‘People power’ is an extra-constitutional means of political succession. It gained currency during the 1980s as a result of its effective use to oust authoritarian rule or dictatorship in various countries worldwide, including in the Philippines and South Korea in East Asia, and Poland in Central/Eastern Europe. The movement against authoritarian rule during this period formed part of third wave democratization that Huntington so succinctly described and analyzed in his classic work on the subject.¹ 

In the Philippines the phrase ‘people power’ was first used in this sense in the February 1986 popular protest against the attempt by the Marcos dictatorship to steal the results of the snap elections he called in order to validate his presumed mandate to govern the country. Its dramatic success in removing Marcos paved the way for the transition to democracy under his successor, Corazon (Cory) C. Aquino. Its documentation in real time by international media, particularly the CNN, dispersed the phenomenon worldwide, allegedly inspiring popular protest movements against dictatorships in other parts of the world.

Consequently, the symbols of Philippine people power – yellow ribbons and other paraphernalia, flowers, religious symbols including the rosary and images of Mary, the Virgin Mother – were adopted by subsequent popular movements against dictatorships elsewhere in the world either in full or in part, depending on religious and cultural contexts. Its subsequent use in January 2001 to remove Joseph Ejercito Estrada successfully from office, and in May 2001 as well as between 2005 and 2006 to try and remove his successor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has raised questions about the wisdom of resorting to people power as a vehicle for political succession in polities still going through stages of transition to democracy.

This essay examines the use of people power in the democratization process in the Philippines through four cases, two of which were successful and the other two not: (i) February 1986, (ii) January 2001, (iii) May 2001, and (iv) persistent attempts during July 2005-February 2006. It analyzes its contribution to democratization, including its pitfalls, particularly its potentials for undermining constitutional processes and the institutionalization of legal mechanisms for political succession. Finally, it explores the prospects for people power in the Philippines’ democratic future.

 

People power refers to the extra-constitutional removal from office of an elected chief executive, usually an elected president through nonviolent civil resistance. Civil resistance need not be widespread in the removal of such an elected official. It is sufficient that civil resistance occurs in the capital city and other major centres of political power and that it results in the incapacitation of the elected official from governing. The latter could include the resignation of a significant number of cabinet and diplomatic officials, as well as the withdrawal of support by local chief executives and the uniformed services particularly the military and the police.

Democratization is the process of regime change from authoritarian rule or dictatorship to a democratic political system. It usually goes through four stages: (i) decay of the authoritarian regime, (ii) transition to democracy, (iii) consolidation of democracy, and (iv) maturity of democracy.² These stages often overlap and do not proceed sequentially. Therefore, democratization is not a linear process. Philippine democratization since 1986 has taken some of the characteristics of consolidation, such as the adoption of a post-authoritarian constitution in 1987 and subsequent election of three presidents (Fidel V. Ramos, 1992; Estrada, 1998; Arroyo, 2004). However, features anachronistic to consolidation continue to hound Philippine politics, including issues about procedural legitimacy, threats of civil disobedience by civil society groups to unseat Arroyo, coup plots and conspiracies by civilian and military groups, and impeachment attempts by the political opposition, among others.

 

Democratic transition refers to the stage of democratization where a ‘hybrid regime’ governs with authoritarian and democratic features, where power is shared by authoritarian and democratic leaders, and the political situation is highly uncertain.³ Over 20 years since February 1986, presidential decrees and other enactments with the force of law issued during the Marcos dictatorship continue to be observed and leaders of the authoritarian period have either survived or are making a come back.

Democratic consolidation refers to the stage of democratization in which a new democratic constitution has been adopted and free elections with few obstacles to mass participation held, and where substantial consensus on the rules of the political game and the value of democratic institutions has been reached among the elites.⁴ Juan Linz claims that a consolidated democracy is ‘one in which none of the major political actors, parties or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision-makers.’⁵ In short, only when there is consensus among the strategic players that there is no other alternative to democracy as a form of governance can democracy be considered consolidated. Given this description of democratic consolidation, the Philippines in 2007 remains in democratic transition as will be shown below.

 

The Philippines has a twenty-year history of the use of people power to remove an incumbent. Its first use was preceded by nearly three years of massive public demonstrations against Marcos that came to be known as the ‘parliament of the streets’. These public demonstrations were mainly organized by the middle classes who were jolted from their complacency by the assassination under military custody of Marcos’ main political rival, former Senator Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino upon his arrival from exile in the United States in August 1983.

