despite the welcome accorded to the Fakhruddin government and notwithstanding the popular disgust and dissatisfaction with the undemocratic behaviour of the major political parties and their leaders, a consensus exists within the country and the international community that this can only be a temporary arrangement, that the nation cannot be ruled for long either by an unelected military backed civilian government or directly by the military. It is widely accepted by all sections of society, including the military, that Bangladesh would have to ultimately return to a system of democratically elected government.

 

While there is a general consensus about the need to organize a free and fair election, opinion varies as to the timing of the election and the measures required to create a level playing field for the contestants. The major political parties are in favour of elections at the earliest opportunity, preferably in 2007. While the BNP-led coalition has generally remained silent on the issue of independence of the election commission (after all it has consistently denied that the EC has been under its influence), the AL- led coalition has demanded various actions to make the upcoming election credible, such as neutrality and independence of the EC, preparation of a correct voters list, voter ID, transparent ballot boxes and so on.

However, the AL-led coalition’s emphasis has been on an early election and it has not endorsed measures such as preparation of a national ID to vote if that would require more than a year to implement. Some members of civil society have also stressed the need for an early election and a limited reform agenda, arguing that the implementation of a large and complex agenda would require time and mobilization of widespread constituency support. But a prolonged stay would get the military deeply involved in politics and consequently in partisan controversies. Additionally, the mobilization of constituencies is a political task for which the military is ill-equipped.

 

However, many members of civil society have viewed the military intervention as an opportunity for carrying out a number of critical governance and political reforms. They have argued that the institutional reforms that are needed for democratic consolidation but have long been stalled under the rule of the two major parties, have the best chance of implementation under a non-partisan government. Some of these reforms have been on the agenda of civil society for decades, for example the separation of the judiciary from the executive, independence and neutrality of the Election Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, Public Services Commission and state-run electronic media. They have also urged the government to undertake measures to reform the political parties and the election process such as registration of political parties, transparency in party and campaign funding, elimination of the influence of black money and muscle power in elections, ensuring representation of women in elected bodies and so on.

Many of these demands, though on the agenda of civil society, receive only lukewarm support from political parties. The parties have paid lip service to these agendas during election campaigns, but once in power they have been put on the backburner and gone back to business as usual.

Fakhruddin Ahmed in his first speech to the nation on 21 January 2007, as well as in his subsequent speeches pledged to organize a free, fair, and neutral election, but at the same time he and his colleagues underscored the commitment of the government to take all necessary measures to create a congenial environment for a ‘truly democratic’ election. The Election Commission (EC) has already been reconstituted with new members who are generally perceived as non-partisan. The EC has promised to correct the disputed voters list and undertake other measures such as the introduction of tamper-proof voter ID and transparent ballot boxes to ensure a credible election. After a long delay the EC has now announced that it would require 18 months to complete preparations for a credible election and has set December 2008 as the date for the next parliamentary election.

The EC has also proposed several measures which have for some time been on the agenda of civil society reformists including registration of political parties, democratization of party decision-making, reservation of 33% seats for women in all party decision-making bodies, ban on front organizations of parties, scrutiny of the income and asset statements of the candidates, provision of a no vote on the ballot paper and so on.¹⁵ While civil society groups have on the whole been positive to these proposed measures, political parties have expressed reservations about some, including reservation of seats for women.

 

The Fakhruddin Ahmed government has also undertaken several other initiatives for governance reforms. It has announced its decision to separate the judiciary from the executive. It has appointed non-partisan and well regarded persons to head the Public Services and University Grants commissions thus signalling its intention to free the civil administration from partisan influence. However, the most dramatic of its initiatives has been the massive anti-corruption drive. The government appointed retired Lt. General Hasan Mashud Chowdhury, the former Chief of Staff of the army and one of the four advisors who resigned from the Iajuddin CTG to head the ACC. Since General Chowdhury enjoys the reputation of being incorruptible, and uncompromising, the appointment sent a signal that the government would take a tough position on corruption.

 

In the last three months many of the top leaders of the BNP and the AL have been arrested. Most of the political leaders who have been arrested earned a widespread reputation for corruption and in the last few years newspapers had published stories of their rise from rags to riches, and of their influence pedalling and other criminal behaviour. In addition to the politicians, a number of well-connected and conspicuously affluent businessmen have been detained on grounds of various financial improprieties or their financial ties with some political leaders. All the detainees are held without bail under emergency provisions pending investigation and preparation of formal charges of corruption against them.

Civil society, media and the international community appear on the whole to be supportive of the anti-corruption drive though they are also concerned that the drive may be arbitrary and lead to human rights violations. The international community has repeatedly asked the government to follow due process. The political leaders have understandably been unhappy since the anti-corruption drive has primarily targeted them. Both Khaleda and Hasina claimed that the anti-corruption drive is a strategy to malign their personal and party’s image. But on the whole the political leaders who have not been arrested so far have been on the defensive, claiming that they were ignorant about the corrupt practices of their party colleagues.

 

The elimination of party stalwarts, particularly the two party chiefs from active politics, seems to be a key element of the government’s political reforms agenda. Newspapers have reported the government’s pursuit of the ‘minus two formula’ (BNP and the AL without Khaleda and Hasina) to democratize the two parties. For a long time many BNP and AL leaders have informally complained that the ‘two ladies’ are the main obstacles to reforms within the parties. Emboldened by the current government’s initiatives, some of these leaders have now started to talk publicly about party reforms without the two top leaders.