Since that time, street protests against the dictatorship became a common occurrence in Metro Manila and other urban centres. The most significant among them was the series led by Cory Aquino calling for the boycott of companies owned by Marcos’ business cronies. The largest of these rallies was the one held on the eve of the snap elections which Marcos called to obtain a fresh mandate to govern, given the continuing anti-Marcos demonstrations being held since the 1983 Aquino assassination. However, people power came in full bloom when Marcos tried to steal the results of the snap elections in February 1986 in which the opposition fielded Ninoy Aquino’s widow, Cory. These elections drew the participation of huge segments of the electorate that erstwhile had opted for an election boycott during the dictatorship as another means of protest against the Marcos government.

 

The first use of people power against an incumbent took place even as the results of the snap elections were being processed. Evident during this period were well-publicized attempts by the Marcos government to thwart the will of the electorate which wanted Cory Aquino to be president.⁶ Without going through its details, people power was adopted within the context of a constitutional process whose rules of the game were being subverted by Marcos, using the uniformed services, the official elections watchdog (Commission on Elections, COMELEC), and his political allies to commit fraud and deprive Aquino of her votes.⁷ 

The public protests against electoral fraud engulfed Metro Manila and other urban centres when Marcos’ Defence Minister, Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and leaders of a reform-oriented group of officers (Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement or RAM) defected from the government as a coup plot in which they were implicated was discovered by Marcos and the AFP Chief of Staff. Fearful of being arrested, these defectors with a handful of supporters holed themselves up in the military camp where the defence ministry and the AFP general headquarters were located.

 

Before too long, hordes of civilian anti-Marcos and pro-Aquino supporters surrounded this camp as well as another one across the city’s main highway (EDSA) which housed the Integrated National Police (INP). They represented a cross-section of Philippine society, except left-wing groups who chose not to join. Thus, Cory’s yellow dominated as the symbol of people power I. Efforts by the Marcos government to prevent people power failed especially after the United States advised Marcos ‘to cut, and cut cleanly.’ The military faction loyal to Marcos could but did not attack the civilian demonstrators on EDSA who held their positions even after an ineffectual declaration of a curfew at nightfall by Marcos and threats of armed attack by the military.

During the four days of people power, Aquino was sworn in as president followed by the swearing in of Marcos. The stalemate came to an end when Marcos left the presidential palace and boarded, together with his family and retinue, an American aircraft for eventual exile in Honolulu. Not a single shot was fired by either the defectors or the Marcos loyalists.

 

The second use of people power was in January 2001 when unorganized civilian groups, mostly young people, flocked to EDSA following the disruption of the impeachment trial by the Philippine Senate of former President Estrada. He was impeached by the House of Representatives for culpable violation of the Constitution, among other impeachable offences. Aware that impeachment is a political and not a legal process, Estrada’s allies in the Senate voted not to open a second envelope allegedly containing damning evidence against Estrada. This act was seen as an act of impunity, where the Senate majority loyal to Estrada prematurely played their winning hand by preventing the second envelope from being opened. This took place in the late afternoon.

Before midnight, EDSA was swarming with people, largely unorganized demanding his resignation. The icons of people power I, Cory Aquino and the late Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Sin were once again at the head of this movement. This time, left-wing groups with their red banners joined, mindful of the success of people power I despite their non-involvement. Like in February 1986, it took four days to reach an outcome that saw Estrada leave the presidential palace through mediation, however by politicians rather than a foreign government. Like in February 1986, military and police support played a role in removing the incumbent, but this time the breakaway came after the imminent success of people power had already became evident.⁸ Unlike people power I, confrontation between anti- and pro-Estrada groups close to the presidential palace resulted in physical injuries to the protagonists, although there was no systematic use of armed might.

Arroyo was sworn in as President at the EDSA Shrine – the site of people power I – by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Estrada had appointed and who earlier chaired the commission that investigated the failed coup of December 1989 against Aquino. In response to a case filed to contest her legitimacy, the Supreme Court declared that although Arroyo came to power through an extra-constitutional process, she was the legitimate successor to Estrada. This issue was to haunt her beyond the unexpired portion of Estrada’s tenure (February 2001-May 2004) which she served.

 

The first of May has traditionally been the day to commemorate workers. Barely four months into serving Estrada’s unexpired tenure, President Arroyo faced the first major crisis of her incumbency. Groups of factory workers, farmers, fisherfolk, urban poor groups, and lumpen proletariat, egged on by politicians close to Estrada, gathered at EDSA in the afternoon and by nightfall proceeded to march to the presidential palace, largely unopposed by either military or police units. This was primarily an underclass uprising, with the middle classes represented by politicians close to Estrada and partisan leaders disgruntled with the government since the Aquino presidency.

Carrying clubs, sticks, stones, Molotov cocktails, loose firearms, and allegedly propped by drugs, they launched an attack against the presidential palace that was little protected, enabling them to reach the palace’s main gate. Only then did military troops and police forces come to the rescue to push the hordes away from the gates, and into military and police vehicles, to be brought before the authorities for framing appropriate charges. There were many casualties from the skirmishes, particularly from the groups of attackers. Unlike in people power I and II, this was a dismal failure. Arroyo remained president, although much indebted to the uniformed services for her survival. Politicians who egged on the attack against the presidential palace retreated without punishment, only to resurface after subsequent elections, some on the side of Arroyo’s coalition.

 

Burdened by allegations of lack of legitimacy, heir to policy mistakes and performance deficit of her predecessors, and hampered by the challenges of democratic transition and consolidation, including good governance of both civilian and military institutions, Arroyo has faced the challenges of people power virtually from the start of her incumbency in January 2001. In July 2007, a faction in the military which came to be known as the Magdalo⁹ occupied the Oakwood Premier Hotel in the country’s financial district, and called for the resignation of key defence, military, and police officers and the redress of numerous military grievances, many of which were already articulated by coup plotters of the 1980s.¹⁰ Among them are military corruption, poor and inadequate medical, housing and other services provided to the military, preferential treatment of academy graduates, and grandstanding politicians.

 

The Oakwood mutineers were persuaded to stand down without firing a single shot, proceeded against according to the degree of accountability, and either dismissed from service or prosecuted. Since resorting to a coup d’etat is violative of the Constitution, the Magdalo leaders stood trial at both the General Court Martial and the civilian court. Plea bargain agreements had been forged with various penalties imposed on those involved, including some of the leaders. However, because the Philippine political and criminal justice systems allow even individuals with pending court cases to stand for public office, one of the Magdalo leaders and another who had been implicated in the coup attempts of the 1980s and the Oakwood Mutiny ran as senators in the May 2007 elections and won! Whether the Magdalo leaders will be allowed to attend parliamentary sessions remains unresolved at this time.

The revival of people power followed allegations of electoral wrongdoing by Arroyo during the May 2004 presidential elections which she won. Her alleged wrongdoing was captured on tape from a wire-tap illegally made of one of the COMELEC officers.¹¹ A crisis ensued in which a number of the members of the cabinet and other top executive appointees resigned. A major political party to which the Senate President belonged broke away from the government coalition, and even former President Aquino joined the former calling for Arroyo’s resignation. The scandal united groups from all colours of the political rainbow, including left-wing and rightists. Thus, when people power was invoked, the flags that flew over the people’s heads collectively painted a colourful picture.

 

Yet, the people did not come in droves reminiscent of people power I and II. Neither did they stay at the site of these public protests. The moment darkness fell, and their attendance fee paid, the bulk of protesters went home to tend to their private concerns. The majority came from the underclass, even as they were led by people from the middle and upper classes with varying motivations for invoking people power. They included those who genuinely believed that Arroyo was an illegitimate president who had to be removed immediately, those with an axe to grind against the incumbent and with private political agendas, those who continued to seek revenge for the ouster of Estrada, as also those who simply did not like her.

These calls for people power against Arroyo also witnessed the fall from grace of an icon of people power I who failed to strike a responsive chord even among those who truly believed in her. Cory Aquino suffered a tremendous decline in her popularity as seen in her inability to gather a critical mass to unseat Arroyo. Attempts to impeach her did not succeed because Arroyo’s coalition controlled the House of Representatives.

In February 2006, the anniversary of people power I, two officers who took part in the coup attempts against Aquino’s government in the 1980s, allegedly plotted against Arroyo. Both are respected officers who redeemed themselves through honourable and valiant military service during the 1990s until February 2006. Both were arrested, put under military custody and are now undergoing court martial. Attempts to use people power to unseat Arroyo by members of the political opposition and factions in the military, joined in by their unnatural allies among left-wing organizations, continued to fail during 2005-2006. The mid-term elections of May 2007 reflected popular dissatisfaction with the incumbent at the national level as the political opposition and independents captured at least nine out of the 12 senatorial seats. This does not mean, however, that the electorate was prepared to unseat the incumbent through people power, in much the same way that while Aquino’s popularity sank in the 1980s, popular support for coup attempts remained extremely low.

 

As public calls for people power increased during 2005-2006, thoughtful Filipinos began to reflect on the wisdom of using people power as a vehicle for political succession. Procedural shortcuts rarely help build democratic institutions, such as elections. This observation is especially valid in societies under transition, when old authoritarian and new democratic structures, norms, rules, players and interests coexist, and when democratic reversals lurk everywhere in ambush for authoritarianism to return.