Having failed to persuade Khaleda and Hasina to go into exile, the government is now bringing corruption cases against them, their family members and close associates. However, substituting Khaleda and Hasina with alternate leaders from within BNP and the AL will not be easy. The leaders whose names have been floated as possible substitutes have not been able to inspire much confidence. Some of them have a reputation of corruption. All are associated with the old regime and cannot project themselves as fresh new faces committed to reforms. Additionally their capacity to hold together the warring factions within the parties is questionable.

The possibility of the emergence of a new political force committed to reforms excited the public imagination when on 22 February 2007 Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus announced his decision to form a new political party. He specifically committed his party, which he named Nagorik Shakti, to clean politics. However, after a little over two months, on 3 May 2007, Yunus gave up his initiative to form a party on the grounds that the various individuals and groups who had earlier encouraged him to join politics had themselves not come forward to publicly join his party. Yunus’ withdrawal demonstrates the difficulties of forming a credible third political force in Bangladesh. Earlier, similar efforts by Kamal Hossain, a former Law and Foreign Minister under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government, who broke away from the AL in 1993 to form another political party, GonoForum, which committed itself to clean politics, had failed to mobilize the expected popular support. GonoForum could not win a single seat in parliament in 1996 and 2001.

 

The huge reforms agenda which is being championed by the current government is designed to address the long-standing problems of mal-governance and malfunctioning of democracy in the country. The agenda incorporates many items which have been highlighted by civil society and the media over the last 15 years of rule by democratically elected governments. But a key weakness of the reform movement has been its lack of support from the major political parties and their constituencies.

So far civil society, the media, and international donors have been the main champions of reform. The main political parties and their leaders have been preoccupied with the ‘business’ of mobilizing support through patronage politics. Some of the minor parties and their leaders have talked about cleaning politics but they have not been able to mobilize major constituency support behind their reforms agenda. However, in 2006 the 14-party opposition alliance, led by the Awami League, presented a 23 point agenda of political reforms which was no less radical in its reach than the proposals tabled by civil society. But the AL’s own commitment to clean politics had begun to weaken even before it could come to power when the party violated the 23 point reform agenda by ‘selling’ nominations for the January 2007 election to people with money and control over vote banks.

 

It is too early to assess the chances of the current military backed government to build support among credible political leaders to both back its reform agenda and then sustain it when elected to office. The ‘minus two’ formula may not be easy to implement as both Khaleda and Hasina enjoy the support of the rank and file members of their respective parties. Even their ouster may not necessarily produce the desired results as the two leaders may be able to control the party from outside as is demonstrated by the experience of the two exiled leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, in Pakistan.

In addition, meddling in the factional politics of mainstream political parties will not be prudent as this will inevitably create a partisan image for the caretaker government. Past history also reminds us that parties formed with government support can only win a government engineered election. In the final analysis, political reforms cannot be envisioned as a bureaucratic/technocratic project. Political actors will have to demand reforms and not be forced to accept them. The prospect of democratizing democracy largely rests on the hunger for reform within the political parties, particularly among the younger generation of leaders. This political constituency can be strengthened by the commitment and stamina of civil society but it cannot be substituted by such forces.

 

Footnotes:

1. For a description of minimalist democracies see Adam Przeworski, ‘Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense’ in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordo’n (eds.), Democracy’s Value. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

2. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton, New York, 2003.

3. Rounaq Jahan, ‘Bangladesh’ in Countries at the Crossroads, 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance. Freedom House, New York City, 2005; ‘Bangladesh in 2002: Imperilled Democracy’, Asian Survey 43(1), January-February 2003, pp. 222-229; and ‘Bangladesh in 2003: Vibrant Democracy or Destructive Politics?’ Asian Survey 44(1), January-February 2004, pp. 56-61; and Rehman Sobhan, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance. Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1993.

4. Rounaq Jahan, ‘Why Are We Still Continuing With a "Viceregal" Political System?’ The Daily Star, 31 January 2004.

5. Report of the Nagorik Committee, 2006. See CPD website: http://www.cpd-bangladesh. org/Policy%20Brief/index.html

6. Fakhruddin Ahmed, The Caretakers: A First Hand Account of the Interim Government of Bangladesh (1990-91). University Press, Dhaka, 1998; and Muhammad A. Hakim, Bangladesh Politics: The Shahabuddin Interregnum. University Press, Dhaka, 1993.

7. ‘One Out of Twelve on Voter List Erroneous: Reveals NDI Survey’, The Daily Star, 15 August 2005.

8. ‘Hasan "Unwilling" to be Caretaker Chief’, The Daily Star, 28 October 2006.

9. ‘Parties Challenge in Court President’s Becoming CA’, The Daily Star, 27 November 2006.

10. ‘Four Advisers Resign in Frustration’, The Daily Star, 12 December 2006.

11. For a discussion of the Iajuddin CTG see Rehman Sobhan, ‘The Twilight of Caretaker Governance?’ Forum 2(1), January 2007.

12. ‘Reforms, Polls Within Next Year: Mainul’, The Daily Star, 11 June 2007.

13. ‘Bangladesh To Have Own Brand of Democracy’, The Daily Star, 3 April 2007.

14. ‘No Chance For Military Involvement in Politics’, The Daily Star, 24 May 2007.

15. ‘Provision For "No Vote", 33% Woman Office Bearers in Parties’, The Daily Star, 20 May 2007.