In the case of the Philippines, democratization was already compromised by the 14 years of martial law and authoritarian rule, during which no genuine political contestation took place. These years translate into three presidential elections (for a term of four years as mandated in the 1935 Constitution), or seven elections including midterm elections for members of the legislature. These represent many opportunities for political recruitment, political learning, and political maturity among the governing elite. These opportunities are unrecoverable, lost to the nation forever.

 

In the meantime, the largely unlettered Filipino electorate, susceptible to name recall in which the old elites, media personalities, the rich and powerful have a distinct advantage over the competent, continued to choose from among a narrow field. The present generation of elites that grew up under people power, an extra-constitutional means for political succession, being untrained in the difficult, lengthy and challenging processes of democracy, are liable to be easily seduced by the lure of people power. At the end of the day, this aspect of people power is detrimental to democratic consolidation.

Having said this, however, the peculiar situational contexts of people power I and people power II in the Philippines can be used to justify the removal of disgraced leaders. Had Marcos not attempted to steal the results of the snap elections in February 1986 in such a horrendous display of impunity, many Filipinos would have thought twice before using people power. The series of events leading to people power I – human rights abuses, the Aquino assassination, election fraud brandished with impunity, and the arrogant display of power conjoined to fire people power I into motion. Similarly, had the pro-Estrada senators allowed the opening of the second envelope during the impeachment trial in January 2001 and not prematurely used their numerical superiority, the people that massed at EDSA would not have had even a whisper of legitimacy to use people power to oust him.

Thus, we must seriously examine people power with regard to issues about democratic consolidation and development. Its all to frequent use as a vehicle of political succession can do serious damage to democratic institutions, processes, and the consolidation of democracy itself.

Given this wealth of experience in the use of people power, and the inability even of people power icons to mobilize the people against an incumbent in recent times in the Philippines, it is unlikely to be successfully used in the near future. Moreover, Filipinos have become somewhat jaded as a consequence of the sense of betrayal of their contribution to political succession, whether through the vote or through people power, because they believe that their leaders have failed to meet their expectations.

Thus, one finds only leaders of ‘interested’ groups seeking the ouster of Arroyo – those who stand to profit from participation in people power activities either immediately or under a change of political leadership, or those who truly believe that people power is the only means to remove an unpopular leader at a particular historical juncture are likely to join people power exercises at this point. This has been demonstrated in the failed calls for people power during 2005-2006. It did not help that the opposition failed to offer a more acceptable alternative to Arroyo, who despite these challenges reversed the economic situation by narrowing the fiscal deficit, strengthening the Philippine currency, improving economic growth, and restoring confidence in the stock market and in the Philippine economy generally.

It will be a while before the mainstay of successful people power exercises, i.e., the independent-minded middle classes, professionals, non-ideological community leaders, and others of a similar mould, once again unite through a demonstration of people power against an unwanted leader.

 

Footnotes:

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1992.

2. Doh Chull Shin, ‘On the Third Wave of Democratization: a Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research’, World Politics 47, October 1994, 143-150.

3. Ibid., pp. 143-144.

4. Ibid., p. 144.

5. Juan Linz, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, Washington Monthly 13, Summer 1990, fn. 19, p. 158 as cited in ibid., p. 145.

6. A study on the snap elections conducted by a professor of mathematics at the University of the Philippines showed that in all probability, Cory Aquino would have won the elections had the votes been properly counted.

7. See Amado Jr. M. Mendoza, ‘Civil Resistance, "People Power", and Democratization in the Philippines’, a draft paper presented at the International Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 15-18 March 2007, for a full account and excellent interpretation of people power in the Philippines.

8. Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Military in People Power II’, in Amando Doronila, ed., Between Fires: Fifteen Perspectives on the Estrada Crisis. Anvil Press and Philippine Daily Inquirer, Pasig City, 2001, pp. 62-77.

9. The term is from a faction of the revolutionary group that revolted against Spain in 1896 because the leaders and troops involved in the July 2007 mutiny adopted many of the symbols of this revolutionary group, including the alphabet, the flag, and the rituals of membership. See The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, dated July 30, 2003, 17 October 2003.

10. These grievances are discussed in The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) of October 1990. Bookmark Inc., Makati, 1990, pp. 470-475.

11. The scandal is known as ‘Hello Garci’, named after Garcillano, the COMELEC official Arroyo allegedly called to ensure her lead over her rival now deceased and the closest friend of Estrada.